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ABSTRACT
SELF-KNOWLEDGE, CHOICE BLINDNESS, AND
CONFABULATION

MAY 2019

HAYLEY FRANCES JOY WEBSTER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith

There are two kinds of epistemic theories about self-knowledge: the
traditional account, and the inferentialist account. According to the traditional
view of self-knowledge, we have privileged access to our propositional
attitudes. “Privileged access” means that one can gain knowledge of one’s own
propositional attitudes directly via an exclusive, first-personal method called
introspection. On the other hand, the inferentialist view of self-knowledge
postulates that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes
and must infer or self-attribute them instead. In this thesis I argue that the
traditional view of self-knowledge, which postulates that we have privileged
access to our propositional attitudes, ought to be abandoned in favor of an
infernetialist picture of self-knowledge
vi

I argue that recent experimental results in social psychology strongly
imply that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes. In
the choice blindness paradigm, the majority of participants can be
manipulated into becoming oblivious to choices that they made just moments
previously. Not only do participants utterly fail to notice that they did not
receive what they wanted, but they also provide confabulated reasons as to
why they made their “decision.” I maintain that the phenomena of choice
blindness and confabulation are very difficult for the traditional theory of selfknowledge to accommodate and explain; whereas, on the other hand, the
inferentialist account actually predicts and anticipates these experimental
findings.
The traditional theorist cannot avoid the threat that choice blindness
and confabulation pose by restricting the scope of privileged access even
further, to exclude propositional attitudes, because privileged access to
propositional attitudes is the very property which distinguishes the traditional
view of self-knowledge from an inferentialist account. The traditional theorist
might attempt to argue that privileged access to propositional attitudes is
conceptually necessary, but I maintain that this argument fails. The
traditional theorist’s only option, then, is to adopt a dual-method account
whereby we sometimes gain self-knowledge via introspection and sometimes
via inference. However, I maintain that the dual-method approach is a much
weaker theory in terms of explanatory power when compared to the
inferentialist account. On balance, then, the traditional view of self-knowledge
should be rejected in favor of the inferentialist account.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about self-knowledge: the knowledge we have of our mental
states, like beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, thoughts, intentions, and the
like. In particular, I am going to argue that the traditional picture of selfknowledge, which has been around since the time of Descartes, ought to be
rejected. The traditional view of self-knowledge seriously struggles to explain
recent findings from social psychology, whereas the rival inferentialist account
has no problem accommodating these results. The inferentialist view of selfknowledge is the stronger theory, and thus should replace the traditional view.
According to the traditional view of self-knowledge, the access we have
to our mental states is significantly different from the kind of access we have
to the mental states of other people. I cannot come to know the beliefs of
another person directly: I must ask them what they believe and hope they tell
me the truth. When it comes to myself, however, it seems that I do not have to
observe my own behavior or ‘ask myself’ what it is I believe – I just come to
know my beliefs directly. Thus, the central tenet of the traditional view of selfknowledge is that we have privileged access to our own mental states. While
we must work out other people’s mental states via inference to the best
explanation, we can gain knowledge of our own mental states immediately via
a faculty called introspection. Introspection delivers highly epistemically
secure, direct knowledge of one’s own mental states, but not the mental states
of others – hence the term “privileged access.” There is some debate about the
scope of privileged access, but I’m just going to assume that, at the very least,
we have privileged access to sensations (like the feeling of pain), current
1

thoughts (like a ditty running through one’s mind), and occurrent
propositional attitudes (like the belief that “Paris is the capital of France.)
In this thesis, I am going to argue that experimental results from the
“choice blindness” paradigm pose significant problems for the traditional view
of self-knowledge. Choice blindness is a phenomenon whereby experimental
participants become oblivious to decisions and choices they have just made. In
a typical choice blindness experiment, a participant is required to choose
between photographs of two faces which she indicates by pointing at the
preferred face. In a non-manipulated trial, if the participant points at face one,
then she will immediately be given that photograph. In a manipulated trial,
however, a participant points at face one and actually receives face two instead
due to an experimental sleight of hand. Counter-intuitively, the vast majority
of participants in the manipulated trials fail to notice they did not receive the
face they initially pointed at: they have become “choice blind”.
I argue at length that these experimental results give one good reason
to doubt that we have privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes, as
well as posing a host of other problems to the traditional view of selfknowledge. The traditional view of self-knowledge is considerably weakened
by these results, and so ought to be rejected in favor of an inferentialist
account of self-knowledge which can accommodate the experimental results
much more successfully. Inferentialists argue that we do not have firstpersonal, direct access to our propositional attitudes but must infer, or selfinterpret, them in much the same way as we must infer the propositional
attitudes of other people. In short, I will argue that these recent experimental
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findings leave us no choice but to drastically revise the commonly accepted
picture of self-knowledge.1
Two caveats must be noted. Firstly, while these experimental results
severely weaken the traditional view of self-knowledge, they only touch on
traditional epistemic theories of self-knowledge and not rationalist theories.
Epistemic theorists argue that self-knowledge is special, and distinct from
other-knowledge, for epistemic reasons. A traditional epistemic theorist
argues that self-knowledge is epistemically special because we have privileged
access to our own mental states that is especially epistemically secure.
Rationalist pictures of self-knowledge, however, deny that what makes selfknowledge metaphysically distinct has anything to do with epistemic
properties. Rationalists maintain that “self-knowledge is special because of
the distinctive agential relation one bears to one’s own mental states.”2 The
experimental results I discuss only impact epistemic theories of selfknowledge – they do not cause problems for the traditional rationalist picture
of self-knowledge. Thus, this thesis is not a complete vindication for the
inferentialist, non-traditional view of self-knowledge.
Secondly, while I argue that on balance the inferentialist view has more
explanatorily power than the traditional view of self-knowledge, I do not
support any particular inferentialist theory. My conclusion is that, generally
speaking, an inferentialist approach to self-knowledge is to be preferred, but
On an informal survey of philosophical papers published since the 1970s,
94% of authors hold that we have direct privileged access to our mental states.
See Carruthers Peter. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of SelfKnowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.9.
2 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-knowledge/>.
1
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beyond that I have no views about which inferentialist theory is the best.
While I briefly mention Carruther’s ISA (interpretive sensory-access) account,
Cassam’s ‘inner prompting’ theory, and Ryle’s behaviorist view I do not have
any opinion about which of these is the best theory. My takeaway point is that
any successful theory of human self-knowledge will be inferentialist in flavor,
only because the traditional introspective account greatly struggles to
accommodate experimental results and facts about the actual cognitive
constitution of human beings.
With these caveats about this work’s scope in mind, I will now briefly
outline each chapter. In chapter two, I discuss the traditional view of selfknowledge in detail, with a focus on the concept of privileged access. I explain
why privileged access to propositional attitudes is a crucial concept for many
traditional theorists of self-knowledge, and I showcase the central role that
privileged access to propositional attitudes plays in traditional theories. I then
discuss the inferential account of self-knowledge, which denies that we have
privileged access to our propositional attitudes. While the inferentialist can
acknowledge that we have direct access to our sensory states and feelings, she
denies that we have such direct access to our propositional attitudes, which we
are forced to infer or self-interpret instead. Thus, crucially, the dividing line
between inferentialist theories of self-knowledge and traditional theories of
self-knowledge is not the concept of privileged access per se but privileged
access to a particular subset of mental states – propositional attitudes. The
distinguishing feature of any traditional theory of self-knowledge is that it
postulates direct, privileged access to propositional attitudes. If it turns out
that privileged access to propositional attitudes does not exist, then the
traditional theory of self-knowledge is doomed.
4

In chapter three, I introduce two different experimental paradigms that
have explored introspection and self-knowledge. I firstly discuss Nisbett and
Wilson’s influential 1970s studies into decision-making. Nisbett and Wilson
discovered that their experimental participants very often “tell more than they
know,” in that they report reasons for decisions that were not, in fact, the
actual reasons for their decision. In one famous experiment, Nisbett and
Wilson got shoppers to select a pair of stockings from an array and then
provide reasons for why they chose the pair that they did. The catch was that
all of the pairs were identical. Not a single participant noticed this fact about
the stockings, and every participant went on to report some reason or other
why she chose a particular pair. However, the participant referenced features
of the stockings that simply couldn’t be true – no pair could have been ‘the
softest’ when they were all the same! Nisbett and Wilson theorized that these
unusual effects occur because we don’t have introspective access to the
reasons for our decisions. The participants failed to notice the real factor
which influenced their decision: the position effect. All things being equal,
people are more likely to choose the items that are most far to the right in a
left -to- right visual array. Because they are ignorant of the causal factors
behind their decision, the participants have no option but to infer their
reasons for choosing a particular pair of stockings. This explains why they end
up confabulating reasons that are nothing more than post-hoc justifications
after the fact.
I then discuss in detail the choice blindness experimental paradigm, a
spiritual successor to the Nisbett and Wilson experiments. The core feature of
any choice blindness experiment is that the relationship between participant’s
choices and the eventual outcome is manipulated such that participants end
5

up receiving the opposite of what they actually picked.3 In one typical choice
blindness study, for example, participants are required to try different jam
flavors and select the flavor they prefer.4 They might taste a strawberry jam
and a grapefruit jam. After trying both flavors, they are asked to pick the jam
they like the most, and they are then given the preferred flavor one more to
taste. Finally, the participants are asked to explain their reasons for their
choice. In a manipulated trial, if a participant selects strawberry as her
favorite jam, then the flavors in the jars will be surreptitiously swapped such
that she actually receives grapefruit flavor on the second tasting. Intuitively,
we expect participants to immediately notice any discrepancies between what
they chose and what they received. However, a full tw0-thirds of participants
fail to notice the manipulation – they do not notice that they did not receive
the flavor that they initially picked. Furthermore, and even more contrary to
commonsense, these manipulated participants go on to give seamless,
compelling, and detailed explanations for why they made their ‘choice’. Thus,
a participant who initially picked strawberry jam but received grapefruit jam
instead will launch into a convincing explanation as to why she preferred the
flavor that she actually rejected. Participants are none the wiser that anything
unusual has occurred until the debriefing, at which point they are quite
shocked that the object they received was not, in fact, the object they had
chosen from the very start.

Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes." Psychological Review,
84, no. 3 (1977): 231-59.
4 Hall, Lars, Petter Johansson, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and Therese
Deutgen. "Magic at the Marketplace: Choice Blindness for the Taste of Jam
and the Smell of Tea." Cognition 117, no. 1 (2010): 54-61.
3
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Choice blindness, then, is an unusual epistemic phenomenon that is
need of an explanation. In particular, it poses problems for the traditional
view of self-knowledge because on the traditional view people are not just
supposed to become entirely unaware of what they chose just seconds before,
and then provide confabulated explanations to justify their ‘choice’. In the
remainder of the chapter, I discuss some of the strengths and advantages of
the choice blindness paradigm over the Nisbett and Wilson paradigm; and I
defend the choice blindness experiments from various criticisms.
In chapter four, I argue that no matter how one interprets the choice
blindness effect, choice blindness has troubling implications for the
traditional view of self-knowledge. In order to lay out what is going on during
choice blindness, epistemically speaking, I briefly discuss the concepts of
‘attitudes’ and ‘beliefs’ because both are implicated in the choice blindness
experiments. I provide an example case of a typical choice blindness
experiment, and I outline several different possible explanations of the choice
blindness effect. Out of the six possible interpretations I consider, only three
are cognitively plausible. I reject suggestions that choice blindness is caused
by participants reporting the wrong attitude by mistake, that choice blindness
is caused by participants forgetting their original attitude, or that participants
hold two contradictory attitudes at the same time.
The first plausible interpretation of choice blindness, and the one that I
think is most likely to be correct, is that choice blindness is caused by
participants forming false beliefs about their attitudes. The participant’s
actual attitudes do not change. For example, a participant may have a strong
positive attitude towards free higher education but is presented with
(manipulated) evidence that she actually indicated a strong negative attitude
7

towards free higher education. Upon seeing this manipulated evidence, the
participant becomes blind to the fact that she actually holds a strong positive
attitude towards free higher education and mistakenly attributes a false belief
that she holds a negative attitude towards free higher education. This false
belief then causes her to confabulate reasons as to why she holds a negative
attitude towards free higher education (when, in fact, she does not hold such
an attitude).
The second plausible explanation that I consider is that the choice
blindness manipulation causes the participant’s actual attitudes to reverse.
Thus, a participant may come into the experiment with a positive attitude
towards free higher education, but the experimental manipulation causes her
attitude to reverse without her even noticing. She leaves the experiment with a
negative attitude towards higher education and is under the impression that
she has always held this negative attitude (at least, until the debriefing
occurs).
The final potential explanation of choice blindness I consider is that
participants do not, in fact, hold any genuine attitudes towards the target
objects at all (even though they may very well think they do.) A choice
blindness experimental participant might think that she strongly supports free
higher education, but she is mistaken: she does not actually hold any attitude
one way or the other about higher education. Choice blindness, then,
functions as a kind of test for ‘attitudiness’ – whether a professed attitude is
genuine or not. The idea is that participants who do not succumb to the choice
blindness effect can be assumed to hold genuine, strong attitudes towards the
target object; whereas those who do succumb to choice blindness must not
have any genuine attitudes towards the target object.
8

Each of these potential explanations of choice blindness causes
significant headaches for the traditional view of self-knowledge. If we accept
that the first interpretation is correct, then it is difficult for the traditional
theorist to explain why the participants become blind to their actual attitudes
and are forced to self-interpret false beliefs instead. On the traditional view of
self-knowledge, participants should be able to introspect and become aware of
what their actual attitudes are at any point during the experiment. It is thus
something of a mystery why they opt to self-interpret and mistakenly attribute
false beliefs instead. The inferentialist, of course, can argue that this is no
mystery: the participants are forced to self-interpret their attitudes because
they do not have introspective access to any of their propositional attitudes at
all. The traditional theorist, however, will have to maintain that for some
mysterious reason the participant’s introspective access to her attitudes is
blocked during the choice blindness experiments. Without independent
empirical support and further explanation, however, this reply is ad-hoc and
unsatisfactory.
The second interpretation, that the experimental manipulation causes
the participant’s actual attitudes to reverse, also causes problems for the
traditional view of self-knowledge. If this interpretation is correct, it entails
that participant’s sincerely held attitudes may be irrationally reversed by a
mere experimental manipulation without them even noticing. Rational
attitude change is characterized by an agent consciously changing his or her
attitudes because of carefully considered reasons. This explanation entails
that our attitudes can entirely reverse, outside of our conscious awareness, on
the basis of something other than considered reasons. Such a prospect is very
unpalatable to the traditional theorist.
9

The final interpretation holds that people who succumb to the choice
blindness effect do not possess any real attitudes about the target object at all.
The first problem with this interpretation is that it means that most people do
not hold genuine attitudes about some of the most salient and topical moral
and political issues of the day. The second problem is that, again, it implies
that participant’s lack privileged access to their attitudes when there is no
good reason why privileged access should be blocked. If a participant really
does not hold a genuine attitude towards the target object, then she should be
able to introspectively access this fact about herself. The fact that participants
are under the impression that they hold genuine attitudes when, in fact, they
do not suggests that they lack introspective access to their propositional
attitudes. Thus, I argue that no matter which interpretation of the choice
blindness phenomenon turns out to be correct the traditional view of selfknowledge is in trouble: the traditional view of self-knowledge cannot easily
explain and accommodate the choice blindness phenomenon.
In chapter five, I discuss the phenomenon of confabulation, which
occurs in every manipulated choice blindness experiment (no matter which
interpretation of choice blindness turns out to be correct). Confabulation
occurs when participants are asked to provide reasons for the “choice” they
never actually made. Commonsensically, we expect participants to reply with
something like “I don’t know,” or to be unable to answer this question at all.
Instead, when participants are asked why they chose photograph 2, when in
fact they chose photograph 1, they come out with cogent, detailed, and
persuasive explanations for their ‘choice’. Furthermore, when Johansson et al.
compared the reports from the manipulated and non-manipulated trials and
subjected them to linguistic analysis, no differences were found between the
10

two kinds of reports. I argue that confabulation also poses problems for the
traditional view of self-knowledge but is entirely accommodated and
explained by the infernetialist view of self-knowledge. Indeed, the
inferentialist account actually anticipates that confabulation may occur
whenever the inferences that we make in order to self-interpret our mental
states go awry.
I first discuss the history of the concept of ‘confabulation’ in a medical
context. The term ‘confabulation’ was first used by the neurologist Korsakoff
to refer to the unusual verbal reports that his patients produced. Korsakoff’s
patients suffered from an alcohol-induced form of amnesia, and would often
report distant memories, or fantastical occurrences as if they were actual
current events. Nowadays, the concept of confabulation is applied to patients
with no apparent memory deficit and refers to the production of false stories
that the patient does not realize are false. Confabulation is not caused by any
particular brain lesion, which implies that many different cognitive
mechanisms underwrite confabulation. I then go on to discuss some core
characteristics of non-pathological confabulation: confabulation is not a form
of lying or self-deception, confabulated reports are delivered with a high
degree of confidence, certainty, and sincerity, and confabulators are unaware
that they are confabulating – from their perspective they are providing an
introspectively derived verbal report. I then outline some influential
definitions of confabulation and argue that these definitions are problematic
in various ways. I settle on a simplified definition of confabulation, in which
the core feature of confabulated utterances is the fact that they are post-hoc
reconstructions that play some justificatory role.
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Finally, I discuss the problems that confabulation poses to the
traditional view of self-knowledge. On the traditional view of self-knowledge,
if I lack access to the reasons for my behavior I am not just supposed to
reconstruct plausible sounding reasons after the fact to ‘explain’ why I
behaved the way I did. And yet, this is what we observe in the manipulated
choice blindness experiments. When participants are asked to justify the
‘choice’ they never actually made they produce a confabulated answer. On the
traditional view, we would expect choice blindness participants to simply state
that they don’t know why they chose the item, or to give a very hesitant
wavering answer, or to not answer at all. Confabulation also raises a skeptical
worry, in that confabulators are entirely unaware that their verbal reports are
confabulations and are under the impression that they are reporting their
directly introspected mental states. Some traditional theorists of selfknowledge argue that if confabulators reflect for a little bit they will surely
come to realize that their verbal reports are confabulations, but I argue that
the traditional theorist’s faith in the power of reflection is misplaced. There is
no reason to think that reflection can enable us to detect whether a particular
utterance is a confabulation or not. I finally address another worry for the
traditional view, which is the fact that the manipulated verbal reports are
identical to the non-manipulated verbal reports. The fact that the two reports
corpuses are identical is not direct evidence against the existence of an
introspective faculty per se, but it is certainty an unexpected finding. If the
non-manipulated verbal reports are generated via the introspective faculty,
and the manipulated reports are generated via inference (as the traditional
theorist maintains) then one would expect there to be distinct differences
between the verbal reports – after all, the reports are supposedly generated
12

via two entirely different cognitive mechanisms. The fact that there are no
differences between the two kinds of reports strengthens the infernetialist
claim that only ever one kind of mechanism, inference, is used to generate
verbal reports about propositional attitudes. In short, then, the phenomenon
of confabulation is also very difficult for the traditional theory to
accommodate and explain.
In chapter six, I put everything together and argue that, ultimately, the
inferentialist account of self-knowledge is a stronger theory than the
traditional account of self-knowledge. Quite simply, the traditional view of
self-knowledge is incompatible with, and greatly struggles to explain, the
phenomena of choice blindness and confabulation. Given that the
inferentialist view has no problems accommodating these phenomena, and, in
fact, predicts that choice blindness and confabulation will occur on any
inferentialist theory of self-knowledge, the infernetialist view ought to be
adopted over the traditional view of self-knowledge. In particular, I maintain
that the choice blindness experiment results strongly imply that we do not
have privileged access to even our occurrent propositional attitudes. I argue
that the traditional view of self-knowledge cannot defuse this threat by simply
restricting the scope of privileged access even further because then there will
be nothing to distinguish the traditional view of self-knowledge from the
inferentialist account.
The only strategy available to the traditional theorist is to adopt a dualmethod account, in which introspective access is sometimes disabled (for
some reason or other), and so we must sometimes gain self-knowledge via
inference. The traditional theorist must argue that during the choice blindness
experiments participants lack introspective access to their propositional
13

attitudes, which explains why the participants are forced to self-interpret their
attitudes instead. In real life, outside the choice blindness lab, we can usually
gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes via privileged access. However,
none of these claims are backed by empirical evidence: we have to take it on
faith that the faculty of introspection exists, and that even though it appears to
be shut down during the choice blindness experiments it functions perfectly
well in other contexts. I argue that even adopting a dual-method approach
cannot save the traditional theory of self-knowledge because, on balance, the
inferentialist account comes out the much stronger theory. The dual-method
theory is weakened because it postulates two distinct mechanisms by which to
gain self-knowledge, whereas the simpler inferentialist account only proposes
one mechanism. Furthermore, the dual-method theory lacks evidential
support, and predictive validity. Overall, the inferentialist approach to selfknowledge is far more successful at explaining the choice blindness and
confabulation data, whereas the traditional view struggles to accommodate it.
For these reasons, the traditional view of self-knowledge should be rejected in
favor of the inferentialist account.
I finally address concerns that choice blindness threatens far more than
just the traditional view of self-knowledge. It may be argued that the fact we
succumb to choice blindness has grave implications for our very rationality
and epistemic reliability. If we are capable of becoming choice blind and
confabulating we may not be as rational or as epistemically competent as we
commonly think. Choice blindness and change blindness, then, threaten the
picture we have of ourselves as rational agents. I argue in the remainder of
this chapter that there is, in fact, no good reason to think that the findings
from the choice blindness experiments threaten our overall rationality. The
14

reason for this is because choice blindness is a natural side effect of the way
our cognitive system is set up – choice blindness is analogous to visual
illusions. I extensively compare choice blindness to the greater studied, and
similar, phenomenon of change blindness. Change blindness occurs when
participants fail to notice changes that, intuitively, should be immediately
obvious. It is now well established that change blindness occurs because the
visual system makes assumptions about the stability of the world, and takes
shortcuts, in order to preserve cognitive processing power. Furthermore, the
visual system does not represent every detail of the visual array but only
provides a sparse representation that conveys the ‘gist’ of the scene in front of
the viewer. Change blindness is thought to occur when the assumptions the
visual system makes are violated. We are not able to detect the fact that an
error has occurred because of the representational sparseness. In normal
conditions, however, when the assumptions of the visual system are not
violated, the visual system is highly reliable, and change blindness does not
occur.
I argue that choice blindness occurs for similar reasons as change
blindness. The decision-making system does not, contrary to folk theory, fully
represent in detail our intentions, choices, and decision-making outcomes.
There is thus representational sparseness even in the realm of decisionmaking. The decision-making system, further, makes certain assumptions
about the world and so can fall into error when these assumptions are violated
(as they are in the choice blindness experiments). In normal conditions, when
the assumptions of the decision-making system are not violated, we are not
very likely to succumb to choice blindness: our decision-making systems are
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highly reliable. In most contexts, we will notice when there is a mismatch
between our choices and the outcome.
It might be argued that the fact that choice blindness naturally falls out
of our cognitive constitution renders us even more intractably irrational,
because this implies that irrationality is built in and unavoidable. However, I
argue that any theory of human rationality needs to take into account the way
human beings are actually cognitively constituted. It is not very fair, or
realistic, to compare the cognitive capacity of human beings to an idealized,
perfect model of rationality – the “homo philosophicus,” as Cassam terms it.5
Instead, any decent theory of human rationality should accommodate the way
the human cognitive system is actually set up, and consider whether what we
can achieve, rationally speaking, despite our inbuilt flaws and foibles. The
choice blindness experiments, then, do not establish that humans are globally
irrational: at most, choice blindness demonstrates that in certain
circumstances, when the decision-making system’s assumptions are violated,
we will be less reliable than in normal circumstances. This is no reason to
impugn the overall rationality of human beings, however. Thus, while the
choice blindness findings do pose a considerable threat to the traditional view
of self-knowledge, they do not pose a threat to our overall rationality and
epistemic reliability.

Cassam, Quassim. Self-Knowledge for Humans. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2015, p.2.
5
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CHAPTER 2
INTROSPECTION AND PRIVILEGED ACCESS

The Traditional View of Self-Knowledge

“Self-knowledge,” as philosophers use the term, refers to the knowledge
individuals have of their own mental states, such as beliefs, intentions,
desires, feelings, sensations, emotions, thoughts, and so on. Philosophers are
more concerned with how we know rather trivial mental states like “I believe
it is raining right now,” or “I desire ice cream,” as opposed to how we know
more so-called substantial self-knowledge like “what will make me happy?” or
“am I a good person?”6 The reason for the excessive focus on ‘mundane’ selfknowledge is because this kind of self-knowledge is thought to have rather
unusual features that are in need of an explanation: as Gertler puts it, “selfknowledge attracts philosophical attention partly because it seems different
from other types of knowledge.”7 In this section, I will discuss what I call the
‘traditional’ view of self-knowledge and I will explain why traditional theorists
believe that self-knowledge is metaphysically special compared to other types
of knowledge.
Descartes is commonly accepted to be the first major philosopher to
notice and deeply theorize about the distinctive nature of self-knowledge.
Descartes considered self-knowledge to be substantially different from other

6
7

Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans, p.10.
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge. New York, USA: Routledge, 2011, p.10.
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types of knowledge (such as knowledge about other people’s mental states, or
knowledge about the external world) because it seemed to him to be
exceptionally epistemically secure. Descartes theorized that while it is possible
for us to form mistaken beliefs about the external world, and about other
people’s mental states, it is not possible for us to form mistaken beliefs about
our own current mental states. If I am hallucinating. it might cause me to
mistakenly believe that it is raining right now. However, according to
Descartes, even if my belief that it is raining right now is in error my belief
that I believe that it is raining right now cannot be mistaken. Self-knowledge
is special, Descartes argued, because it is not possible for us to be mistaken
about our own ongoing mental states: my belief that “I believe it is raining
right now” cannot be in error.8 In other words, my belief that I believe it is
raining right now is infallible. Descartes also thought that self-knowledge is
self-intimating: if we possess a belief or desire, or any other kind of mental
state, we automatically become aware that we are in that mental state. As Ryle
describes it, according to the Cartesian picture “a person’s present thinkings,
feelings and willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings are
intrinsically phosphorescent: their existence and their nature are inevitably
betrayed to their owner.”9 Descartes appears to be describing something very
similar to what Kozuch and Nichols refer to as “automatic access.” One has
automatic access to a mental state if “simply by virtue of undergoing a mental
event one is thereby aware of undergoing that mental event.”10 They contrast
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by Michael
Moriarty. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.9.
9 Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009, p.4.
10 Kozuch, Benjamin, and Shaun Nichols. "Awareness of Unawareness: Folk
Psychology and Introspective Transparency." Journal of Consciousness
Studies 18, no. 11-12 (2011): 135-60, p.139.
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automatic access with weaker “unrestricted access” in which “one is not
automatically aware of all of one’s current mental events, [but] one always can
be aware of one’s current mental events.”11
The Cartesian picture of self-knowledge also claims that it is impossible
for mental states to be non-conscious. The mind is like an open book: every
mental state is available to conscious awareness. Finally, Descartes postulated
that we come to know our own mental states via a special first-personal
method, a method that can only be used to gain self-knowledge and not, say,
knowledge of the world, or of other people’s mental states. For Descartes, the
mode by which we gain self-knowledge is via an infallible inner gaze, a kind of
perceptual faculty turned on one’s own mind, that yields maximally
epistemically secure knowledge about one’s mental states.12
Nowadays, most “contemporary philosophers generally deny that we
are infallible or omniscient about our own mental states.”13 Furthermore, the
thesis that the mind is an open book has long been disproven by discoveries in
psychology and cognitive science, which established that at least some mental
states and mental processes are unconscious. However, Descartes’ legacy lives
on, in that traditional theorists of self-knowledge agree with him that selfknowledge is special and distinct from other kinds of knowledge: as
Carruthers states, most philosophers are ‘weak Cartesians.’14 Why do they
think this? Firstly, traditional philosophers of self-knowledge, following

Kozuch, Benjamin, and Shaun Nichols. "Awareness of Unawareness”, p.139.
See Moran, Richard. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on SelfKnowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.3.
13 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/selfknowledge/>.
14 Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind, p.13.
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Descartes, theorize that we can gain self-knowledge via a first-personal
method that can only be used by oneself to apprehend one’s own mental
states. Secondly, this special first-personal method sometimes yields
knowledge that is “especially secure…[and] immune from some types of error
to which other kinds of empirical knowledge, most obviously perceptual
knowledge, are vulnerable.”15 While no philosopher advocates full-blooded
Cartesianism about self-knowledge anymore,16 most traditional theorists of
self-knowledge think that we achieve self-knowledge via a special method that
can result in especially epistemically secure knowledge, and this is what
makes even mundane forms of self-knowledge philosophically interesting.
The combination of the unique first-personal method, plus the fact
that it yields exceptionally epistemically secure knowledge, are epistemic
reasons for thinking that self-knowledge is distinct from other kinds of
knowledge. In this thesis, I will focus mainly on the epistemic case for the
distinctiveness of self-knowledge. In the next section, I will discuss in more
detail what the unique first personal method to gain self-knowledge consists
of, but before I do it is worth briefly discussing the rationalist case for why
self-knowledge is special. Rationalists deny that the specialness of selfknowledge can be explained solely in epistemic terms. One distinctly
rationalist reason for thinking that self-knowledge is special is that we are
responsible for our own mental states, but not for the mental states of other

Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-knowledge/>.
16 Note, however, that at the time Ryle wrote ‘The Concept of Mind’ in the
1940s, the full-blooded Cartesian picture of mentality, what Ryle termed the
“official doctrine”, was still accepted by many philosophers. That is, many
philosophers thought that access to our own mental states was infallible and
self-intimating.
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people. For example, suppose I discover that a particular belief of mine has
poor justification, and is undermined by new evidence that has come to light.
In this case, it is incumbent on me, as a rational agent, to update my belief in
light of this new evidence, or to reject it altogether. I have a duty, an epistemic
responsibility, to ensure that my beliefs and desires are not at odds with what
I rationally ought to believe, or what I ought to desire. However, it appears
that, intuitively, I am not responsible in the same way for other people’s
propositional attitudes. If you believe something that is at odds with your
evidence, then that’s your problem – I cannot rationally update your beliefs
for you.17
Another rationalist reason why self-knowledge is regarded to be special
is that our declarations about our own mental states are taken to have a
certain authority. For rationalists, this authority is not epistemic in nature
(i.e., our assertions about our own mental states are not authoritative because
these assertions are particularly reliable or accurate). Rather, according to a
view initially developed by Wittgenstein, the authority we have over our own
mental states derives from sociological practices: purely as a matter of sociolinguistic convention, we treat people’s statements about their own mental
states as authoritative.18 If I assert that “I am in pain right now,” then my
assertion is taken by other people to be authoritative. It would be very odd,
and a violation of communicative norms, if someone responded to my

For a theory of self-knowledge which incorporates the rationalist idea that
we are responsible for shaping our propositional attitudes see Moran,
Richard. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on SelfKnowledge.
18 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-knowledge/>.
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declaration that I am in pain with “prove it,” or “no, you’re not.” Each of us is
deemed to be an authority over our own mental states, and our assertions
about our own mental states are taken at face value.19

The first-person method: Introspection

Much traditional philosophical work on self-knowledge is dedicated to
theorizing about just what the unique first-personal method is, and how it can
yield epistemically secure knowledge. Many philosophers claim that the
unique first-person method is a special kind of inner observation which they
call ‘introspection’. As Ryle puts it, introspection is a kind of “inner
perception,” that enables one to “take a non-optical ’look” at what is passing in
his mind.”20 Introspection is also characterized as “inwardly directed
attention…that when successful yields awareness of a mental state.”21 Gertler
defines introspection as “some sort of attention – a non-visual ‘looking’” into
the mind of oneself. 22 Finally, Carruthers states that when we introspect a
mental state we thereby “come to know (or at least believe)” that I am in that
mental state.23 Introspection enables us to ‘grasp’ mental states in order to
become gain knowledge of them, and it also yields second-order beliefs –
Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-knowledge/>.
20 Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. p.4.
21 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-knowledge/>.
22 Gertler, Brie. "Introspection." In The Oxford Companion to Consciousness,
edited by Patrick Wilken, Timothy J Bayne and Axel Cleeremans, 76-111.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.1.
23 Carruthers, Peter. "Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80, no. 1 (2010): 76-111, p.76.
19

22

beliefs about our mental states. So, for example, suppose I have a standing
desire to eat chocolate. If I introspect successfully, I will become consciously
aware that I have such a desire to eat chocolate: my desire will become salient
to me. Introspection will not only grant me awareness of this particular
mental state, but it will also result in the generation of a second-order belief,
namely, “I believe that I have a desire to eat chocolate.”
It is important to note that introspection is not the same thing as
merely experiencing a mental state. One can feel pain, or consciously
entertain a belief, without introspecting: introspection is something over and
above the experience of the mental state. As Myers cautions:

We do not want to slide into talking as if feeling a tingling and
introspecting it were one and the same…Introspection is a studied
awareness of the tingling already felt; the introspection is an awareness
superimposed upon the awareness of the tingling. Merely to feel a
twinge is no more to introspect it than to see a [tree] stump is to
introspect it.24
Introspection, then, is not the same thing as feeling a pain or noticing a
tingling. The pain and the tingling can be experienced without any
introspection occurring at all. Rather, introspection is a separate process
whereby we affix attention upon a mental state we are already preintrospectively aware of. We can feel a pain initially, and then, if we choose,
we may focus our introspective attention upon that pain in order to gain
knowledge about that mental state. Carruthers proposes that the conflation, or
confusion, of introspection with pre-introspective awareness (i.e., that to feel
a pain just is the same thing as introspecting it) derives from the ambiguity of

Myers, Gerald. E. "Introspection and Self-Knowledge." American
Philosophical Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1986): 199-207, p.199.
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the term “introspection.” As Carruthers puts it, in one sense of the word,
“introspection” just means to focus and ‘look within’ the body. On this
definition, pain perception, or the feeling of a cramp, or the sensory awareness
of one’s heart beating, would qualify as introspection.25 Carruthers rejects this
definition, and identifies the proper definition of introspection as ‘looking into
one’s mind’: “in this sense, the outputs of an introspective process are always
metarepresentational, involving representations of one’s mental states as
such. And in this sense perceptions of pain…are definitely not introspections,
since they issue in first-order representations of properties of the body.”26
The sensation, or perception, of pains and other mental states is
separate from introspections of these sensations. Introspection is a
mechanism by which we can gain knowledge of our mental states and focus
more attention on them: it is not synonymous with the mere experience of the
mental state itself. Note, furthermore, that if introspection is a separate
activity from the initial awareness of mental state itself, then this poses a
problem for Descartes’s self-intimation thesis. According to Descartes, mental
states are self-intimating, such that the existence of a mental state guarantees
that one automatically becomes aware of that mental state. However, if
introspection is a separate process from the initial awareness of the mental
state itself, and if introspection requires a further focusing of attention, then it
is entirely possible that we could be in some mental state and fail to notice it if
our attention is directed elsewhere, or if we simply don’t introspect. And if this
is possible, then self-intimation is false. The most we can hope for, then, is
Carruthers, Peter. "How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship
between Mindreading and Metacognition." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32
(2009): 121-82. p.167.
26 Carruthers, Peter. "How We Know Our Own Minds” p.167.
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‘unrestricted access’ to our mental states whereby we can in principle become
aware of our mental states via introspection.
The mechanism of introspection has a few key features. First, as Gertler
puts it “introspection is a special method which “will never yield knowledge of
what someone else thinks or feels.”27 Introspection, then, is strictly a firstpersonal way to gain self-knowledge: it is a method that is “available
exclusively to the subject.”28 Because introspection is uniquely first-personal I
can never use it to gain knowledge of someone else’s beliefs: it can only be
used to discover what I myself believe. As Ryle states, “while I can have direct
knowledge of my own states and operations, I cannot have it of yours…I
cannot introspectively observe, or be conscious of the workings of your
mind.”29 The fact that introspection is an exclusively first-personal method
entails that I can come to know my own mental states in a very different way
from how I come to know about the world and other people’s mental states.
This feature of introspection accounts for what is termed the ‘asymmetry’ of
self-knowledge. Moran describes asymmetry thusly:

“Whatever knowledge of oneself may be, it is a very different thing from
knowledge of others, categorically different in kind and
manner… [an individual] knows and comes to know his own thoughts
and experiences in ways that are categorically different from how I may
come to know them.”30 [emphasis mine]

Gertler, Brie, ed. Privileged Access. New York: Routledge, 2003, p.xiv.
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29 Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind, p.137.
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Self-knowledge is said to be asymmetrical because I can access my mental
states using this special introspective method, but I cannot access another
person’s mental states in the same way; and the relationship I have with my
own mental states and mind is radically different from the relationship I have
with other people’s mental states.
Second, introspection is thought to yield non-inferential and nonevidential knowledge of one’s own mental states. Introspected self-knowledge
is not derived from evidence or inference, like other kinds of knowledge: it is
said to come to us ‘directly’ or ‘immediately’. The vast majority of traditional
theorists of self-knowledge maintain that introspected self-knowledge is like
this. For example, Davidson asserts that:
It is seldom the case that I need to appeal to evidence or observation in
order to find out what I believe; normally I know what I think before I
speak or act. Even when I have evidence, I seldom make use of it.31
Gertler, similarly, states that “while I know your mental states only by
inferring them from your behavior… I can know my own states directly… Selfknowledge need not involve any mediating observations of my behavior.”32
And finally, Boghossian asserts:
In the case of others, I have no choice but to infer what they think from
observations about what they do or say. In my own case, by contrast,
inference is neither required nor relevant. Normally I know what I
think – what I believe, desire, hope or expect – without appeal to
supplementary evidence…I know what I think directly.33

Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2001, p.15.
32 Gertler, Brie. Privileged Access., p.xiv.
33 Boghossian, P. "Content and Self-Knowledge." In Externalism and SelfKnowledge, edited by P Ludlow and N Martin. Stanford, USA: CSLI
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There is thus a broad consensus among traditional theorists that selfknowledge is immediate, where immediacy is taken to mean we do not
necessarily require any evidence or inference in order to make a selfknowledge attribution. For example, imagine a case where I wish to know if
you desire ice cream. To find this out, I must either infer it from your
behavior (maybe I observe you staring longingly at ice cream and infer that
this must mean you want it) or gather evidence directly (by asking you if you
would, indeed, like ice cream). In the case of introspected self-knowledge,
however, traditional theorists hold that I don’t have to gather any such
evidence about myself in order to know what I desire, or what I believe
because introspection delivers self-knowledge directly (although, there is
nothing stopping me from gathering such evidence, or making inferences to
the best explanation if I so wish.) To apply the ice cream example to myself,
according to traditional theorists of self-knowledge I don’t need to infer from
observation of my own behavior, such as walking to the freezer, to work out
that I would like ice cream. I also don’t need to gather any evidence, such as
asking myself, if I would like ice cream. Instead, I simply introspect and the
answer of whether I desire ice cream or not just directly pops into my
awareness. I seem to know, immediately and directly, whether I want ice
cream or not: I do not have to work out what I believe like I must do to find
out whether you want ice cream.
The fact that introspected self-knowledge is non-inferential and nonevidential means that self-knowledge ‘groundless,’ according to Coliva. Coliva
maintains that groundlessness is the phenomenon whereby we know our
mental states directly without any mediating steps of inference or evidence
gathering, and it is another feature which makes self-knowledge distinctive
27

and special compared to other kinds of knowledge.34 One objection, at this
point, might be that there is a tension here. Introspection has already been
defined as a kind of ‘inner observation’. This makes introspection appear to be
similar to perception. However, perceptual knowledge is not immediate or
direct. So how can it be that introspection is analogous to perception and yet
yields direct knowledge? Most theorists of self-knowledge maintain that
introspection is only metaphorically similar to perception and is not really a
fully-fledged perceptual process. This explains how introspective ‘perception’
yields direct, non-inferential knowledge of mental states. Of course, this raises
the further question as to just how, precisely, the faculty of introspection
functions: how can introspection be both perceptual in nature and also
epistemically direct?
The final feature of introspection is that, under normal conditions, it is
a reliable method by which to gain self-knowledge. Introspected selfknowledge thus enjoys high epistemic security. As Smithies and Stoljar state,
many traditional theorists of self-knowledge think that “introspection is better
than other ways of knowing about the world in certain epistemological
regards…it is more reliable, or it is immune from certain types of ignorance
and error.”35 Carruthers, talking about the neo-Cartesian view of selfknowledge, states that a central tenet is that introspected self-knowledge “is
much more reliable than knowledge of the mental states of others.”36 When

Coliva, Annalisa. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London, UK: Palgrave
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combined with the epistemic immediacy feature, this makes introspection
rather unusual indeed: as Moran states:

Rather than this non-reliance on evidence casting doubt on the
reliability of such [introspected] reports, judgments made in this way
seem to enjoy a particular epistemic privilege not accorded
corresponding third person judgments that do base themselves on
evidence.”37
In the usual state of affairs, assertions made without any evidence, that are
not based on observation or inference, are epistemically insecure.
Introspected self-knowledge, on the other hand, has a prima facie claim to
reliability despite not being based on any evidence or observation.
The reliability thesis comes in degrees: some traditional theorists of
self-knowledge think that introspected self-knowledge is generally very
reliable, and that introspection delivers especially secure knowledge. Others
make more tempered claims. For instance, Davidson clearly thinks that
introspected self-knowledge is particularly epistemically secure when he
asserts that “a mind’s reports of its own affairs have a certainty superior to the
best that is possessed by reports of matters in the physical world.”38 For
Davidson, the knowledge we have of our own mental states is even more
certain than any knowledge we have of the external world. Davidson also
states that “the possibility that one may be mistaken about one’s own thoughts
cannot defeat the overriding presumption that a person knows what he or she
believes; in general, the belief that one has a thought is enough to justify that
belief.”39 Even if other traditional theorists of self-knowledge reject such
Moran, Richard. Authority and Estrangement, p.10.
Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p.4.
39 Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p.15.
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strong claims, as Gertler points out it remains the case that even on very weak
interpretations “our self-attributions are…somewhat more epistemically
secure than our beliefs about other matters.”40 Introspection, then, is always
thought to deliver more epistemically secure beliefs compared to other
methods, even if this epistemic gain is only very slight. This is not to say, of
course, that other methods by which we gain self-knowledge, such as
inference, are unreliable in comparison. Other kinds of knowledge can achieve
a high degree of epistemic security as well.
There are two classical epistemic theories of self-knowledge which
utilize the concept of introspection: the acquaintance theory and the inner
sense theory. The acquaintance theory of self-knowledge postulates that
introspection grants us immediate access to our own mental states in such a
way that we become directly acquainted with them, in a metaphysical sense.41
In other words, when we gain knowledge of a mental state via introspection,
“no event or process mediates between my awareness and the mental state
itself.”42 This is a striking claim. To appreciate what this means, consider how
visual perception operates. When I observe a tree on a hill, the visual percept
of the tree is mediated via my visual experience. I don’t see the tree directly,
so to speak: “my visual experience may mediate between my awareness of [the

Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.67.
For the classical view of acquaintance theory, see Russell, Bertrand.
"Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description." In Mysticism
and Logic: George Allen and Unwin, 1917. For contemporary acquaintance
views see Hasan, Ali, and Richard Fumerton. "Knowledge by Acquaintance
Vs. Description." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/knowledgeacquaindescrip/>
42 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
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tree] and the [tree] itself.”43 The acquaintance theory of self-knowledge claims
that self-knowledge of our own mental states is not at all like visual
perception. Nothing comes between the mental state and my awareness of it:
introspection allows me to directly (that is, non-causally) come into contact
with my mental states. When I am in pain, there is no ‘painful experience’ that
mediates my awareness of the pain – I just immediately feel the pain directly.
Acquaintance theorists argue that “relative to perceptual beliefs…introspective
beliefs enjoy an especially high degree of epistemic security or certainty.”44 It
follows, then, that on the acquaintance theory introspection is a highly reliable
mechanism that yields very accurate self-knowledge.
As Gertler puts it “the idea that we know (even some of) our sensations
by acquaintance remains highly controversial; the idea that we know our
thoughts, or our beliefs…by acquaintance is even more controversial.”45 The
acquaintance theory is controversial for a few reasons. Firstly, the
acquaintance theory sets up a distinction between mediated and nonmediated knowledge. Perpetual knowledge, for instance, is mediated via visual
experience; whereas knowledge of mental states is supposedly mediated by
nothing at all. But if one has to introspect to gain direct acquaintance with
one’s mental states, doesn’t the activity of introspection itself qualify as a
medium through which I grasp my mental states? It seems that for the
acquaintance theory to uphold the distinction between mediated and non-
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mediated mental states, it must scrap the idea that introspection is a kind of
observation or process via which we gain self-knowledge. For if introspection
is a sort of inner look at our mental states, this would make the process of
introspection just as mediated as in the case of visual perception of the
external world. But if acquaintance theory requires us to reject the idea that
introspection is an observation of our mental states, then it becomes quite
mysterious as to what, precisely, introspection actually is.
A second issue with the acquaintance theory, the problem of
conceptualization, was initially highlighted by James. James argued that it
requires more than acquaintance with my mental states in order for me to
actually come to know them. If, for example, I desire ice cream mere
acquaintance with my mental state of desire is not enough for me to know that
I desire ice cream, in particular. Merely coming into contact with my mental
state is not enough to enable me to know what the mental state is. Knowing
that I desire ice-cream requires a deeper conceptualization than mere
acquaintance with my mental state can allow for – it requires that I grasp the
concept that my mental state is of a particular kind, desire, and it requires me
to grasp what it is that I desire (ice-cream). As Gertler explains, “the difficulty
is to explain how awareness of a mental state can be direct and immediate, yet
epistemically substantial – a genuine grasp of the state as a state of a certain
kind.”46
A final problem with the acquaintance theory is it becomes very hard to
explain how this mechanism of introspection works within a naturalistic
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picture of the world. On this theory, the knowledge we have of our own mental
states is non-causal, and so cannot be mediated via brain processes – or,
indeed, by any physical process at all. The fact that we grasp our mental states
via non-causal contact is somewhat mysterious and difficult to explain: as
Gertler asserts “the process of grasping an introspected property through
acquaintance may be difficult to accommodate within a broadly naturalistic
view of the mind, since many prominent naturalistic accounts of mentality
construe mental processes in purely causal terms.”47 The acquaintance theory
of self-knowledge sits awkwardly with a naturalistic picture of the mind, and
so for that reason is rejected by many philosophers.
The other theory of self-knowledge which utilizes the concept of
introspection is the inner sense theory.48 The inner sense theory postulates
that introspection is a mechanism which works similarly to perception, or, at
the very least, is analogous to perception. According to inner sense theorists,
introspection is a cognitive mechanism which is instantiated in the brain, and
thus functions via causal processes. Its purpose is to monitor and scan mental
states and to produce representations of these mental states as output. So, for
example, if I have the belief that “Paris is in France,” the faculty of
introspection (whatever this is) will take this belief as input, and produce
another belief, namely, “I believe that Paris is in France.” The inner sense
theory differs from the acquaintance theory, in that it postulates a wholly
naturalistic causal mechanism by which we gain self-knowledge. One virtue of
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.126.
For more on the inner sense account, see Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen P
Stich. Mindreading. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2003.; Goldman, Alvin.
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of
Mindreading. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006.; and Armstrong,
D. A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge, 1968.
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the theory is that it renders knowledge of one’s own mental states continuous
with knowledge of the external world, and it leaves open the possibility that
self-knowledge and the mechanism of introspection can be studied and
explained by science.
Unlike acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory does not posit that
we have direct acquaintance with our mental states: rather, self-knowledge is
mediated like in visual perception. To say that perceptual knowledge of the
external world is ‘mediated’ means that my knowledge that there is a tree in
front of me, for example, depends on my knowledge that I have a certain
mental state – namely a visual percept of the tree. My knowledge that there is
a tree in front of me, then, is mediated by my knowledge of another mental
state: my knowledge that I have a visual impression of a tree. My belief that
there is a tree in front of me is only justified if it is based on a belief about my
mental state, and this is why knowledge of the external world is not direct and
is said to be mediated. Descartes, like the acquaintance theorists, thought that
self-knowledge was not mediated like perceptual knowledge. According to
Descartes, when I experience a painful sensation, for example, my knowledge
that I have a painful sensation is not mediated by some second mental state of
the painful sensation. Rather, I experience the pain directly without an
additional mental intermediary. The inner sense theorist disagrees with
Descartes and the acquaintance view and argues that self-knowledge is just as
mediated as perceptual knowledge of the external world. We do not encounter
our mental states directly on the inner sense theory. This means that
introspected self-knowledge is vulnerable to the types of errors that visual
perception may suffer from. For instance, in some circumstances, the
introspection mechanism may not function at full reliability or may break
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down, and so it is possible that I could be misled into thinking I have a
particular belief when I do not. Inner sense theorists emphasize that, in
normal conditions, introspection is a highly reliable mechanism which yields
accurate self-knowledge; but still, errors are possible. Thus, the inner sense
theory does not guarantee as high a degree of accurate self-knowledge as the
acquaintance theory. However, inner sense theorists can live with this,
because self-knowledge is, at the very least, as epistemically secure as visual
perception and other perceptual beliefs. and these enjoy a high degree of
epistemic security under normal conditions. Finally, the inner sense theory
claims, just like the acquaintance theory, that introspection is a distinctly firstpersonal method for gaining knowledge, “since the relevant scanners or
monitoring mechanisms are directed only towards one’s own mental states.”49

Privileged Access

Traditional theorists of self-knowledge claim that we enjoy privileged access
to our own mental states, although “privileged access” is a term which suffers
from a lack of a universally agreed upon definition. In her book “SelfKnowledge,” Gertler presents a definition of privileged access as “access [to
mental states] that is either especially secure, epistemically, or proceeds by
use of an exclusively first personal epistemic method (or both).”50 Defining
privileged access in terms of a disjunction (it can consist of access which is
either epistemically secure or proceeds by use of a first-personal method) does
Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/selfknowledge/>.
50 Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.61.
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not capture what is intuitively meant by the term, in my view. It is my
contention that Gertler’s definition only works as a conjunction: privileged
access is access which proceeds via a unique first personal method (in other
words, introspection), that also yields epistemically secure knowledge. Both
elements are required for something to constitute privileged access. In other
words, privileged access just comprises of the epistemic reasons for thinking
that self-knowledge is special and distinct in the first place.
To see why the conjunctive definition is necessary consider that, on
Gertler’s definition as it stands, privileged access could just be any kind of
access to one’s mental states that yields especially epistemically secure
knowledge. But, intuitively, privileged access can’t just be constituted by any
method that is epistemically secure. For example, it is possible to find out
one’s mental states via inference to the best explanation, and this method of
gaining self-knowledge may be very reliable and yield especially epistemically
secure knowledge. I could also, say, read my therapist’s notes and discover
new facts about myself. If my therapist is very insightful this too could be a
highly reliable method by which to gain self-knowledge. However, traditional
theorists of self-knowledge presumably do not want to claim that gaining
knowledge of mental states via inference to the best explanation, or by reading
therapy notes, counts as distinctively privileged access to these mental states.
There has to be something more than just reliability for something to be
privileged access – otherwise it does not seem to be ‘privileged’ in any
ordinary sense of the word. Reliable access to mental states alone is not
automatically privileged access.
Could privileged access just be any access to mental states that
proceeds via introspection, the unique first personal method, without any
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guarantee of reliability or high epistemic security? This seems to better
capture what is meant by ‘privileged,” in that it is access to my mental states
that only I can have. However, let’s imagine a case where I access my mental
states using introspection, but I inhabit a world where introspection just so
happens to be a highly unreliable method by which to gain self-knowledge:
most of the time when I introspect it yields a false belief. This is entirely
possible: just because a method is uniquely first personal, a method that only I
can use, does not entail that it must automatically be a reliable method.
Furthermore, let’s also assume that in this world my other methods by which
to gain knowledge are highly reliable, and yield accurate beliefs. So, in this
scenario, I have a unique first-personal method by which to access my mental
states, but it is not very reliable at all. I am much better off using other
methods to gain knowledge, such as inference or observation.51 In such a
world, when I use my first-person method to access my mental states and
attempt to gain knowledge, does this capture what is meant by ‘privileged
access’? Arguably it does not. Intuitively, I don’t have ‘privileged access’ to my
mental states if, every time I use the first personal method, I gain false beliefs:
in such a scenario it does not seem as if the method is granting me any kind of
‘access’ to my mental states at all. Furthermore, there isn’t anything
philosophically special or noteworthy about a form of access to my mental
Note that both Gertler (Self-Knowledge, p. xiv) and Moran (Authority and
Estrangement, p.10.) claim that, conceptually speaking, the first personal
method is not necessarily reliable. The question of reliability is not simply
settled by virtue of the fact that a method is merely first personal. The
reliability of the first personal method cannot be assumed but must be
demonstrated or argued for. Thus, it is entirely possible that introspection
could be a far less reliable method to gain knowledge than, say, inference to
the best explanation. In practice, however, the vast majority of traditional
theorists of self-knowledge do think that introspection yields epistemically
secure beliefs.
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states which is entirely unreliable. Surely, by “privileged access” philosophers
can’t be referring to a potentially wholly unreliable method by which to gain
mental states.
I maintain that the concept of privileged access must involve more than
just accessing mental states using a first personal method. Gertler’s definition,
then, is almost correct: privileged access is access to one’s mental states that 1)
proceeds by a uniquely first-personal method (introspection) and 2) is a
reliable method for gaining self-knowledge. Privileged access is access to our
mental states which incorporates all of the aforementioned features of
introspection. It is access which is uniquely first personal, and which yields
direct, psychologically immediate, and epistemically secure self-knowledge of
one’s mental states.
When it comes to the concept of privileged access, a significant topic of
debate among traditional theorists of self-knowledge concerns the scope of
such access: which mental states do we have such access to? In Descartes’
time, and up until quite recently, the answer was either “all of them” or “most
of them.” Introspection was thought to yield privileged access to every, or
almost every, mental state. However, nowadays, no philosopher thinks that
one can have privileged access to every single mental state, or even to the
majority of mental states. The scope of privileged access is thought to be at
least somewhat limited. The question, then, is just how limited is the domain
of privileged access? Gertler, for instance, thinks that the range of mental
states to which we have privileged access is very restricted indeed: as she
states “there is a broad consensus….that the domain of privileged access is
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very narrow.”52 Gertler cites results in cognitive science and psychology, which
“sharply restrict the domain of privileged access”, but “do not show that we
lack privileged access entirely.”53 What kind of mental states do we not have
privileged access to? According to Gertler, psychology has shown that we lack
privileged access to what our personality is like, our character traits, what
sorts of things are liable to make us happy, and to behavioral dispositions in
general (such as “what would I do in that kind of situation?”) We also lack
privileged access to most, if not all, of our moods and emotions, and most of
our propositional attitudes if they contain a dispositional component (Gertler
maintains that we lack privileged access to all dispositions.)54 Finally, it is
likely that Gertler would also agree with Goldman’s assertion that “no
introspectivists, or defender of privileged access, holds that past mental states
are available for introspective access, only current mental states.”55 Thus, once
a mental state slips out of consciousness or working memory, it is no longer
accessible to introspective access even if we were entertaining that mental
state mere seconds ago.
Furthermore, based on the experimental studies of Nisbett and Wilson,
which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter, Gertler concedes that we lack
access to the reasons, or causes, for why we act a certain way: “we appear to
lack privileged access to the fact that a certain action or choice was caused by a
particular mental state.”56 Gertler is not too worried about this revelation,
however, because she states that:
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Gertler, Self-Knowledge, p.70.
54 Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.75-79.
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56 Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.74.
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Even the staunchest proponents of privileged access acknowledge that
we lack privileged access to…causal relations. So we should be wary of
attempts to challenge the general idea of privileged access by citing
cases in which subjects are ignorant of the causal sources of their
attitudes…to show that we lack privileged access to such matters is to
attack a straw man.57
What mental states do we have privileged access to, then? Gertler explains
that “in general, proponents of privileged access limits its domain to (at most)
three types of mental states: sensations, thoughts, and occurrent attitudes.”58
Sensations presumably include physical sensations, such as pain, the feeling
of heat and cold, and current perceptual experience. Gertler has already
discounted emotions as a kind of mental state to which we have privileged
access to, but it seems odd to claim that we can have privileged access to a
sensation but not the feeling of a raw basic emotion, like joy and excitement,
deep sadness, or burning anger. As Schwitzgebel states, “some emotions – joy,
anger, fear- can involve or accompany conscious experience,”59 and so it
seems plausible that we have privileged access to this conscious,
phenomenological element of emotions at the very least. What we lack is
privileged access to the fact that a sensation constitutes an instance of a
particular kind of emotion. To put it another way, we may have privileged
access to the feeling of burning rage, but lack access to the fact that the
emotion we are experiencing is rage. We also have privileged access to
occurrent, conscious thoughts that run through our minds, such as
daydreams, musings, snippets of inner speech, mentalistic imagery, and so on.
Finally, according to Gertler, we have privileged access to occurrent, but not
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.75.
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.82.
59 Schwitzgebel, Eric. "The Unreliability of Naive Introspection." Philosophical
Review 117, no. 2 (2008): 245-73, p.249.
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standing, propositional attitudes. According to Gertler, occurrent
propositional attitudes are propositional attitudes which are currently
entertained in consciousness and include thoughts such as “I desire a pizza
right now,” or the thought that “Paris is the capital of France”. Standing
propositional attitudes are propositional attitudes which are not currently
being consciously entertained. So, according to Gertler, we lack privileged
access to standing beliefs, but the moment these beliefs become occurrent, the
moment we consciously entertain them, they become available to
introspection.
There are a few problems with Gertler’s claim that the scope of
privileged access is restricted to just these three kinds of occurrent mental
states. Most importantly, it just simply isn’t true that the majority of
traditional theorists of self-knowledge think we have “at most” privileged
access to such a restricted domain of mental states. Many traditional theorists
of self-knowledge think we have privileged access to a far larger domain of
mental states than what Gertler claims. Take, for example, Moran’s theory of
self-knowledge, in which he proposes that we gain self-knowledge via the
transparency method (whereby we answer questions about our own mental
states by looking outwards and answering questions about the world).60 What
is special about self-knowledge, according to Moran, is that we have control
over our own attitudes: we can shape, amend, and reject our mental states in
response to the demands of rationality. So, for example, if I realize that a
belief of mine falls short of rational standards, I can amend it or reject it. It is
a crucial, and central part, of Moran’s theory that we have privileged access to
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standing propositional attitudes, as well as occurrent ones. As Moran states,
there are two kinds of mental states to which “privileged access is meant to
apply: occurrent states, such as sensations and passing thoughts, and various
standing attitudes of the person, such as beliefs, emotional attitudes, and
intentions.”61 It is essential for Moran to maintain that we possess privileged
access to our standing propositional attitudes because these are precisely the
kinds of attitudes which can conform to the standards of rationality, and
which we can thus rationally shape. A ticklish sensation, or a daydream of a
song, are not the kinds of mental states which can even count as rational: what
would it even mean to shape a feeling of pain into something which aligns
with reason? Moran’s theory, then, depends on us possessing privileged access
to standing propositional attitudes, and not just occurrent ones.
Similarly, Coliva also claims that we possess privileged access to
standing propositional attitudes. According to Coliva, we have privileged
access to what she terms ‘commitment’ propositional attitudes. These are
propositional attitudes which “depend on a judgment based on the assessment
of the evidence at a subject’s disposal, and for this reason, are within their
control and for which they are held rationally responsible.”62 Thus, Coliva
does not restrict privileged access to just occurrent propositional attitudes
either: rather, she argues that we have privileged access to mental states
which are rationally within our control, and which are responsive to reasons.
Furthermore, while Coliva agrees with Gertler that the scope of privileged
access is limited (according to her, we don’t have access to future dispositions,
or to causal relations), she does think that we have access to the basic
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emotions (such as anger, and sadness.)63 Thus, contrary to what Gertler
claims, there are many traditional theorists of self-knowledge who extend the
domain of privileged access beyond mere occurrent attitudes, conscious
thoughts, and sensations. These theorists think that we also have privileged
access to standing propositional attitudes, as well as to our basic emotions.
Furthermore, recall that Gertler adamantly maintains that no
traditional theorist of self-knowledge thinks that we have privileged access to
causes and any causal relations between mental states. As was previously
mentioned, Gertler states that “even the staunchest proponents of privileged
access acknowledge that we lack privileged access to…causal relations,”64 and
Gertler even asserts that it is a straw man to claim that traditional theorists of
self-knowledge think we have privileged access to causal relations. Clearly, for
Gertler, the notion that we might have privileged access to causal relations is
something that no serious proponent of privileged access would ever propose.
And yet, some philosophers do sincerely maintain that we have privileged
access to causes and the causal relations between mental states. Gertler
asserts that philosophers have known since the time of Hume that we lack
insight into causal relations. However, even in Hume’s day there was
disagreement about this claim. Reid, for instance, argues that we do have
direct introspective access to causal relations; and this fact explains why we
have the idea of causality and causal relations in the first place. Reid wonders,
“could the conception of efficient cause…ever have entered our minds if we
hadn’t had the experience of activity in ourselves?”65 He then theorizes that:
Coliva, Annalisa. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, p.51.
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.75
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Our conception of an efficient cause very likely comes from our
experience in childhood of our own power to produce certain
effects…our notion of efficiency…is a relation between the cause and
effect that is similar to the relation between us and our voluntary
actions.66
In other words, we have introspective awareness of our own causal efficacy
over our bodies and minds. Via introspection, we come to realize that there is
a causal connection between willing one’s arm to move and the movement.
And this realization, in turn, leads to the idea of causation in the external
world. Crucially, Reid is maintaining that we possess something like direct
introspective access to the causal relations between our will and our
movement. The idea that we have introspective access to causal relations is
not just an old, outdated idea either: Chisholm agrees with Reid that the
concept of causality, in general, is derived from the introspective access we
have to our own causal powers.67 According to Chisholm, we infer the idea of
‘event causation,’ causation between events in the external world, from the
awareness we have of our own ‘agent causation.’ As Chisholm asserts:

We may plausibly say…that the notion of immanent causation, or
causation by an agent, is in fact more clear than that of …causation by
an event, and that it is only by understanding our own causal efficacy as
agents that we can grasp the concept of cause at all.68
Finally, Armstrong also agrees with Reid, and maintains that we very likely
possess privileged access to causal connections: he states that “Reid’s idea is
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that when we are introspectively aware of the successful operation on our
will…we are experientially aware of causality in the mental sphere. This seems
to me to be very plausible.”69 Armstrong disputes the Humean idea that
causes cannot be directly perceived and claims that “we have direct awareness
of causality when we experience pressure on our bodies…Pressure is the
action of the force; that is, it involves causality.”70
Other philosophers, in the course of explaining how our beliefs gain
justification, have also maintained that we possess direct introspective access
to the causal relations between mental states, as well as the source of our
propositional attitudes (in other words, whether a belief derived from
observation, experience, testimony, and so on). According to these
philosophers, belief justification is only possible if we have direct introspective
access to the source of our beliefs, as well as to the logical and causal relations
between them. For instance, in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,
BonJour defends a coherentist, internalist picture of belief justification.
According to coherentism, our beliefs are justified if they hang together in a
logically coherent fashion. For BonJour, direct introspective access –
privileged access – plays a huge role in his theory: as he states, “introspection
plays an important role in the justification of…knowledge within a coherentist
account.”71 As an internalist, BonJour argues that we are not justified in
holding any belief unless we have internally accessible reasons for thinking
that belief is justified. Bonjour thinks that the externalist view, in which a
Armstrong, D. “Causes are perceived and introspected” in Goldman, Alvin.
"The Psychology of Folk Psychology." Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 16, no. 1 (1993): 15-107, p.29.
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belief system could be coherent without the believer personally grasping this
coherence relation, is “unacceptable,” and he states that coherence must be
“cognitively accessible” to the believer.72 BonJour maintains that we have
privileged access to our overall standing belief system, which strongly implies
that none of our beliefs can be hidden from the introspective ‘gaze.’73 The
reason we must have access to our whole belief network is because internalism
demands that we must personally grasp the coherence relations between our
beliefs, and “if the fact of coherence is to be accessible to the believer, it
follows that he must somehow have an adequate grasp of his total system of
beliefs.”74 On his view, in order for our belief system to be justified, we must
have introspective access to the coherence relations that hold between all
beliefs in our belief network.
Furthermore, in order for our beliefs to be justified, one must
introspectively access how one acquired all of one’s beliefs (the source of the
beliefs), as well as the logical and justificatory relations that hold between
one’s beliefs, and, finally, “the reason or basis…for beliefs…must be accessible
to the person in question.”75 BonJour maintains that, via introspection, we can
directly access the way in which our beliefs came about, and we can personally
recognize whether we hold the belief for good reasons and whether it coheres
appropriately with our other beliefs. As Kornblith states “BonJour…calls on
this faculty [introspection] to locate our cognitive errors, provide the material
for correcting those errors, and to certify that the correction has taken
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place.”76 Finally, BonJour maintains that we can use introspection to check
whether our belief system is “approximately” coherent or not.77 For BonJour,
then, privileged introspective access is doing a lot of work his theory of belief
justification; and, according to him, we have almost unlimited privileged
access to our network of beliefs and the causal relations in that network. In his
theory we certainly possess introspective access to far more mental states than
just occurrent propositional attitudes, conscious experience, and sensations.
With all of these examples in mind, Gertler is thus incorrect to assert
that concept of privileged access to causes (and the causal relations that hold
between mental states) is nothing more than a straw man. The notion we have
privileged access to causal relations is not a ‘straw man’ postulated by critics
of the traditional view of self-knowledge: on the contrary, a great many
philosophical theories depend upon privileged access to causal relations, and
the idea has considerable pedigree.
Gertler also routinely claims that the scope of privileged access is
uncontroversially accepted by most traditional theorists of self-knowledge to
be very limited indeed:

The key controversies about…privileged access concern our grasp of
mental states within a tightly restricted class…the remaining
disputes concern whether the subject has special access to the mental
states that fall within the narrowly circumscribed domain.”78
[emphasis mine]
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However, this is not a settled issue: many philosophers argue that the scope of
privileged access is far more extensive than Gertler claims. It is very common
for traditional theorists of self-knowledge to extend the scope of privileged
access to encompass a wide variety of mental states and processes: the domain
of privileged access, as it functions in many contemporary philosophical
theories cannot truthfully be described as a “narrowly circumscribed domain.”
Many traditional theorists of self-knowledge claim that we possess privileged
access to a wide range of mental states, and mental processes; and postulate
that this privileged access has a key role to play in explaining a wide range of
phenomena, such as how we come to grasp the concept of free will, or how our
beliefs obtain justification, or why our knowledge is special compared to the
knowledge of animals.
In light of the fact that many traditional theorists of self-knowledge
postulate a wide scope of privileged access, why does Gertler claim that
privileged access is restricted to ‘at most’ three kinds of mental states? Gertler
is, presumably, not ignorant of the fact that many traditional theorists of selfknowledge propose that we have privileged access to a plethora of mental
states. In restricting privileged access in such a way, Gertler is not so much
making a descriptive claim about what most traditional theorists of selfknowledge take the scope of privileged access to be, as she is making a
normative claim about what the scope of privileged access should be. She is
making a claim about which mental states traditional theorists of selfknowledge are, at most, entitled to include in the domain of privileged access.
Gertler is well aware that findings in cognitive science and psychology indicate
that the range of mental states that we can be sure are introspectively
accessible is very small indeed. Thus, when philosophers claim we have
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privileged access to, for example, causal relations, or standing propositional
attitudes, or the reasons for our beliefs, Gertler will presumably maintain that
such claims are epistemically irresponsible. This is a similar position to
Goldman, who states that “no careful privileged access theorist should claim
that people have introspective access to the causes of their mental states,”79
despite the fact that, as has just been shown, many of them do claim such a
thing. To sum up, psychology and cognitive science indicate that, at most, the
domain of privileged access is restricted to occurrent propositional attitudes,
sensations, and conscious experience. To extend privileged access beyond this
domain, then, is to rashly ignore our best science, and to build philosophical
theories on sand. Gertler, and others, advocate that any responsible
traditional theorist of self-knowledge should only postulate privileged access
to these three kinds of mental states, or else risk contradicting our current
best science.
While it may very well make sense to restrict the scope of privileged
access in light of results in psychology and cognitive science, the reality is that
most traditional theorists of self-knowledge ignore these studies and propose
that we do have privileged access to a much wider variety of mental states.
Gertler’s claim that privileged access is restricted to “at most” conscious,
occurrent mental states does not mesh with the current philosophical reality.
Traditional theorists of self-knowledge routinely postulate that we possess
privileged access to a wide variety of mental states, and this privileged access
plays a large explanatory role in their philosophical theories. Thus, when one
critiques the traditional theory of self- knowledge, one must take at face value
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how the concept of privileged access is actually being used: one cannot ignore
the fact that, in practice, traditional theorists of self-knowledge think that the
range of mental states we supposedly have privileged access to is larger in
scope than Gertler claims. One must not assess the traditional theory of selfknowledge based on what its practitioners ought to be doing, but on what they
are actually doing in practice.
No matter just how extensive, or restricted, the scope of privileged
access is, all traditional theorists accept that privileged access is hugely
important and even essential for things such as human rationality, freedom,
and personhood. In the next section, I will outline why traditional theorists of
self-knowledge think that privileged access to propositional attitudes is
essential for our very humanity.

The Value of Privileged Access and Self-Knowledge

The concept of privileged access plays a central role in the traditional view of
self-knowledge because traditional theorists think that privileged access is
epistemically necessary for human beings. Without privileged access to some
of our mental states, human beings wouldn’t be human, in the sense that they
would lack freedom, rationality, and perhaps even personhood. Thus, a
central tenet of the traditional view of self-knowledge is that without
privileged access human beings would be in a very bad way indeed. This
entails that, for traditional theorists, self-knowledge is exceptionally valuable
and important. If privileged access is necessary for human autonomy,
rationality, and so on, it follows that self-knowledge is also necessary. This
further implies that self-ignorance cannot be the norm and must be regarded
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as an aberration: normal human beings possess a fair amount of accurate selfknowledge, and do not routinely fall into error about themselves. As Cassam
puts it, traditional theorists of self-knowledge are epistemic optimists: they
believe that “[self] ignorance is not, and cannot be, prevalent,”80 and that selfignorance is quite easy to remedy via careful reflection. Traditional theorists
also argue that self-ignorance is an abnormal state of affairs and imply that a
self-ignorant individual has something grossly wrong with them. Burge, for
instance, asserts that errors about one’s beliefs, desires, and intentions
“indicate something wrong with the thinker.”81 Thus, regular errors about our
own mental states are far from normal and suggest a serious cognitive
malfunction. In the remainder of this section, I explain why privileged access,
and by extension self-knowledge, is considered to be so valuable by traditional
theorists of self-knowledge.
Moran, for example, argues that “it belongs to the concept of a
person”82 that he should be able to “arrive at knowledge of his own attitudes
in a way that is not based on evidence or observation of himself.”83 While I
may only learn of another person’s mental states “from what she says and
does,”84 I can know my own mind immediately, without inferring what my
mental states are. For Moran, then, the very concept of personhood depends
on us having the capacity to grasp our mental states immediately via an
exclusively first-personal method. Moran, it should be noted, is a rationalist
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about self-knowledge and not an empiricist: that is, he thinks that what makes
self-knowledge special is not anything epistemological but, rather, the fact
that we have authority over our own mental states. In particular, Moran
rejects the inner sense theory, and denies that introspective access is like a
kind of ‘inner perception.’ Moran argues that the inner sense theory of selfknowledge makes us nothing more than “expert witnesses” about our own
mental states, which is not enough for us to have any sort of agency over
them.85 Thus, on Moran’s account privileged access to our mental states is not
like a kind of epistemically secure perception of our mental states, but
something else entirely. For Moran, what constitutes privileged access to our
mental states is the fact that a person may know his own belief by avowing
it.”86 While Moran rejects the classical Cartesian picture of introspective
access as a kind of inner eye, the basic point remains: for Moran, it is essential
that we access our own mental states in a special, exclusively first-personal
way. If it turned out that we infer our own mental states in the same way as we
infer the mental states of other people, then our very personhood would be
threatened.
Some traditional theorists of self-knowledge think that privileged
access is tightly coupled to rationality: human reasoning is impossible, or
cannot be explained, without the concept of privileged access. Coliva, for
example, claims that “knowing of [our mental states] only through inference
to the best explanation and in the way of a hypothesis would actually
represent a major departure from rationality.”87 Coliva maintains that any
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human being who lacked privileged access to their mental states, who had to
use some other method to gain self-knowledge, would be less than a fully
cognitively functioning, rational, and intelligent creature: “massive failures at
this kind of [first-personal] self-knowledge would display…failures of
rationality.”88 Thus, our very rationality depends on us having privileged
access to our mental states. Coliva’s reasoning is that if we lacked privileged
access to our mental states we would often exhibit very unusual, irrational
behavior. Coliva gives an example of a woman who is grocery shopping. If she
lacked privileged access to her intentions and beliefs, when we asked her why
she was pushing a shopping cart around, Coliva maintains that the woman
could very well say something like “I don’t know why I have this cart…let me
think. Ah! I infer that I must have this cart because I’m shopping,”; or her
inference may fail and she may simply report “I don’t actually know why I’m
pushing this cart around.”89 Coliva maintains that if we lacked privileged
access to our mental states, and if we have to infer what our beliefs and
intentions are, we would be expected to behave in ways that indicated a
mental illness: a serious cognitive malfunction. Privileged access to one’s
mental states, then, is essential for one to be a rational agent:
On a ‘thick’ notion of being a rational agent…knowing of [her actions]
and their motivations only through inference to the best explanation an
in the way of a hypothesis would actually represent a major departure
from rationality.90
Coliva, and other traditional theorists of self-knowledge, deny that even a
being with perfect self-knowledge could be wholly rational if that knowledge
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Coliva, Annalisa. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge p.53.
90 Coliva, Annalisa. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge p.57.
88

89

53

was solely gained via a non-introspective, interpretive method. In other
words, even I infer what my own mental states are with 100% accuracy I
would still fall short of rational standards according to these traditional
theorists of self-knowledge. Why do they think this? These philosophers seem
to worry that if we lack privileged access to our beliefs we will be at the same
metaphysical distance (so to speak) from our own beliefs as we are from other
people’s. If we have to infer what our own beliefs are, the concern is that we
will end up alienated from our beliefs; that there will be no real sense in which
our beliefs can be said to belong to us. As Coliva states, if a subject had to infer
she was in pain “she would bear to her mental state the kind of relation she
bears to those of others,”91 which would mean the subject would be “in some
sense alienated from herself.”92 Coliva makes the further point that if we bear
the same relation to our own mental states as we do to the mental states of
other people, our mental states cannot really be said to belong to us. As Coliva
states, if we had to infer our mental states this would “result in a lack of
‘ownership’ or mine-ness’ over the mental states one would be inferring to
have.”93 She further adds that:

What makes a mental state of ours ours is…the fact that it is known to
us in a way which differs from how we know of other people’s mental
states and in which no one else can know of it.94
For Coliva, then, if we cannot have distinctly first-personal access to our
beliefs, if we have to gain knowledge of our own beliefs in the same way as we
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gain knowledge of other people’s beliefs, then our beliefs cannot be rightly
said to be our beliefs. And if ownership of our beliefs is threatened then so is
rationality: we can only have rational control over our own beliefs. Privileged
access, according to Coliva, is essential for rationality because without it
beliefs and other mental states cannot be properly said to be ours.
Like Coliva, Moran also argues that without immediate, first-personal
access to our mental states we risk being alienated from our beliefs. Moran
distinguishes between ‘ordinary’ self-knowledge and ‘theoretical’ selfknowledge. ‘Theoretical’ self-knowledge is self-knowledge that is achieved via
inference or application of a theory. ‘Ordinary’ self-knowledge, on the other
hand, is knowledge that is achieved via “a deliberate, non-observational
capacity” – that is, knowledge that is gained via the immediate first-personal
method. Moran argues that the very concept of ‘knowing one’s own mind’
depends on ordinary self-knowledge: if a person “can only learn of his belief
through assessment of the evidence about himself,” then he will not possess
ordinary self-knowledge, and he cannot be said to “know his own mind.” 95
Moran argues that “it is a rational requirement…on being a believer,
that one should have access to what one believes in a way that is radically
nonevidential, a way that does not rely on inferences.”96 According to Moran,
if a person lacked first-personal access to her beliefs, if she needed to rely on
inference and evidence in order to work out her mental state then “this would
suggest something wrong with [her], some state of dissociation.”97 For Moran,
then, the lack of a first-personal method to our own mental states is a deeply
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abnormal state of affairs: humans cannot function normally without it. Moran
argues that there are two routes to self-knowledge: we may come to know our
mental states via theorizing and inference, and we may come to know of our
mental states through “the nonevidential way of avowal.”98 According to
Moran:

When I avow a belief, I am not treating it as just an empirical
psychological fact about me…it is explicit in the avowal that it commits
me to the facts beyond my psychological state; and as a commitment it
is not something that I am assailed by, but rather it is mine to maintain
or revoke.99
For Moran, then, we cannot ‘avow’ mental states that we come to know via
inference. We can only avow mental states that we have immediate access to.
And it is only via this process of avowal that we avoid becoming alienated
from our own mental states. For example, suppose an individual discovers, via
theorizing about herself, that she does not, in fact, hate her father as she has
believed for many years. Rather, she comes to learn that she loves her father.
Moran argues that in such a circumstance, such an individual will be alienated
from this knowledge that she loves her father: “without her capacity to
endorse or withhold endorsement from that attitude [towards her
father]…this information [that she loves her father] may as well be about some
other person, or about the voices in her head.”100 Thus, we can only avow or
endorse mental states if we have non-inferential, immediate access to them. If
we only ever come to know of our mental states via inference, we can never
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avow such states and so we will be alienated from them: there is no real sense
in which these mental states can be said to be ours.
Other philosophers think that self-knowledge is essential for the
activity of critical reasoning. Burge, for instance, maintains that critical
reasoning requires self-knowledge of one’s reasons: “critical reasoning is
guided by an appreciation, use and assessment of reasons and reasoning as
such.”101 In order to be a critical reasoner, one’s beliefs and desires must be
mediated by an appreciation of reasons: any changes to our belief must be
reason induced. For instance, suppose I have the belief that “Oswald killed
President Kennedy” After sustaining a bump to the head, my belief changes,
and I now believe that “The CIA killed President Kennedy”. This does not
constitute an instance of critical reasoning because my belief has been
changed by blunt forces and not by any rational appreciation of the evidence
or reasons. Imagine another case, where I change my mind about who killed
Kennedy, but I don’t know why. If you ask me the reasons why I changed my
belief, I couldn’t possibly tell you. Cassam terms this “blind reasoning,” –
reasoning where we fail to consciously appreciate our reasons for a belief or
desire change.102 Again, this fails to be a case of rational belief change In
order for my belief change to be rational, then, I must consciously appreciate
that I have no reason to think that Kennedy was killed by the CIA, and every
reason to believe that he was killed by Oswald. My belief revision can only be
said to be rational if I alter my belief in light of these consciously accessible
reasons. On this view, then, “critical reasoning requires thinking about one’s
Burge, Tyler. "Our Entitlement to Self Knowledge." In Externalism and
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thoughts”103 – it requires self-knowledge. If I don’t have self-knowledge about
my reasons, then I cannot engage in critical reasoning: “for critical reasoning
to be possible, one’s thinking about one’s own thoughts must be normally
knowledgeable…to check, weigh, criticize and confirm one’s reasons, one must
know what one’s reasons, thoughts and reasoning are.”104
Furthermore, just like Coliva, and Moran, Burge closely links our
ability to critically reason with privileged access. He does not think critical
reasoning is possible if we lack first-personal, immediate access to our own
mental states. As Burge puts it, the self-knowledge we have of our own
reasons “must take a…non-observational form.”105 The reason is because
inferred, or observational, knowledge of our reasons would “entail a
dissociation between cognitive review and the thoughts reviewed, that is
incompatible with norms of epistemic responsibly.”106 Burge, like the other
traditional self-knowledge theorists, also appears to be worried that any
distance between our mental states and our ‘cognitive review’ of them entails
that we lack responsibility for those mental states: that they are alienated
from us in some way.
Shoemaker agrees with Burge that privileged access is essential for
critical reasoning and conscious belief revision. Shoemaker thinks that we
must have self-knowledge of our beliefs, and privileged access to our mental
states, in order for us to notice inconsistencies, such as beliefs that clash or
beliefs that need updating.107 Shoemaker concedes that often our beliefs are
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updated automatically, and so introspective awareness is not always necessary
to maintain our belief system and to remove inconsistencies. However,
Shoemaker thinks that only lower animals always update their beliefs using
automatic mechanisms. In the case of humans, we have the ability to revise
our beliefs manually:
In an important class of cases the rational revision or adjustment of the
belief-desire system requires that we undertake investigations aimed at
determining what revision or readjustments to make – either “external”
activities of conducting tests or experiments, or “internal” activities of
constructing and evaluating arguments.108
Shoemaker thinks that in such cases, where we must adjust our beliefs
manually, self-knowledge plays an important role. In order for us to engage in
critical reasoning, he maintains that “one must know a good deal about what
the contents of that [belief] system are.”109 This is because what rationalizes
the endeavor of critical reasoning in the first place “are one’s higher-order
beliefs about what one believes and has reason to believe.”110 Thus, the activity
of critical reasoning is guided by higher-order self-knowledge: one must know
that one’s beliefs are inconsistent, or in need of revision, before one can
engage in critical reasoning in the first place. Crucially, Shoemaker argues that
privileged access to one’s belief systems is necessary:
It is because one believes certain things, and has apparent reason to
believe certain other things…that one initiates the particular course of
investigation one does. What rationalizes the investigation are one’s
higher-order beliefs about what one believes and has reason to believe.
Creatures without introspective access to their beliefs and
desires would lack this resource for rational revision of their
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beliefs and desires, and would fall short of normal human
rationality.”111 [emphasis mine]
In other words, without privileged access to one’s belief system, one would
only be able to revise one’s beliefs in the same way as animals do. The activity
of critical reasoning necessarily requires privileged access, according to
Shoemaker.
Some philosophers, like Coliva, argue that privileged access is
necessary for agent responsibility. Coliva, argues that if we lack privileged
access to our beliefs and other attitudes we must lack responsibility for those
beliefs and attitudes: “a subject who would know of [her beliefs] only
inferentially, by inference to the best explanation…would actually strike us as
not being fully responsible for them.”112 Coliva imagines a case of an
individual who only knows of her own intentions via inference, and not via
privileged access. In such a case, if an individual lacks privileged access to her
own intentions, she cannot be said to be responsible for her actions. This is
because, according to Coliva, such an individual would only discover what her
motives for action were after the action was completed: she would have to
infer what she intended by observing her own behavior.113 She would not have
immediate access to her intentions, and so would have to work out what her
intentions were after the fact. This means that, at the moment of the action,
she was not responsible for it because she could not know what it is she was
really intended: as Coliva puts it “prior to having interpreted [her behavior] it
would just be a movement or a piece of overt behavior to her.”114 Thus, Coliva
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maintains that immediate access to our mental states, and thus by extension,
privileged access, “is a constitutive element of being a responsible agent.”115
Finally, Shoemaker argues that there are pragmatic reasons why
privileged access to our mental states is essential. If we lacked privileged
access, according to Shoemaker we would be unable to communicate
effectively with each other. When I inform another person of my beliefs, very
often the purpose is to provide “information about oneself which will assist
[the other person] in predicting one’s behavior,”116 which will enable us to
coordinate our behavior. Shoemaker maintains that the utility of selfknowledge relies upon privileged access to mental states, and without it
“cooperative endeavors would be considerably more difficult, to say the
least.”117 According to Shoemaker, if we had to infer our mental states, the
cooperative process would become harder because it would take a longer time
for us to convey our beliefs to other people. As he puts it, “if I had to figure out
from my behavior what my beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., are, then in most
cases it would be more efficient for others to figure this out for themselves
than to wait for me to figure it out and then tell them about it.”118 Shoemaker
paints a bizarre picture, in which someone could ask me what my belief is and
some time goes by while I try to work out just what it is I believe. After my
process of inference is complete, I can then report back “I’ve worked out what
I believe! I believe that p.” The fact that such gaps in conversation do not
routinely happen is evidence, according to Shoemaker, that we possess
privileged access to our mental states. The reason why we can report our
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attitudes so quickly and confidently is precisely because we have direct
privileged access to our them.
To summarize, traditional theorists of self-knowledge postulate that
privileged access to our mental states, and thus self-knowledge, is essential for
our rationality, critical reasoning, responsibility, personhood, and effective
communication. Most traditional theorists of self-knowledge, then, don’t just
value privileged access highly: they see it as a necessary component of normal
human cognition. Without privileged access, human beings would be woefully
cognitively deficient in various ways and would be reduced to the level of
lower animals. Privileged access to our own mental states, in a very real sense,
is what makes us human. In the next section, however, I will discuss a very
different view of self-knowledge, one which challenges almost every tenet of
the neo-Cartesian traditional view of self-knowledge. In particular, the
inferential view of self-knowledge proposes that we do not, in fact, possess
privileged access to our propositional attitudes.

The Inferentialist View of Self-Knowledge

In this chapter so far, I’ve discussed at length the traditional view of selfknowledge. To recap, according to neo-Cartesians self-knowledge is special
compared to other forms of knowledge because we have privileged access to
some of our mental states. Privileged access is defined as access to our mental
states via the first-personal method of introspection, which yields immediate
(non-inferential) knowledge that is also especially epistemically secure. While
some traditional theorists of self-knowledge take heed of scientific findings
and restrict the scope of privileged access to a tiny number of mental states, in
62

practice many traditional theorists of self-knowledge postulate that we
possess privileged access to a large domain of mental states. Furthermore,
many traditional theorists also maintain that privileged access is essential for
human rationality, critical reasoning, personhood, and moral responsibility.
Consequently, traditional theorists of self-knowledge maintain that normal
human beings possess lots of self-knowledge; and that self-ignorance and
errors in self-knowledge are abnormal and imply that a cognitive malfunction
has occurred.
Not every philosopher is a neo-Cartesian, however. Some philosophers
deny that there is anything special, philosophically interesting, or
metaphysically distinctive about self-knowledge: as Medina states “the
persistent insistence that [self-knowledge] is a special area of knowledge…is
an unwanted residue of the Cartesian picture of human knowledge.”119 They
deny that we have privileged access to our propositional attitudes, and argue
that we gain knowledge of our beliefs, desires, and most mental states by
using the same method that we use to gain knowledge about the mental states
of other people. In particular, these philosophers maintain that most of our
self-knowledge is gained via inferring or interpreting our mental states. Ryle,
for instance, states that “the sorts of things I can find out about myself are the
same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the
methods of finding them out are much the same.”120
Cassam, similarly, notes that the peculiar nature of our access to our
own mental states has been highly over-stated, and that “the asymmetry
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between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others boils down to a
difference in the kinds of evidence that are available in the two cases.”121
Cassam does not deny that there is some asymmetry, in a sense, between self
and other knowledge. Other people do not have access to my sense percepts
and memories in the same way that I have access to them: when it comes to
figuring out my mental states, myself and another person are not in “exactly
the same boat epistemologically speaking” because we “have access to
different types of evidence.”122 What Cassam denies is the neo-Cartesian
claim, articulated by Moran, that “whatever knowledge of oneself may be, it is
a very different thing from knowledge of others, categorically different in
kind and manner.”123 Cassam maintains that the access I have to my own
mental states is not significantly different in kind and manner, but can be
explained in terms of “ a difference in the kinds of evidence that are
available.”124 He denies that there is any deep, metaphysically significant
Asymmetry (with a capital A), and instead argues that self and other
knowledge is more similar than not due to the fact that I gain knowledge
about myself, and other people, in essentially the same way: “by drawing
inferences from the evidence available [to me].”125 I can infer other people’s
mental states by observing their behavior and listening to their assertions. In
my own case, I may also infer my mental states by observing my own behavior
but in addition I have access to a larger repository of data, such as my own
memories, conscious thoughts, sensations, and current percepts as well as my
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behavior. ‘Privileged access,’ according to Cassam is nothing more than having
“excellent and readily available”126 evidence about one’s own mental states.
The difference between self and other knowledge, then, is not a difference in
kind but merely in degree: as Ryle puts it, “no metaphysical iron curtain
exists”127 between ourselves and other people. The different evidence I have at
my disposal when working out my own mental states “isn’t the kind of
difference that justifies talk of an epistemic Asymmetry.”128 Thus, while the
inferentialist acknowledges that there is an asymmetry, of a sort, between self
and other knowledge she does not accept, as the traditional theorist does, that
this asymmetry signifies a deep, metaphysical distinction between self and
other knowledge.
The inferentialists also deny that we gain self-knowledge of the vast
majority of our mental states immediately and without evidence. At most,
inferentialists may concede that we gain knowledge of phenomenal mental
states, like pains, directly. But they deny that we can gain direct knowledge of
other mental states, like propositional attitudes via privileged access. The
inferentialists argue that even though it phenomenologically feels to us as if
we are introspecting and gaining knowledge directly, we are actually
performing a very swift inference to the best explanation. As Cassam states,
“self-attributions of propositional attitudes…are always the result of a swift
and unconscious process of self-interpretation.”129 Ryle was one of the first
philosophers to postulate that we gain self-knowledge using the same methods
we use to gain knowledge of other people. Ryle argues that “our knowledge of
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other people and of ourselves depends upon our noticing how they and we
behave”130 and then using “induction to law-like propositions” on the basis of
these “observed actions.”131 In other words, on the basis of observed behavior
and other evidence, we make an inference to the best explanation in order to
gain knowledge of the self and other people. Ryle famously claimed that in the
same way I can gain knowledge about what you believe by listening to what
you say, I can also gain knowledge about my own beliefs by listening to what I,
myself, say: as Ryle puts it “we eavesdrop on our own voiced utterances and
our own silent monologues,”132 in order to infer what it is that we believe,
intend, or desire.
More recently, Carruthers has developed a theory of self-knowledge,
the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory, which claims that we gain
knowledge of our own propositional attitudes by interpreting sensory data
that serves as input to cognition.133 Carruthers argues that we only have
immediate access to sensory mental states, like pains and feelings: every other
mental state must be inferred. Carruthers postulates the existence of a single,
dedicated mind-reading faculty which detects and attributes mental states in
oneself and other people. The mind-reading faculty “takes sensory data as
input; interprets these data by drawing on situational facts and background
information; and yields representations of mental states as output.”134 A core
tenet of the ISA theory is that the mind-reading faculty originally evolved for
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the purpose of attributing mental states to other people, and so it is less
reliable when it is used to gain self-knowledge about one’s own mental states.
Carruthers maintains that in many cases of self-interpretation, the mindreading faculty breaks down and we make errors about our own mental states.
According to Carruthers, the frequency and severity of these errors, which
have been demonstrated in cognitive science and psychology, are evidence
that we lack privileged access to our own mental states. We must instead come
to know our mental states via inference. On some occasions, when the
background information is faulty or misleading, our self-interpretation goes
awry and we end up falsely attributing mental states to ourselves.
One of the key criticisms against any inferentialist account of selfknowledge is that it is unintuitive. As Cassam states, inferentialist theories of
knowledge are usually quickly dismissed as “patently absurd.”135 The idea that
we possess immediate access to our mental states is simply assumed to be
correct, and so any theory of self-knowledge which denies that we have
privileged access to many of our mental states is regarded with suspicion. The
reason that privileged access is presumed to exist is because the alternative an inferentialist account of self-knowledge - is regarded as an insult to
common sense. There are two main reasons why traditional theorists of selfknowledge think that inferentialist theories of self-knowledge are nonsensical,
and not worthy of serious consideration. First, access to our mental states is
psychologically immediate: it just phenomenologically appears to us as if we
directly gain access to our own mental states. It doesn’t, from the inside, feel
as if we are performing any kind of inference to the best explanation. And
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second, traditional theorists maintain that if we had to infer our own mental
states there would be obvious behavioral evidence of this. This behavioral
evidence doesn’t exist, and so we can’t routinely be making inferences about
what our mental states are.
As for the first point, the inferentialists have an explanation for why it
feels as if the access to our mental states is immediate. Ryle argues that the
immediacy of self-knowledge is nothing more than an illusion, “the natural
product of the expertise we have acquired in ascribing beliefs desires, etc., to
ourselves.”136 Ryle’s claim is that we become such experts at inferring our own
mental states that the process becomes automatic, and so the inferential
nature of our introspection becomes hidden from view. Furthermore, just
because it feels like our access to our mental states is direct does not mean
that our cognitive access to our mental states really is direct. Phenomenology
does not always provide an accurate picture of what is really going on in our
minds. For example, when I pass my gaze around a room, it just feels, from
the inside, like I have immediate perceptual access to the scene in front of me.
I perceive a seamless, richly detailed visual array, which immediately updates
without any lag when I move my gaze. It seems to me that visual perception
delivers immediate, direct access to the external world. However, cognitive
scientists have known for quite some time that visual perception involves a
huge degree of inference, interpretation, and computation. The visual system
must work hard to figure out depth, color, object boundaries, shade, and every
other element of the visual array.137 The brain must actively interpret the
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scene that is in front of it and make choices about what to include in the visual
array, and what to leave out. From our point of view, however, we are unaware
of all of this interpretation and processing because it occurs sub-consciously.
From our perspective, it just seems as if vision grants us immediate, direct
perceptual access to the world around us – and yet, cognitive science has
demonstrated that this is nothing more than an illusion. The inferentialist
maintains that introspection is analogous to visual perception. At the level of
consciousness, it does phenomenologically seem to us as if we have direct
access to our mental states. At the lower, sub-conscious levels of cognitive
processing, however, there is a great deal of inference and interpretation going
on. While the access to our own propositional attitudes and other mental
states seems to be direct, it is, in fact, inferential in nature.
As for the second point, traditional theorists of self-knowledge propose
that if we really do infer our mental states, and lack privileged access, we
should expect to observe some rather unusual behavior. The fact this odd
behavior does not occur in normal human beings implies that we cannot be
merely inferring our mental states. For example, Coliva gives the example of a
woman who goes shopping.138 As the woman is pushing her shopping cart
around the store, someone asks her what she is doing. Coliva maintains that if
the woman lacks privileged access to her own propositional attitudes in order
to answer the question she will have to make an inference from her observed
behavior. The woman must notice that she is pushing a cart around, and on
the basis of that observation she must then infer that she is shopping: “she
would not know that she intends to buy some groceries because she is aware
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of that intention, but because she would realize that she has gone to the shops
and done her shopping.”139 Until the woman pauses to note her overt
behavior, and make an inference based off that observation, she has no
knowledge about what she is doing or why. Coliva further argues that in any
interaction with such a person, they would come across as very mentally ill. In
response to the question “what are you doing?” the woman’s inference might
go awry, and she could very well respond with “I don’t know.” Or, equally as
likely, according to Coliva, the woman might pause for a while before
declaring “I hypothesize that I’m shopping.” Shoemaker, similarly, maintains
that if we have to infer our own mental states, there will be large gaps in
conversations; and that “it would be more efficient for others to figure [out
what my beliefs are] for themselves than to wait for me to figure it out and
then tell them about it.”140 Finally, consider Rey’s rebuttal to Carruthers’s
theory that we interpret our propositional attitudes. Rey states that:
It is far from clear that the only way we ascribe either mental or any
other concepts to ourselves or others, involves serious interpretation,
inference or explanation…life is too short, and matters too
pressing for us to rely on them alone.141 [emphasis mine]
Rey later refers to the process of inferring other’s mental states as “laborious.”
It is clear, from Rey’s language, that he thinks that inferring mental states is
time and effort consuming, so much so that Carruthers’s theory is
immediately rendered implausible.
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Many traditional theorists of self-knowledge, then, depict the process
of inferring one’s mental states as a slow and clunky, conscious process that
renders us robot-like. They argue that because we don’t take long pauses to
work out what we’re thinking, or because we don’t routinely assert that we
have no idea why we are at the grocery store, we must therefore have
immediate, direct access to our mental states. If we had to infer our mental
states, this would surely be reflected in our behavior. The fact there is no
behavioral evidence of us performing any kind of inference implies that we
access our mental states directly. But this picture of inference is wholly
inaccurate. As Lawlor points out, “the cognitive processes of inference can be
very swift, barely rising to consciousness.”142 Inference is not necessarily a
slow, clunky, and laborious process that results in noticeable lags and glitches
in our behavior. To return to the example of vision, when we take in a visual
array it is trivially easy for us to tell where one objects ends and where another
begins; and we can easily track the course of individual objects across our
visual field. For example, if I watch a dog playing with a ball, the dog and ball
both ‘pop out’ from the background and are very easy to track as separate
objects: at no point do I confuse the ball with the dog or the dog with the ball.
This ability to track separate objects, and, indeed, to even perceive objects as
separate objects, is the result of complex processing and inference that occurs
at the sub-personal level. The visual system, using inbuilt rules and
assumptions about object boundaries, infers that the dog and the ball are two
individual objects; and this inference is performed so swiftly that we are not
even aware that it is happening. From our perspective, we don’t have to pause
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and consider a visual scene and take time to work out which objects are in
front of us. We don’t have to consciously consider anything like “well, hmmm,
I think that might be one object…that’s a dog. And there’s another object.
That’s a ball. So I infer there are two objects in front of me.” Similarly, there is
no reason to think that if we gain self-knowledge via inference this will lead to
behavioral slow-downs or gross irrational errors. Just like the visual system,
our introspective faculty might perform very swift, unconscious inferences in
such a way that it just feels to us as if we have direct, immediate access to our
mental states. Because these inferences are performed so quickly there is no
chance for behavioral lag to occur; and because they are performed
unconsciously the subject herself does not have to consciously consider
questions such as “well, now, why am I pushing a shopping cart around? Let
me theorize…”
Finally, note that traditional theorists often make the mistake of
thinking that the only evidence that would be available to us, in cases of selfinterpretation, is overt behavior. Now, if we were forced to interpret our
mental states using only overt behavior as evidence, this would be rather odd
and counterintuitive: it would mean that, for example, I could only work out
that I desire ice cream by observing myself opening the freezer door and
getting ice cream. However, inferentialists respond to this concern by pointing
out that, in cases of self-interpretation, we have far more evidence available to
us than just overt instances of behavior. Aside from our observed behavior, we
also have access to our current and recently past perceptual experience,
emotions, feelings, memories, instances of inner speech, judgments, and
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propositional attitudes.143 As Carruthers states, “there is generally more
sensory evidence relevant to the process of [mental state] interpretation in the
first person case, including one’s own visual imagery, inner speech, and
affective feelings.”144 Thus, inferentialists of self-knowledge deny that we must
infer our mental states based only on observations of overt behavior, as some
traditional theorists seem to think. On the contrary, they maintain that we
have access to all the evidence that is normally available when interpreting
other people’s mental states (behavioral evidence, speech interpretation,
social theories, current perceptual experience) as well as evidence that we
have about ourselves, such as our memories, inner speech, imaginings,
current stream of consciousness, and so on.
To summarize then, the inferentialists deny all the major claims that
traditional theorists make about self-knowledge and privileged access.
Inferentialists disagree that self-knowledge is metaphysically distinct, or
special, compared to other knowledge. They deny that we have privileged
access to our propositional attitudes and the majority of our mental states:
that is, we don’t gain knowledge of our beliefs immediately and noninferentially. The phenomenon of psychological immediacy – the fact that it
just feels as if we access our mental states directly and not via any process of
interpretation – is explained away as an illusion engendered by our increased
familiarity with ourselves, and the larger amount of evidence we have at our
disposal. And, finally, the inferentialists deny that self-knowledge is
epistemically superior to other kinds of knowledge. The knowledge I have of
my own mind, far from being secure, may routinely be error-ridden. While the
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traditional theorist maintains that regular self-ignorance and error is rare and
abnormal, and may be easily remedied by careful reflection, the inferentialist
argues that self-ignorance may be more common than we suppose. The
inferentialist does not accept that self-ignorance is necessarily a sign of
cognitive malfunction or gross irrationality: self-ignorance may simply be a
common side effect of the way our cognitive architecture is set up, just like
visual illusions are to be expected given the way our visual system operates.
Self-ignorance, far from being a sign that something is wrong may, in fact, be
a normal part of being human. As Cassam puts it, “some self-ignorance… is
inevitable and quite normal for humans. Not knowing what you want, believe
or hope doesn’t indicate that you are irrational or malfunctioning.”145

Looking Ahead: Thesis Statement

In this thesis, I’m going to argue that the inferential picture of self-knowledge
is correct, and thus the traditional view of self-knowledge ought to be rejected.
I will accept Gertler’s claim that the scope of privileged access is restricted to,
at the very most, just three kinds of mental states: occurrent propositional
attitudes, sensations, and thoughts. I am going to argue that not even this
highly restricted account of privileged access is enough to keep the traditional
view of self-knowledge safe because recent findings in psychology strongly
indicate that we lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes. In
particular, I’m going to argue that recent “choice blindness” studies in
cognitive science that build on Nisbett and Wilson’s seminal work into
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decision-making show that we lack privileged access to even our occurrent
propositional attitudes. It is my contention that the choice blindness
experimental paradigm puts enormous strain on many tenets of the
traditional view of self-knowledge while vindicating the inferential picture.
The inferential view of self-knowledge can comfortably accommodate the
choice blindness phenomenon, whereas the traditional view greatly struggles
to accommodate the experimental findings and what they imply about selfknowledge. The choice blindness studies also demonstrate that humans may
frequently confabulate about their own mental states. The phenomenon of
confabulation is further evidence in favor of the inferential view of selfknowledge and is very difficult for the traditional view to explain. I will argue
that because the inferential view of self-knowledge can explain, and take on
board, these recent scientific findings more successfully than the traditional
view of self-knowledge, the inferential view is more likely to be correct.
Now, Gertler may attempt to accommodate these empirical results in
the same way she accommodated the findings of Nisbet and Wilson, by
restricting the scope of privileged access even further. After all, the restriction
of privileged access to just three kinds of mental states “has done little to
diminish the importance of introspection in philosophy,”146 so what harm can
it do to restrict the scope even further? Thus, in response to these empirical
findings, the traditional theorist of self-knowledge could restrict the domain of
privileged access even further to just encompass sensations and thoughts.
These findings do not demonstrate that we lack privileged access entirely:
they do not prove that privileged access does not exist. As long as we have
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privileged access to at least some mental states, the traditional view of selfknowledge is safe.
However, I maintain that this option is not available to the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge because privileged access to occurrent propositional
attitudes is an essential component of the traditional view. While it is true that
the empirical results I will present do not touch the concept of privileged
access to phenomenal states, this does not matter. Even if we do, as a matter
of fact, possess privileged access to sensations and thoughts this is not enough
to save the traditional view of self-knowledge. In order to challenge the
traditional view of self-knowledge, then, I don’t need to go so far as to
disprove the very concept of privileged access itself.
An essential feature of the traditional view is privileged access to at least some
propositional attitudes: if we lack this, then the traditional view is doomed as
a viable account of self-knowledge.
Why can’t the traditional view of self-knowledge abandon the concept
of privileged access to propositional attitudes? Why is this an essential feature
of the traditional view? As I have just discussed, the traditional view of selfknowledge has a rival: the inferentialist (or interpretivist) view of selfknowledge. The core thesis of interpretivism is that we don’t have privileged
access to the vast majority of our mental states, and we are forced to interpret
what our mental states are. In particular, interpretivist accounts of selfknowledge maintain that we lack privileged access to propositional attitudes –
beliefs, desires, hopes, etc., - and must infer, or interpret, them instead. On
one influential interpretivist account, Carruthers’s ISA (interpretive sensory
access) theory, “our access to our own propositional attitudes is almost always
interpretive…utilizing the same kinds of inferences and many of the same
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sorts of data that are employed when attributing attitudes to other people.”147
The core claim of any interpretivist account of self-knowledge is that we lack
privileged access to our propositional attitudes and so must interpret them
instead. Interpretivists do not go so far as to claim that privileged access itself
does not exist: indeed, Carruthers himself claims that “we can have
transparent, non-interpretivist access to our own sensory states.”148 The
dividing line between interpretivist accounts of self-knowledge and the
traditional view, then, is not whether they postulate the existence of privileged
access itself. Both views can, and do, accommodate privileged access –
privileged access as a concept is not in dispute. The dividing line between the
two views is whether we have privileged access to propositional attitudes. The
traditional view maintains that we have privileged access to at least some
propositional attitudes, some of the time. The interpretivist view, on the other
hand, maintains that we entirely lack privileged access to our propositional
attitudes: we always interpret our propositional attitudes, and never have
direct access to them. As Carruthers puts it, the heart of the neo-Cartesian
(traditional) view of self-knowledge is that “one has privileged access to some
subset of one’s mental states of each of the main common kinds.”149 [emphasis
mine] The main common kinds of mental state include “perceptions,
judgments, decisions”150 and so by necessity include propositional attitudes.
The interpretivist view of self-knowledge denies that we have privileged access
to each of the main common kinds of mental states: “it holds that we never
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have…privileged knowledge of…propositional attitudes. On the contrary, our
access to almost all such attitudes is interpretive rather than transparent.”151
Thus, privileged access to propositional attitudes is essential for the
traditional view of self-knowledge, and why the traditional view cannot
survive if it restricts the scope of privileged access even further to just
encompass sensory states and thoughts. If the traditional theorist restricts the
scope of privileged access such that it excludes propositional attitudes, then
the traditional view of self-knowledge will collapse into the interpretivist view.
If we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes, the
traditional theorist will have to concede that we gain knowledge of our beliefs
and desires via interpretation or inference. But this is precisely what the
interpretivist view of self-knowledge claims. Thus, the very identity of the
traditional view of self-knowledge depends upon privileged access to
propositional attitudes. If we don’t have privileged access to propositional
attitudes, then the traditional view is doomed.
Thus, in order to significantly challenge the traditional view of selfknowledge one does not have to go so far as to demonstrate that privileged
access itself does not exist. All that is required to cause problems for the
traditional view is to cast doubt on whether we really have privileged access to
occurrent propositional attitudes. If it turns out that we do indeed lack
privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes, then there will be
nothing to distinguish the traditional view of self-knowledge from the
interpretivist view. The traditional view of self-knowledge, then, needs to hold
onto the concept of privileged access to propositional attitudes at all costs. In
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the subsequent chapters, I will outline empirical evidence which strongly
suggests that we lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes. In
light of this evidence, I conclude that the traditional view of self-knowledge is
significantly weakened, and consequently, the interpretivist view is the only
viable epistemological account of self-knowledge
In the next chapter, I will discuss Nisbett and Wilson’s influential
experiments into decision-making and introspection, before examining in
detail the choice blindness paradigm. I will later argue that the choice
blindness experiment results pose a great challenge to the traditional view of
self-knowledge while being fully accommodated by the interpretivist account.
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CHAPTER 3
“TELLING MORE THAN WE CAN KNOW”, CHOICE BLINDNESS,
AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

In the previous chapter, I discussed the traditional and the inferential views of
self-knowledge. The broad distinction between the two theories is that the
traditional view maintains that we possess immediate, privileged access to our
propositional attitudes; whereas the inferentialist view maintains that we lack
privileged access to our propositional attitudes and thus must infer them. In
this thesis, I shall argue that there are psychological findings which strongly
cast doubt on the idea that we have privileged access to occurrent
propositional attitudes. The traditional view struggles to accommodate these
results, while the inferentialist view actually anticipates and fully explains
them. Consequently, the traditional view of self-knowledge ought to be
rejected in favor of the inferentialist picture.
In this chapter, I will outline two of the most important experimental
paradigms that have that have explored introspection and self-knowledge; and
I will discuss how these experiments challenge the traditional view of selfknowledge. I will begin by examining in detail Nisbett and Wilson’s famous
studies into decision-making. The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated
to discussing the choice blindness experimental paradigm, the ‘spiritual
successor’ to Nisbett and Wilson’s research. After examining the phenomenon
of choice blindness in some detail, I will discuss how the choice blindness
experimental paradigm manages to overcome some of the problems with
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Nisbett and Wilson’s study. I will finish by addressing some criticisms of the
choice blindness paradigm.

Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments into decision-making

In the 1970s, Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson published their influential
research into decision-making in which they explored the extent to which we
have introspective access to cognitive processes which underlie our
judgments, decisions, and choices.152 In one famous experiment, Nisbett and
Wilson presented shoppers in a mall with four pairs of stockings in a row, and,
after allowing them to examine the stockings, asked them “which article of
clothing was the best quality…and why they had chosen the article they
had.”153 A consumer survey of this kind is commonplace and routine: we are
often asked to explain the reasons for choosing one particular item over
another. In Nisbett and Wilson’s study, however, there was a twist: all of the
stockings were identical, so no pair was of better quality than any other pair.
The task demand, then, was rather more unusual: it is not common for us to
be asked which item is the best and why when all the items are identical!
In previous studies, Nisbett and Wilson noticed that in cases where all
the items in an array are identical, study participants did not choose at
random: “there was a pronounced left to right position effect, such that the
rightmost object in the array was heavily over chosen.”154 Nisbett and Wilson
Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We
Can Know”
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thus inferred that, in cases where the stockings were identical, the
participant’s final choice was strongly influenced by the position of the
stockings in the display. In other words, the cause of their decision was not
some feature of the stockings themselves but the fact that the stockings were
at the far right-hand side. What Nisbett and Wilson were interested in was
whether any participants noticed that the position of the stockings influenced
their choice.
There were 52 participants in the stocking experiment, and “only two
subjects voiced a suspicion that the stockings were identical.”155 Ten
participants exhibited hesitancy in choosing a pair but quickly chose when
prompted.156 This could be interpreted as a sign that they felt something was
suspicious: nevertheless, the vast majority of the participants either did not
notice that the stockings were identical, or chose not to voice their concerns.
Nisbett and Wilson reported that most of the participants examined the
stockings thoroughly but briskly, before confidently announcing their choice
and reasons. Just a quarter of the subjects required prompting from the
experimenters to get them to “explain the basis of their choices,”157 and the
rest provided their reasons freely. And what were their reasons for choosing
one pair over the others? Nisbett and Wilson recorded 80 distinct reasons,
most of which cited the “knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity, or workmanship
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that they felt to be superior.”158 The participants’ reasons, then, clearly
referred to qualities of the stockings themselves and not to any extraneous
environmental factors. In fact, “not a single subject mentioned the position of
the stockings as a reason for the choice,”159 and only one participant conceded
that the stocking’s position could have had an impact on their decision making
(and she was a psychology student, so perhaps was more willing to
countenance such counter-intuitive findings.) Indeed, when the
experimenters suggested the possibility that the position of the stockings
might have had something to do with their choice, the rest of the subjects
“denied it, usually with a worried glance at the interviewer suggesting that
they felt they had misunderstood the question or were dealing with a
madman.”160
Two things are noteworthy about this experiment. Firstly, none of the
participants had any insight into the real factor which influenced their
decision, which was the position of the stockings in the display. They did not
cite this as a reason, or motivation, for their decision, and they did not
countenance this as a genuine explanation for their choice. Thus, even though
the stimuli (the position of the stockings) affected their choices, they seemed
to be utterly unaware that the stimulus was present and having any effect.
Secondly, crucially, the participants’ lack of awareness of the position effect
did not prevent them from reporting at least some reason for why they
selected a particular pair over others. The participants did not shrug and say,
Wilson, Timothy DeCamp, and Richard E Nisbett. "The Accuracy of Verbal
Reports” p.124.
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“I don’t know why I picked them,” nor did they say something like “well, the
stockings were all identical, so I chose at random.” Instead, the participants
gave confident and elaborated reasons for why they chose the way they did:
reasons that could not be true given that all the stockings were identical and
so no one pair was better than any other in terms of quality, thickness,
sheerness, and so on. So, in summary, the participants did not know the
factors underlying their choice, and yet they happily reported reasons that
could not possibly have been the basis for their final decision. Nisbett and
Wilson refer to this phenomenon as ‘telling more than we can know’: the
subjects don’t know which processes or factors caused their decision, and yet
this doesn’t stop them from proffering a detailed explanation anyway. As
Nisbett and Wilson put it “people sometimes make assertions about mental
events to which they may have no access and these assertions may bear little
resemblance to actual events.”161
On the basis of this, and other similar experiments which demonstrate
that subjects often fail to report the factors which actually influenced their
choices, Nisbett and Wilson reached the controversial conclusion that “we
have little or no introspective access to processes involved in decision
making.”162 They proposed that we “do not have direct access to higher order
mental processes that are involved in evaluation, judgment and problem
solving.”163 Commonsensically, and according to some traditional theorists of
self-knowledge, we do have access to the causes and factors which influenced
Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We
Can Know”, p.247.
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our decision making, and can observe how these led to our eventual choice.
We can routinely explain why we chose the way we did and elucidate our
reasons. Nisbett and Wilson deny that this is the case. All we have access to is
the end product of this decision-making process, which is the thing we
actually choose. The causes and factors that influenced this choice are
invisible to us – we simply don’t have access to them.164 So the participants in
the stocking study would know that it was this particular pair of stockings that
they chose, but they would have no insight into why they wanted this pair.
Now, some traditional theorists of self-knowledge agree with Nisbett and
Wilson and deny that we have privileged access to the causes of our behavior.
Nisbett and Wilson’s findings, then, don’t inform them of anything new in this
regard. However, what should be surprising to even these philosophers is the
fact that participants confidently and unhesitatingly gave reasons for why they
made their decision that couldn’t possibly be accurate.
If participants had direct introspective access to the cognitive processes
underlying their decision, one would expect them to have insight into the
factors which directly influenced their choice (such as the position of the
stockings); and one would also expect that they would provide accurate verbal
reports about why they chose the way they did. Because they do not have
insight into what influenced their decisions and do not provide accurate
reports, Nisbett and Wilson deny that participants have direct introspective
access to their reasons: “the explanations that subjects offer for their
behavior…are so far removed from the processes that investigators presume to
have occurred as to give grounds for considerable doubt that there is direct
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access to these processes.”165 But if participants are not directly accessing the
cognitive processes that underlie decision making while introspecting, what,
exactly, are they doing when they are asked to explain their reasons; and what
is the basis for the verbal reports they produce? Nisbett and Wilson theorized
that participants rarely, if ever, access their “personal founts” of privileged
self-knowledge when asked what caused or influenced their decision. Rather,
people construct their reasons after the fact by relying on “prior causal
theories about the effects of particular stimuli on particular responses,”166 and
they make “judgments about the particular representativeness of potential
causes and given effects.”167
According to the traditional view of self-knowledge, participants make
(or at least, should make) decisions based on consciously accessible reasons:
they chose this pair of stockings for the reason that it was the softest or the
sheerest, and so on. Later, when asked why they chose that pair of stockings,
they introspectively access the reason for their decision and then verbally
report it. If, for example, the reason they chose the pair was because it was the
softest, they will introspect, directly access the reason (which was “I chose this
because it was the softest”) and then report this reason to the experimenter.
However, Nisbett and Wilson propose that something quite different is going
on. Participants make a decision first, and then refer to a ‘causal theory’ which
concerns ‘good reasons for choosing one pair of stockings over another’ when
asked to report the reason for that decision. On the basis of this implicit causal
Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We
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theory, the participants construct a post-hoc reason that seems most plausible
and appropriate given the circumstances. They pick first, and make up a
convincing reason later.
What are these ‘causal theories,’ and where do they come from?
According to Nisbett and Wilson, we construct causal theories about the world
in order to make predictions about the effects of stimuli. ‘Causal theories’ are
theories about which types of stimuli cause particular effects, and incorporate
“judgments about how plausible it is that the stimulus would have influenced
the response.”168 Nisbett and Wilson speculate that our theories about the
cause and effect relations between stimuli employ “ a sort of
representativeness heuristic…Thus a particular stimulus will be deemed a
representative cause if the stimulus and response are linked via a rule, an
implicit theory, [or] a presumed empirical covariation.”169 In the case of the
stocking experiment, “the subjects were making quite simply a
representativeness judgment…the knit, sheerness, and weave of nylon
stockings seem representative of reasons for liking them.”170 These causal
theories can be developed via many diverse sources: from direct experience
with stimuli (“Through personal experience I know that if I throw a brick at a
window it will smash”), through knowledge of rules (“I’m confident he will
stop his car because the light is red”), or via socializing and cultural norms
(“they will go to the prom together because he gave her flowers.”)171 We rely on
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a causal theory whenever we make a judgment about whether a stimuli caused
a particular effect, or make a judgment about what kind of stimuli could cause
such an effect.
Nisbett and Wilson are keen to stress that it is not the case that “people
will always be wrong in their verbal reports about the effects of stimuli on
their responses.”172 Now, it could be argued that when our verbal reports are
accurate this is when introspection comes into play: accurate verbal reports
are due to us directly introspecting the causal factors that led to our choices.
And, furthermore, inaccurate verbal reports are caused by a reliance on mere
causal theories when our mental states, for whatever reason, are not
introspectively accessible. However, Nisbett and Wilson reject this argument.
When people produce accurate reports it’s not because they have directly
introspected their reasons for their choice: rather, people will produce
accurate reports when the theory they rely on “corresponds to the actual
causes that influence the responses.”173 And when verbal reports are
inaccurate, this is “not because the theories are in error in every case but
merely because they are incorrectly applied in the particular instance.”174 The
causal theories themselves, when utilized in the right context, may be highly
reliable and lead to accurate verbal reports. Inaccurate reports are not
necessarily due to faulty theories but may be caused by solid theories being
applied in the wrong circumstances. Nisbett and Wilson speculate that our
verbal reports are highly likely to be accurate when we are fully aware of the
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relevant influential stimuli, the stimuli are very plausible causes of the effect,
and when few or no “plausible but noninfluential factors are available.”175
Thus, the fact that our verbal reports stem from causal theories, as opposed to
a report of directly introspected reasons, does not imply that theoretically
generated reports will always, or mostly, be faulty or inaccurate. If the
conditions are right, we will reliably produce accurate reports on the basis of
causal theories. Causal theories, in the right conditions, are highly reliable and
yield accurate verbal reports.
It is also important to note that, while Nisbett and Wilson are adamant
that we lack introspective access to certain mental processes and mental
states, they do not argue that we lack direct introspective access to any mental
states whatsoever. On the contrary, just like traditional theorists of selfknowledge, Nisbett and Wilson take it for granted that we possess privileged
introspective access to many different kinds of mental states when they assert
that “we do indeed have direct access to a great storehouse of private
knowledge.”[emphasis mine]176 While they do not outright state which kinds
of mental states we have direct access to, Nisbett and Wilson imply that we
have privileged access to occurrent perceptual states and the content of
memories. Furthermore, in a review article, White maintains that, according
to Nisbett and Wilson, “personal historical facts, the present focus of
attention, current sensations, emotions, evaluations, plans…knowledge of
prior idiosyncratic reactions to a stimulus category…and knowledge of
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intentions”177 are all introspectively accessible. Nisbett and Wilson, then, are
not total skeptics about introspective access: on the contrary, they agree with
traditional theorists of self-knowledge and admit that many of our mental
states are available to direct introspection. While Nisbett and Wilson are not
offering a purely inferential account that attempts to do away with
introspection altogether, they are keen to emphasize that no introspection of
cognitive processes occurs: we are always constructing reasons on the basis of
previously constructed, implicit theories.
At this point, it is worth pausing to consider what Nisbett and Wilson
mean when they talk about ‘introspective access’ to mental states. One
criticism of Nisbett and Wilson, put forward by White, is that they rely on the
idea of ‘introspection,’ and thus ‘genuine introspective reports,’ without giving
any substantial explanation about what they take introspection to be, or what
qualifies as a genuine introspective report. White argues that without a clear
contrast case between verbal reports generated via direct introspective access,
and reports generated on the basis of theories, it is not possible to test Nisbett
and Wilson’s hypothesis that many of our verbal reports have a theoretical
basis. As White puts it, “it is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain the nature
and extent of involvement of ‘introspective’ access, whatever that is, in the
generation of causal reports.”178
Nisbett and Wilson do not outright define “direct introspective access,”
but it is possible to work out what they may have in mind. They state that
White, Peter A. "Knowing More About What We Can Tell: 'Introspective
Access' and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later." British Journal of
Psychology 79 (1988): 13-45, p.15.
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23, no. 4 (1987): 311-15.
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direct introspection enables us to “observe directly the workings of [our] own
minds,”179 which implies that introspection is a perceptual or quasi-perceptual
faculty. Their theory is thus an ‘inner-sense’ theory of self-knowledge and not
an acquaintance account. They also mention that introspection necessarily
involves conscious awareness of mental states: introspection entails conscious
awareness, while a lack of introspection means there is no conscious
awareness of the relevant mental state or process. For instance, we conscious
awareness, and thus introspective access, to processes having to do with
memory and perception.180 On the other hand, Wilson states that “it is silly to
assume that people do not directly experience feelings…like pain. There are
times when we know directly that we feel pain.”181 We thus have a conscious
experience of pain, and so have privileged access to that sensation. The tight
coupling of direct introspective access with conscious awareness is continued
in Wilson’s later work Strangers to Ourselves. Wilson states that “people
cannot directly examine how many parts of their minds work, such as basic
processes of perception…because these parts of the mind are inaccessible to
conscious awareness.”182 He also states that a lack of direct access to mental
processes entails they are “inaccessible to consciousness.”183 Furthermore,
White himself acknowledges that, even though Nisbett and Wilson do not
directly define what they mean by introspection, it is clear that “introspective
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access refers to the gaining of knowledge…about mental activity through the
perceptual aspect of consciousness - conscious awareness.”184 Thus, direct
introspective access is linked with conscious awareness: to have direct
introspective access to a mental process is to be able to become consciously
aware of that process.
Following the traditional theorists of self-knowledge, Nisbett and
Wilson also imply that ‘direct’ introspective access means ‘non-inferential’
introspective access. To have ‘direct’ access to a mental state is to perceive, or
experience, it immediately without having to infer, or observe, what the
mental state is. Wilson conflates ‘direct observation’ of mental states with
introspective access and pairs ‘inference’ of mental states with a lack of
introspective access.185 The picture that Nisbett and Wilson build of
‘introspection,’ then, is of a mental faculty which grants immediate, noninferential, perceptual (or perceptual-like) conscious awareness of mental
processes and mental states. So, when a mental state, or process, is directly
introspected, we gain conscious awareness of that mental state or process.
Nisbett and Wilson’s picture of introspection, then, is something that a
traditional theorist of self-knowledge could endorse: there is nothing in their
concept of introspection which particularly clashes with the traditional view.
White’s objection that it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell the
difference between an introspectively generated report and an inferred report
loses its sting when one considers that Nisbett and Wilson do indeed provide a
substantial description of what they have in mind when they talk about direct
introspective access; as well as detailing which mental states are directly
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introspectable and which are not. Nisbett and Wilson are quite clear that it is
not possible to directly introspect mental processes, but it is possible to gain
direct introspective access to various mental states like pain, certain emotions,
the contents of memories, and propositional attitudes. According to their
theory, a verbal report of pain is highly likely to be an introspectively
generated report, whereas a report about what caused us to choose a
particular product must be constructed on the basis of an inference. The
contrast between the two kinds of reports falls out of Nisbett and Wilson’s
theory and can be empirically tested. For instance, if there really are two
distinct methods by which verbal reports are generated, it is possible that
introspected reports have different features from the non-introspected ones.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, even the most ardent
inferentialist is wary about proposing a wholly inferential account of selfknowledge, in which we must infer that we are cold, thirsty, or in pain. The
vast majority of inferentialists accept that we have privileged access to at least
our current sensory states: for them, the defining feature of inferentialism is
that it denies we have privileged access to non-phenomenal mental states, like
propositional attitudes. Carruthers, for instance, happily grants that we have
privileged access to sensory data (sensations, feelings, percepts, and so on)
while proposing that we interpret everything else. At the very least, it seems as
if we don’t have to infer, or interpret, that we are in pain; and it further
appears that I find out I’m in pain (by feeling it) in a different way from how I
find out you are in pain. The inferentialists part ways from the traditional
theorists, however, when it comes to propositional attitudes. Recall from the
previous chapter that, for many traditional theorists, privileged access to our
own propositional attitudes (like beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.,) underpins
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our rationality, personhood, responsibility, and freedom. Thus, the
inferentialists can concede that we have direct access to our sensations, but
they draw the line at propositional attitudes. The point of contention between
an inferentialist account of self-knowledge and a traditional account, then, is
not whether we possess privileged access to some mental states (as both
parties can agree that such a thing exists) but whether we have privileged
access to propositional attitudes.
Nisbett and Wilson, however, do not restrict the domain of privileged
access to just feelings and sensations, as inferentialists do They propose that
we have introspective access to a wide range of mental states, including
propositional attitudes. And because they concede that we do have direct,
non-inferential, access to propositional attitudes, this puts their theory firmly
in the traditional camp. As Goldman puts it, by acknowledging that we have
introspective access to a wider variety of mental states than just sensations
Nisbett and Wilson “concede to privileged-access theorists everything they
really want or deserve.”186 Gertler, too, maintains that no responsible
traditional theorist would ever postulate that we possess direct access to
mental processes, reasons, or causes in the first place and so Nisbett and
Wilson’s findings are not damaging to the traditional view. If, as Gertler
claims, it is commonsensical that we lack privileged access to causal relations
and the reasons for our decisions, then traditional theorists would embrace
the explanation that we must use some other method, like inference, to work
out what our reasons are. Nisbett and Wilson, far from proposing a
revolutionary idea about self-knowledge, have merely presented yet another
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traditional theory.187They cannot properly be said to be inferentialists about
self-knowledge.
There are, to my mind, two reasons why Nisbett and Wilson feel the
need to maintain that we do have direct introspective access to propositional
attitudes, and why they do not adopt a fully inferentialist position. I will argue,
however, that the reasons they give for thinking that we have privileged access
to our propositional attitudes are not compelling, and thus it is possible to
expunge the concept of privileged access to propositional attitudes from their
theory. Firstly, Nisbett and Wilson maintain that directly introspected mental
states (such as our current thoughts, the current focus of attention,
perceptions, feelings, beliefs, intentions, and so on) often serve as input, as
evidence, to our causal theories. This directly accessed ‘private content’ allows
the individual (on occasion) “to be more accurate in his reports about the
causes of his behavior than an observer would be.”188 According to Nisbett and
Wilson, the fact that we do possess direct introspective access to some mental
states explains why we sometimes have superior knowledge about the reasons
for our actions when compared to observers. Suppose, for example, myself
While it appears that Nisbett and Wilson do indeed assume that we have
privileged access to some propositional attitudes, one could also argue that
they are not seriously committed to this assumption. As Kornblith points out,
it made dialectical sense in their time to simply assume for the sake of
argument that we possess privileged access to propositional attitudes. In 1977
it was controversial enough to claim that we lack privileged access to mental
processes, and so further claiming that we lack privileged access to mental
states makes their theory even more difficult to swallow. Simply put, in the
scope of their paper, Nisbett and Wilson do not need to assume a
controversial view, namely that we lack privileged access to propositional
attitudes, when all they wish to concretely establish is that we lack privileged
access to mental processes. Their insistence that we possess privileged access
to propositional attitudes, then, may be more for the sake of argument as
opposed to a view that they sincerely endorse.
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Can Know”, p.256.
187

95

and a third-party observer are trying to figure out my reasons for asserting
that “the party was fun.” The observer will have access to my behavior, my
verbal reports, and a causal theory about ‘why people say that parties are fun.’
I will have knowledge of my behavior, my verbal reports, and a similar causal
theory; but in addition to the evidence available to the observer I will also
have access to what Nisbett and Wilson refer to as ‘private content.’ I will have
access to personal memories of the party, as well as “a host of personal
historical facts.”189 I will also know what my current locus of attention is, and I
will have access to my current thoughts, feelings, and sensations. All of this
additional data may serve as input to enrich my causal theory about ‘why
parties are fun’ and may aid me in crafting a more accurate verbal report than
an observer. In short, the superior accuracy of our verbal reports about our
own mental states requires an explanation, and Nisbett and Wilson propose
that the best explanation for this superior accuracy is that we do indeed
possess direct introspective access to many of our mental states. Just because
we are more reliable in reporting our own mental states does not necessarily
imply that we have privileged access to this additional insider information.
Ryle, for example, argued that we don’t have privileged access to our own
mental states and explained that the reason we know ourselves better than
other people because we spend more time with ourselves than with anyone
else. In other words, I may indeed have more information about myself, and
this increases my accuracy when reporting my mental states. However, it is
not strictly necessary to postulate privileged access to explain this accuracy.
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Interestingly, in recent years, Nisbett and Wilson have wavered in their
commitment to the idea that having privileged access to certain mental states
actually improves verbal report accuracy and reliability in general. Wilson
recently stated that “averaging across several studies, there seems to be no net
advantage of having privileged information about ourselves. The amount of
accuracy obtained by people about the causes of their responses is nearly
identical with the amount of accuracy obtained by strangers.”190 Nisbett et al.
also undertook a study where subjects were required to make judgments
about a job candidate and produce verbal reports. At the same time, observers
were asked to make predictions about the kind of verbal reports the subjects
would produce. Nisbett noted that “the accuracy of observer predictions
equaled the accuracy of subject reports…subject reports were accurate if and
only if observer reports were also accurate.”191 Furthermore, the subject and
observer reports were so similar (“virtually identical”)that “they must have
been generated by similar processes, that is, by reliance on similar [causal]
theories.”192 This lead Nisbett to state that “such instances of subject
superiority over observers may turn out to be relatively rare.”193
Thus, even though Nisbett and Wilson’s theory grants that we directly
introspect many mental states because it improves our reliability and
accuracy, it appears that they have since back tracked from the claim that
privileged access results in more accurate verbal reports. Even though our
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privileged introspective access to propositional attitudes does not, apparently,
increase our verbal report accuracy, or even results in reports that are
noticeably different from third-party observer’s reports, Nisbett and Wilson
still insist that we do have direct introspective access to a wide variety of
mental states, including beliefs and desires: it just doesn’t appear to do very
much. One worry is that if there is no difference between first person and
third person verbal reports, and if the first-person reports are never more
accurate than the third person verbal reports, then direct introspective access
appears to be explanatorily otiose. We have an introspective faculty which
works in tandem with inference that doesn’t seem to do very much for us (in
terms of epistemic reliability, at least). In other words, Nisbett and Wilson’s
theory could function just as well without reference to direct introspective
access to propositional attitudes, because the experimental results can be
solely explained by subjects using inference and implicit causal theories to
construct their verbal reports. Furthermore, the very thing that direct
introspective access was supposed to explain – the superior accuracy of firstpersonal verbal reports compared to observer’s reports – does not appear to
exist. If first personal verbal reports are not, in fact, more accurate than thirdparty verbal reports, there is no need to postulate direct introspective access
to propositional attitudes.
There is, however, a second reason why Nisbett and Wilson maintain
that we have direct introspective access to propositional attitudes. If, when we
proffer explanations for our choices, we are relying on cultural scripts and
constructing theories, why does it feel, from the inside, like we are directly
introspecting? And if we are so often unaware of the factors that influence our
choices, why are we unaware of our own unawareness? Why do we simply
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not notice that we don’t have access to the factors that influence our choices?
There is a persistent illusion of global introspective access that needs to be
explained. Thus, Nisbett and Wilson are keen to insist that we have direct
introspective access to some mental states because it helps to explain why we
succumb to this persistent ‘illusion of introspection.’ Given the fact that we do
have direct introspective access to our propositional attitudes, Nisbett and
Wilson postulate that we mistakenly extrapolate that we have global
introspective access to all aspects of our cognition, including cognitive
processes. As they put it: “the individual does possess a great deal of accurate
knowledge and much additional knowledge that is at least superior to that of
any observer, [so] it becomes less surprising that people would persist in
believing that they have, in addition, direct access to their own cognitive
processes.”194 There is thus a presumption generated that we have universal
introspective access. This explanation, however, still leaves the illusion of
global introspective access something of a puzzle. For instance, Nisbett and
Wilson explain that when we are asked about our reasons, we do something
“that may have felt like introspection but which in fact may have only been a
simple judgment of the extent to which input was… a plausible cause of
output.”195 This leaves it rather mysterious as to how a judgment based on
inference can be taken to ‘feel’ like introspection. Nisbett and Wilson
themselves appreciate the oddity of this when they exclaim that “the only
mystery is why people are so poor at telling the difference between private
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facts that can be known with near certainty and mental processes to which
there may be no access at all.”196
There is, however, another explanation for the ‘illusion of direct
introspective access,’ presented by Gopnik, that does not necessarily rely on
the existence of direct introspective access to mental states.197 Like Nisbett
and Wilson, Gopnik proposes that we do not have direct introspective access
to many of our mental states and mental processes. Despite this, we succumb
to an illusion that we apprehend our own minds immediately and directly via
a special first-personal method while believing that we apprehend the minds
of others in a completely different way, via inference. As Gopnik states, “[we]
believe that our relations to our own beliefs and desires are different from our
relations to those of others. We believe that we know our own beliefs and
desires directly, but that we must infer the beliefs and desires of other
people.”198 Gopnik maintains that the commonsense belief that we possess
direct access to our own mental states is false: in many cases, we apprehend
our own mental states in exactly the same way as we apprehend the mental
states of other people – via inference and observation. Note that, similarly to
Nisbett and Wilson, (and indeed, most inferentialists) Gopnik is not making
the stronger claim that we apprehend all mental states in the same way as we
apprehend the mental states of others. For instance, Gopnik thinks that in the
case of “simple sensations” like pain, it may very well be the case that the
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method by which we apprehend we are in pain is different from the way we
apprehend that others are in pain.
Gopnik uses the example of a particular belief, the belief that mental
states are intentional (or, in other words, that beliefs represent the world and
can be misleading) as a model of a mental state that we lack direct, privileged
access to. Gopnik claims that we possess a commonsensical, but false,
intuition that “knowledge of intentionality comes directly and reliably from
our psychological experience. I know that my beliefs refer to the world – but
that they may be false, they may change…simply by experiencing these facts
about them.”199 While knowledge of the intentionality of my own beliefs is
thought to be accessed directly, we think that knowledge of the intentionality
of other people’s beliefs must be inferred.
Gopnik argues that it is an empirical question whether mental states
are indeed directly accessed via a unique first-personal method, or whether we
use the same method to gain knowledge of our own mental states and the
mental states of others. While Nisbett and Wilson investigate this issue within
a social psychology experimental paradigm, Gopnik’s experiments take place
within the domain of developmental psychology. Gopnik’s basic argument is
that very young children do not succumb to the illusion of first-person access
and have very different beliefs about intentionality compared to adults.
Gopnik argues that young children do not utilize a special first-person method
to understand their own behavior and beliefs while using a different method
to infer the beliefs of other people. Instead, it seems that children use the
same method to understand their own mental states and behavior, as well as
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other’s mental states and behavior, and this neatly explains why they make the
same kinds of errors in both domains.
For example, in the false-belief experiment, children are shown a pencil
box and asked what they think is inside. They usually reply “pencils.” The
children are then shown that the pencil box contains candy, much to their
surprise. A new person enters the room and is shown the pencil box. The
children are asked what the new person will think is inside the box. Threeyear-olds state that the person will think that candy is inside. They do not yet
seem to grasp that the person can possess false beliefs about the contents of
the box. Four-year-olds, however, state that the person will think that the box
contains pencils. Notably, when four-year0olds are asked what they initially
thought was in the box they reply “pencils,” but three-year-olds answer
“candy”. As Gopnik puts it “children make errors about their own immediately
past states that are similar to the errors they make about the states of
others.”200 Gopnik argues that if privileged access accounts are correct “we
should predict that however erroneous children’s views of the psychological
states of others might be, they would not make similar errors in their
understanding of their own psychological states.”201 However, the
experimental results do not support the privileged access account. Three-yearolds make systematic errors about their own mental states, as well as the
mental states of others. The fact that they make similar mistakes when
reporting their own mental states, as when they report the mental states of
others, suggests they are using the same method to work out both what their
own mental states are, and what the mental states of others are. An error in
200
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the method leads to a similar error in both self and other mental state
attribution. If children really possess direct, privileged access to their own
mental states, it is very difficult to explain why they make the same kinds of
errors when reporting their own mental states as when they report the mental
states of others.
According to Gopnik, the method that very young children use to work
out their own mental states, as well as the mental states of others, is inference
based off an implicit theory of intentionality: “the idea of intentionality is a
theoretical construct, one we invent in our early lives to explain a wide variety
of evidence about ourselves and others…this theoretical construct is equally
applicable to ourselves and others.”202 Young children try to understand the
mental states and behavior of themselves and others by applying a theory of
intentionality. The reason they make mistakes regarding the beliefs of
themselves and others is because their theory of intentionality is faulty. When
children get older, they update their theory of intentionality, and they do not
make the same systematic errors. At all times, however, the same theory of
intentionality is applied to the self as well as others: we never use a unique
first-personal method to grasp the intentionality of our own beliefs. The
reason the three-year-olds make the same mistake when reporting their
mental states and the mental states of others is because they are applying the
same faulty theory to themselves and others. When the children reach the age
of four, their theory of intentionality becomes more sophisticated and
accurate, and this enables them to correctly report their own beliefs as well as
the beliefs of others in the false belief experimental paradigm.
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It is important to note that this picture is complicated somewhat by
more recent studies which seem to suggest that three-year-olds may be
capable of passing the false belief task. Clements and Perner, for example,
argue that the difference in ability between three and four-year-olds on the
false belief tasks is not due to a difference in theory, as Gopnik proposes.
Rather, the reason three-year-olds fail the task is because they do not yet
possess an explicit understanding of the concept of belief. Three-year-olds
only have an implicit concept of belief, which means that they can’t verbally
articulate or explain the concept of belief to experimenters. Clements and
Perner hypothesized that if one measures the children’s implicit beliefs (by
way of eye gaze) as opposed to explicit beliefs (by way of a verbal report), then
the three-year-olds will be just as capable of passing the false belief task as the
four-year-olds.203
In their study they ran the false belief task as usual, but instead of
asking the three-year-olds a probing question like “what will she think is in
the box?” the experimenters track the children’s eye gaze. In their study, a
character plays with a toy at location A and leaves it there. The character
leaves the scene and the toy is moved to location B. Thus, when the character
returns and looks for his toy, if the children have a concept of false belief their
gaze should go to the original location A. If the children don’t even have an
implicit concept of false belief they will look at the new location B.
Clements and Perner’s hypothesis was vindicated. Children as young as
two years 11 months passed the implicit false belief task (by looking at the
original location), but they failed the explicit false belief task. As Clements and
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Perner state “this very sharp and early sign of implicit understanding of false
belief contrasts strongly with explicit responses to the
experimenter’s…question.”204 Thus, it seems that Gopnik may be incorrect to
state that very young children possess a different theory of false belief. It looks
more likely that young children have the same theory of belief as older
children, but they are not yet able to explicitly articulate this concept of false
belief.
In another similar study, Onishi and Baillargeon demonstrated that
children as young as 15 months understood the concept of false beliefs.205
Very young infants can be acclimatized to a scene by watching an action over
and over again. When the scene changes in some way, the children stare
longer. Thus, a longer gaze indicates that the children have detected the
change and are puzzled or surprised by it – their expectations have been
violated. Onishi and Baillargeon ran a false belief task in an expectation
violation format. The children (with a mean age of 15 months) watched an
actor play with a toy and then place it in a yellow box. The actor left the scene,
and the toy was moved to a green box. The experimenter hypothesized that if
the children possessed a concept of false belief they should exhibit surprise if
the actor looks for the toy in the green box. The actor should search for the toy
in the last place he found, which is the yellow box. Sure enough, “the infants
expected the actor to search on the basis of her belief about the toy’s location.
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These results suggest that 15-month-old infants already possess (at least in a
rudimentary and implicit form) a representational theory of mind.”206
Again, this experimental result suggests that Gopnik is incorrect to
postulate that children before the age of four have a different, faulty theory of
false belief which explains why they fail the task. It looks as if it is not the case
that two and three-year-olds have a faulty theory of belief which leads to them
failing the task: rather, the evidence suggests that two and three-year-olds
have the same theory, or concept, of belief that four-year-olds do but the
standard false belief task is too difficult for them to pass. The two and three
year-olds struggle to pass the verbal false belief task because it is too
cognitively complex for them at this stage of their development. But, as we
have seen, they easily pass the implicit false belief task which tracks eye gaze
or expectations. So, it seems as if the two and three- year-olds have the same
theory of belief as the four-year-olds, but they are not able to deploy it in some
tasks due to excessive task demand.
One problem for Gopnik is that these findings do not support her view
that children are like little scientists who continuously refine their theories.
Gopnik wishes to argue that the three-year-olds incorrectly apply the same
theory to both themselves and other people, which leads to them failing the
false belief task. The more sophisticated four-year-olds, on the other hand,
have learned to apply a different theory to themselves and others which
explains their success in the false belief task. However, these new
experimental findings do not support this theory. If anything, these findings
suggest that children have an innate or built-in concept of intentionality and
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that they fail the false belief task because they are unable to deploy this
concept explicitly.
If, as Gopnik proposes, the origins of first person intentionality is the
same as third person intentionality why do we succumb to the illusion that
they are different? Gopnik argues that the illusion of first person access can be
explained in terms of expertise. We have greater expertise when it comes to
our own mental states and behavior compared to the mental states and
behavior of others. This expertise leads to the perceptual illusion that we are
directly accessing our own mental states while indirectly inferring the mental
states of others. Gopnik claims that “certain kinds of expertise appear to cause
changes not just in knowledge but in perception.”207 For example, a very
experienced doctor just immediately ‘sees’ that an x-ray of a lung depicts lung
cancer. The doctor experiences the knowledge that the x-ray shows cancer as
immediate and perceptual: the cancer ‘pops out’ of the x-ray. However, this
perception is based off and depends on a “long theoretical knowledge.”208
In the same way the doctor’s expertise leads to the illusion that she can
directly perceive cancer, our expertise with our own mental states leads to the
illusion that we directly perceive our own mental states. In short, because we
live with our own minds every day “the force of this expertise might be such
that our beliefs about psychological states…would appear to perceptually
immediate, non-inferential and direct.”209 This ‘illusion of expertise’ leads
credence to the common-sense view that we possess privileged direct access to
our own mental states, but just indirect access to the mental states of others.
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There is, then, an alternative credible explanation, the expertise theory, for the
illusion of privileged access that does not require us to commit to direct
introspective access to some mental states.
In summary, then, Nisbett and Wilson do think we possess direct
introspective access to many of our mental states, including propositional
attitudes. The remaining mental states, as well as all mental processes, are not
accessible to introspection but must be inferred. Nisbett and Wilson propose
two reasons why they think some mental states are directly introspectable: it
explains our occasional superior accuracy in verbal reports, and it also neatly
explains why we fall for the persistent illusion of universal introspective
access. However, in recent years Nisbett and Wilson appear to have denied
that first-person verbal reports are, even on occasion, more accurate than
third-party reports. Further investigations have established that access to
private knowledge does not increase report accuracy, and that first-person
reports are only just as accurate as third-party verbal reports. Furthermore,
Gopnik has proposed a viable alternative explanation for the global illusion of
direct introspective access that does not necessarily rely on direct
introspective access to some mental states. We may succumb to the illusion of
global introspective access simply because we have more expertise with our
own minds and mental states. It is therefore theoretically possible to strip
Nisbett and Wilson’s theory of its reference to direct introspective access to
propositional attitudes, which aligns Nisbett and Wilson more closely with the
inferentialist camp than with the traditional theory of self-knowledge.

Building on Nisbett and Wilson: The choice blindness paradigm
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Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments were hugely influential, and their seminal
paper “Telling more than we can know,’ is one of the most highly cited pieces
in the field of psychology. Since 2005, a lab at Lund University has expressed
hopes to expand upon Nisbett and Wilson’s legacy by means of a new
experimental paradigm called ‘choice blindness’: indeed, they consciously
claim to follow in Nisbett and Wilson’s footsteps by stating that
“philosophically speaking, our choice blindness paradigm is of the same breed
as Nisbett and Wilson experiments.”210 They aim to continue, and deepen,
Nisbett and Wilson’s study of “self-knowledge and the representational nature
of decisions and intentions.”211 After discussing in detail the choice blindness
paradigm, I will mention some proposed problems with Nisbett and Wilson’s
original experimental design, and I will argue that choice blindness succeeds
in avoiding them. It is my contention that the choice blindness paradigm
manages to continue the legacy of Nisbett and Wilson while overcoming some
of the weaknesses and problems with their experiments.
The choice blindness paradigm enables experimenters to
“surreptitiously manipulate the relationship between the choice and outcome
that…participants experience.”212 The phenomenon is best explained by
describing a typical experiment. An early choice blindness study centered
around a task where participants evaluated the attractiveness of two faces and
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choose the face they liked best. They were then required to provide reasons for
their choice.213 Choice blindness experiments have two kinds of trials:
manipulated and non-manipulated. In a non-manipulated trial, the
participants are shown two cards each with a photograph of a woman’s face.
The experimenter is holding a card in each hand. The participant points to the
face they prefer. The experimenter then puts the cards face down and slides
the chosen card over to the participant. The participant receives the card and
then is asked to explain why they chose this face. So far, so good: the
participant gets the option that she wanted and has an opportunity to explain
why she made that choice.
The manipulated trials are quite different, however. The manipulated
trials proceed, at first, just like the non-manipulated trials. The participant is
shown two cards, one in each hand of the experimenter, and is asked to pick
the preferred face. However, this time, these cards are trick cards – behind the
visible face of the card is another card depicting the other face. When
participants point to the preferred card, the experimenter (using a sleight of
hand common in magic tricks) quickly flips down the pictures and slides the
hidden picture depicting the opposite, non-chosen, face to the participant.
Thus, in manipulated trials, participants who pick face one as their preferred
option will actually be handed a card depicting face two; and similarly, if they
select face two as their preferred option they will receive face one. In other
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words, they don’t receive the face that they chose just moments previously –
they receive the face that they just rejected. [See figure 1.]

Figure 1: An illustration of the manipulated choice blindness trial.
Thus, in the manipulated trials, the normal relationship between choice and
outcome is broken down: usually when we choose something that’s what we
get as the outcome. The experimenters were interested in seeing what
happened when participants got something they didn’t actually choose.
According to common-sense, what will happen during the manipulated
trials? Common-sense dictates that most people (if they are of sound mind, in
normal conditions, are paying attention, and so on) will immediately notice
that they did not receive the card they actually chose merely moments ago.
They will straight away report to the experimenter “oh, this is the wrong card.
I picked the other face.” It is, intuitively, highly implausible that we could be
tricked in such a way. This isn’t just a theory of common-sense, but an
assumption of psychological theories of decision making. As Johannsson et al.
note, “a fundamental assumption of theories of decision making is that
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intention and outcome form a tight loop,”214 and that we actively monitor and
compare outcomes to ensure that they align with our intentions. If, for some
reason, subjects do not notice that there has been a mismatch between their
choice and what they received they will struggle to provide reasons for their
choice – after all, they didn’t actually intend to choose this card. As Johansson
and Hall note, “intuitively, it is difficult to envisage how one would respond to
such an anomaly (i.e., we simply do not what it is like to say why we prefer a
particular picture, when we in fact chose the opposite one.)”215 When it comes
to reporting their reasons, they may just say “I don’t know”. They may
eventually notice this wasn’t the face they chose. They may frown and say, “I
don’t really like this face, to be honest.” They may provide a reason that is
more suited to the originally chosen face. This is what common-sense
predicts: so, what actually happens in the manipulated trials?
The results of the manipulated trials are unexpected. Firstly, only 13%
of participants noticed, at the time, that they had received the wrong card.216
On the vast majority of manipulated trials, participants failed to notice that
they did not receive the card they had actually chosen. Furthermore,
Johansson et al. stress that the faces “bore very little resemblance to each
other,”217 so it is not easy to muddle them up and confuse one face for the
other. Thus, the first assumption of common-sense is belied – most
participants failed to notice they didn’t receive their intended face.
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Secondly, to the experimenter’s surprise, the verbal reports (the
reasons given for the choice) in the manipulated trials are not appreciably
different from the verbal reports in the non-manipulated trials. The nonmanipulated verbal reports are the kind that we make in everyday life:
providing reasons for a choice we made. Participants will state things like “I
chose this face because she has a nice smile,” or “’I prefer dark hair to blonde
hair.” The manipulated reports, on the other hand, “stem from a truly
anomalous [situation]…revealing the reasons behind a choice one manifestly
did not make.”218 Thus, the experimenters hypothesized that the two reports
would differ in various ways. However, on the dimensions of emotionality
(emotional attachment and engagement with the image), specificity (how
precise the language is), and certainty (how confidently the answer is
delivered), the manipulated and non-manipulated reports were identical: “the
M [manipulated] reports were delivered with the same confidence as the NM
[non-manipulated] ones, and with the same level of detail and
emotionality.”219
Furthermore, the experimenters anticipated that in many manipulated
trials no reasons would be provided at all: subjects would be so baffled at the
prospect of explaining a choice they never actually made that they would claim
to not know why they ‘chose’ this card. However, the vast majority of
participants in the manipulated trials proceeded to give full, detailed,
confident and immediate answers to the question of why they preferred that
particular face. Despite the fact that the face was not the one they had
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originally chosen, they still provided compelling reasons for why it was their
favorite – and many of these reports (around 40%) closely referred to specific,
unique features of the face they ended up with and not their originally chosen
face. This implies that participants did not just end up making the verbal
report they were planning on making for the originally chosen face. On this
point, Johansson et al. note that “as these reports cannot possibly be about the
original choice…this would indeed be an indisputable case of ‘telling more
than we can know.’”220 The experimenters classify these reports as
‘confabulations. ‘Intriguingly, despite not noticing the face switch, 11% of
participants provided reasons that corresponded to their original choice and
could not possibly be about the face they ended up with. For example, a
participant might report that “I like her because she is smiling” when the face
they actually received was not smiling (but their original choice was). Despite
not realizing their original choice has been switched, “vestiges of the original
intention are revealed in the…reports.”221 Johannsson et al. classify such
reports as “truthful,” and not as confabulations.
It is worth, at this point, discussing what Nisbett and Wilson would say
about such a result. Johannsson et al. create a contrast between ‘truthful’
verbal reports versus ‘confabulations.’ However, according to Nisbett and
Wilson, ‘confabulations,’ post-hoc verbal reports, do not necessarily have to be
false. Confabulations can be truthful, in that they can be accurate accounts of
why one chose the way one did. If, for instance, the background theory that I
implicitly rely on is accurate, and if the context is appropriate, then my
Johansson, P, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, and A, Olsson. "Failure to Detect
Mismatches” p.118.
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confabulated report may also be accurate. If I confabulate that “I went to the
party because fun people were there,” my confabulation may not necessarily
be false if my background theory about parties is accurate. Nisbett and
Wilson, then, do not conflate confabulations with false or inaccurate reports.
Johansson et al. agree with Nisbett and Wilson that many of our verbal
reports stem from implicit theories, and so it would make sense for them to
abandon the notion that confabulated reports are less accurate than the
originally intended reports. It does appear to be the case that some
participants simply used the report they intended for their original choice,
which could not possibly apply to the photo they received. This suggests that
participants did not notice the photo swap, and simply assumed that the
photo they received was their original choice. This does not make their reports
anymore ‘truthful,’ but it does imply that these reports are original, in the
sense that these were verbal reports they were going to make anyway. The
confabulated reports which refer to unique features of the originally rejected
face, on the other hand, cannot be the original reports which were originally
intended for the chosen face. These confabulated reports must be new
creations. Again, however, this does not mean that these newly created
confabulations are necessarily false – they may very well be accurate reports.
Something else of interest is that, before the experiment, 84% of
participants claimed that they would easily be able to notice such an
experimental manipulation: they would be able to tell when their original
choice was swapped with a rejected option.222 It is no surprise, therefore, that
(like Nisbett and Wilson’s incredulous stocking shoppers) most of the
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participants were shocked to discover the truth behind the choice blindness
experiment. During the debriefing interview “many participants showed
considerable surprise, even disbelief.”223 Johannsson et al. term this
metacognitive error ‘choice blindness blindness’ and define it as
overconfidence in our ability to detect manipulations of the sort that occur in
choice blindness experiments.
Entirely contrary to common-sense, then, participants in the study
often failed to notice a massive change to the outcome of their choice, and
many proceeded to provide reasons for why they preferred a face they did not
choose. Johansson et al. conclude by stating that “choice blindness warns of
the dangers of aligning the technical concept of intention too closely with
common sense.”224 According to them, the strongly counterintuitive findings
mean that the commonsense concept and theory of ‘intention’ may not be
accurate. Johannsson et al. do not deny that humans are capable of forming
detailed intentions prior to decision making: they are not total skeptics about
intention. We are capable of forming a specific intention and carrying that
intention through: I can intend to go to the freezer to get chocolate ice cream,
and I can execute that intention in such a way that I get what I originally
wanted. However, just because we can form concrete intentions and carry
them out does not mean that we always succeed in doing so. Choice blindness
shows that the common-sense story of intention can’t be entirely correct:
sometimes the connection between what we intend and what we get is broken,
and sometimes, contrary to common-sense, we don’t recognize that we
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haven’t received what we originally intended. The tight loop of intention
always matching outcome may not be as tight as we commonly suppose.
Furthermore, we cannot just assume that people will be entirely unable to
report reasons for choices they did not actually make: the experimenters
found that a great many participants were willing to ‘tell more than they knew’
in that they provided very detailed and thorough explanations for why they
chose something they did not actually intend to choose.

From pretty faces to politics: Expanding the choice blindness
paradigm

One early criticism of the choice blindness paradigm was that the results were
so dramatic and counter-intuitive that they could not possibly apply to more
‘serious,’ higher stake task demands. Moore and Haggard, for instance,
conceded that the results were valid in the attractive face task, but they
strenuously denied that choice blindness had wider implications: “we suggest
that the choice blindness paradigm is an aberrant case…in the choice
blindness paradigm, the choice that is made is decidedly unimportant. It is
unlikely that people profoundly care whether or not a face is attractive or
not.”225 [emphasis mine] In fact, Moore and Haggard confidently asserted that
the choice blindness paradigm would not be replicated for more ‘serious’
decisions, and so was no threat to the common-sense picture of decisionmaking. They offered a prediction: the choice blindness effect would not be
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observed in cases where people had to make decisions about important moral
issues, or about partisan political beliefs. In other words, they accepted that
someone could be tricked into thinking that a previously rejected face was the
one they preferred, but they did not accept that someone who previously
espoused liberal beliefs would be tricked into thinking they had actually
expressed conservative beliefs. As far as they were concerned, choice
blindness was an interesting but unimportant experimental ‘anomaly’ that did
not even come close to threatening our intuitions or common-sense theories
about decision-making and self-knowledge.
In response to such criticisms, Johansson et al. set about to discover if
the choice blindness effect could be in induced in the case of the more serious
domain of moral and political decision making.226 Before the experiment got
underway, participants were asked “to indicate how strong their moral
opinions in general were, and if they were politically active or not.”227 The
experiment took the form of a survey. Participants were provided with a list of
“foundational moral principles” as well as “current dilemmas hotly debated in
the media”228 [see figure 2] and they were required to rate on a 9-point scale
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with these statements (with 1
representing strong disagreement and 9 representing strong agreement.) The
purpose of testing participants on general moral principles, as well as
currently debated dilemmas, was to see if there was any difference between
abstract moral principles and more concrete, contemporary moral problems.
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It was hypothesized that participants might exhibit less choice blindness to
abstract moral principles, because these are more general and (plausibly)
constitute our core moral beliefs. It was also theorized that if a statement was
close to, or matched, a participant’s core morality then they would not
succumb to choice blindness – they would immediately notice the
discrepancy.
In a non-manipulated trial, the experimenter asked the participant to
read aloud and explain three of their ratings. For example, suppose the
participant agreed strongly with the statement that “it is morally
reprehensible to purchase sexual services in democratic societies where
prostitution is legal and regulated by the government.”229 They would be
required to read aloud the statement and provide their rating. They would
then be asked ‘so, just to clarify, you agree with this statement?’ And they
would then be encouraged to share their reasons for why they allocated this
rating. In the manipulated trials, however, the experimenters covertly
replaced the questionnaire, such that two out of the three statements were
now reversed. If a participant strongly agreed that purchasing sexual services
was wrong, it now appeared that they strongly agreed that purchasing sexual
services was permissible. Their ranking (let’s say it was 9) remained the same,
but the statement itself was reversed. The experimenters wanted to see if
participants would notice the moral statements had been reversed and if they
were willing to endorse, and give reasons for, the opposite of what they had
initially stated.
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Figure 2: The abstract and concrete moral statements used in the
experiment.
The experimenters branded a trial as ‘detected’ if a participant noticed
the reversed statement immediately upon reviewing the questionnaire (either
by saying they didn’t actually agree with the statement, by changing their
rating, and so on) or if they expressed that they felt something was wrong
during the de-briefing stage of the experiment. Participants were said to have
‘accepted’ a manipulated trial if “there were no signs of the participants having
noticed that the opinions they argued for after the manipulation was the
reversal of what they originally intended.”230 In the end, 69% of the
participants accepted at least one of the manipulated statements: they did not
notice the statement had been reversed, even after reading it aloud, and they
answered in the affirmative when the experimenter asked if they agreed or
disagreed with the statement. The average rating of the non-detected
statements was either quite strong disagreement (2.8 on the scale), or quite
high agreement (7.2). The experimenters took this as evidence that “the
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participants cared about the issues involved.”231 If the experimenters were
indifferent about the statements, they could have ranked them as a 5, which
was the mid-point of the scale.
The experimenters discovered that some participants were more likely
to concurrently detect manipulations than others. Participants who were very
politically active and who directly engaged with the relevant issues were more
likely to notice the switch. So, for example, a participant who was highly
politically aware and also actively campaigned for an end to the sex trade
would be far less likely to be hoodwinked by a reversal of their opinion
relating to prostitution than a less politically engaged participant. However, a
high degree of political activism did not help participants in the case of more
generalized, abstract moral principles: it only aided detection in the case of
the concrete moral dilemmas (and political issues that they were directly
involved with). In general, participants who ranked themselves as having very
firm moral convictions were no more likely to detect the manipulations than
anyone else.232 The experimenters also noticed that the more extreme the
rankings, the more likely participants were to notice a reversal. However, a
full third of the ratings at the extreme ends of the scale (i.e., statements rated
as 1 or 9) went undetected “which shows that not even extreme levels of
agreement or disagreement with statements guarantees detection.”233 Even in
the important arena of moral judgments, then, a majority of participants were
fooled, on at least one occasion, into thinking that they had endorsed the
opposite of a statement they had ranked just moments before.
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The experimenters then turned their attention to the verbal reports the
participants produced in defense of their moral opinion. Would the
participants verbally endorse, with appropriate reasons, a position they had
just moments before rejected? In the non-manipulated trials, the majority of
the verbal reports unequivocally support the participant’s originally endorsed
position.234 So, for example, if a participant strongly agreed that government
surveillance was wrong, their verbal report clearly explained and gave reasons
why government surveillance was wrong. Commonsensically, this is to be
expected: rational agents are supposed to be able to provide at least somewhat
relevant reasons in support of their judgments and attitudes.
In the manipulated trials, however, the majority of the reports “are
seen as supporting the opposite of what [participants] originally intended.”235
[See figure 3] Thus, if a participant strongly agreed that government
surveillance was wrong, and failed to notice the reversal of their position, they
would then go on to give compelling reasons for why government surveillance
is morally right. In the end, a full 53% of participants argued strenuously for
the opposite of what they had originally endorsed.236
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Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals

Figure 2. Classification of verbal reports in relation to rated agreement with a moral principle or statement, for NM and M reports,
in condition one and condition two.
Figure
3: Verbal reports for the moral principles (abstract) and
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045457.g002
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opinions, and how certain they were going to vote for the left or right-wing
party. When they had completed the survey, they were then asked to give
reasons for their opinions on specific issues. Finally, they were told which
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political side they were on, based off their answers, and asked to confirm
which party they would vote for.237
As in other choice blindness studies, in the manipulated trials some of
the participants’ answers were reversed so it appeared as though they
endorsed the opposite of their original opinion. So, for example, if a
participant strongly supported tougher prison sentences for drug offenses,
their answer would be reversed such that it appeared they did not support
tougher prison sentences for drug offenses. The experimenter would then ask
them to explain why they advocated soft-touch sentencing when this was not
what they had originally opined at all. Furthermore, if a participant was
strongly left wing in all their opinions, the reversal would make it seem as if
they were actually very conservative.
Intuitively, it seems that any participant who was somewhat politically
engaged, or not entirely neutral in their political opinions, would not be duped
by this at all. Surely a left-wing Green party voter would notice if their political
affiliation was deemed conservative? And surely if a participant, intending to
vote in the general election that very week, claimed they strongly supported
tougher prison sentencing they would notice a reversal of this view? Instead,
the results are similar to all the other choice blindness studies. 47% of
participants did not correct any of the manipulated answers. 53% of
participants corrected at least one out of the four manipulations. And just 22%
of participants noticed all the reversals.238 Furthermore, participants who
Hall, Lars, T. Strandberg, Philip Parnamets, Andreas Lind, Betty Tarning,
and Petter Johansson. "How the Polls Can Be Both Spot on and Dead Wrong:
Using Choice Blindness to Shift Political Attitudes and Voter Intentions." PloS
one 8, no. 4 (2013): 1-6.
238 Hall, L., Strandberg, T., Parnamets, P., Lind, A., Tarning, B., & Johansson,
P. (2013). How the polls can be both spot on and dead wrong, p.3.
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rated themselves as exceptionally politically engaged, or very certain in their
political beliefs, were no more likely to spot manipulated answers than a
participant who was disengaged or uncertain when it came to politics.239
At the start of the experiment, the participants stated whether they
intended to vote in the upcoming election and they asserted which party they
planned to vote for. By the end of the experiment, a full 10% of the
participants in the manipulated condition swung from solidly left wing to
solidly right wing, and vice versa, and 19% went from total certainty about
who they were going to vote for to undecided.240 There was no correlation
between education level, or political engagement, political certainty, or
strength of political affiliation in relation to those willing to fully switch
political positions. In total, 48% of the participants were willing to consider
some political shift on the basis of the survey. Those who did not switch
political positions were not found to be more politically knowledgeable, or
more confident in their political views: rather, it appears that the reason for
their intransigence is due to having stubborn personalities that are resistant to
change.241 Unsurprisingly, when the participants were debriefed most were
utterly shocked that they had failed to notice the switched opinions and that
they had been induced to argue for the opposite of what they had originally
chosen.242 These results are surprising, and even the experimenters seemed
Hall, L., Strandberg, T., Parnamets, P., Lind, A., Tarning, B., & Johansson,
P. (2013). How the polls can be both spot on and dead wrong, p.3.
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P. (2013). How the polls can be both spot on and dead wrong, p.4.
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somewhat taken aback: they commented that “remarkably…a few individual
manipulations can add up to seriously challenge something as foundational as
left or right wing identity…one of the most stable constructs in the political
landscape.”243
The choice blindness lab has demonstrated that choice blindness can
be induced in a wide variety of circumstances: people can be choice blind
about consumer goods, the taste of jam, attractive faces, and now, as we have
just seen, even their own political and moral opinions.244 It is therefore not
the case that the choice blindness effect is restricted only to inconsequential or
unimportant decisions – choice blindness appears to have wider reaching
effects than was previously supposed. Of course, there are presumably limits
to the choice blindness effect: it is not likely, as Johannsson and Hall joke,
that they would be able to trick a bride into marrying someone else on her
wedding day by using the choice blindness paradigm! Yet, as they point out
“there is ample territory to explore between these small-scale consumer
survey and the preposterous idea of covert spouse swapping,”245 and the
political and moral experimenters show that the territory conquered by choice
blindness may be uncomfortably close to the ‘spouse swapping’ side of things
and is not just restricted to the small consumer survey side.
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Advantages of the choice blindness paradigm

The choice blindness paradigm is a powerful experimental tool for creating “a
wedge…to get between the decisions of the participants and the outcomes with
which they were presented.246 While the choice blindness paradigm elaborates
on and continues Nisbett and Wilson’s work in interesting ways, I contend
that it is also a more refined experimental paradigm. The strength of the
choice blindness paradigm lies in the fact that it succeeds in overcoming some
objections that have been raised against Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments. I
will outline some of these criticisms of Nisbett and Wilson and explain how
choice blindness avoids these issues.

Objection one: Nisbett and Wilson’s results are limited in scope.

Gertler acknowledges that Nisbett and Wilson’s studies are instructive, in that
they demonstrate the restricted scope of the mental states which are
accessible to privileged introspective access, but she maintains that their work
is not as damaging to the concept of privileged access as one might suppose.
“Their results are limited,” according to Gertler, because “they apply only to
the unconscious sources of decisions; they are silent as to our privileged
access to our current mental states.”247 One could argue in response that the
limited applicability of Nisbett and Wilson’s results is not an issue. Even if

. Johansson, P, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, and A Olsson. "Failure to Detect
Mismatches” p.118.
247 Gertler, Brie. "Self-Knowledge." Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University,
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their results are limited in scope, they have still succeeded in demonstrating
something useful: namely, that we lack introspective access to cognitive
processes and the causes of our decisions. However, Gertler’s point cuts
deeper than this. Gertler seems to suggest that Nisbett and Wilson’s results
are, in effect, useless because they demonstrate something that every advocate
of privileged introspection knows anyway: “even the staunchest proponent of
privileged access acknowledges that we lack privileged access to these causal
relations.”248 Gertler maintains that “to show that we lack privileged access to
such matters is to attack a straw man,”249 because no serious advocate of
direct introspection ever argued that we have introspective access to the
causes of our mental states, or our mental processes, in the first place.
Introspective access theorists maintain that we have introspective access to a
very limited range of mental states: at most, we have privileged access to our
current thoughts, sensations, basic emotions, and non-dispositional
propositional attitudes.250 Nisbett and Wilson’s results do not show that we
lack introspective access of any of these kinds of mental states, and so their
experiments do not threaten the idea of privileged access nor the traditional
view of self-knowledge.
Firstly, I maintain that Gertler is incorrect to dismiss Nisbett and
Wilson’s studies as an ‘attack on a straw man’: their experiments are not
merely demonstrating something that every advocate of privileged access
already supposed. As I discussed in detail in chapter one, a great many
philosophers disagree with Gertler’s view that the scope of privileged access is
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge. p.75.
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.75.
250 See Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge. and Coliva, Annalisa. The Varieties of
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very limited. Many traditional theorists of self-knowledge do claim, contra
Gertler, that we have privileged access to mental processes and causation.
Chisholm and Armstrong, for example, argue that we have privileged access to
causal relations and this privileged access explains why we even possess a
concept of causation in the first place. Furthermore, foundationalists of
knowledge like BonJour also claim that we possess privileged access to the
causal relations between beliefs and other mental states. For these theorists,
then, Nisbett and Wilson’s results substantially damage their theories of selfknowledge. Nisbett and Wilson are not merely attacking a straw man.
Secondly, the choice blindness paradigm manages to overcome
Gertler’s objection because I shall argue that the choice blindness paradigm
demonstrates that we lack privileged access to propositional attitude – in
particular, occurrent propositional attitudes. Thus, the choice blindness
paradigm restricts the scope of privileged access even further to, at most,
current thoughts and sensations. The results of the choice blindness studies,
then, land a heavy blow against Gertler’s theory of privileged access in that it
renders the scope of privileged access even more limited than before. I shall
discuss this point in more detail in chapter 5, but the participants in the choice
blindness study appear to lack introspective access to the product of their
decision-making process, as well as the process itself. When a choice
blindness participant initially chooses person A as more attractive than person
B, the product of that decision-making process should be available to direct
introspective access even if the decision-making process itself is not. That is,
the participant should be able to directly introspect, and immediately grasp
that person A was their choice. However, crucially, in the course of the
experiment, the participant becomes blind to their original choice – they can
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be induced into thinking that they really picked person B instead of person A.
This experimental result does threaten the scope of direct introspective access
and cannot be accused of merely attacking a straw man. By all accounts of
direct introspective access, the choice blindness participants should have
succeeded in reporting the product of their decision-making process. The fact
that they become ‘blind’ to their initial decision is highly counter-intuitive and
in need of an explanation.

Objection 2: The verbal reports in Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments are
always retrospective.

Another criticism of Nisbett and Wilson’s work is that, due to their
experimental design, the verbal reports of participants are always
retrospective: participants do not make their verbal report at the very moment
when they make their decision. In Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments,
participants firstly make their decision and then are debriefed a while later
about the reasons for why they made that choice. Because there is quite some
delay between the actual decision and the report, participants must remember
what they were thinking at the time of the decision when making their verbal
reports. This is a weakness of the study because it brings short-term memory
into the picture. If too much time has elapsed, or if participants undergo
significant mental load, then participant’s short-term memory may have
degraded to the point where they cannot access the mental states that they
entertained during the experiment simply because the mental states do not
exist anymore. The worry, then, is that the participant’s faulty verbal reports
are not caused by a lack of direct introspective access to the relevant mental
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states, but that “their memory was impaired thus making the report
inaccurate.”251 At the very least, without amendments to the experimental
design, it cannot be ruled out that the results are an experimental artifact due
to memory degradation.
The choice blindness experimental paradigm does not suffer from this
problem. In addition to a post-experiment debriefing, similar to the Nisbett
and Wilson studies, choice blindness participants are also required to
verbalize their choice at the moment of their decision, as well as provide a
verbal report right there and then about the reasons for their choice. This
entails that the participant’s verbal reports are not solely retrospective, and so
the worry about memory degradation no longer applies.
Now, it might be claimed by the neo-Cartesian that introspective access
exclusively applies to mental states at the current instant. Even in the choice
blindness studies, there is a short delay of a few seconds between the decision
and the verbal report. Thus, even the choice blindness results don’t
demonstrate conclusively that we lack privileged access. However, in some
choice blindness studies, the participants receive the object they ‘chose’ while
they must surely be entertaining occurrent thoughts about that object. Even in
cases where participants immediately receive the chosen object they still fail
to notice they don’t receive the object they just selected right then.
In the face choice blindness experiments, for example, participants
point at face A and are immediately handed face B. There is simply no
temporal gap here: it is implausible to suggest that the participant’s thoughts
about A are no longer current, or active. Indeed, if the participant immediately
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stopped thinking about his choice the moment he pointed his finger at
photograph A, this would suggest a very odd model of decision making. As
Johansson et al. point out, commonsensically, a working theory of decisionmaking requires us to monitor our choices in order to make sure that the
object we receive matches the object we actually chose. It is more likely that
the participant entertains thoughts about his choice, photograph A,
throughout the decision-making process and right up until he receives the
photograph. If this is the case, it is very difficult for the neo-Cartesian to
explain why the participant fails to notice he didn’t get the face he just pointed
at.

Objection 3: Nisbett and Wilson’s study focuses solely on causal reports, and
so is limited in applicability

Another objection put forward by White is that Nisbett and Wilson’s study
focuses solely on causal reports and neglects other kinds of verbal reports
such as mental rehearsal, predictions about future behavior, or statements
about the content of a memory. While granting that participants do indeed
seem to have some difficulty generating accurate causal reports, White argues
that this does not mean we will see similar effects when it comes to other
kinds of verbal reports: as he puts it, “causal reports could turn out to be a
small inaccuracy in a sea of insight.”252 Because Nisbett and Wilson only
examine casual verbal reports, it is improper for them to extrapolate that
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other kinds of verbal reports are inaccurate or prone to error: they just don’t
have the evidence to make this claim.
Again, the choice blindness paradigm attenuates this problem. The
choice blindness paradigm does focus heavily on causal reports, like Nisbett
and Wilson do, but this is not the only verbal report type that is studied. For
instance, participants in choice blindness studies are asked to make
predictions about how well they would do in a choice blindness scenario: these
are verbal reports which concern a prediction of future behavior (and,
incidentally, these are not very accurate.) Participants are also required to
verbally state which option they chose, and as a result of the choice blindness
manipulation many participants incorrectly report their initial decision. This
is a verbal report of the product of a decision-making process (a report about
what they chose), not a causal report (why they chose it), and the choice
blindness paradigm reveals that participants make errors when reporting the
product of their decision-making process. However, even if the scope of these
studies is restricted to focusing mostly on causal reports, I maintain that
White’s objection is not a major concern. Even if causal reports, reports about
why we did something or why we chose the way we did, are inaccurate
amongst a sea of accurate reports, it is still interesting and worthy to examine
why we have such difficulty with causal reports; and what makes them so
different from the rest.
It is also worth noting that a distinct advantage of the choice blindness
paradigm is that it generates two separate report corpuses: the manipulated
trial reports, and the non-manipulated trial verbal reports. This is beneficial
because it creates a contrast class between normal, everyday verbal reports (in
which participants provide reasons for a choice they actually made), and post133

hoc constructed reports (in which participants offer reasons for choices they
didn’t make). These reports can then be examined to see if there are any
distinguishing features that differentiate non-manipulated reports from
manipulated reports. The choice blindness paradigm is the “first to give
cognitive scientists the opportunity to systematically study how confabulatory
reports are created, and how they relate to standard or ‘truthful’ reports about
choice behavior.”253 The hope is that it will enable scientists to “find patterns
of reporting that will enable us to say something about the general properties
of introspective reports.”254

Eye-tracking and verbal report analysis

In this section, I will briefly discuss some supplemental studies the choice
blindness lab has undertaken to explore the choice blindness paradigm in
more detail. I will discuss eye-tracking studies and verbal report analyses.
These studies are useful as they give us a fuller picture of what the
phenomenon of choice blindness is, and about what happens cognitively when
someone does not notice a manipulation and becomes choice-blind.

Eye-tracking studies

In eye tracking studies, eye movements and gaze are monitored using a
device. The core assumption behind eye tracking studies is that “eye gaze is a
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window onto cognitive processing.”255 Eye movements can tell us something
about how the mind works. The specifics of eye tracking, and what can be
inferred about cognitive processes from eye movements, do not need to be
discussed in great detail; but three points are worth noting. Firstly, the
location of the center point of the pupil (the fovea) pinpoints the center of the
gaze. While the focal point of the gaze is not necessarily correlated with
attention, it is the case that they mostly co-occur. We can shift the focus of our
attention without moving our eyes, and without directing the gaze, but it is
impossible for us to shift our eyes without, at the same time, shifting
attention. Whatever the fovea is fixating on, then, can be inferred to be the
main focus of attention and interest.256 Secondly, eye movements can be
regarded as a window into decision making. If a participant’s gaze sweeps
back and forth between two options, while ignoring all others, it can be
inferred that they are deciding between these two options and not the others.
Thirdly, it has been established that when the pupil of the eye dilates this is
due to interest or arousal – pupils may dilate in response to surprising or
unexpected stimuli, for example. In particular, pupil dilation is a reliable
indicator that a change in the visual array has been detected, and a lack of
pupil dilation is, conversely, an indication that visual changes have not been
detected.
During a choice blindness task participants were fitted with eye
trackers, and their gaze was recorded. Experimenters were curious to see if
Parnamets, Philip, Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Christian Balkenius,
Michael Spivey, and Daniel Richardson. "Biasing Moral Decisions by
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there was any difference, in terms of eye gaze, between detected and nondetected manipulated trials.257 As it turned out when participants detected
manipulations their “pupils were significantly more dilated compared to when
failing to detect.”258 As Parnamets states, “detection registers as a
differentiable event in the cognitive system.”259 This suggests that participants
who failed to notice manipulations were really unable to detect them, even at
the basic visual level – and so could rightfully be said to be ‘blind’ to the
manipulation. In terms of eye gaze, eye movement, and pupil dilation there
was no difference between the non-detected manipulated trials and the nonmanipulated trials. Tentatively, this suggests that the cognitive processes
underlying the two are, at the very least, somewhat similar.

Verbal report analysis

In Nisbett and Wilson’s studies, the verbal reports produced by participants
are not, in and of themselves, given much attention: indeed, the actual verbal
reports – the reasons why participants chose the way they did - were not
published. The choice blindness lab, on the other hand, has analyzed the
verbal reports produced in manipulated and non-manipulated choice
blindness experiments in the hope of finding some enlightening differences
between the manipulated and non-manipulated reports. Their ambition was
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to examine if there are any identifiable differences between ‘genuine’ verbal
reports and ‘confabulated’ verbal reports (the reports generated in the
manipulated condition.) They hypothesized that analysis of the report corpus
would reveal significant differences between the two kinds of reports, which
would support the theory that the reports are generated in different ways.260
The report corpus comprised of 228 non-manipulated reports and 163
manipulated reports, of various lengths. The two groups of reports were
subjective to a comparative linguistic analysis, which can reveal “structural
differences between different texts.”261 For instance, suppose you have a group
of texts which were written by men and another group of texts which were
written by women. Comparative linguistic analysis can flag interesting
differences between these two texts, and so can reveal distinct properties of
male-generated texts as opposed to female-generated texts. Essentially, the
choice blindness researchers wanted to examine whether, and to what extent,
there were any differences between the non-manipulated and manipulated
verbal reports.
In the comparative linguistic analysis, many different linguistic
properties of the reports were compared. One feature of great interest was
linguistic ‘uncertainty.’ Uncertainty in a verbal report can be indicated by long
pauses, hedge words such as “um” or “err,” laughter, and the like. Given the
nature of choice blindness manipulations, the experimenters expected the
manipulated reports to exhibit higher signs of uncertainty. In particular, the
experimenters hypothesized that the manipulated reports would contain more
Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
"How Something Can Be Said”
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empty filler and pauses because the participants are making up their report on
the spot, which puts them under a higher cognitive load. The nonmanipulated reports, on the other hand, do not involve constructing a new
reason on the spot, but merely require the reporting of a pre-generated
reason. This puts participants under much less cognitive strain, and so the
verbal delivery of these reports ought to be smoother.262 Much to the
experimenter’s surprise, however, there were no differences between the
manipulated and non-manipulated reports in terms of uncertainty. This
suggests that the subjects in the manipulated trials were not under any
increased cognitive load, compared to the subjects in the non-manipulated
trials.
Another area where researchers hoped to find a difference between the
reports was in terms of report specificity. The experimenters theorized that
the non-manipulated reports would be richer in detail and more specific than
the manipulated reports. Because the manipulated reports were reports about
a choice that was never actually made, the experimenters proposed that these
reports would contain more non-specific empty talking.263 Again, there was no
difference between the two kinds of reports: “the participants seemed to have
as much content to report on regardless of whether they talked about a choice
they had actually made, or responded to a mismatched outcome.”264 The
experimenters then looked at the emotional content of the reports, surmising
that the manipulated reports would contain less emotional engagement than
Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
"How Something Can Be Said” p.680.
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the non-manipulated reports (the participants, after all, were talking about a
face that they initially had not preferred and had rejected.) In this case, there
was a difference – but it was very slight. On one measurement of emotionality,
the long non-manipulated reports exhibited a small difference from the
manipulated reports: they contained more positive adjectives. However, the
short manipulated and non-manipulated reports were not different in any
way.
Finally, the experimenters examined the reports for signs of deceit.
While there is no suggestion that the manipulated reports are lies, the
manipulated reports are similar to lying in that “something with no grounds in
actual experience is being talked about.”265 Previous linguistic analyses have
demonstrated that lies have distinct properties from truthful reports. In
particular, lies “used fewer first person references, fewer third person
pronouns, fewer exclusive words (such as ‘except’, ‘without’), and more
negative emotion words.”266 When one is lying, one has to make things up and
think on the fly; consequently, lies show more signs of cognitive load than
truthful reports. Due to the increased cognitive load inherent in lying, lies
show more pauses and filler words (to buy time to think of what to say next),
and use less complex and diverse language. Once again, the semantic analysis
showed there was no difference between the non-manipulated reports and the
manipulated reports. In terms of semantic structure, at least, the manipulated
verbal reports are not similar to lies or deceptive reports.

Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
"How Something Can Be Said” p.682.
266 Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
"How Something Can Be Said” p.678.
139

In one sense, the results of the semantic analysis of the verbal reports
generated by the choice blindness experiments are disappointing: no
significant or numerous differences were found, contrary to expectations.
When setting out their hypothesis, the experimenters predicted and hoped for
significant differences between the reports, and yet were forced to concede
that “the overall pattern of findings indicates that the NM [non-manipulated]
and the M [manipulated] reports are surprisingly similar.”267 In another
sense, the results can be seen as quite significant, in that they are evidence for
Nisbett and Wilson’s claim that all verbal reports are generated in the same
way. This result causes difficulty for those who claim that the nonmanipulated reports are derived from introspectively accessed reasons while
the manipulated reports are simply made up. I will discuss the significance of
these results more fully in the next chapter, where I explore what the choice
blindness studies might mean for traditional theories of self-knowledge and
introspection.

Problems with the choice blindness paradigm, and replies

In this section, I will address some potential problems with the choice
blindness paradigm. I contend that the criticisms fail to make a significant
mark and that the choice blindness paradigm, as well as the experimental
results, are solid. As Parnamets states,” choice blindness is a robust effect, and
the basic findings have been replicated in a wide range of domains.”268
Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
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Criticism 1: Choice blindness does not extend to important decisions, and so
can’t be extrapolated to all domains of decision-making

One of the primary and enduring criticisms against the choice blindness
paradigm is that participants only become choice blind to inconsequential or
unimportant decisions, and therefore it is false to say that choice blindness
could potentially affect any decision. However, this criticism has been stymied
by the experimental results showing that participants can be choice blind
about their moral and political opinions – which are rather important, by the
standards of most people. Undoubtedly, choice blindness has limits:
Johansson et al. are confident that no one could be made choice blind about
their spouse on their wedding day, for example. However, even if choice
blindness cannot be induced in all circumstances, this does not mean that it
only applies to inconsequential, trivial decisions.
It might be argued, of course, that what is relevant for our purposes
here is not ‘importance’ in general, but how important a topic is to the
individual experimental participant. A participant might not find political
topics very important at all, and so may not have any strong attitudes one way
or the other about a particular political issue. If it turns out that the majority
of choice blindness participants do not, in fact, find political or moral issues to
be particularly salient, then it is not so surprising that they become choice
blind to such decisions. Perhaps Moore and Haggard are wrong to distinguish
between ‘trivial’ decisions, like choosing between two faces, and ‘serious’
decisions, like choosing which political party to vote for. I have a couple of
things to say on this issue of importance. Firstly, even if some individual
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participants do not find politics to be particularly important, there is,
intuitively, a difference between deciding between tea flavors and making a
decision about whether a salient moral issue is right or wrong. The decision
about the tea is fleeting and based on a product that one has just encountered
for the very first time. It makes no real impact on a person’s life, or sense of
identity, whether they pick a gooseberry flavored tea or strawberry flavored
tea. Intuitively, however, moral decisions are different from tea decisions.
When it comes to the topic of abortion, for example, the vast majority of
normal human adults will have encountered this issue time and time again in
the course of their everyday lives. This is, very likely, a topic which many
people will have thought about a fair bit, and which may be quite intimately
connected to their conception of who they are as a person. With regards to
abortion, many people actively identify as pro-life or pro-choice and take this
identity to say something about who they are and what they value. Not nearly
as many people, I maintain, derive an identity from what flavor of tea they
happened to choose during a product taste test. In short, it is reasonable to
categorize some decisions as more important, or significant, than others.
Secondly, Johansson et al. have tried to gauge, as much as possible, the
degree to which participants find moral issues to be ‘important.’ For one
thing, the very nature of the survey enables participants to express to the
experimenters whether they strongly agree, strongly disagree, or are neutral
on certain topics. If a participant scores a moral issue 5 out of 10 on the scale,
this indicates she is indifferent towards it – she does not personally find the
topic very important. If, on the other hand, a participant scores a moral issue
10 out of 10 this indicates that she strongly agrees with it. Thus, the
participants are given the opportunity to indicate the extent of their
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agreement and engagement with a moral issue and, indeed, some participants
do register indifference towards specific moral issues. I would argue that it is
reasonable to infer that participants who give neutral scores personally find a
particular topic to be of less importance, and those who give scores at the
extreme end of the scale are indicating that they find the topic to be of great
subjective importance to them.

Criticism 2: Choice blindness is a temporary, experimentally induced effect
that has no lasting consequences

Another criticism of the choice blindness paradigm is that, while at the time
the effects of the manipulations are dramatic, choice blindness is, in fact, a
very temporary, experimentally induced effect. The prediction is that
immediately after participants are manipulated into endorsing a choice they
didn’t actually make, they will revert to preferring and endorsing their original
choice. For a very short time only a participant can be tricked into arguing for
the conservative political party, but the effects of choice blindness wear off
almost instantly. This means that choice blindness is a mere short-lived
artifact of the experimental manipulation and is of no real consequence
outside the laboratory.
The choice blindness lab set up an experiment to test if choice
blindness is a temporary or longer-lasting phenomenon.269 The first round
proceeded just like a normal attractive face choice blindness study, with the
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(Believe You) Chose to Read It!". Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 27,
no. 3 (2013): 281-89.
269
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usual manipulations. A second round was introduced, the aim of which was to
see “to what extent the participants prefer the same face the first time and the
second time they are presented with the pairs.”270 In the second round, the
participants were shown the face pairs again and were asked to choose the
face they preferred. They were then asked to rate, on a 10-point scale, all of
the pictures. If the original preference does indeed re-assert itself over time,
we would expect to see the participants pick their originally preferred face in
the second round. This would be an indication that the effects of choice
blindness are ephemeral and have no lasting consequences on the
participant’s behavior.
In terms of choice consistency, in the non-manipulated trials 94% of
participants picked their original choice a second time. This shows that the
vast majority of participants continued to prefer their initially chosen face.
They also gave the chosen faces a much higher ranking than the rejected faces
each time they were asked to provide a rating. In the case of the manipulated
trials, however, 56% of participants chose the originally rejected face – in
other words, most participants did not revert to their original preference.271
Furthermore, in the manipulated trials the rejected faces were rated much
higher than in the non-manipulated trials.272 Taken together, these results
“indicate that the manipulation strongly influenced subsequent choices and
attractiveness ratings. The initially rejected face is chosen more frequently in a
second choice, and the perceived attractiveness is increased…the natural
Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
Blindness and Preference Change” p.2.
271 Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
Blindness and Preference Change” p.4.
272 Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
Blindness and Preference Change” p.4.
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interpretation…is that in the manipulated trials the participant came to prefer
the face they were led to believe they liked.”273 Choice blindness, then, is not a
temporary or ephemeral phenomenon but can have lasting effects beyond the
initial manipulation. It is thus much more than a mere experimental artifact.

Criticism 3: Choice blindness is caused by memory impairment, and so is an
experimental artifact

One explanation for choice blindness is that participants fail to adequately
encode (cognitively register) their original choice, which is why they do not
notice the manipulation. In other words, participants do not pay enough
attention to what they are choosing and so fail to remember the choice they
actually made. Participants fall for the manipulation simply because they are
not able to recognize their original choice, and so do not notice when it has
been swapped for something else. If this is true, it would be an indication that
participants do not take the task seriously and so do not take the time to
process their choices properly. This would be an indictment against the
experimental design and would demonstrate that choice blindness may be
nothing more than an experimental artifact caused by participant’s failure to
pay adequate attention. Parnamets et al. ran an experiment to test if
participants in a choice blindness study encode, or remember, the choices they
made.274

Johansson, P., Hall, L., Tarning, B., Sikstrom, S., & Chater, N. (2013).
Choice blindness and preference change, p.5.
274 Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”
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In the first stage of the experiment, the participants were asked to
choose between two faces. They were then asked to register their confidence in
their choice on a scale. Some of the trials were manipulated, so this first stage
functioned as a typical choice blindness experiment. In the second stage,
participants were presented with two faces. One face was from the set of faces
shown in stage 1, and another face had never been shown before. Participants
were then asked to pick the face they recognized, and if they had selected this
face in the previous stage. This stage functioned as a memory task.
Parnamet’s results indicate that choice blindness is not due to
participants failing to recognize the choices. 89% of participants recognized
the faces from the previous trial, and their memory accuracy was equally as
high in manipulated and non-manipulated trials.275 As Parnamets states,
“acceptance of the choice blindness manipulation is not due to a failure of
participants to attend to or encode the choice options.”276 However, while
participants recognized the faces, and could remember their rankings, the
participants in the manipulated trials did overwhelmingly state that they
remembered choosing the originally rejected face. Some memory distortion,
then, was occurring – participants mistakenly misattributed the non-chosen,
originally rejected face, as the chosen one. Thus, participants’ “explicit
memories about those choices”277 were affected by the choice blindness
manipulation – they exhibited a false memory for what they originally chose.

Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”
p.1826.
276 Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”,
p.1827.
277 Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”
p.1827.
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The choice blindness manipulation seemingly caused them to believe they had
originally picked the rejected choice all along.
In a separate study, Sagana et al. demonstrated that memory
impairment is not sufficient for choice blindness to occur.278 In other words,
choice blindness cannot be explained just in terms of memory impairment.
Participants rated the attractiveness of faces and were asked to rank the faces
on a 10-point scale. After a short delay, they were presented with the face and
their rating and were asked to give reasons for why they rated the face the way
they did. In some of these trials, the original rating was either increased or
decreased by three points (60% of participants did not notice this
manipulation). After a filler task, the participants were then informed that
some of their rankings had been altered. Participants were tasked with
viewing the faces again and recalling their original ratings.279 Sagana et al.
discovered the recall rate for the original ranking was the same in both nonmanipulated and manipulated trials (45.8% and 46.2% respectively.)280
Sagana et al. thus concluded that:
Choice blindness phenomena cannot be attributed to impaired memory
of the initial memory trace, or memory decay. In a substantial number
of trials (46.6%) participants were able to remember their original
rating with precision. This supports the idea that the memory trace for
the original rating was still accessible and could be retrieved at will.
These findings support earlier indications that blindness phenomena
cannot be reduced to weak memory or forgetting.281
Sagana, Anna, Melanie Sauerland, and Harald Merckelbach. "Memory
Impairment Is Not Sufficient for Choice Blindness to Occur." Frontiers in
Psychology 5, no. 449 (2014): 1-8.
279 Sagana, Anna, Melanie Sauerland, and Harald Merckelbach. "Memory
Impairment Is Not Sufficient” p.3.
280 Sagana, Anna, Melanie Sauerland, and Harald Merckelbach. "Memory
Impairment Is Not Sufficient”, p.4.
281 Sagana, A., Sauerland, M., & Merckelbach, H. (2014). Memory impairment
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Thus, while something unusual is going on with participant’s memories in
choice blindness studies, the phenomenon of choice blindness is not entirely
caused by participants forgetting their original choice or failing to properly
attend to their choices. Participants fully attend to and encode their choices,
and they retain memories of their original ratings even after a manipulation.

Criticism 4: Choice blindness experiments artificially strain our cognitive
capacities

Dennett has argued that experimental results which threaten our commonsense views about human rationality and competence are not to be trusted
because “psychologists are deliberately trying to produce situations that
provoke irrational responses – inducing pathology in a system by putting
strain on it.”282 In other words, the choice blindness experiments reveal
nothing interesting about our decision-making processes, or our capacity for
self-knowledge, because they lack ecological validity. According to Dennett,
the experimental manipulation puts our cognitive systems under stress, which
causes them to behave abnormally. In everyday life, however, we do not
encounter such pressures, and our cognitive systems function normally. The
experimental results, then, are not a reliable guide about how our cognitive
systems function.
The worry about ecological validity is well known in psychology, and
psychologists work hard to reduce it. However, it does not seem that Dennett’s

Dennett, Daniel. "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology." In The
Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, p.52
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objection applies to the choice blindness experiments or any decision-making
studies in general. It is a stretch to claim that a brief magic trick manipulation
is putting a real “strain” on our cognitive systems; and choosing one thing but
getting something else is an event that can certainly occur in real life outside
of the laboratory walls. In fact, during the choice blindness studies, some
participants did indeed notice they received the rejected choice and presumed
that a mistake had been made. The mystery is why so many participants failed
to notice they didn’t receive their original choice, and why they then went on
to provide reasons for a choice they never made. If anything, what is
surprising about the choice blindness studies is how easy it is to induce: the
experimenters did not have to go to any great lengths to produce the choice
blindness effect in most participants. As Cassam points out, by placing people
in bizarre, highly artificial situations the psychologists are not inducing any
sort of pathology but are evoking very simple responses using very simple
techniques.283 Dennett’s objection, then, does not apply in the case of choice
blindness. Furthermore, Dennett’s objection misses the point somewhat, in
that the original intention of the choice blindness studies was to provide some
insight into the architecture of our cognitive system. The goal was not to figure
out how our cognitive systems work in ‘everyday life,’ but was, rather, to throw
a spanner in the works to see how the cognitive system responds. Observing
how the cognitive system responds to unusual situations may provide real
insight into the structure, and function, of our cognitive systems.

Chapter Summary
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In this chapter, I examined in detail Nisbett and Wilson’s influential studies
into decision-making and self-knowledge. Contrary to the traditional view of
self-knowledge, Nisbett and Wilson maintain that we lack direct introspective
access to the reasons for our decisions, and so all explanations for our choices
are post-hoc constructions based off implicit causal theories. Furthermore, we
are unaware of our own unawareness because we succumb to the illusion that
we do have direct access to the reasons for our decisions. Even though we are
unaware of the reasons for our choices, this does not prevent us from
providing a reason anyway for why we acted the way we did: Nisbett and
Wilson call this phenomenon “telling more than we can know.”
Nisbett and Wilson do not entirely deviate from the traditional view of
self-knowledge, because they maintain that we do possess direct introspective
access to some mental states such as the content of our memories, the
products of decision-making processes, current thoughts and feelings, and so
on. However, it is my contention that, by their own lights, Nisbett and Wilson
do not need to postulate direct introspective access to propositional attitudes
for their theory to function. They maintain that direct introspective access to
some mental states explains why subject’s verbal reports are sometimes more
accurate than third-party observer reports, and it also explains why we
succumb to a global illusion of introspective access. However, Nisbett and
Wilson have now radically backtracked from the idea that subject’s reports are
ever more accurate than observer reports, and there is an alternative
explanation for the global illusion of introspective access – namely, Gopnik’s
theory that we possess superior expertise about our own mental states and
minds compared to the minds of others.
150

I then moved on to discuss the choice blindness paradigm, which
carries on Nisbett and Wilson’s legacy. I argued that the choice blindness
paradigm manages to overcome some of the classical criticisms and problems
with Nisbett and Wilson, and thus is an advancement of their experimental
paradigm. Choice blindness, similarly to Nisbett and Wilson’s studies, shows
that we lack introspective access to the reasons for our decisions, and thus
have to construct post-hoc explanations. However, what is crucial about the
choice blindness paradigm is the fact that, after the experimental
manipulation, participants are rendered blind to the outcome of their original
decision-making process: they can be induced to report that they picked the
initially rejected option and can provide compelling confabulated reports
about why they picked something they did not, in fact, choose. Choice
blindness thus not only demonstrates that we appear to lack introspective
access to our decision-making processes, but it also demonstrates that we can
sometimes lack introspective access to the products of our decision-making
process. This should worry any traditional theorist of self-knowledge: on all
traditional accounts of self-knowledge, participants should not become blind
to their original decision (the product of the decision-making process) as it
should always be available for direct introspection.
In the next couple of chapters I will examine the phenomenon of
choice blindness and confabulated verbal reports more closely, and I will give
an account of what is going on when subjects succumb to choice blindness and
when they produce confabulated reports. I will then examine and explain the
phenomenon of confabulated verbal reports, and give an account of just what,
precisely, a “confabulation” is. I will further argue that the phenomenon of
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choice blindness, and its attendant confabulation, is very difficult for the
traditional view of self-knowledge to accommodate and explain.
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CHAPTER 4
WHAT IS GOING ON DURING CHOICE BLINDNESS?

In the previous chapter, I discussed two major experimental paradigms in
psychology that explore the nature of introspection and self-knowledge:
Nisbett and Wilson’s studies into decision making, and the choice blindness
experiments. To recap, Nisbett and Wilson argue that we entirely lack
introspective access to mental processes, which entails that we lack direct
introspective insight into the fact that certain mental states are the reasons for
our decisions. That is, I may very well have direct introspective access to a
particular mental state, P, which happens to be the reason for my decision
while lacking direct access to the fact that P is the reason for my decision.
Thus, I can have introspective access to the mental states that happen to be
my reasons even if I don’t have access to the fact that they are my reasons.
This lack of introspective access to reasons qua reasons does not, however,
impede our ability to identify certain mental states as the reasons for our
actions. In the stocking experiment, for example, participants confidently
asserted reasons for their choice even though these reasons could not possibly
be a genuine basis for the decision: all the stockings were identical, with no
features to distinguish them. Nisbett and Wilson maintain that when we are
asked to justify our choices, we construct a plausible sounding reason for our
actions after the fact. This act of self-interpretation occurs so seamlessly and
swiftly we mistake it for an instance of introspection when, in fact, it is really
an inference to the best explanation about why we made a certain choice or
performed a specific action. Introspective access to mental processes, at least,
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is an illusion, according to Nisbett and Wilson. We do not have privileged
access to the reasons for our decisions, and so must self-interpret, theorize,
and infer what they plausibly could be.
The choice blindness paradigm “is of the same breed as the Nisbett and
Wilson experiments…philosophically speaking,”284 and attempts to say more
about cases in which we ‘tell more than we can know’: where we provide
verbal reports that could not possibly be the real reasons for our decisions.
Choice blindness studies consist of manipulated trials and non-manipulated
trials. In a typical non-manipulated study, participants (who are under the
impression they are taking part in a consumer taste-test survey) may be given,
for example, strawberry flavored jam to try followed by grapefruit jam.285
Participants will then be asked to select the jam they prefer. After being given
the chosen jam to try once again, they are then asked by the experimenters to
provide reasons for their preference. So, participants who pick the strawberry
jam after the initial tasting will be given the strawberry jam to try again and
will then be prompted to explain why they prefer this flavor. In a manipulated
trial, however, after selecting their preferred jam the participants are actually
given, via sleight of hand, the rejected jam to taste. So, if a participant chose
strawberry jam after the initial tasting, they would instead be provided with
grapefruit jam for the second tasting. The participants would then be required
to report the reasons for their “choice”: a choice they never actually made.
Intuitively, the vast majority of participants should immediately notice
that they did not receive their initially chosen flavor. If a participant picked
Johansson, Petter, Lars Hall, S Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas Lind.
"How Something Can Be Said”, p.690.
285 Hall, Lars, Petter Johansson, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and Therese
Deutgen. "Magic at the Marketplace”
284
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strawberry jam and is subsequently provided with grapefruit just seconds
later, common-sense dictates that they will notice this and say something to
the experimenters.286 However, the vast majority of participants failed to
notice that they did not receive their originally chosen jam. We also have the
strong intuition that the verbal reports in the manipulated trials will be quite
different from the verbal reports in the non-manipulated trials.
Commonsensically, we expect the participants to exclaim that they don’t
actually know why they chose this particular jam. They may give a very
faltering, hesitant answer (which makes sense, because they have to
essentially come up with reasons on the fly). Or they may just draw a blank
and say nothing. Again, contrary to the experimenter’s expectations, this is
not what occurred. Much to the experimenter’s surprise, the participants
provided detailed and persuasive verbal reports about why they preferred the
jam they had actually initially rejected. Linguistic analysis later revealed there
were no significant differences between the manipulated reports and the nonmanipulated reports.
The two features of choice blindness which are philosophically
interesting, and in need of an explanation, is the phenomenon of ‘choice
blindness’ itself, and the fact that the participants seemingly ‘confabulate’
reasons in the manipulated condition. I discuss confabulation in the next
chapter, but for now I will consider the phenomenon of choice blindness itself.

Note, that it was already established in an earlier trial that the participants’
ability to discriminate different flavors was not impaired. Thus, it is highly
unlikely that the participants were mistaking the taste of strawberry with the
taste of grapefruit, or that the two flavors somehow were perceived as similar.
Even top-down processing mediated by the expectation that they are about to
taste strawberry jam is not enough to render the taste of grapefruit
indiscriminable from the taste of strawberry.
286
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The curious thing about choice blindness is that somehow, due to the
experimental manipulation, the participants became blind to the actual choice
they made just seconds previously: they receive the rejected option, and yet
fail to notice that they did not receive the thing they initially chose. As
Johansson et al., note, this is puzzling because:

A fundamental assumption of theories of decision making is that
intentions and outcome form a tight loop. The ability to monitor and to
compare the outcome of our choices with prior intentions and goals is
seen to be critical for adaptive behavior.287
The phenomenon of choice blindness, then, challenges a fundamental tenet of
many theories of decision-making.288 As Johannsson puts it, there is an
assumption that there exists a tight metacognitive loop between a
participant’s intentions (“I choose the strawberry jam”) and the outcome of
that choice (I will actually get strawberry jam). For us to be successful in
achieving our goals, which is essential for everyday success and survival, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that there exists a monitoring mechanism which
tracks outcomes and compares them to prior intentions to ensure that our
intentions are actually fulfilled. Suppose my goal is to receive strawberry jam
instead of grapefruit jam. If the outcome of my actions results in me receiving
grapefruit jam, one would expect the monitoring mechanism to flag a
discrepancy between my original goal (“Get strawberry jam”) and the outcome
(which was to receive grapefruit jam instead). At the very least, even if I don’t

287 Johansson,
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mind very much, I should at least notice the fact that I didn’t get what I
intended, and that my goal was thwarted. In the choice blindness studies,
however, this link between intention and outcome is broken: the participants
don’t get what they intended, and the monitoring mechanism fails to flag this
discrepancy. The participants don’t notice that they didn’t get what they
wanted: they have become choice blind. What causes this to happen?
In this chapter, I’m going to discuss several theories which attempt to
explain just what is going on when participants become choice blind. I shall
argue that, on every plausible interpretation of the choice blindness
experimental results, the phenomenon of choice blindness is hard for the
traditional theory of self-knowledge to accommodate and explain. The
phenomenon of choice blindness, then, is exceptionally difficult to reconcile
with the idea that we have privileged access to our propositional attitudes, and
that careful, rational reflection can remedy any errors in our thinking. There is
no explanation of the choice blindness results that leaves the traditional
theory of self-knowledge intact: core assumptions of the traditional theory will
have to be abandoned or heavily revised.
Before I discuss the possible interpretations of the choice blindness
studies, I will explain what is meant by the terms ‘attitude’ and ‘belief.’ It is
important to clarify the concepts of ‘attitude’ and ‘belief,’ because on some
interpretations of choice blindness the experimental manipulation interacts
with and affects participant’s beliefs and attitudes in some way. As
Johannsson notes, in the morality choice blindness study, the “participants
express their moral opinions, then moments later many of them are blind to
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the mismatched outcome and endorse the opposite view.”289 Thus, it seems as
if their moral opinions, and potentially their beliefs and underlying attitudes,
have been reversed by the choice blindness manipulation. However, more
investigation is required to elucidate just what, precisely, has caused this
effect; and what the nature of this effect is. Have the participant’s attitudes
toward the moral opinions actually reversed? If so, how has the choice
blindness manipulation caused this? Do the participants even possess real,
pre-experimental attitudes about morality? Or do the participant’s attitudes
stay the same, while their beliefs about their attitudes change? These are all
possibilities, and each has different implications for the traditional theory of
self-knowledge.

Attitudes

In this section, I will provide an account of what is meant by the terms
“attitude” in the context of choice blindness. In the choice blindness
experiments, Johansson et al. explicitly state that they are interested in
participants’ attitudes. In the moral opinion choice blindness experiment, for
example, the participant’s attitude towards a particular moral proposition is
measured. The participant’s attitudes were measured using a survey and a
verbal report. In the survey stage, participants were required to rate on a 9point scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a particular
moral statement. They were then asked to read their answers aloud and

289Johansson,
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provide reasons for the rating.290 The experimenters straightforwardly take
the verbal report, and the completed survey, to be an explicit declaration of a
particular attitude towards the moral statement. But what, precisely, is an
attitude?
Attitudes are a foundational concept in social psychology. They are
defined as an evaluation of some entity in the world: an event, a person, an
idea, or an object.291 A person’s reported attitudes are a representation of his
or her evaluation of the entity in question: for example, “I prefer this poster to
that one,” “ice cream is good,” or “I think that euthanasia is immoral.” We all
have a wide variety of attitudes on a diversity of topics and objects in the
world. A fundamental assumption is that there is a close relationship between
our verbal or written attitude reports and our actual evaluation of a given
entity. If a choice blindness study participant, for instance, scores a moral
viewpoint 9 out of 9 on the survey scale this is taken to be an accurate
reflection of her attitude of that moral opinion and a representation of the fact
that she strongly approves of it. A sincere report of one’s attitudes, then, is
assumed to be an honest reflection of one’s actual evaluative stance towards a
given object.
Attitudes are a particularly important concept in psychology because
there is a prevailing assumption by social psychologists that attitudes heavily
influence people’s choices and actions.292 All things being equal people are
Johansson, H., and T Strandberg. "Lifting the Veil of Morality”
Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. "Attitude-Behaviour Relations: A
Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical Research." Psychological
Bulletin 84, no. 5 (1977): 888-918, p.889.
292 Brinol, Pablo O., and Richard E Petty. "Knowing Our Attitudes and How to
Change Them." Chap. 10 In Handbook of Self-Knowledge, edited by Timothy
DeCamp Wilson and Simone Vazire, 157-80. New York City: Guildford Press,
2012. p.157.
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expected to choose objects, and approve of opinions, which align with their
attitudes; and they will reject entities which clash with their attitudes.
Attitudes, then, are thought to be consistent with one’s behavior. Carruthers,
for instance, defines attitudes as “a disposition to engage in evaluative
behavior of some sort.”293 Similarly, Gross and Niman state that:

Attitudes are assumed to reflect predispositions to behave in a
particular manner, and…are integrally related to most aspects of social
life, carrying expectations about our own behavior.294
It is important to note that the fact an individual possesses one particular
attitude is not sufficient to enable us to predict an individual’s behavior. For
example, even if an individual strongly agrees with the statement that
“cannabis should be legal,” this is not enough information to enable us to say
with certainty that this individual will behave in a particular way in the future.
To predict her behavior, I will need more information about her other
attitudes, desires, and background beliefs. I can only predict what someone
with a strong attitude in favor of cannabis legalization is likely to do in any
given situation if I know her other beliefs and desires. An individual’s vote on
the cannabis issue in the context of a referendum, for example, can only be
taken to reflect her attitude about cannabis just so long as she has no other
ulterior motives for voting in a particular way. And, similarly, if the only
information I have about an individual is the fact that she has a strong
attitude towards cannabis being legalized this is not enough to enable me to
predict how she will vote in a referendum to legalize cannabis. She may
Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind p.357.
Gross, Steven J, and Michael C. Niman. "Attitude-Behaviour Consistency:
A Review." Public Opinion Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1975): 358-68. p.358
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possess competing beliefs and desires that cause her to vote against cannabis
legalization, even if she does have a strong pro-attitude in favor of cannabis
being legal.
As Davidson pointed out in “Actions, reasons, and causes,” a single
belief by itself, or a desire by itself, is not sufficient to enable one to predict
behavior. What is needed to predict behavior, according to Davidson, is a
belief-desire pair. Davidson gives the example of an individual who flips a
light switch and thereby illuminates the room but also, at the same time, alerts
a burglar to his presence.295 The individuals’ behavior, the flipping of the
switch, is explained once we find out that he believed that flipping the switch
would illuminate the room, and he desired to illuminate the room – he did not
intend to alert the burglar to his presence, but only intended to illuminate the
room. The primary reason he flipped the switch was to illuminate the room –
it was not to disturb the burglar. Thus, Davidson would maintain that to
predict behavior we need to know more than an individual’s single beliefs, or
desires.
Attitudes imply certain behavioral dispositions, and we can, on the
basis of common sense and intuition, deem a behavior to be inconsistent or
consistent with a given attitude. If an individual’s verbal assertions and other
behavior stray too far from the stereotypical behavioral profile we
commonsensically expect to match a given attitude, we can legitimately
question whether the individual really holds the attitude in question. In short,
we expect there to be consistency between a person’s stated attitudes and their
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subsequent behavior. There is an assumption that if a person sincerely says
she feels a particular way about an issue that she will then behave in a way
that is, at least, broadly consistent with her stated attitude.
In the 1970s, the field of social psychology was rocked by a series of
meta-analyses which purportedly demonstrated that there was very little
correlation, if any, between explicitly asserted attitudes and behavior. For
example, Wicker reviewed 46 studies in which subject’s behavioral responses
to attitude objects were tracked.296 As Gross and Niman report, Wicker
discovered that in the context of these 46 studies, “only infrequently did
attitudes account for more than 10 percent of the variance in the overt
behavior measures.”297 Gross and Niman further state that, “measured
attitudes were often unrelated to, or only slightly related to overt behavior;
rarely were attitude-behavioral correlation coefficients above .30.”298 In other
words, people’s stated attitudes had no strong connection to their behavior:
there appeared to be little, if any, attitude-behavior consistency. This weak
connection between stated attitudes and behavior led Wicker to conclude that
there is “little evidence to support the postulated existence of stable
underlying attitudes within the individual which influence both his verbal
expressions and his actions.”299 Some psychologists began to doubt the very
existence of attitudes.

Wicker, A. "Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt
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(1969): 41-78.
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However, since then, the connection between stated attitudes and
behavior has been at least somewhat vindicated. In a review article, Ajzen and
Fishbein argue that just so long as a general attitude is not being used to
predict one specific behavior the correlation between stated attitude and
behavior is very high. For example, in an attitude-measuring experiment of
the 1960s,300 students were asked to what extent they supported AfricanAmerican civil rights. They were then asked if they would like to have their
picture taken with a pro-civil rights group. Most of the students who claimed
to support civil rights agreed to have their picture taken. However, a few days
later, experimenters phoned participants and asked if they could publish the
picture in a local newspaper. Many of the students who reported a positive
attitude towards civil rights refused to have their picture published. The
experimenters interpreted this as a straightforward discrepancy between the
student’s explicit attitudes and their behavior: if the students really supported
civil rights, they would surely not mind the picture being released. The fact
that the students objected to having the picture published implies that they
didn’t really hold a pro civil-rights attitude in the first place, according to the
experimenters.
The problem with this interpretation of the experimental results is that
it assumes there is a very tight link between a pro civil-right attitude and
agreeing to the publication of the photograph, such that the refusal of the
latter indicates the falsity of the former: if you don’t agree to have the picture
published, you can’t really hold a pro civil-rights attitude. However, as Ajzen
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and Fishbein point out, “people who hold the same general attitude can
behave in different ways.”301 It could very well be the case that a given
participant sincerely supports civil rights, and yet rejects the publication of
the photograph due to the presence of other, unrelated and unreported
attitudes and background beliefs. For instance, a participant with a pro civilrights attitude might value her privacy, and so refuses the publication of the
photograph because she does not want her political views to be advertised and
is worried about potential ostracism from her peers. There are many reasons
why someone with a genuinely pro civil-rights attitude might not agree to
have that picture published. The mistake the experimenters made was to
“select a single behavior that…they believed would be indicative of behavior in
the domain of interest.”302 They incorrectly assumed that if someone were
genuinely pro civil-rights they definitely would agree to the publication of the
picture. However, as Ajzen and Fishbein state:

In retrospect, there is reason to doubt that the particular behaviors
selected (or for that matter any single behavior) could be representative
of the broad domains under investigation…Given the idiosyncratic and
non-representative nature of the behavioral criteria, it is hardly
surprising that investigations of this kind obtained virtually no
evidence for a relation between attitudes and behavior.303

The mere fact that someone holds a genuine pro civil-rights attitude, then,
does not enable us to reliably predict whether they will perform a particular
Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. "The Influence of Attitudes on
Behaviour." In The Handbook of Attitudes, edited by D Albarracin, B Johnson
and M Zanna. New Jersey, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005, p.180.
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Behaviour."p.181.
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behavior such as agreeing to have a picture published. If we know an
individual’s general attitude towards a target object, the most that we can
reliably predict is whether that individual will behave in a way that is “broadly
representative of the behavioral domain, rather than a single, arbitrarily
selected action.”304 The fact that attitudes enable us to predict broad
behavioral dispositions, but not specific behaviors, was demonstrated in a
study in which participants were required to report their attitude towards
religion. The researchers then tracked 100 behaviors that were associated with
a pro-religious attitude (such as, for example, ‘going to church,’ ‘reading the
Bible,’ and so on). The presence of a pro-religion attitude had no predictive
validity for any one individual behavior. However, across all 100 behaviors,
there was a very high correlation with a pro-religion attitude.305 People with
pro-religion attitudes were very likely to engage in at least some pro-religion
behaviors. General attitudes, then, can predict broad behavioral dispositions
that are related to the target attitude; but they cannot be used to predict a
single, specific, arbitrary behavior. To return to the civil rights study, the mere
fact that a participant has a pro civil-rights attitude tells us nothing about
whether they are likely to authorize the publication of the photograph, but it
does tell us that they are likely to behave in ways that are consistent and
representative of being pro-civil rights, broadly speaking. Thus, Ajzen and
Fishbein conclude that:
Contrary to the pessimistic view…broad behavioral dispositions…are
reflected equally well in verbal response and overt actions. It is for this
304Ajzen,
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reason that we obtain very high correlations between attitudes towards
objects and multiple-act criteria.306
What if one is only interested in just one particular behavior, and not in broad
behavioral dispositions in general? Is there ever a correlation between a stated
attitude and a tendency to perform a specific action? It turns out that knowing
a participant’s attitudes can enable us to predict specific behaviors as long as
we know some of their other attitudes, beliefs, and desires as well. As Ajzen
and Fishbein report, social psychologists discovered that they could achieve a
high degree of behavioral-attitude consistency if they asked participants to
report their attitudes towards a particular behavior instead of just their
general attitudes towards the target object. Thus, instead of asking
participants for their attitude towards a particular object, researchers began
asking participants for their attitude towards the specific behavior of interest;
where behavior is “viewed as an action directed at a target, performed in a
given context, at a certain point in time.”307 For example, suppose researchers
wish to find out if drug addicts are likely to use clean needles. It is not useful
to find out about the drug addicts’ attitudes towards safe drug taking in
general: this attitude is too broad to enable us to predict whether or not drug
addicts will actually use clean needles. A drug addict may very strong express
the attitude that safe drug taking is preferable, and yet still fail to use clean
needles. Instead, researchers should ask drug addicts what their attitude is
towards them using safe needles in a particular context, at a particular time. If
drug addicts express a strong pro attitude towards the specific behavior of
Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. "The Influence of Attitudes on
Behaviour." p.182.
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306

166

using safe needles, then the correlation between their stated attitude and the
behavior can be expected to be very high. In short, if drug addicts have a
positive attitude towards using safe needles, in a certain context and at a
certain time, one can predict with a high degree of certainty that they will, in
fact, use safe needles in that context.308 In this case, it is not correct to say that
the mere holding of a pro safe needle attitude has a direct behavioral upshot.
Rather, this case demonstrates that so long as the various background beliefs
are made explicit, and so long as the individual possesses other crucial
attitudes and desires (for example, the desire to be honest and comply with
the experiment, the belief that the needles really are clean, and so on) then it
is possible to predict the individuals’ specific behavior in a particular context.
Thus, to summarize, it is not the case that a subject’s stated attitudes
have no relation to their future actions. The mistake that early researchers
made was to assume that the mere holding of one particular attitude was
sufficient to enable prediction of future behavior. As later research
demonstrated, we can only predict an individual’s future actions if we know
more information than just the fact they hold a particular attitude. We also
need to know the individual’s background beliefs, desires, and other attitudes
towards a particular action, in a specific context, before we can be in a
position to accurately predict what they are likely to do in such a situation.
On the topic of attitude, it is also worth mentioning the distinction
between implicit and explicit attitudes. It has been known for some time now
that “people can hold two attitudes at the same time, one implicit and often
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unrecognized, and the other explicit and under conscious control.”309 Implicit
attitudes are associated with so-called system one processes, and explicit
attitudes are associated with system two processes. The system one/system
two distinction plays a major role in many cognitive theories and has been
outlined in some detail by Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow.310 System
one processes are characterized as being fast, automatic, non-conscious,
involuntary, insensitive to conscious thoughts, and requiring little cognitive
effort. System one is commonly regarded as the system that produces ‘gut
feelings,’ intuitions, or heavily rehearsed associations, and “operates as a
machine for jumping to conclusions.”311 System two, on the other hand, is
characterized as slow, effortful, voluntary, requiring conscious input and a lot
of cognitive effort. System two is “engaged whenever we are induced to tackle
reasoning tasks in a reflective manner.”312
During periods where system two is overloaded, and under strain,
system two cannot take on any more tasks besides what it is already doing: on
occasions, system two can be working at capacity. On such occasions, we may
not be able to reason deeply because system two is engaged with these other
tasks. System one, on the other hand, still functions even when the cognitive
system is overworked. It is tempting to regard the deliverances of system 2 as
more reliable than the outputs of system one, but this is a mistake. Both
system one and system two are capable of being reliable, and they are also
capable of error. The mere fact that system two is guided by reason and
Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. "The Influence of Attitudes on
Behaviour”, p. 205.
310 Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011.
311 Cassam, Quassim. Self-Knowledge for Humans.p.15.
312 Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind: p.99.
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conscious control does not necessarily render it more reliable than system
one. Even though system one operates unconsciously and swiftly, it may
nevertheless be exceptionally reliable under normal operating conditions.
Implicit attitudes are associated with system one processes because
they are nonconscious, automatically activated, are not under conscious
control, and are unresponsive to reasons; whereas explicit attitudes are
associated with system two processes because we can be consciously aware of
them, they require cognitive effort to activate, they are under conscious
control, and are responsive to reasoning. Implicit and explicit attitudes can
sometimes clash. For example, Bill might hold the explicit attitude that “black
people are just as competent, and as hard-working as white people.” Bill may
very well strongly identify with, and endorse this attitude, and he may
frequently and publicly assert it. Bill may openly support more opportunities
for black people, and enthusiastically agree that more diversity in the
workplace is a good thing. He would be horrified by the suggestion that he is
racist and would strongly repudiate such a claim. However, Bill may also hold
an unconscious, implicit attitude which has been formed by years of exposure
to stereotypes about black people, which is that “black people are not as
competent and are lazier than white people.” This implicit attitude is harder to
uncover than Bill’s explicit attitude: implicit attitudes can usually only be
discovered indirectly via an implicit attitude test, or by careful observation of
Bill’s behavior.
Bill’s explicit attitude, which is positive towards black people, conflicts
with his implicit attitude which is negative towards black people. In the case of
a conflict between implicit and explicit attitudes, the automatically activated
implicit attitudes will generally guide behavior “unless they are overridden by
169

controlled processes.”313 It may require a great deal of motivation, cognitive
effort, and awareness to override one’s automatically activated implicit
attitudes and activate explicit attitudes instead. What this unfortunately
means is that Bill’s behavior may more often than not be guided by his
negative, implicit attitudes towards black people instead of his consciously
endorsed, explicit, pro-black attitudes. Thus, for example, Bill may react more
favorably to a resume with the name “John Smith,” than to a resume with the
name “LaToya Jackson.” Bill might punish a black employee more harshly for
absenteeism than a white employee who has had just as many days off. And
Bill may behave in these ways without consciously recognizing that he has a
bias against black people. Bill may act in these ways and yet still explicitly
maintain that he holds no ill will towards black people and that he treats
everyone in the same way (even though his actions say otherwise.)

Belief

The choice blindness manipulation may interact with, and affect, participant’s
beliefs, as well as their attitudes, so it’s worth outlining what is meant by the
term ‘belief.’ In the same way that ‘attitude’ is a foundational concept in social
psychology ‘belief’ is a core concept in philosophy, particularly in the
philosophy of mind and epistemology. However, while the term ‘attitude’ has
a widely agreed definition, the same cannot be said for ‘belief.’ As Gendler
states, “although belief is clearly one of the central notions in epistemology the
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question of what belief is has been…underexplored.”314 Connors and Halligan,
who are cognitive psychologists, echo Gendler’s view when they state that
“there is…no philosophical consensus on what belief is.”315 However, as
Schwitzgebel notes, most contemporary analytic philosophers agree, at the
very least, that belief refers “to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we
take something to be the case or regard it as true.”316 Beliefs are propositional
attitudes, in that they have a particular meaning and a truth value – they can
either be true or false.317 My belief that “Paris is in France,” for example, is
something I take to be true; and it has the representational content about
Paris and its location in France which may or may not, in fact, be true or false.
Beliefs are not the same thing as attitudes. Attitudes are
representations of an agent’s evaluation of a particular object, and so track an
agent’s preferences towards the object. Beliefs, on the other hand, do not track
what the agent prefers but, rather, what the agent takes to be true. Beliefs and
attitudes are related in that one can have beliefs about one’s attitudes, and
about the objects of one’s evaluation: beliefs can be said to express, or reflect,
one’s attitudes. For example, suppose I have a strong positive attitude towards
Paris. My pro-attitude about Paris may be accompanied by various related
beliefs. I may believe, for example, that Paris has various features that I
admire (“I believe that Paris has tasty bakeries”, “I believe that Paris has good
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art galleries”) and these beliefs may contribute towards my positive attitude
towards Paris. In other words, I may hold my positive attitude towards Paris
precisely because of the beliefs I have about Paris: beliefs can make a causal
contribution towards one’s attitudes. I may also have a belief about my
attitude itself: I might hold the correct belief that “I have a positive attitude
towards Paris” (or, more typically, “I believe that I rate Paris very highly.”)
That is, I may possess self-knowledge about my attitudinal evaluation towards
Paris. So, in this case, my attitude may have a causal impact on my belief. The
fact that I have a positive attitude towards Paris contributes towards my belief
that I have a positive attitude towards Paris. The causal relationship between
attitudes and beliefs, then, goes both ways. This is not to say that this is a
necessary causal relationship, however. I may have various beliefs about less
admirable features of Paris (“I believe that Paris is expensive,” “I believe that
Paris is grubby.”) and this may not affect my positive attitude towards Paris in
the slightest. I may have an entrenched positive attitude towards Paris that
will not budge or alter no matter what. Similarly, I may have a positive
attitude towards Paris, but I might not have the belief that I have a positive
attitude towards Paris – I might lack this piece of self-knowledge.
In the section on attitudes, I discussed the distinction between implicit
and explicit attitudes. Gendler argues that the phenomenon of implicit and
explicit attitudes can be explained by reference to beliefs and another type of
mental state which she calls ‘aliefs.’ According to Gendler, explicit attitudes
are just “genuine evidence-responsive beliefs,”318 whereas implicit attitudes
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are not beliefs at all but something else entirely - “aliefs.” Explicit attitudes, on
this view, are just what we would call ‘beliefs’ in that they track truth and are
reality sensitive; whereas nonconscious, arational implicit attitudes are ‘aliefs.’
Gendler thinks that the concept of ‘alief’ can help explain, and unify, some
puzzling cases of behavioral/belief mismatch. The concept of ‘alief’ can be
illustrated by means of an example. The case concerns the behavior and
beliefs of visitors who cross the Grand Canyon sky bridge. The sky bridge is a
transparent glass platform that juts out over the top of the Grand Canyon,
which generates the eerie effect (if one looks down) that one is walking in thin
air thousands of feet above the ground. Gendler notes that many of the people
who cross the sky bridge behave in rather odd ways: they crawl across, they
act very hesitant, they refuse to look down, they exhibit fear and so on. In
other words, the sky bridge crossers act as if they believe that the sky bridge
isn’t safe and that they are in mortal danger of falling thousands of feet. This is
puzzling, according to Gendler, because if they really believed the sky bridge
was unsafe they wouldn’t dare set foot on it. Surely, they must believe that the
sky bridge is safe; yet they act as if it is not. And if we ask them directly “do
you think the sky bridge is safe?” they surely will respond that it is safe, even
though they exhibit fear when they cross it.319 How do we explain this
behavioral/belief mismatch?
According to Gendler, the visitor’s behavior can be explained by
reference to aliefs. A typical alief is “a mental state with associatively linked
content that is representational, affective, and behavioral, and that is
activated- consciously or non-consciously - by features of the subject’s internal
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or ambient environment.”320 In the case of the sky bridge, the Grand Canyon
visitors have the explicit belief that “the sky bridge is safe.” This explicit belief
explains why they walk out on the sky bridge in the first place. At the same
time, however, the visitors also have an alief with the representational content
‘not safe,’ the affective or emotional content of ‘fear,’ and the activation of
various motor routines (such as crawling on the bridge, refusing to look down,
and so on.) Their aliefs, then, lead to behavioral and emotional reactions that
are inconsistent with the explicit belief that the sky bridge is safe, and also
contains the representational content that the sky bridge is not safe. The
Grand Canyon visitor’s explicit beliefs clash with their implicit aliefs, which
leads to the behavioral/belief mismatch. The visitors do not have
contradicting beliefs – beliefs with opposing mental content – but, rather,
possess two different kinds of mental states: a belief and what Gendler calls a
‘belief discordant alief.’
Aliefs are constituted by a cluster of associations that are bundled up
with affective responses, behaviors, and representational content. Aliefs are
entrenched habits or innate dispositions towards particular stimuli, and they
are activated whenever we think about or encounter a member of the relevant
category. One key property of aliefs, according to Gendler, is that they are not
under (very much) rational control: “they operate at a level that is
relatively…impenetrable by controlled rational processes.”321 In much the
same way that a phobia is entrenched after repeated negative associations and
bad experiences, aliefs are not especially responsive to reasoning, nor to
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conscious efforts to alter or remove them. Even if I cross the sky bridge, and I
consciously think to myself “don’t be scared – this is silly. It’s perfectly safe”, I
will not be able to just throw off the activated alief that is “high up/scared/get
off/danger/falling.”322 Because aliefs are mostly impervious to rationality,
they can only be altered in arational ways, such as, for example, building up
positive associations with the stimulus in question: “[alief] regulation is best
achieved by strategies that exploit capacities other than rational argument and
persuasion.”323
With this explanation in mind, it is easy to see how the concepts of
beliefs and aliefs link up with implicit and explicit attitudes: indeed, Gendler
herself explicitly identifies racist implicit attitudes with aliefs. Implicit
attitudes, on Gendler’s theory, are nothing more than aliefs: clusters of
associations, with representational, affective, and behavioral content, that are
mostly impervious to reason and conscious control. And explicit attitudes can
straightforwardly be identified as consciously endorsed beliefs – mental states
that are reality sensitive, that track truth, and are responsive to reasons. To
return to the example of Bill, Bill’s implicit attitude that black people are
inferior to white people is constituted by an alief that is activated in the
presence of black people. The alief may have the representational content of
‘not a good worker, lazy,’ the affective content of “annoyance,’’ and may
prompt certain behaviors such as avoidance. Bill, at the same time, has an
explicit attitude that black people are not inferior to white people, and this is
constituted by a consciously endorsed belief, with the content “I believe that
black people are equal to white people.” Bill has a belief discordant alief, and
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this leads to belief/behavioral clashes at times; such as when Bill asserts that
he isn’t racist and yet fires a black member of staff for a minor infraction or
throws away a resume that has a typical black name on the cover.
With all of this discussion about aliefs, beliefs, implicit attitudes, and
explicit attitudes in mind, it is worth pausing to consider an important
question: which attitudes and beliefs, if any, can be said to be my actual
beliefs and attitudes? There is a strong intuition that some beliefs and
attitudes are ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ in that they reflect one’s actual evaluation
towards a target attitude. However, given that implicit attitudes may routinely
guide our behaviors, and can be just as strong as explicit attitudes, there is a
question about whether implicit or explicit attitudes should be identified as an
individual’s ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ evaluation of a target object. This question is
particularly pressing in cases where implicit and explicit attitudes conflict:
does Bill, for example, hold a pro-attitude towards black people or a negative
attitude? Does Bill really have racist beliefs and attitudes, or should we
identify Bill with his explicitly held anti-racist attitudes instead?
Some philosophers and psychologists argue that implicit attitudes
should be treated as an individual’s genuine evaluative stance, towards a
particular object. On this interpretation, Bill’s explicit attitudes towards black
people are just a socially acceptable front while his implicit attitudes reflect
his ‘real’ views – his negative evaluation of black people. Cassam, for instance,
argues that an individual’s explicit assertions about race are not reliable
indicators of his or her genuine attitudes because explicit attitudes can be
mediated by downstream influences and conscious control for the purposes of
social acceptability. Real attitudes, on the other hand, are reflected in
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“unguarded behavior…and spontaneous emotions.”324 If Bill lived in a society
where racism was more socially acceptable, he may very well let his real views
be publicly known. Given that he lives in a culture where overt racism is
frowned upon, however, he must constantly exert conscious control in public
to make it appear as if he holds positive views towards black people. However,
occasionally the façade slips and his real evaluative stance, in the form of
implicit attitudes, come to the surface. Similarly, Nosek and Hansen argue
that conscious endorsement of implicit attitudes is irrelevant when
considering whether an implicit attitude really belongs to an individual.325
They argue that if an implicit attitude affects an individual’s future behavior
(so if Bill really does refuse to hire black people because of his implicit
attitude), then it can rightfully be said to belong to that individual. The origin
of the attitude, how it came about, is irrelevant with regards to the question of
ownership.326
Another option is to say that only explicit attitudes constitute our
genuine evaluative stance towards a particular object. Philosophers argue that
explicit attitudes reflect genuine evaluations because only explicit attitudes
are conscious and within our conscious control. Negative implicit attitudes
towards black people, on the other hand, do not reflect genuine evaluations
because they cannot be consciously controlled, and are highly insensitive to
reasons: in fact, they may arise out of mere exposure to negative stereotypes
over time and not as the result of a rationally considered judgment. As Levy
Cassam, Quassim. Self-Knowledge for Humans p.33.
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puts it, “[implicit] attitudes are judgment insensitive…they are changed by
means that resemble the ways in which they were acquired…by acquiring new
associations and learning new habits.”327 Due to their insensitivity to
conscious control, and due to the fact that such attitudes may be formed by
arational forces, one may very well be alienated from one’s implicit attitudes. I
might be stuck with an attitude that I cannot change, that clashes with all of
my explicit attitudes and beliefs, and that I repudiate in the strongest terms. If
I cannot exert conscious control over my implicit attitudes and can only alter
them via non-rational means (such as, say, exposing myself to positive
imagery to counter the negative stereotypes I have inculcated) then many
philosophers maintain that these attitudes are not, in any meaningful sense,
my attitudes but are simply mental states that I am subjected to against my
will and best intentions. It could very well be the case that my overall
evaluative stance, comprised of all of my attitudes, is anti-racist; and that my
racist implicit attitudes are nothing more than incalcitrant outliers that I am
stuck with against my will.
According to Levy, one’s evaluative stance is one’s “global perspective
on what matters, normatively.”328 The set of attitudes that make up one’s
evaluative stance must be, broadly speaking, consistent to properly constitute
a ‘stance,’ but, as Levy puts it, we are not perfectly rational beings: we may
hold a few attitudes that conflict with our overall evaluative stance. Levy
argues that any attitudes which lie outside the evaluative stance do not belong
to the individual, in any meaningful sense. Thus, according to Levy, racist
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implicit attitudes do not belong to an agent if they clash with an agent’s
overall evaluative stance.
Gendler, similarly, agrees that implicit attitudes, which she identifies as
beliefs, do not necessarily express one’s genuine evaluative stance. According
to Gendler, aliefs are nothing more than entrenched habits of thought or
annoying mental tics – they are conceptually similar to phobias or delusional
fixations. Aliefs are not very responsive to reason and cannot be consciously
controlled. I may find myself in a position where I discover I have a particular
alief, and I may not consciously endorse it in the slightest but publicly disavow
it. I may find myself alienated from a particular alief, and I may desperately
wish to rid it from my cognitive system to put an end to its unwanted
influence on my behavior. Thus, in the same way that one isn’t really
responsible for acting fearful in the presence of an object that triggers a
phobia, one isn’t responsible for actions caused by aliefs. Aliefs do not reflect
our genuine attitudes towards target objects; only beliefs and explicit attitudes
reflect our real evaluative stance.

What is going on during choice blindness?

With the concepts of ‘attitude’ and ‘belief’ in mind, I will now provide some
potential explanations of what might be going on during the undetected,
manipulated choice blindness trials. As Johansson et al. point out, in one
sense choice blindness is an easy phenomenon to explain: “participants
express their…opinions, then moments later many of them are blind to the
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mismatched outcome and endorse the opposite view.”329 However, while these
results are straightforward enough, “it is considerably more difficult to
explicate all the implications”330 of choice blindness. What does choice
blindness entail for traditional theories of self-knowledge, and for theories of
decision making in general? Before I dig into the explanations, however, I will
briefly address one particular suggestion of how to figure out what is going on,
cognitively speaking, at the moment choice blindness occurs. Fiala and
Nichols suggest that one potentially fruitful way to find out what is going on
during decision making studies, such as the stocking experiment, is to directly
ask the experimental participants what they are thinking when they, for
example, pick the rightmost pair of stockings.331 In particular, Fiala and
Nichols maintain that we can get useful data if we just “asked
participants…whether they think they are introspecting or interpretation
[their mental states].”332 Thus, if we wish to know if participants are, in fact,
introspectively accessing their reasons we should just ask them “did you
introspectively access your reasons?”
According to Nichols and Fiala, Nisbett and Wilson are not entitled to
simply assume that participants are interpreting their mental states because
they have neglected to ask the participants what they thought they were doing
at the moment of their decision. So, to apply this suggestion to the choice
blindness studies, one could just ask the participants what their thoughts were
during the experiment. At the moment they became ‘choice blind’ did they
Johansson, H., and T Strandberg. "Lifting the Veil of Morality” p.5.
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329

330

180

really not notice the switch? When provided reasons for a choice they did not
make, were they introspecting these reasons or merely interpreting them?
It is far from obvious, however, that Fiala and Nichol’s suggestion could
actually yield any useful information about what is cognitively going on during
choice blindness experiments. For one thing, the terms ‘introspection’ and
‘interpretation’ are terms of art. It is highly unlikely that the average
experimental participant will have any idea what the difference between
‘introspecting’ and ‘interpreting’ is, and, consequently, they will be simply
unable to answer the question “did you directly introspect your decision?” As
Carruthers points out, experimental participants “will almost certainly find
the question to be confusing, and they might revert to bits and pieces of
knowledge acquired about Freud, or about cognitive science, or whatever,
when trying to say something sensible by way of answer.”333
Furthermore, Carruthers has argued that the illusion of transparent
access to our mental states may be an innate feature of the human mind, and
thus all the experimental participants will be heavily inclined to state that they
are directly introspecting even though this may not be the case. 334 Briefly, his
argument is that the mind-reading system can operate far more efficiently if it
“model[s] people’s access to their own minds as entirely transparent.”335
Suppose I am trying to interpret my friend’s beliefs and desires, based off her
behavior and speech. If my mind reading system has a built-in assumption
that people must interpret their own mental states, this makes my task of
working out my friend’s beliefs much more difficult. My mind reading system
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will not just have to work out the bare meaning of my friend’s speech and
behavior but will also have to make a further inference about whether my
friend interpreted her own speech and behavior correctly. However, if the
mind-reading system has a built-in assumption that people’s access to their
own mental states is via direct introspection, this makes the mind-reading
faculty’s task much easier without a huge loss of reliability (because people are
generally excellent interpreters of themselves.)336
In short, then, there is no good reason to trust that participants
themselves can provide reliable information about what is going on during
choice blindness. In much the same way that we lack access to what is going
on during low and mid-level visual processing, we also lack access to what is
going on at the moment of choice blindness. Finally, even if experimenters
succeeded in getting participants to understand the question such an inquiry
is a non-starter in the first place by Nisbett and Wilson’s own lights. On
Nisbett and Wilson’s account, participants succumb to an illusion of global
introspective access: from their point of view, it is just as if they are
introspecting reasons when, in fact, they may be interpreting them. If Nisbett
and Wilson’s theory is correct, asking the participants if they are interpreting
rather than introspecting their mental states is pointless because such
information is introspectively inaccessible to the participants – they will just
state that, as far as they are concerned, they are introspecting. But if Nisbett
and Wilson’s theory is incorrect, and the participants really are introspecting
their mental states then they will also deny they are interpreting. Either way,
no matter if Nisbett and Wilson are right or wrong, asking the participants
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this question is fruitless and can provide no evidence to adjudicate between
the two hypotheses.337 Asking the participants directly, then, cannot help us
figure out what is going on during choice blindness.
I will use the moral opinion choice blindness statement as a model of a
standard choice blindness study, because participants becoming blind to their
previously stated moral opinions is a more serious consequence than, say,
participants becoming blind to a previously chosen face or to a flavor of jam.
In the moral opinion study participants are provided with a questionnaire
about moral issues. There were two surveys: one on abstract, foundational
moral principles (for example, “what is morally permissible ought to be
similar between different cultures and societies”), and one on topical ethical
topics (for example, “the violence Israel used in the conflict with Hamas is
morally defensible despite the civilian casualties suffered by the
Palestinians.”)338
After taking a supplemental survey where they reported the strength of
their moral opinions, and their degree of political activism, the participants
were provided with a survey with 12 different ethical statements, and they
were required to rate on a 9 point scale to what extent they agreed or
disagreed with the statement. 5 indicates neutrality, 1 indicates strong
disagreement, and 9 indicates strong agreement. After completing the
questionnaire, the participants were requested to read aloud three of their
answers and to explain their ratings. In the non-manipulated condition, the
participants were required to discuss and give reasons for the ratings they had
actually provided. In the manipulated condition, however, via a sleight of
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hand magic trick the participants were provided with an answer sheet which
displayed something quite different from their original survey responses. As
Johansson explains:

Unbeknownst to the participants, two of the statement they read aloud
at this stage were actually the reverse of the statements they had
originally rated – i.e., if the original formulation stated that “large
scaled governmental surveillance of e-mail and internet traffic ought to
be forbidden as a means to combat international crime and terrorism.”,
it was now changed to “large scale governmental surveillance of e-mail
and internet traffic ought to be permitted as a means to combat
international crime and terrorism.” As the rating was held constant but
the direction of the statement was reversed, the participant’s original
opinion was reversed as a consequence.339
So, for example, if a participant initially gave a score of 8 (signifying strong
agreement) to the statement “the violence Israel used in the conflict with
Hamas is morally defensible despite the civilian casualties suffered by the
Palestinians,” she would then be confronted with a survey sheet which shows
she had given a score of 8 to the opposite statement: “the violence Israel used
in the conflict with Hamas is morally reprehensible despite the civilian
casualties suffered by the Palestinians.” She would be requested to read this
statement aloud, and then the experimenters would interject to summarize
the attitude by saying something like “so you strongly agree that the violence
used by Israel is morally reprehensible?” At this juncture, she may notice that
this statement does not reflect her original survey rating and so will correct
the experimenters. The participant might also fail to notice the manipulation
and become blind to her original moral opinion.
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In this choice blindness experiment, the survey scale was designed to
reflect the degree to which participants agreed with the moral opinions. A
score of 9 represents complete agreement, whereas a score of 1 represents
complete disagreement. The midpoint of the scale “allowed participants to be
neutral or undecided about the issues,” and some participants did take a
neutral stance towards some ethical issues. These neutral trials were removed
from the final pool of analyzed trials because “when the participants rated
themselves to be neutral, the manipulated reversal of the principle or
statement did not affect the participant’s stated opinion (i.e., they were still
neutral).”340 The experimenters also assume that there is a tight link between
the survey ratings and how deeply the participants cared about the particular
issue. In the current study, Johannsson et al. state that “the average rating
was 2.8 or 7.2 [out of 10] depending on the direction of the rating…this is
evidence that the participants cared about the issues
involved.”341[emphasis mine] The experimenters thus assume that if a
participant ranks an opinion very highly or low on the survey scale, he or she
cares deeply about that issue.
On the other hand, participants who allocate middling scores, like 5/10,
are assumed to not care very much either way about the political opinion in
question. In the case of the choice blindness manipulation, then, it will be
instructive to look to cases where participants care deeply about specific moral
topics. Intuitively, a human rights advocate who has been actively
campaigning for the welfare of Palestinians living in Gaza is far less likely to
succumb to a choice blindness manipulation regarding an attitude about the
340
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict than a person who doesn’t care as much about the
conflict.
In the morality choice blindness study, most of the manipulated trials
were not detected. In the abstract moral principles study, one-third of the
manipulations were detected at the moment of the manipulation. In the
salient moral issues study the detection rate was higher at almost 50%.342 In
total, 69% of the participants did not notice that at least one of their
statements had been reversed and went on to give compelling reasons for why
they held this moral opinion.343 The experimenters also found there was no
correlation between the reported strength of the participant’s moral opinions,
and their ability to notice the manipulation. This means that participants who
declared themselves to have very strong moral opinions were just as likely to
fall for the manipulation as participants with weak moral opinions. However,
participants who rated themselves as more politically active were more likely
to notice the manipulation (but only in the current affairs survey, not in the
abstract moral principles survey). As Johansson et al. state, “unless one is
directly involved with the current dilemmas (as the politically active
participants in condition two were), level of [moral] abstraction does not seem
to affect levels of choice blindness.”344 Note, however, that Johansson et al.
are not entitled to claim that participants were directly involved with the
current moral dilemma. The survey only asked participants about their
general extent of political and moral engagement and did not ask them how
engaged they were about individual issues. It is entirely plausible that a
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particular individual may be very politically engaged with the topic of
Palestinian-Israeli conflict but may not be engaged at all with the issue of
government email surveillance. Such an individual could very well become
choice blind on the topic of government surveillance but would not succumb
to choice blindness when asked about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus,
the questionnaire was a blunt instrument in that it only asked for levels of
general political and moral engagement while neglecting to ask about
participant’s engagement with the particular moral issues at hand.
Furthermore, it is not terribly surprising that individuals who are
politically active were less likely to notice the manipulation in the abstract
moral principle case. Hot-topic, current moral issues are not at the level of
fundamental, abstract principles, and political activists are likely to be more
concerned with current affairs than with the foundations and principles of
morality. It would be interesting, as a follow-up experiment, to see if
philosophers who have spent some time thinking about abstract moral
principles succumb as easily to the manipulation as individuals who have not
spent much time thinking about such matters.345Finally, there was also a
correlation between the strength of the reported opinion and the rates of
manipulation detection. That is, “the more the participants agreed or
disagreed with a statement, the more likely they were to correct the
manipulation.”346 Thus, the more one agrees or disagrees with a viewpoint,
the less likely it is that one will succumb to the choice blindness effect. This
protection is not absolute, though. As Johansson et al. state, “a full third…of
all manipulated trails rated at the endpoints of the scale (1 or 9) remained
345
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undetected, which shows that not even extreme levels of agreement or
disagreement with statements guarantees detection.”347
While the morality choice blindness study seems to show a relation
between attitude strength/degree of political engagement and manipulation
detection, it is curious to note that in another choice blindness study, in which
participants were surveyed on their political opinions, no such correlation is
found. Thus, it may be the case that strong attitudes and high general political
engagement do not really help all that much in preventing choice blindness
and that there is no real correlation between attitude strength and resistance
to the choice blindness manipulation. In the political opinions choice
blindness study, the participants were asked to indicate their degrees of
political activism and engagement (in general and not for specific political
issues), as well as how certain they were in their political views.348 This study
shows the same pattern of results as the other choice blindness studies: 47%
of participants failed to notice any of the manipulations. Contrary to the moral
opinions study, however, in the political choice blindness study “there were no
differences in self-rated political engagement or in political certainty between
participants who corrected no answers and participants who made one or
more corrections.”349
Furthermore, having strong political opinions as indicated by a very
high or very low survey score did not enable participants to notice the
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manipulation. In the political opinions study, it was the participant’s actual
score, and not the opinion itself, that was altered in the manipulated condition
(so, for example, if a participant gave an opinion a score of 90 her score might
change to 40.) On average, across all trials, the score was manipulated 36
points either way along the scale: so, on average, a score of 10 would be
changed into 46; and a score of 80 would be changed into 44. However, unlike
the moral opinions study, there was no correlation between the strength of the
survey score and the ability to detect manipulations: participants who gave
scores of 90 were just as likely to become choice blind as participants who
gave more middling scores of 45.
While these results are inconsistent, it is safe to say that there must be
a point where a participant is so directly experienced, and engaged, with an
issue that they are protected from the choice blindness effect.350 Johansson et
al. think it is absurd to suggest that one could become choice blind to any
choice: “obviously an experimental finding like choice blindness is bound at
the limits by choices we know to be of great importance in everyday life.”351 A
bride will not be manipulated into marrying a total stranger on her wedding
day! Thus, it is fair to assume that attitude strength, and degree of
engagement does mitigate the choice blindness effect to an extent. It could be
the case that participants with specific involvement in the target object, as
opposed to just general political engagement, are protected from choice

With regard to the moral attitudes study, Joe Levine raised the point that a
life-long campaigner for Palestinian rights would be highly unlikely to
succumb to the choice blindness effect. They are so immersed in this issue
that they would immediately detect the manipulation. And, indeed, Johansson
et al. found that participants who directly engaged with a moral issue were
less likely to succumb to the choice blindness effect.
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blindness. A weakness of the political and moral choice blindness studies is
that the experimenters only managed to measure participant’s general moral
or political engagement and not the degree of direct involvement with the
issues. For instance, an individual who has spent his whole life working for
environmental protection laws may consider himself to be highly politically
engaged in general, but it is not clear how this political engagement could
inoculate him from becoming choice blind to a moral opinion about
something entirely unrelated to environmental protection, like euthanasia for
example. In such a case, it would be interesting to see whether he is less likely
to become choice blind to his area of expertise.
Let’s look at an example of a non-manipulated trial and give a
commonsense interpretation of what occurs in this case. Note, that one
guiding assumption I use to explain the choice blindness effect is that
participants are sincerely attempting to report their attitudes about the
political statements – they are not just randomly providing any old answer,
nor are they lying or trying to deceive the experimenters. I assume that,
during the study, the participants were motivated to get things right and not
actively confound the study results. Given the nature of the choice blindness
studies, it is reasonable to assume that the participants were motivated to be
accurate and truthful. In the morality choice blindness studies, for instance,
Johannsson et al. state that “we made an effort to choose a task that our
participants would be knowledgeable about, and that would concern and
engage them.”352
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Given that the participants were concerned and engaged with the task,
it is reasonable to suppose that they were motivated to sincerely report their
actual attitudes if they had any. Furthermore, in many of the choice blindness
studies, such as the jam tasting study or the political opinion study, the
participants were promised some tangible reward for volunteering to
complete the survey (such as a jam sample, or a political compass rating). The
original intention of the study was concealed from participants, and
volunteers freely offered to fill out the survey in exchange for the reward.
Again, this makes it more likely that the participants were keen to sincerely
answer the questions as best as they could.
Furthermore, I maintain that it is highly unlikely that the participants
noticed the manipulation but went along with it out or embarrassment, or a
desire to please the experimenters. Firstly, the choice blindness experiments
were deliberately designed in such a way to reduce the risk that participants
would go out of their way to please experimenters: the real purpose of the
experiment was hidden from them, it was made clear that they would not be
judged on the basis of their answers, and so on. Secondly, it has already been
established via eye-tracking studies that the participants who became choice
blind in the manipulated trials literally did not notice the manipulation, and
so this rules out explanations which postulate that participants really did
notice the manipulation but chose to keep quiet about it. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that the choice blindness results are not an experimental artifact
caused by the participant’s trying to please the experimenters.
In the case of a non-manipulated trial, imagine that Sally is filling out
the survey, and she is confronted with the statement that “the violence Israel
used in the conflict with Hamas is morally defensible despite the civilian
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casualties suffered by the Palestinians.” She disagrees with this statement, and
so scores it 2/10. After she has completed the survey, she hands it to the
experimenter. Her survey sheet is returned to her a few seconds later, and the
experimenter says to her something along the lines of “I see you don’t think
that the Israeli violence against Hamas is defensible. Can you please explain
why you hold this opinion?” Sally, in response, may give some reasons as to
why she holds the moral opinion that she does. In this case, Sally’s verbal
report really does support her stated attitude: they are congruent.
Commonsensically, Sally does indeed hold a strong negative attitude (and
concomitant beliefs) about this moral issue, an attitude which was preexisting prior to Sally undertaking the choice blindness experiment.
Let’s now consider the example of a manipulated choice blindness
experiment. Sue, another participant, is taking part in the same moral
opinions study. While filling out the survey, she is confronted with the same
statement about Israel: “the violence Israel used in the conflict with Hamas is
morally defensible despite the civilian casualties suffered by the Palestinians.”
Sue, like Sally, gives this statement a score of 2 out of 10, indicating strong
disagreement. After she has completed the survey, she gives it to the
experimenter who, unbeknownst to Sue, manipulates her answers such that
the statement about Israel now reads “the violence used in the conflict with
Hamas is morally reprehensible because of the civilian casualties suffered by
the Palestinians.” Seconds later, the experimenter hands Sue back her
manipulated survey sheet. Sue’s survey rating has remained the same: it is still
2/10. However, the statement itself has now been reversed, such that Sue’s
2/10 reflects strong approval of Israel’s military policy: it now appears as if
Sue strongly disagrees with the view that Israeli’s military policy is morally
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wrong when, originally, she expressed strong disagreement with the view that
the military policy is morally permissible. To avoid the possibility of Sue
misreading, or failing to notice, the adjusted statement the experimenters will
ask her to read aloud the statement along with her score. After she has done
so, the experimenters will explicitly say to Sue something like “so you disagree
that what Israel is doing is immoral. Can you explain why you hold this
opinion?” If this is a case where Sue has become choice blind, she will not
notice the altered statement when she reads it aloud, nor will she challenge
the experimenter’s claim when he states, “so you disagree that what Israel is
doing is immoral.” She will not challenge the pro-Israeli attitude that has been
attributed to her. Instead, she will launch right into a cogent, detailed
explanation of why she thinks that Israeli’s military policy is morally
defensible. In other words, she will fail to notice that her survey has been
altered. She will also fail to notice that not only is she is arguing in favor of a
viewpoint she did not initially express, but she is, in fact, arguing for a
position that is the polar opposite of her initially reported attitude. What,
then, can we say about Sue’s attitudes and beliefs towards Israeli military
policy, in such a case? And what has occurred during the experimental
manipulation to produce the strange, counter-intuitive effect of choice
blindness?
Taking Sue’s example as the paradigm test case of choice blindness, I
will now discuss some possible explanations of what causes the “choice
blindness” effect, and what happens to Sue’s beliefs and attitudes during the
experimental manipulation. For simplicity, I will refer to Sue’s originally
reported attitude as attitude 1. Sue’s second reported attitude, the attitude she
reports after the manipulation, will be attitude 2.
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1) Attitude 2 was Sue’s real, pre-experimental attitude all along. Attitude 1 was
not her real attitude, and Sue reported it by mistake.

On this interpretation of the choice blindness results, Sue does not really
become ‘choice blind’ at all: she is always fully aware of her actual attitude
towards Israel’s military policy which remains unchanged by the experimental
manipulation. Sue went into the experiment with a positive attitude towards
Israel’s military policy from the very start: she always believed quite strongly
that “Israel’s military policy against Hamas is morally justified, even given the
Palestinian casualties.” The manipulated attitude, then, really does reflect her
genuine evaluative stance towards Israel’s military policy. When Sue provides
her explanation to the experimenters as to why Israel’s military policy is
morally permissible, she is sincerely asserting reasons that support her actual
evaluative stance. That is, she truthfully and sincerely asserts reasons for why
she holds a positive attitude towards Israel’s military actions against Hamas.
Furthermore, given that Sue’s actual attitude hasn’t changed as a result of the
manipulation, it is reasonable to surmise that Sue’s beliefs have not changed
either. Thus, Sue sincerely believes that Israel’s military policy is permissible,
and she believes that she believes this as well.
This interpretation of choice blindness is highly unlikely to be correct
because it relies on repeated coincidences, and unnoticed errors to work.
According to this interpretation, Sue turns up to the experiment with a strong
pre-theoretical attitude in favor of Israel’s military policy against Hamas and
yet somehow, during the survey stage, ends up reporting a strong anti-attitude
towards Israel’s military policy without noticing her error (while still
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managing, presumably, to fill out the rest of the survey accurately.) In
addition to Sue’s unnoticed error, by sheer coincidence an experimenter just
so happens to pick Sue’s mistakenly reported answer to reverse, out of the 12
potential answers. It is only by pure luck that the experimenter reverses Sue’s
mistaken attitude in order to reflect her genuine evaluative stance. Sue,
oblivious to the fact that she made a mistake in the original reporting of her
attitude, sees this manipulated survey page and is satisfied that this reflects
her genuine pro-Israel attitude. So, according to this explanation, the choice
blindness results are produced by a series of accidents and errors: participants
don’t notice that they make an error when reporting their initial attitude, but
the manipulated survey fortuitously turns out to reflect their true attitude
after all.
This explanation of the choice blindness results can be soundly rejected
for several reasons. Firstly, over 50% of the study participants became choice
blind during at least one manipulated trial. For this explanation to be true,
then, it needs to be the case that over 50% of participants make a specific
error on the original survey and fail to notice. It is plausible that one or two
participants might make a mistake on the initial survey and give a score of 9
instead of their intended score of 3. But it is highly implausible to postulate
that a majority of participants make the same error in every single choice
blindness study. If 50% of participants are making the same mistake, this is
less of an innocent ‘error’ and more a systematic issue that requires its own
explanation.
Secondly, what makes this explanation even more unlikely is the fact
that the experimenters do not reverse every moral opinion, but only three of
them per trial. This explanation requires us to not only accept that over 50%
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of participants made a basic error, and did not notice it, but also that the
experimenters, by sheer luck, corrected all of these errors so that they ended
up matching the participant’s genuine evaluation. Thirdly, the experimenters
were not just running manipulated trials, but also non-manipulated trials as
well. The non-manipulated trials are important because they generate the
non-manipulated report corpus and because they also function as an
experimental control. If this interpretation is correct, the participants should
also be making survey errors in the non-manipulated trials. If a systematic
error is to blame for the choice blindness results, there is no reason to think
that the error would only show up in the manipulated trials – mistakes would
surely be made in the non-manipulated trials as well. We should thus expect
to see a large proportion of participants making the same kind of survey errors
in the non-manipulated trials as well. This, however, is not what we find: as
Johansson et al. point out, “there are remarkably few differences between how
the participants behave in non-manipulated and non-detected manipulated
trials.”353 In the non-manipulated trials, participants record their scores and
are handed back the very same survey sheets. No manipulation takes place,
and so if the participant made an error they would surely notice it when they
look at their survey sheet a second time and read aloud their answers.
However, participants do not make systematic errors in the non-manipulated
condition and thus one can safely infer that there aren’t any widespread
mistakes occurring in the manipulated condition either. This explanation,
then, doesn’t capture what’s going on during choice blindness.
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2) Goldman’s explanation: Sue forgot her original survey rating, and simply
accepted attitude 2 as a reflection of her genuine attitude.

Another interpretation of the choice blindness results comes from Goldman.
According to Goldman, after the manipulated survey is handed back to the
participant “it seems likely that a participant is…attending to the [survey
score] currently being perceived and forming new reasons on the fly, even
though the conversation is supposed to concern his reasons for the choice
made a moment earlier.”354 On Goldman’s explanation, then, the choice
blindness results can be explained entirely in terms of a memory deficit: Sue
just forgets her original survey score and goes along with the new score in
front of her. According to Goldman, Sue fills out her survey, reports a negative
opinion towards Israel’s military policies, and then hands the survey sheet
back to the experimenter. While the experimenter is surreptitiously
manipulating Sue’s survey, Sue’s memory of her survey score (and her
reported moral attitude) decays. As Goldman puts it, “the representation of an
earlier display can decay quickly or be overridden by a new stimulus.”355
When Sue gets her survey back a few seconds later and looks at the
manipulated answer, the reversed attitude is so salient it overwrites the
decayed trace of the memory of her initial score. In other words, Sue’s
memory of her originally survey score fades very rapidly, and the sight of the
manipulated attitude causes the initial score memory to be overwritten
entirely – and forgotten.
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Sue thus forgets what her initial attitude report is, and simply accepts
this new opinion. Even though Sue is supposed to be reporting on her reasons
for her initial choice, the stimuli she is presented with are so overpowering she
is compelled to come up with reasons on the fly for the moral opinion she sees
in front of her. She has simply forgotten that this wasn’t her original survey
rating and that she was supposed to come up with reasons for why she does
not support Israel’s military policy. According to Goldman, his interpretation
saves the traditional account of self-knowledge from the “wholesale
confabulation story”356 which choice blindness threatens. Sue’s original
attitude report is wiped from memory, but she sincerely accepts the new
attitude report that she is presented with. She then uses introspection to find
compelling reasons to explain this manipulated survey score. Sue’s verbal
report is not an instance of ‘confabulation’ because it is a veridical and sincere
report of the moral opinion that she is currently entertaining.
Goldman’s interpretation is very unlikely to be correct, given what we
know about the choice blindness phenomenon. Firstly, his theory heavily
implies that none of the participants who become choice blind have preestablished, strong attitudes (that are chronically, and personally accessible)
about the moral issues. The fact that Sue entirely forgets what her attitude was
just seconds later strongly indicates that Sue does not have a strong, preexisting negative attitude towards Israel’s military policy at all. Intuitively, one
does not just ‘forget’ one’s genuine evaluative stance towards something a few
moments later, especially when one has been primed to provide reasons for
one’s moral views. Rather, a more fitting explanation is that Sue doesn’t really
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have a set opinion either way and so just records any old score that feels right
to her at the time. On this interpretation, then, Sue has a very weak attitude
that she quickly forgets when she is confronted with the manipulated survey.
Goldman would maintain that ‘choice blindness’ only occurs in participants
who have no pre-established or only very weak attitudes towards the political
viewpoint. I will discuss the issue of whether the participants had any ‘real,’
pre-experimental attitudes, or strong attitudes, at a later point; but it is worth
keeping in mind that Goldman’s view is very difficult to square with the idea
that the participants have strong, pre-established, regularly accessed attitudes
towards the moral viewpoint in question.
Another issue with Goldman’s interpretation is that it saves
introspective access at the cost of giving choice blindness participants the
memories of goldfish. Goldman argues that a virtue of his explanation is that
it preserves introspective access: the choice blindness effect is not caused by a
malfunction or failure of introspective access, but by a memory deficit instead.
However, there are unlikely to be many traditional theorists of self-knowledge
who are overly happy with the idea that, in certain cases, our capacity to
remember our intentions and choices is exceptionally poor. Johansson et al.,
for example, reject the memory deficit explanation for choice blindness
because “intentions are not supposed to be instantly forgotten…they are
supposed to be the guiding structures behind our actions.”357 On most
traditional theories of self-knowledge and decision-making our intentions,
choices, and decisions are supposed to guide our behavior and expectations
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and are not the kinds of mental states that should be easily or instantly
forgotten. If I order a pizza at a restaurant and receive a salad instead,
commonsense suggests that I should be able to recall that I didn’t receive what
I initially ordered. Our choices and intentions are meant to be highly salient
and memorable to effectively guide our goal-directed behavior. If intentions
and choices are the kinds of mental states that can be immediately forgotten
and replaced, it is hard to see how they can play any serious role in our
everyday decision-making. Goldman’s explanation turns our memories of
intentions, choices, and decisions into fragile things that are easily scattered
to the wind when new stimuli come onto the scene. But, intuitively our
memories of intentions and choices are not like that, and can’t be like that, if
they are to are to play a guiding role in our goal-oriented behaviors.
The biggest problem with Goldman’s theory is that it contradicts what
we know about the nature of choice blindness. According to Goldman, the
memory trace of the original moral attitude decays so quickly, that by the time
the clipboard has been handed back just a few seconds later the memory trace
is almost gone. Upon seeing the new, manipulated moral opinion, and upon
reading it aloud, the visual and auditory stimuli overwrite the decayed
memory trace entirely. Thus, the participant doesn’t really become “blind” in
any meaningful sense to her original opinion but just forgets what her moral
opinion is. On this interpretation, the participants not only forget their initial
attitude, but they don’t even notice that they have forgotten it: nothing seems
amiss to Sue in the slightest, and she segues smoothly into providing cogent
reasons for this new moral opinion she sees before her.
This explanation also implies that participants in choice blindness
studies are not concentrating on the task; or are failing to take the task
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seriously. Under normal conditions, when experimental participants take the
task seriously and pay attention to what they are doing, they can hold their
answers in memory for far longer than just a few seconds. If the memory trace
decays in a few seconds, as Goldman maintains, this suggests that the memory
trace has been held in perceptual memory only, which further implies a very
low level of attention and shallow encoding of the relevant stimuli on the part
of the participant. However, as has been mentioned in previous chapters,
studies into the choice blindness phenomenon have shown that choice
blindness is not caused or explained by a memory deficit, or a failure to
encode the target choice. Parnaments established that participants do not
forget their initial choice, and that “acceptance of the choice blindness
manipulation is not due to a failure of participants to attend to or encode the
choice options.”358
Furthermore, Sagana et al. also established that “choice blindness
phenomena cannot be attributed to impaired memory of the initial memory
trace, or memory decay.”359 Thus, Goldman’s explanation of choice blindness
cannot be correct. Goldman’s interpretation relies on memory decay of the
originally stated opinion, and forgetfulness on the part of the participants.
However, other studies have confirmed that no memory decay takes place and
that participants do not just forget what the content of their original choice is.
Choice blindness is not primarily caused by a memory deficit, at least not in
the way that Goldman has described.

Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”
p.1827.
359 Sagana, Anna, Melanie Sauerland, and Harald Merckelbach. "Memory
Impairment Is Not Sufficient” p.7.
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3) Sue holds two attitudes, one positive and one negative, at the same time.

Could choice blindness be explained by appeal to implicit and explicit
attitudes? On this account of choice blindness, Sue holds two conflicting
attitudes simultaneously. Sue’s explicit attitude, which she reports in the
survey, is negative towards Israel’s military policies. However, Sue also holds
a nonconscious implicit attitude, which is favorable towards Israel’s military
policies. The experimental manipulation induces Sue to report this second,
implicit attitude. Thus, Sue literally has a positive and negative attitude
towards Israel’s military policies at the same time.
This proposal can swiftly be rejected. Recall that, one of the defining
features of implicit attitudes, is that they are nonconscious: they are not
personally accessible in the same way that explicit attitudes are. Even if one
comes to be aware of the presence of an implicit attitude (by careful
observation of one’s behavior, say, or by completing an implicit attitude test),
it may very well be the case that one feels that it doesn’t reflect one’s genuine
evaluative stance. Bill may very well hold an explicit positive attitude towards
black people, as well as an implicit negative attitude, but this does not mean
that he accepts both as valid expressions of his evaluative stance. Once Bill
discovers the presence of a negative implicit attitude towards black people, he
may very well experience distress that he has such an attitude and may seek
ways to limit its impact on his behavioral dispositions. With all this in mind,
then, we can see why the choice blindness phenomenon cannot be explained
in terms of implicit and explicit attitudes.
On this explanation, we are supposed to accept that Sue simultaneously
holds an explicit negative attitude towards Israel’s military policies and an
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implicit positive attitude towards Israel’s military policies. When Sue indicates
strong disagreement with the morality of Israel’s military policies, she is
veridically expressing her genuine explicit attitude. When the choice blindness
manipulation occurs, upon looking at her altered survey sheet Sue reverts to
endorsing her implicit attitude, which is favorable towards Israel’s’ military
policies. The big problem with such an explanation is that this is not how
implicit attitudes work. Implicit attitudes operate at the nonconscious level
and cannot be brought to conscious awareness in the same way that explicit
attitudes can. The presence of implicit attitudes can only be established
indirectly, via careful observation of one’s behavior or via implicit attitude
tests. One cannot simply ask someone what their implicit attitudes are: if an
individual can report an attitude then, by definition, it is explicit and not
implicit.
To return to the case of Sue, given that Sue can confirm verbally that
she has a positive attitude towards Israel, and given that she is able to give
reasons for why she holds this attitude, one can conclude that this cannot be
an implicit attitude: it must be explicit. Even if Sue did hold an implicit
positive attitude towards Israel, that clashed with her explicit negative
attitude, it is hard to see why Sue (upon being made aware of her implicit
attitude) would accept it and agree with the experimenters that this is indeed
her attitude. Most people, upon becoming aware of implicit attitudes,
vociferously repudiate them, and insist that this attitude is not ‘theirs’: they
are alienated from their implicit attitudes. Upon discovering that she has a
positive implicit attitude towards Israel, we would not expect Sue to just go
along with this and provide a cogent explanation for why she holds this
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attitude: rather, Sue would most likely protest that this attitude doesn’t reflect
what she really believes at all.
Might it be the case, then, that Sue holds two explicit attitudes with
different content at the same time? Could it be that Sue has, simultaneously, a
positive attitude towards Israel’s policies as well as a negative attitude? On
this account, Sue has two contradictor and competing attitudes towards
Israel’s military policies’. When she initially reports that she has a negative
attitude towards Israel’s policies, Sue is being truthful and sincere. And, at a
later point, when she reports that she has a positive attitude towards Israel’s
policies, she is, again, being truthful and sincere. Her verbal report in favor of
Israel is not confabulated: it is a report of the actual reasons why she has the
attitude that she does. While this avoids the problem of confabulation, this
account is highly unlikely to be correct because it suggests that at least 50% of
choice blindness participants are highly irrational. One cannot rationally hold
a positive and negative attitude towards the very same entity at the same time.
What’s more, if the participants held contradictory opinions
simultaneously, we would expect this fact to be made salient in the debriefing.
If the participants really held two contradictory attitudes at the same time,
they would not be surprised to be informed that they originally reported a
different attitude. On the contrary, such participants upon being told of their
original attitude report would be expected to say something like “I know. I
hold that attitude as well.” The fact that participants express surprise strongly
suggests that they do not consciously hold two contradictory explicit attitudes
at the same time.
A final problem with this interpretation is that it doesn’t actually
explain Sue’s choice blindness. A defining feature of choice blindness is that
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Sue does not notice that her endorsement has switched from one attitude to
another. In the manipulated trials, participants do not merely switch from one
attitude to another: they become blind to the fact that they originally endorsed
a different attitude; and accept the current attitude as the attitude they
expressed all along. Furthermore, they express disbelief and shock when the
experimenters reveal that they originally reported a different attitude. Even if
Sue really does hold two conflicting attitudes at once, we are still owed an
explanation as to why Sue becomes blind to the fact that she originally
reported her negative attitude. This interpretation still leaves the core
phenomenon of choice blindness a complete mystery and is thus an
unsatisfactory account of choice blindness. In summary, then, choice
blindness is not explained by participants holding two conflicting attitudes at
the same time.

4) Attitude 1 is Sue’s genuine attitude. The choice blindness manipulation
does not cause Sue’s attitude to change, but it does change Sue’s belief or
behavioral dispositions.

On this view, Sue has an established, pre-experimental, negative attitude
towards Israel’s military policy, and she sincerely reports this attitude in the
survey. The experimental manipulation does not cause Sue to lose, or change,
her actual attitude: before, during, and after the experiment Sue always holds
a negative attitude towards Israel’s military actions. While the manipulation
doesn’t alter Sue’s moral attitude, it does cause some of her beliefs, or her
behavioral dispositions, to change. Thus, while Sue’s actual evaluative stance
towards Israel’s’ military actions remains untouched by the manipulation, her
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accompanying beliefs, or behaviors, are altered in such a way so as to reflect
the opposite attitude towards Israel’s foreign policy: Sue beings to behave in a
counter-attitudinal way with regard to the Israel moral issue. For example,
Sue’s second order beliefs could change from “I believe that I believe that I
have a negative attitude towards Israel’s military policy” to “I believe that I
believe that I have a positive attitude towards Israel’s military policy.” Thus,
Sue’s beliefs about her own attitudes might be distorted such that she comes
to believe that she has a positive attitude towards Israel’s military actions
when she really holds a negative attitude towards Israel’s military actions.
Alternatively, Sue’s first order beliefs might be changed from “I believe that
Israel’s military actions are morally reprehensible,” to “I believe that Israel’s’
military actions are morally permissible.”
On this theory, the choice blindness manipulation (which consists of
the sight of the reversed moral opinion, and the request to justify why she
approves of Israel’s military actions) causes Sue’s beliefs or behavioral
disposition to change. Furthermore, in order for Sue to become genuinely
blind to her original attitude, in order for choice blindness to occur, something
else must happen as well – Sue’s ability to access her genuine attitude must be
blocked Intuitively, when Sue sees the altered moral opinion, this should be a
strong enough cue to activate her real attitude about Israel. On the traditional
theory of self-knowledge, it should be trivially easy for Sue to introspect and
‘see’ what her actual attitude is, to compare it with the reversed moral opinion
before her. It is not enough, for this explanation of choice blindness to work,
that that only Sue’s beliefs or behaviors are changed by the manipulation.
Something else must happen for change blindness to occur, and that is her
actual attitude, her genuine evaluative stance towards Israel, must become
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inaccessible to her and fail to activate even in the presence of salient cues. The
fact that her real attitude is inaccessible means that Sue is unable to notice
and correct the error: a metacognitive failure occurs. If her attitude were
personally accessible to her, Sue would immediately notice the discrepancy
and say to the experimenters something like “oh, that’s not my real attitude. I
am actually against Israel’s military action against Hamas.” In the nondetected trials, however, something occurs such that the usual metacognitive
awareness of one’s actual attitude fails.
Note, further, that the participant’s genuine attitude is rendered so
inaccessible to their conscious awareness, that they go on to provide
compelling, well-reasoned arguments for the opposite position of what they
initially endorsed. Thus, not even arguing for opposite attitude is enough of a
cue for them to realize that something is up. In normal conditions, when one
argues in favor of something that one does not endorse, it is a rather
uncomfortable emotional experience – one’s genuine attitude, in such a
situation, is very salient. According to this interpretation, the blindness
towards their original attitude is so strong that it fails to even slightly register
when they are arguing for the opposite of what they sincerely endorse. On this
view, then, the choice blindness experiments cause two things to happen.
Firstly, it generates false beliefs or incongruent behaviors such that Sue
mistakenly believes that, or acts like, she supports Israel’s military policy
when she, in fact, does not. And secondly, it causes a metacognitive failure
that results in Sue’s complete lack of awareness of her actual attitude, with no
inkling that something has gone awry. In possession of false beliefs, and with
her actual attitude inaccessible to her, Sue launches into an explanation of
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why she holds an attitude that is not actually hers while being under the
mistaken impression that she is defending what she believes in.
As Johansson et al. note, most psychologists accept that experimentally
induced preference change, as exhibited in choice blindness, is caused by a
phenomenon called ‘cognitive dissonance.’ However, Johansson et al. rejects
the cognitive dissonance explanation of choice blindness, and states that “in
the current context, we argue that some form of self-perception theory is the
more likely candidate.”360 I will discuss the self-perception interpretation of
choice blindness in due course, but I will firstly discuss the cognitive
dissonance hypothesis and explain why it is not a suitable explanation of the
choice blindness effect.
Cognitive dissonance refers to the emotional and affective discomfort
that occurs when one is induced to freely act in a way that is contrary to one’s
sincerely held attitudes, beliefs, and values. In response to such emotional
discomfort, we unconsciously engage in dissonance reducing strategies, by
changing the way we behave or think to reduce or eliminate the negative
affect. In one famous cognitive dissonance study participants are required to
write an essay that goes against one of their beliefs – for example, vegans
might be induced to write an essay in favor of meat eating. In one condition,
the participants are given quite a bit of monetary compensation for writing the
essay; and in another condition the participants are paid a very low amount.
The robust finding is that:

People who have been cleverly manipulated into writing an essay for a
paltry sum of money in defense of something that they initially disagree
Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
Blindness and Preference Change”, p. 9.
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with will end up, after the fact, expressing more sympathy for the
position that they have defended than will other people who were paid
a decent amount.361
The ‘sympathy’ that participants end up expressing for the opposite position is
often quite extreme: vegans, for example, can transition from strongly
advocating veganism to adopting a pro meat-eating stance after the
experiment. The explanation for this unusual behavior is that it is a
(nonconscious) attempt by the participants to eliminate their unpleasant
cognitive dissonance. The committed vegan who writes an essay in favor of
meat eating will be in an uncomfortable position: she is a vegan, and yet she
just willingly wrote, for very little compensation, an essay in favor of eating
meat. According to Carruthers, she will experience extreme cognitive
dissonance and mental discomfort because will believe that she freely wrote a
counter-attitudinal opinion piece. To remedy this uncomfortable mental state,
subjects in cognitive dissonance studies “engage in novel behavior that is
intended to reduce aversive feelings of dissonance…people change their
expression of their attitudes.”362 Note that on this explanation of cognitive
dissonance, Carruthers does not propose that subject’s beliefs change, but
only their behavioral dispositions.363 Thus, in an attempt to dispel the
negative emotions that are caused by cognitive dissonance, the vegan will
Carruthers, Peter. "Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated."p.95.
Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind, p.358.
363 Indeed, Carruthers does not think that, in the case of cognitive dissonance,
the uncomfortable emotions would be eliminated by the introduction of a
counter-attitudinal belief. How does it make the vegan feel better if, in
addition to her belief that “I believe I am a committed vegan” she forms a new
belief along the lines of “I believe I am not a committed vegan”? Carruthers
thinks that the introduction of additional beliefs would not do anything to
dispel negative emotions caused by cognitive dissonance, and that only
behavioural changes would reduce the negative affect. See Opacity of Mind
p.130 for more discussion of this point.
361

362
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begin to behave as if she does support meat-eating. The very act of behaving
as if she believes the counter-attitudinal opinion is enough to dispel most, or
all, of the negative emotions.
Carruthers thinks that participants must, at the very least, accept or
buy into what they are telling the experimenters in order to reduce cognitive
dissonance: “if one didn’t accept one’s own assertions in such cases, it seems
unlikely that one’s negative feelings would go away.”364 For the vegan’s
behavior to succeed in reducing dissonance, then, she must accept her
counter-attitudinal behavior. Consequently, when participants nonconsciously engage in counter-dissonance behavioral strategies, they will
observe their own behavior and interpret themselves as judging that the
opinion they are arguing for is acceptable. The vegan, upon observing her own
pro meat-eating behavior, will interpret herself as judging that meat-eating is
acceptable: she will judge that she herself judges that meat-eating is
permissible. This self-interpretation and judgment will eventually result in the
(falsely attributed) higher-order belief that she must believe that meat-eating
is acceptable. As Carruthers puts it, “as a result of the operations of one’s
mindreading system, therefore, one will come to believe of oneself that one
believes that [meat-eating] would be acceptable. And this
metarepresentational belief is false.”365 According to Carruthers, the vegan in
a dissonance study may eventually end up forming false beliefs as a result of
her self-interpreting that she judges that meat eating is acceptable. These false
beliefs are not directly caused by the cognitive dissonance itself but are
formed as a result of the vegan’s dissonance reducing behavior.
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A cognitive dissonance framework can potentially be used to explain
choice blindness. On the cognitive dissonance explanation, the choice
blindness manipulation does not cause any of Sue’s beliefs to change, but only
her behaviors. Her behavior (which includes verbal behavior) radically shifts,
such that Sue now verbally defends Israel’s’ military policy as opposed to
condemning it. Her dispositional profile, after the manipulation, is now more
consistent with her holding a positive attitude towards Israel’s military policy,
even though her actual evaluative stance towards Israel’s military policies is
negative. Thus, none of Sue’s actual propositional attitudes or mental states
change – only her behaviors are altered by the experimental manipulation.366
Upon seeing the reversed moral opinion, and upon being asked by the
experimenters to justify her support for Israel’s military policies, Sue
experiences intense affective discomfort or cognitive dissonance which she
will be highly motivated to reduce or eliminate.
To remedy this dissonance, she alters her behavior (but not her actual
attitudes or beliefs towards Israel’s military policy). In an attempt to tamper
down and manage these negative emotions, Sue will undertake behaviors that
are consistent with her freely choosing to give Israel’s military policies a high
score: such as verbally defending Israel’s policies to the experimenters. By
acting in a way that suggests that she believes that Israel’s military policy is
permissible, the uncomfortable cognitive dissonance is reduced or eliminated
altogether. So, the experimental manipulation causes cognitive dissonance,
which causes Sue to behave in ways that are inconsistent with her actual
evaluative stance in an attempt to reduce the dissonance. Eventually, Sue’s
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counter-dissonance behavioral changes eventually cause her to develop false
beliefs about her own attitudes: she will infer that “I must be behaving in a
way that supports Israel’s military policies because I must agree with them.”
Thus, upon hearing herself say things in support of Israel’s military policies,
Sue will quickly interpret herself as judging that Israel’s actions are acceptable
– she will judge that she herself judges that Israel’s’ military policy is morally
justified. This will eventually lead to false beliefs, which Sue mistakenly
attributes to herself. In summary, according to the cognitive dissonance
theory, the choice blindness manipulation causes Sue to change her behavior,
and this behavioral change is what later causes her to form false second-order
beliefs about her beliefs and attitudes.
However, Johansson et al. deny that choice blindness can be explained
in terms of cognitive dissonance. The reason is that cognitive dissonance
requires participants to experience strong negative emotions because they are
behaving in a counter-attitudinal way. However, there is very strong evidence
that participants in choice blindness studies don’t experience any negative
emotions upon viewing the manipulated survey, or even when they are
cogently arguing for the reversed moral opinion. No negative emotions mean
that no cognitive dissonance has occurred, and so no dissonance reducing
strategies need be employed. Johansson et al. point to the eye-tracking studies
which established that during the undetected trials participants literally don’t
notice the manipulation: “this indicates that participants do not experience
any ‘dissonant’ emotions…that would drive the change in preference.”367
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Johansson et al., then, reject cognitive dissonance as a potential explanation
of the choice blindness results and favor a self-perception framework instead.
The self-perception framework was developed by Bem in the 1970s as a
theory to explain experimentally induced preference changes that could not be
explained in terms of cognitive dissonance.368 According to Bem, in certain
cases (such as during experimental manipulations) “internal cues are weak,
ambiguous, or uninterpretable.” When this occurs, “the individual is
functionally in the same position as an outside observer.”369 In these cases,
then, “individuals come to know their own attitudes, emotions, and other
internal states…by inferring them from observations of their own overt
behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs.”370
Carruthers summarizes self-perception theory as the idea that “people’s
current or recently past behavior can influence their reports of their current
judgments.”371
In one famous study, outlined by Bem, participants are assigned a
boring task to complete. In one condition, they are paid a dollar for the task;
in another condition, participants are paid twenty dollars for the same task.
When the task is finished, the participants must try their best to persuade
another person to do the task. The participants who were paid one dollar were
found to significantly overstate their enjoyment of the task (this is known as
the ‘over-justification effect.’) 372Why did the participants who were paid a low
amount claim to enjoy the task so much more than participants who were well
Bem, Daryl J. "Self-Perception Theory." Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology 6 (1972): 1-62.
369 Bem, Daryl J. "Self-Perception Theory." p.2.
370 Bem, Daryl J. "Self-Perception Theory." p.2.
371 Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind p.345.
372 Bem, Daryl J. "Self-Perception Theory." p.7.
368
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compensated? According to Bem, the participant who receives just one dollar
rules out financial incentive as a motivating factor for doing the task: he
thinks to himself “I obviously wasn’t doing this task because I was getting paid
well. So why was I doing it.?” To paraphrase Bem, participants ask themselves
a question like “what must [my] attitude be if [I am] willing to behave in this
fashion in this situation?”373 The participant will rule out financial incentive as
his reason for doing the task, because he was paid such a small amount, and
so will unconsciously infer that the reason he performed the task is because he
actually enjoyed it. On the other hand, the participant who is paid well will
unconsciously infer that he only did the task for the money, and didn’t actually
enjoy himself (“why am I doing this boring task? It must be because I am
getting paid well.”)
According to Carruthers, the self-perception effect functions slightly
differently from cognitive dissonance, in that self-perception directly causes
participants to attribute false beliefs (whereas cognitive dissonance merely
caused behavioral changes, not actual belief attribution.) In the boring task
experiment just described, the participant non-consciously interprets his
behavior “in such a way as to form initially false beliefs about [his] own
motivation.”374 Outside of conscious awareness, he infers that “I must be
doing this task because I enjoy it. I’m certainly not getting paid well.” As
Carruthers points out, the belief that results from this non-conscious selfinterpretation in this case is false. However, this mistakenly attributed false
belief eventually causes its own fulfillment: the participant believes he enjoys
the task, and so goes on to enthusiastically recommend the task to other
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people. His belief that he enjoys the task causes him to actually enjoy the task.
In summary, then, according to self-perception theory, in certain experiments
participants are forced to interpret their own behavior: they are essentially put
in the same position, epistemically speaking, as an outside observer. After
they non-consciously interpret their behavior and theorize what could have
caused them to behave the way they did, they form a (false) belief about their
motivations or preferences. And this belief, in turn, changes their behavior
and affective reactions in the future.
How does self-perception theory help explain what is going on during
choice blindness? On a self-perception picture, Sue will try to work out why
her survey shows support for Israel, and why the experimenters are asking her
to justify her support for Israeli policies. Her nonconscious self-interpretation
may lead her to infer something like “I guess I must believe that Israel’s
military actions are justified after all. That would explain why I gave such a
high score in the survey.” She will then form the false belief that she believes
that Israel’s’ military actions are justified and attribute this belief to herself.
Similarly, while explaining the choice blindness effect in the attractive face
study, Johansson et al. state that:

Participants…make interpretations. They see themselves act, and
assume that the picture they reached for and were given was also the
picture they intended to choose…it is a reasonable conclusion to draw
given the circumstances. The reason the participants give is their own
interpretation of why they must have wanted this picture rather than
the other. In a sense, they inform themselves as much as everybody else
about what they wanted when they perform and then explain their
actions.375
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Why, though, does the adoption of this false belief cause Sue’s behaviors to
change such that she begins to argue for a moral opinion she does not actually
hold? Carruthers theorizes that, even though the experimentally generated
belief is false and Sue mistakenly attributes this belief to herself, her desire to
present herself as a consistent person may lead to the belief becoming selffulling. Once Sue begins to vocally defend Israel’s military policy, this will “be
interpreted as a sort of commitment” by herself and others. Once we have
publicly made a commitment, there is usually an accompanying desire to
behave in ways that are consistent with this commitment to project a stable
self-image. As Carruthers explains:

Other beliefs and desires (the desire to keep one’s commitments, the
belief that one ought to act in such a way as to honor one’s
commitments) can lead the person to behave just as if she did [believe
that p], even if the initial self-attribution resulted from a
misinterpretation.376
In other words, even though Sue mistakenly attributes to herself the belief
that she supports Israel’s military policy, eventually she may come to behave
as if she really does believe this: her falsely attributed belief becomes a kind of
self-fulfilling prophecy. Sue’s behavior, then, changes as a result of her false
and mistakenly attributed beliefs.
There is some evidence from Parnamet’s memory study that this
explanation of choice blindness is the right one. Recall that Parnamets
discovered that “acceptance of the choice blindness manipulation is not due to
a failure of participants to attend to or encode the choice options.”377 That is,
Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind p.37.
Parnamets, Philip, Lars Hall, and Petter Johansson. "Memory Distortions”
p.1827.
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participants fully encoded and remembered the content of their original
choice. However, Parnamets found that the manipulation caused a memory
distortion which caused the participants to think that the non-chosen option
(in this case the opinion that Israel’s military policy is morally acceptable) was
initially chosen. Participants formed the mistaken belief that the non-chosen,
manipulated option had been their choice all along: “participants source
memory is thus selectively distorted as a result of accepting the false feedback,
even though their overall capacity to recognize previous encountered stimulus
is largely unaffected.”378 Sue can thus recall with a high degree of accuracy
what her initial opinion was (that is, she is able to remember that she strongly
disagreed with the view that Israel’s military policy is morally correct, if she is
prompted to do so), but the manipulation causes a memory distortion such
that Sue mistakenly believes that the manipulated survey score was what she
wrote down all along. Parnamets theorizes that the experimental
manipulation causes Sue to attribute a false belief along the lines of “this was
my original opinion all along,” which in turn leads to a source memory
distortion (it causes her to falsely remember that this was her opinion all
along). Parnamet’s memory study is highly revealing and suggests that “beliefs
about previous choices, rather than preferential adjustment through the act of
choices” is what causes the apparent preference change observed in choice
blindness. Sagana et al., who also investigated memory impairment during
choice blindness, similarly concluded that there is a “complex mechanism for
choice blindness that allows a fairly accurate recollection of the original
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choice, but yet disables the detection of a manipulation.”379 The selfperception account of the choice blindness results, then, has independent
support from other studies.
If this interpretation of choice blindness is correct, it remains to be
explained why the manipulation causes the participant’s actual attitude to
become inaccessible. Why does the manipulation of the survey cause the
usually highly salient moral attitude to become personally unavailable to the
participant? Why do the usual metacognitive checks and balances utterly fail?
These questions are very difficult for a traditional theorist of self-knowledge to
answer. Indeed, if the self-perception account of choice blindness is correct, it
is my contention that the choice blindness results are practically impossible
for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate. Firstly, on the
traditional view of self-knowledge, there is no reason why participants with
strong attitudes towards certain moral issues should fail to notice the
manipulation. Upon reading the manipulated survey answer aloud, on the
traditional theory of self-knowledge, Sue should have immediately recognized
that this survey answer clashed with her actual attitude towards Israel’s’
military policies. In this kind of situation, it is trivially easy for Sue to
introspect, access her actual attitude (which is negative towards Israel’s
military policies), and then correct the experimenters. On the traditional view
of self-knowledge, it is highly irregular for normal, rational human beings to
fail to notice that their survey sheet has been tampered with. Reading over the
survey a second time, the error should be highly salient – one should easily
notice that the survey does not reflect one’s actual attitudes and that a
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‘mistake’ has been made. As Johansson et al. state, if we really had
introspective access to our moral opinions “it is difficult to envisage why so
many of the participants would have failed to notice the reversed
alternatives…it surely would have felt wrong to them.”380The fact that over
50% of participants fall for the manipulation on at least one trial should be
concerning for a traditional theorist of self-knowledge.
Secondly, the self-perception theory proposes that the choice blindness
manipulation causes a false belief to be formed, which is then self-attributed
by the participant. On the traditional theory of self-knowledge, it is very hard
to explain why this false belief is formed in the first place. Upon being asked
the question “you indicated that you support Israel’s’ military policies, is that
right?” Sue should be prompted to introspect and detect her actual attitude,
which is her negative attitude towards Israel’s military policy. The presence of
her pre-existing negative attitude should thus block the formation of any false
beliefs. However, as Carruthers points out, it seems that in this situation
introspection utterly fails: Sue is unable to introspectively access her actual
attitude and goes on to form, and self-attribute, false beliefs. There should
have been no reason why Sue was unable to introspect her actual attitude, and
yet she is unable to do so. As Carruthers states “one would think that a direct
question about one of one’s actual beliefs would have the effect of activating it
and would make it available to inner sense.”381And yet, this doesn’t seem to
happen. Carruthers maintains that the avenues available to the traditional
theorist to explain these findings is “limited”, and that the only option is to
introduce an “auxiliary assumption” of some sort: “for example, it might be
380
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said that for some unknown reason [introspection] fails to operate under
conditions of choice.”382 However, as Carruthers points out, such an
explanation is ad-hoc and lacks independent motivation. It also puts pressure
on the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to explain why, under certain
conditions, introspective access to our mental states is blocked.
Johansson et al. and Carruthers explain the choice blindness results by
adopting a non-traditional, self-interpretation account of self-knowledge.
According to them, we simply lack direct introspective access to our
propositional attitudes, and so do not have direct insight into what our moral
attitudes really are. Instead, as Nisbett and Wilson proposed, we must selfinterpret and infer what our attitudes are using external and internal
contextual cues. In the case of Sue, the choice blindness manipulation puts
her in an epistemic position where all the external cues all strongly indicate
that she supports Israel’s military policy (the survey she completed moments
before shows support, the experimenters are asking her to justify her support,
etc.) Sue, unaware of the manipulation, is forced to self-interpret her own
mental states, and so she asks herself questions like “why did I write that
down? Why are they asking me to justify my support for Israel?” In short, the
choice blindness manipulation puts Sue in the same epistemic position as an
external observer. She encounters the baffling fact that she seemingly
supported Israel’s military action on her survey sheet and is forced to work
out why she did such a thing. Sue cannot simply pause and gain introspective
access to her actual attitude, because, quite simply, she lacks direct access to
her mental states: she must work out what her attitude is.
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If Sue actually possesses a strong attitude against Israel’s military
policies, should this not be highly salient and personally accessible to her? The
interpretivist account admits that, in normal circumstances, Sue’s strong
attitude would be a highly salient cue and Sue would be very likely to infer
(correctly) that she has a negative attitude towards Israel’s military policies.
However, in the manipulated trial, Sue’s normally highly salient internal cues
have competition from conflicting external cues – the manipulated survey
sheet, and the experimenter’s questions. Thus, even though Sue possesses a
strong negative attitude, there is no guarantee that she can come to know
what it is. On the interpretivist account, she cannot just directly introspect her
attitudes, and so has to infer what her attitude might be.
In some cases, as the moral choice blindness study demonstrates, the
participants have very strong attitudes due to them having a vested interest in,
and experience with, the target moral opinion. These participants do not
succumb to the choice blindness effect because their moral attitude is
exceptionally salient to them. This explains why, for example, the aid worker
who actively campaigns on behalf of Palestinians is highly unlikely to fall for
the manipulation; whereas someone with less direct experience, like Sue, is
more likely to succumb to choice blindness. In the case of Sue, the external
cues are more salient than her internal cues because, as Carruthers puts it, the
mindreading system has an “outward focus.”383 Thus, Sue may entirely
overlook, or miss, the internal cues which indicate that she actually has a
strong negative attitude towards Israel because she is so focused on the
external cues: her strong attitude is pushed out of the way, so to speak, by the
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stronger external cues. After self-interpreting, Sue concludes that the best
explanation is that she must really believe that Israel’s military policy is
acceptable. Sue forms the false belief that she supports Israel’s military policy,
and attributes it to herself.
In summary, the self-perception explanation of choice blindness, which
involves participants formulating then attributing false beliefs about their
attitudes which leads to counter-attitudinal behavior, is a highly plausible
account of what is going on during choice blindness. If this account is correct,
it is very hard to see how the traditional view of self-knowledge can
accommodate and explain the phenomenon of choice blindness.

5) Attitude 1 was Sue’s genuine pre-experimental attitude. The choice
blindness manipulation causes her attitude to change, and now attitude 2 is
Sue’s genuine attitude.

On this interpretation, Sue came into the experiment with a genuine preexisting attitude, and belief, that Israel’s military policies are morally wrong.
When she indicates strong disapproval of Israel’s policies Sue is entirely
sincere - the survey score reflects her genuine attitude. The experimental
manipulation, however, causes Sue’s moral attitude to reverse. Sue transitions
from having a negative attitude towards Israel’s military policies to having a
positive attitude about Israel’s military policies. Thus, the manipulated survey
really does reflect Sue’s new attitude towards Israel’s policies, and her
reported reasons are a genuine explanation as to why she supports Israel’s
military policies. Before the experiment, Sue was against Israel’s military
policies but by the end of the experiment she has changed her mind: she is
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now in favor of Israel’s military policies. Sue’s relevant beliefs change as well.
At the start of the experiment, Sue may have believed something like “I believe
that Israel’s military policies are morally wrong.” However, by the end, Sue
may hold the belief “I believe that Israel’s military policies are morally
permissible.” She may also now believe that she believes that Israel’s military
policies are permissible: that is, her relevant second-order beliefs shift as well.
On this explanation, it is not that case that only participant’s beliefs and
behavioral dispositions change: rather, their entire evaluative stance towards
Israel’s military policies changes as well. The choice blindness manipulation
actually causes the participants’ long-standing attitudes to reverse.
On the face of it, this interpretation of the choice blindness results
should be more welcoming to a traditional theorist of self-knowledge than the
previous theory. According to this explanation, the participants change their
minds and reverse their attitudes. Thus, intuitively, their attitude report
should be sincere and not confabulatory – they are sincerely reporting reasons
that do in fact support the attitude they actually hold. And this explanation
does not threaten the concept of introspective access. It is wholly consistent
with the idea that the participants used introspection to gain direct access to
their attitude. After the attitude reversal, introspection would have revealed
their new attitude to them directly, and they would have then correctly
reported it to the experimenters. However, I shall argue that while this
interpretation of choice blindness also has unpleasant consequences that are
tough for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to swallow. Furthermore,
even if this interpretation of choice blindness is correct, then the participant’s
verbal reports are still confabulatory – they are not genuine reports of the
participant’s reasons for their moral attitude.
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The first problem that this interpretation poses for the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge is the fact that it is not at all clear how, or why, the
experimental manipulation causes the participant’s attitudes to reverse. of As
Carruthers states, any account of choice blindness, or any other decisionmaking experiment, which postulates genuine attitude reversal “lacks any
plausible mechanism by which to operate.”384 On this interpretation, the
experimental manipulation itself is the cause of the participant’s attitude
reversal. Carruthers, however, argues that it is very difficult to explain how the
choice blindness manipulation could cause the participant’s attitudes to
switch:

How is it that when presented with an opportunity to indicate one’s
attitude…one immediately comes to make a…judgment that is out of
line with one’s prior attitudes? …How would a question about one’s
beliefs….be supposed to issue in a novel judgment, while at the same
time blocking the activation of the belief one already has?385
If we accept this explanation, then the mechanism of choice blindness remains
a mystery. As Carruthers notes, on this view it is hard to see how merely
viewing an altered survey score or being asked by an experimenter to justify
one’s attitude is enough to cause a wholesale reversal of one’s previously
sincerely stated attitude. How does the experimental manipulation itself cause
the participant’s attitudes to change, and why, furthermore, do the
participants fail to realize that an attitude switch has taken place? Thus, even
if this interpretation is more favorable to the traditional view of selfknowledge, the traditional theorist is burdened with the challenge of
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providing a plausible account of how the experimental manipulation succeeds
in reversing participant’s attitudes.
A second problem for the traditional theorist is the fact that, on this
interpretation, the participant’s attitude change is highly irrational.
Intuitively, rational attitude change requires that I change my attitude in light
of, and because of, good reasons. According to Burge, belief or attitude change
is rational if one believes what one rationally ought to believe and has an
attitude that one rationally ought to have. In other words, when one has good
reasons to believe p, then one ought to believe p.386 If one has good reasons to
change one’s attitude towards p, then one ought to change one’s attitude. For
example, suppose Sue has, by her own lights, good reasons to change her
negative attitude towards Israel’s military action. If Sue changes her attitude
in light of these reasons and is fully aware that her attitude has changed, then
her attitude change is rational: as Burge states, “critical reasoning is guided by
an appreciation, use and assessment of reasons.”387 However, Sue’s attitude
towards Israel’s military policies could also change for irrational reasons. Sue
might change her attitude due to wishful thinking. She may be aware that she
has good reasons to change her attitude but pushes them to one side and
refuses to countenance them. She may fall, and bump her head, and from then
on have a positive attitude towards Israel’s military policies.
If we accept this interpretation of the choice blindness results, then
Sue’s attitude reversal is irrational. Sue has not changed her attitude towards
Israel’s military policies because she has carefully considered reasons in favor
Cassam, Quassim. Self-Knowledge for Humans. p.2.
Burge, Tyler. "Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge." In Externalism and
Self-Knowledge, edited by P Ludlow and N Martin, 239-64. Stanford, USA:
CSLI Publications, 1998, p. 250.
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of the opposite position. In fact, there aren’t really any ‘reasons’ why Sue has
changed her attitude at all. Sue’s attitude towards Israel’s military policies has
only changed because of the experimental manipulation – it has (via
mysterious mechanisms) caused Sue’s attitude to switch via brute force. Sue’s
attitude change is something that happens to her, not something that she
chooses on the basis of carefully considered rational reflection. Sue hasn’t so
much changed her mind, as the experimental manipulation has forced her
mind to change. As Doris puts it, the problem with Sue’s attitude change in
this case is that “reason is not [so much] overwhelmed as it is somehow
bypassed…reason doesn’t take the field.”388
If Sue’s attitude reversal is entirely irrational, then how is she able to
report knowledgeable and coherent reasons in favor of her new attitude? After
all, if Sue’s attitude change was caused by irrational forces, we would not
expect her to give any good reasons for why she holds a positive attitude
towards Israel’s military policy. The mere fact that Sue is able to provide good
reasons for her positive attitude towards Israel’s military policies does not
mean that Sue’s attitude reversal is rational. For Sue’s attitude change to be
rational, it has to be the case that Sue changed her attitude because of the very
reasons that she adduces in her verbal report. However, we already know that
Sue did not carefully consider reasons in favor of Israel’s military policies and
then, on the basis of those very reasons, change her mind about the morality
of Israel’s military policies. Rather, the choice blindness manipulation itself
(somehow) caused Sue’s attitude to change without her conscious input or
awareness – Sue did not “change her mind,” but the experiment caused her
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mind to change. Thus, the reasons that Sue cites in favor of Israel’s military
policies did not have anything to do with her attitude reversal – they are
epiphenomenal to the event of Sue’s attitude switching from negative to
positive. The “reasons” Sue gives had nothing to do, causally, with the attitude
reversal itself, and so one can only conclude that the reasons were constructed
post-hoc after the attitude had already changed. In other words, Sue found
herself suddenly with a positive attitude towards Israel’s military policies (and
was completely unaware that this attitude was not the same one that she
reported earlier,) and quickly scrambled to come up justification for why she
holds this attitude. On this interpretation of choice blindness, then, it is not
the case that Sue sincerely reports reasons for her attitude – confabulation is
still a threat.
Furthermore, on this account of choice blindness participants are
unaware that any attitude reversal has taken place They are under the
impression that they have always held the manipulated attitude (at least until
debriefing occurs after the experiment): as Johansson notes, “there were no
signs of the participants having noticed that the opinions they argued for after
the manipulation was the reversal of what they originally intended.”389 After
the experimental manipulation, Sue is only aware of her current positive
attitude towards Israel’s military policies and has no inkling that only
moments earlier she held a negative attitude towards Israel’s military policies.
From Sue’s perspective, it is as if she has always had a positive attitude
towards Israel. This is a worrying consequence for the traditional theorist of
self-knowledge to accept: rational human beings are not supposed to undergo
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entire attitude reversals without being aware of this fact. Overall, then, this
interpretation of choice blindness should be very worrying to the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge, because it entails that participants can undergo
wholesale attitude reversals, for no good reason, and without them even being
aware of it. Our strongly held moral attitudes are not supposed to be the kinds
of attitudes that can reverse for no reason at all, without us even noticing –
and yet, this is what this interpretation of choice blindness requires us to
accept. If this interpretation of choice blindness is correct, the implications
are deeply troubling for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge.
Is this interpretation of choice blindness plausible, though? There is, as
it happens, some evidence that the participant’s attitudes are reversed, or
significantly altered, by the choice blindness manipulation. Johansson et al.
demonstrated that at least some choice blindness participants go on to behave
in ways that are consistent with the reversed attitude, which implies that their
attitude has really changed. If Sue’s attitude did not change, if she retained
her original attitude, we would expect it to re-assert itself shortly after the
choice blindness experiment was over. After the experiment, Sue would revert
to behaving in ways that are consistent with holding a negative attitude
towards Israel’s military policies. However, according to Johansson et al., this
may not happen. Johansson et al. ran a repeat of the facial attractiveness
choice blindness experiment, in which participants decide which female face
they prefer.390 When the experiment was over, the face pairs were presented
once more, in a random order, to the participants. The participants were then
asked to choose the face which they now preferred. Finally, the participants
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were requested to view all the faces one final time and rate them. The
experimenters wanted to see if the manipulation influenced the participant’s
choices and ratings after the experiment.391
The non-manipulated trial participants behaved in ways that one would
expect. For the non-manipulated participants “the level of choice consistency
between the first and second choices was close to ceiling” at 93%, and their
initial and subsequent ratings were very similar.392 The manipulated trial
participants, however, showed significantly lower choice consistency – just
43% of these participants picked their originally chosen picture the second
time around. Furthermore, while the manipulated participant’s original rating
was low (they didn’t find the rejected face attractive), the second rating was
much higher (indicating that they now found the rejected face attractive).
Thus, many of the manipulated trial participants go on to pick the originally
rejected face after the experimenter is completed, and they also give these
originally rejected faces a much higher ranking. This is consistent with them
actually changing their preferences – they now really do prefer the face that
they originally rejected. Johansson et al. argue that these findings
demonstrate that choice blindness influences future preferences and
decisions: “participants chose x, but end up endorsing y, and often keep doing
so in repeated choices and ratings.”393 Thus it seems as if, in the undetected
manipulated trials, “the participants come to prefer the face they were led to
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believe they liked.”394 These results suggest that the choice blindness
manipulation influenced at least some of the participant’s future behavior and
choices, which is a sign that their preferences and attitudes really did change.
One problem with this experiment is that the scope of these findings is
rather narrow. The participant’s preferences were tested immediately after
the choice blindness experiment took place, which may not have left enough
time for their original attitude to re-assert itself. A much stronger test would
be to examine participant’s preferences a day, or even a week, after the choice
blindness manipulation as this would provide stronger evidence for robust,
long-term attitude change. And, indeed, such an experiment has been recently
carried out by the choice blindness lab.395 The choice blindness experimenters
ran a political opinion choice blindness study, followed by a second study,
which consisted of a questionnaire. The questionnaire contained some of the
same questions that the participants encountered in the manipulated
condition of the choice blindness test. The test was to see if the participants
would stick with their manipulated answers a week later. The participants
were also assigned to two confabulation conditions. In the short condition, the
participants were required to read aloud their answer and state whether they
agreed or disagreed. In the long condition, the participants were required to
also give a thorough justification of their answer.
The experimenters “found that participant’s ratings, both immediately
following false feedback and one week later, were shifted in the direction of
Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
Blindness and Preference Change”, p.6.
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the manipulation. These effects were large, representing considerable shifts in
the direction away from the original attitude and towards the opposite.”396 No
such shifts occurred for the participants in the non-manipulated trials, or in
cases where participants had detected the manipulation during the
experiment. Interestingly, the change in ratings was most marked in
participants who were required to give the lengthier, extended confabulatory
reports. The experimenters hypothesize that “confabulation serves to
consolidate choice induced preference change…observing yourself give
coherent arguments for a manipulated response actually strengthens the
induced attitude in the manipulated direction.”397 In other words, the
participants observed the fact they were confabulating and took this as
evidence that this is what they must really believe. These new findings, then,
mean it is a live possibility that the choice blindness manipulation, in tandem
with extended confabulatory reports, really does change the participant’s
attitudes towards the political issues in question. If this interpretation is
correct, it implies that even our political attitudes are far more flexible and
subject to change than we commonly suppose.

6) Sue has no real attitudes, either way, about Israel’s military policies.
Attitude 1 is not real, and attitude 2 is not real.

On this interpretation of choice blindness, Sue does not enter the experiment
with a strong negative attitude towards Israel’s military policies. In fact, Sue
Siven, David, Thomas Strandberg, Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, and Philip
Parnamets. "Lasting Political Attitude Change” p.305.
397 Siven, David, Thomas Strandberg, Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, and Philip
Parnamets. "Lasting Political Attitude Change” p.306.
396

231

does not have any particular attitude towards the morality of Israel’s policies
at all (although, she might mistakenly think that she does.) Even though Sue
only has a very weak, or nonexistent, attitude towards the moral issue she
nevertheless gives it a very low score in the survey which indicates strong
disapproval. When the survey sheet is returned to her, and Sue sees the
manipulated score, she becomes choice blind. This can be explained by
reference to the self-perception framework: Sue, most likely asks herself “why
did I write down that I support Israel’s military policies?” After some selfinterpretation, Sue infers that the most plausible reason she exhibited support
for Israel’s military policies is that she must believe that they are morally
permissible. Thus, the choice blindness phenomenon is explained, in part, by
participants not really having any attitudes at all (or, at least, by only having
very weak attitudes.) Participant’s do not have ‘real’ attitudes towards the
moral issues in question, and this is why they are so easily able to be
manipulated.
Johansson et al. do consider the possibility that “all opinions subject to
choice blindness [are] not real.”398 On this account, the “absence of choice
blindness could be taken as a form of acid test for attitudes, a basic criterion
for ‘attitudiness.’”399 Thus, those who fall for the manipulation can be taken to
have no genuine attitudes towards the moral opinion in question; whereas
those who notice the manipulation can be inferred to have real attitudes. The
campaigner who works for the welfare of Palestinians in Gaza will not become
choice blind precisely because her attitude towards Israel’s’ military policies
are genuine – she actually does hold a strong negative attitude towards this
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moral issue. Sue, on the other hand, succumbs to the choice blindness
manipulation precisely because she doesn’t really have any opinion, or
attitude, towards Israel’s military policies. The lack of a ‘real’ attitude causes
Sue to become choice blind: if she did have a genuine moral attitude towards
Israel’s military policies she would have immediately noticed the altered
survey sheet.
The strength of this interpretation is that it aligns with our
commonsense intuition that participants with genuine, strong attitudes
towards moral issues will not succumb to the choice blindness manipulation.
How can Sue really be said to have a ‘real’ attitude against Israel’s’ military
policies if, moments later, she is prepared to enthusiastically endorse the
opposite opinion? Furthermore, it has already been established that attitude
strength does interplay with the choice blindness phenomenon, in that
exceptionally salient and strong attitudes are immune to the choice blindness
effect. Given this, it is reasonable to suppose that participants who fall for the
manipulation simply don’t have the attitudes that they claim to have.
However, the unintuitive and unwelcome consequence of this interpretation is
that “half the Swedish population holds no articulated attitudes about the
most visible moral issues in the current societal debate.”400
This unintuitive consequence is the reason why Johansson et al.
roundly reject this interpretation of the choice blindness phenomenon. For
them, the idea that manipulated participants never even had strong
preference or attitudes to begin with is “a barbed bitter bullet to bite.”401 One
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reason they dislike this interpretation so much is that “it renders a great many
preference elicitations potentially meaningless.”402 All of the participants who
become choice blind provide strong survey scores (sometimes on extreme
ends of the scale) which indicates that they do have strong opinions about the
viewpoint in question.403 If these participants do not really have an attitude
towards Israel’s military policies one way or another, then it is unclear why
they claimed to agree or disagree with that particular moral opinion. This
indicates that the participants believe that they have an attitude towards this
moral view when, in fact, they don’t. If participants cannot be relied upon to
accurately gauge whether they hold an attitude or not then, as Johansson
states, it renders their preference elicitations meaningless.
Another reason that Johansson et al. dislike this interpretation is that
it is highly unintuitive that half of the participants had no opinion about these
moral issues – that they were completely indifferent. As Johansson states:

The [moral] statements…were picked to represent salient and
important current dilemmas from Swedish media and societal debate
at the time of the study, thus making it very likely that participants
would have been exposed to prior information about the issues they
were asked to express their attitudes on.404
In other words, the participants in the choice blindness study were, in all
likelihood, not encountering these moral issues for the very first time but
would have encountered them in the course of their daily lives. These topics of
debate are precisely the kinds of dilemmas that people are expected to form an
Johansson, P, Lars Hall, Betty Tarning, S Sikstrom, and N Chater. "Choice
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opinion about – and yet, on this interpretation, we are supposed to accept that
half of the participants had no real view whatsoever about these pressing
moral issues. Johansson et al. find it unbelievable that half of the Swedish
population, potentially, have no real articulated attitudes about important
moral issues, and thus they reject this interpretation of choice blindness.
However, perhaps Johansson et al. are too hasty in their rejection of
this explanation. We hold a strong assumption that people form concrete, set
opinions about moral issues, and that, once established, these attitudes are
unwavering and stable. But it might be the case that our opinions and
attitudes are not as firm as we think: they might even exhibit a large degree of
flexibility and openness to change. We think that we have stable, persistent,
and strongly held moral attitudes towards a wide variety of issues, but
perhaps this is an illusion. Perhaps only those individuals who are deeply
engaged with a particular issue, who have a vested interest or direct
experience, have ‘real,’ or strong, attitudes. The rest of us might harbor the
illusion that we have deep commitments to particular moral issues, but, in
fact, our commitments might be rather shallow and subject to change. In
effect, we may have far fewer ‘real’ attitudes than we take ourselves to have,
but we nevertheless harbor the illusion that we have strong and stable moral
opinions about most moral issues.405 It is not the case, then, that fifty percent
of people have no real moral opinions: rather, most of us have at least some
moral opinions that are much weaker and more flexible than we suppose. This
flexibility, rather than being a liability, could be seen to be a strength. Indeed,
Johansson et al. themselves suggest that “it might not always be considered an
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ideal to have the most minutely tuned attitudes.”406 Many moral issues are
exceptionally complicated and convoluted, and so rather than being
stubbornly single-minded many of us are willing to have our minds changed.
Is this interpretation of the choice blindness effect easier for the
traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate? No. This
interpretation is just as problematic for the traditional theorist of selfknowledge as the others. The problem is this: if participants really lack any set
attitude towards the moral issues, if they don’t have an opinion one way or
another, then this fact about themselves should be available to introspection.
At the moment when Sue has to rate her attitude towards Israel’s military
policies, on the traditional account it should be trivially easy for her to
introspect to see just what her attitude towards Israel is. After introspection,
Sue should come to realize that she has no attitude one way or the other
towards Israel’s military policies: her introspective faculty would search for
the relevant attitude, and would then, presumably, flag that no attitude has
been found. Sue would thus come to know of herself that she lacks an opinion
about Israel’s military policy. On the basis of this self-knowledge, we would,
commonsensically, expect her to give this opinion a score of 5 (to reflect the
fact that she has no opinion towards this moral issue). The problem is that the
vast majority of manipulated participants did not give a survey score of 5:
rather, they gave survey scores that indicated that they did have an opinion
about Israel’s military policies. This is a challenge for the traditional theorist
to explain. If the participants really had no attitude towards Israel’s military
policies, why did they allocate survey scores that represent strong approval or
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strong disapproval? Why did their introspective system not make it salient to
them that they had no strong opinion about Israel’s military policies?
Furthermore, upon being asked by the experimenter to justify her
(manipulated) survey score, Sue launches into a coherent and knowledgeable
defense of Israel’s military policies. Again, this behavior is very difficult for the
traditional theorist of knowledge to explain. Upon being asked ,“why do you
approve of Israel’s military policies?” Sue should have been able to introspect
and see that she doesn’t, in fact, approve of Israel’s military policies because
she has no real opinion about this issue. She should have then told the
experimenter something like “oh, I don’t know. I don’t actually really have an
opinion on this issue.” Instead, Sue gives a detailed verbal defense of a moral
opinion that she doesn’t hold. At every point, Sue’s introspective faculty
should have been able to inform her that she has no opinion about this moral
matter – and at every point where Sue could have introspected it seemingly
fails to give her accurate self-knowledge. Finally, the verbal report itself is very
puzzling for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge. Sue provides detailed,
apparently carefully considered reasons in favor of Israel’s military policies;
but this verbal report is all in aid of a moral opinion that she doesn’t even
hold. I will discuss this more in the next chapter, but this report is clearly not
a veridical report of Sue’s actual reasons because she doesn’t even hold the
attitude in question. Such a report must be a confabulation – which, again, is
a challenge for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate.
In summary, then, this interpretation of choice blindness is not
appealing to the traditional theorist of self-knowledge. Not only does it entail
that a large percentage of people have no real attitudes towards salient moral
issues (and, by extension, political issues), it also poses problems for the
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concept of introspective access. On this account, participants lack real
attitudes towards these moral issues and yet are oblivious to this fact about
themselves – they act as if they do have genuinely strong attitudes towards
these topics. If participants really have direct access to their attitudes, they
should be aware of the fact that they lack strong moral opinions. The fact that
introspective access simply fails in this case is very difficult for the traditional
theorist to explain.

The upshot for the traditional view of self-knowledge

In this chapter, I considered six possible explanations of the choice blindness
phenomenon. I contend that only three of these interpretations are plausible,
and none of them are compatible with the traditional theory of selfknowledge. No matter which interpretation turns out to be correct, choice
blindness poses a huge challenge traditional view of self-knowledge. The first
interpretation that I considered posits that the participants really hold the
manipulated attitude all along and make a mistake when reporting their initial
attitude. This can be rejected as a possible explanation because it relies on
participants making systematic errors in the manipulated trials when no such
errors are observed in the non-manipulated control trials. This interpretation
of choice blindness poses no threat to the traditional theory of self-knowledge,
but, unfortunately, it is highly implausible and so is not a viable candidate for
a theory of choice blindness. The second interpretation I examined was
Goldman’s proposal that choice blindness can be explained in terms of a
specific kind of memory deficit. Participants in the manipulated trials do not
fully encode their original choices, and so they simply forget what their
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original choice was when they are presented with the altered survey score.
Goldman specifically champions this theory because it saves the concept of
direct introspective access. While it has been established that some sort of
memory manipulation does occur during choice blindness, it is not the case
that participants fail to encode, and thus fail to remember their initially
chosen option. Therefore, Goldman’s interpretation of choice blindness
cannot be correct. Thirdly, I considered whether choice blindness can be
explained in terms of participants holding two inconsistent attitudes at the
same time. Given the nature of implicit attitudes, it cannot be the case that
one of the attitudes is implicit because participants are easily able to report
on, and consciously consider, this attitude. If this theory is to be plausible, it
has to be the case that participants hold two explicit attitudes that are
contradictory at the same time, without noticing this fact. This interpretation
is unsatisfactory and can be rejected.
The fourth interpretation is that the initially reported attitude is
participant’s genuine attitude. The manipulation does not cause this actual
attitude to change at any point – the attitude remains the same before, during,
and after the choice blindness experiment. However, the manipulation causes
the participants to form false beliefs, such that they mistakenly come to
believe that they hold the manipulated attitude when, in fact, they do not. If
the choice blindness manipulation causes participants to form false beliefs
about their attitudes, then this is very difficult for the traditional theorist of
self-knowledge to accommodate. If we really do possess direct introspective
access to our attitudes, as many traditional theorists maintain, then after the
manipulation the participants should be able to introspect and directly see
what their attitude is. When the participants are asked to clarify what their
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moral opinion is, it should be trivially easy for them to introspect and realize
that the survey in front of them does not reflect their actual attitude. There is
no reason why introspective access to the original attitude should be blocked
– and yet, seemingly, the participants lack introspective access to their actual
attitude. What’s worse, the participants then go on to vociferously defend the
wrong attitude – they provide compelling arguments in favor of an attitude
that they don’t actually hold without realizing this fact. The most reasonable
explanation for this phenomenon is that the participants don’t actually
possess introspective access to their attitudes and must interpret themselves
to infer what it is that they believe. Thus, the inferentialist approach to selfknowledge has no problem accommodating choice blindness: the choice
blindness effect is not so surprising in light of the fact that we are forced to
self-interpret our attitudes on the basis of faulty and misleading cues.
The fifth interpretation I examined postulates that participants do not
merely undergo belief change, but that the manipulation forces their actual
attitudes to change. At the beginning of the experiment, participants held a
particular attitude towards the moral issue, and by the end of the experiment
their attitude has reversed. It might be thought that this interpretation
provides some relief for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge: if
participants have undergone an attitude reversal then by the end of the
experiment when they are asked to report their attitude they may
straightforwardly introspect and tell the experimenter what their attitude is.
However, this interpretation comes at a cost. It requires participants attitudes
to entirely change without their conscious awareness (they don’t realize that
their attitudes have reversed), and it requires participant’s attitudes to be
changed by the blunt force of the experimental manipulation and not on the
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basis of carefully considered reasons. In other words, the choice blindness
manipulation causes participants’ attitudes to reverse in an entirely irrational
way. The upshot of this is that our sincerely held attitudes can be reversed
mechanistically, without any consideration of reasons, and without our even
being aware of this change.
Furthermore, while the concept of direct introspective access is
preserved on this view, the participant’s verbal reports are still in need of an
explanation. Participants provide compelling reasons for their attitude that, as
we know, cannot be the actual reasons for their attitude simply because these
reasons played no causal role in the formation of the attitude. Participant’s
verbal reports, then, are post-hoc constructions – they are reasons that have
been summoned on the fly to justify the attitude after the fact. The specter of
confabulation still haunts the traditional theorist of self-knowledge on this
account of choice blindness.
Finally, I considered the proposal that all of the manipulated
participants entirely lack real attitudes about the moral issues. On this view,
choice blindness occurs precisely because the participants do not have real
attitudes. This view, again, is exceptionally difficult for the traditional theorist
of self-knowledge to accommodate. If the participants lack real attitudes then
at all points of the experiment this fact should have been available to
introspection – they should have come to realize that they did not have any
opinion, either way, about the moral issue at hand. On this interpretation,
however, introspective access fails twice: first, at the point when participants
incorrectly state that they have a strong attitude when they do not; and
second, when participants incorrectly defend an attitude that they do not
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have. Furthermore, there is still the problem of the seemingly confabulated
verbal reports to contend with.
On reflection, I am inclined to say that the most plausible
interpretation of choice blindness is that it is caused by participant’s forming
false beliefs and mistakenly attributing these beliefs to themselves. This
interpretation can be fully accommodated by the self-perception framework,
and, further, it is supported by Parnamet’s and Sagana’s memory studies. I
have a less favorable view towards the theory that participants have no real
attitudes about the moral issues. It is extremely counter-intuitive to think that
a large segment of the population entirely lacks real attitudes towards salient
moral issues while, simultaneously, being under the impression that they do
have strong views towards these topics. I grant that it is possible that
participants’ actual attitudes could be changed by the experimental
manipulation, but, as Carruthers points out, the mechanism behind this
attitude change is mysterious and implausible. However, the critical point is
that it does not matter which of these possible explanations for choice
blindness is the correct one. No matter which interpretation is right, the
traditional theorist of self-knowledge will find it very difficult to explain and
accommodate choice blindness. Choice blindness poses a direct challenge to
the traditional theory of self-knowledge, whereas it can easily be
accommodated and explained by the infernetialist view of self-knowledge. In
the next chapter, I will discuss the concept of confabulation which I will argue
also poses a massive problem for the traditional theory of self-knowledge.
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CHAPTER 5
CONFABULATION

In the previous chapter, I discussed the phenomenon of choice blindness –
where people become blind to a choice they have made just moments
previously – and I argued that choice blindness sits awkwardly with the
traditional view of self-knowledge. To quickly recap, there are three plausible
explanations of the choice blindness effect, and none of them are compatible
with the traditional view of self-knowledge. The first interpretation I
considered is that participants in the manipulated trial undergo a belief
change, while their original attitude remains unaltered by the experimental
manipulation. That is, a participant retains their original attitude towards
their initial choice but ends up mistakenly believing that they hold the
opposite attitude (and, consequently, will behave in ways consistent with that
opposite attitude). For instance, a participant who initially had a favorable
attitude towards free higher education still has a favorable attitude towards
free higher education by the end of the experiment. What has changed in the
course of the trial is her beliefs: the manipulation causes her to mistakenly
attribute the belief that “I have a negative attitude towards free higher
education,” which in turn causes her to behave as if she does indeed hold a
negative attitude towards free higher education.
The self-perception framework can be used to explain why the
participants become choice blind in the first place. The self-perception
framework postulates that participants lack introspective access to their own
attitudes and must instead non-consciously self- interpret their own behavior
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to work out their attitudes. After the manipulation, upon seeing their altered
survey sheet, a participant may implicitly ask herself something like “why did
I express a negative attitude towards free higher education? And why are the
experimenters asking me to justify this negative attitude?” According to the
self-perception framework, in these kinds of cases participants will
unconsciously interpret their behavior in much the same way as they would go
about interpreting another person’s behavior. If I am confronted with
evidence about a stranger’s actions, and I learn that he has expressed a
negative attitude towards free higher education in a survey and is being asked
to justify this attitude by the experimenters, then it is reasonable for me to
infer that he must really hold a negative attitude towards free higher
education.
Similarly, upon being confronted with the altered survey and the
request to justify this attitude, participants infer that they must really have a
negative attitude towards free higher education (even though, in fact, they do
not). This causes them to form the false belief “I have a negative attitude
towards free higher education,” which in turn influences their behavior. The
self-perception framework neatly explains the choice blindness effect and is
fully compatible with an inferentialist view of self-knowledge in which we
entirely lack introspective access to our mental states and must self-interpret
our attitudes instead.
This explanation of choice blindness causes problems for the
traditional view of self-knowledge because it is very difficult for the traditional
theorist to explain why the participant apparently lacks introspective access to
her actual moral attitude. On the traditional view of self-knowledge choice
blindness simply shouldn’t occur: the participant, at any point during the
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experiment, should be able to gain introspective access to her own attitudes.
The fact that the participant exhibits blindness about what her actual attitude
is, combined with the fact that she attributes a false belief about what her
attitude is, strongly suggests that the participant lacks introspective access to
her own attitudes and must resort to self-interpretation. The participant’s
endorsement of the opposite attitude is understandable, and even to be
expected if she lacks direct introspective access to her attitudes and must selfinterpret her mental states; but her behavior is very difficult to make sense of
in the traditional framework of self-knowledge.
The second interpretation of choice blindness I considered postulates
that the choice blindness manipulation actually causes the participant’s
attitudes to reverse. The participant may come into the experiment with a pro
attitude towards a particular moral issue and will leave with a negative
attitude. This interpretation is problematic for the traditional theory of selfknowledge because, as Carruthers points out, the mechanism which
supposedly causes this wholesale attitude reversal is mysterious and
implausible. How can the mere act of looking at an altered survey score cause
one’s actual attitude to entirely reverse? This interpretation of choice
blindness also entails that the participant’s attitude reversal is wholly
irrational. The participant did not rationally consider reasons in favor of the
opposite view and change her attitude in light of these reasons: rather, her
attitude change is something that happens to her, without her conscious
input, as opposed to something that she has rationally authorized.
Furthermore, until the debriefing, the participant remains utterly
oblivious to the fact that her attitude has reversed. This means that the
participant’s attitudes entirely reverse without them even being aware that
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this has occurred. Finally, on this account, because the participant’s attitude
has not changed due to consideration of reasons it follows that when the
participant reports her reasons for her attitude that these reasons are
confabulatory. The reasons that she provides as justification for her attitude
had nothing to do, in fact, with the formation of the attitude itself: she did not
change her attitude in consideration of the reasons that she cites. The
reported reasons, then, are entirely epiphenomenal with regards to the
attitude formation and so must be confabulatory constructions after the fact.
If the traditional theorist accepts this interpretation of choice blindness, she
must also accept that our sincerely held attitudes may reverse for wholly
irrational reasons without us even being aware that any change has taken
place.
The third plausible interpretation of choice blindness postulates that
participants don’t even possess ‘real’ attitudes to begin with. A trial
participant may think that she has a positive attitude towards free higher
education when, in fact, she does not. On this proposal, choice blindness only
occurs to participants who don’t have real attitudes about the choice they have
made: participants who have a real attitude, either way, will not succumb to
the manipulation. Again, this interpretation threatens the concept of direct
introspective access. If a participant really does lack a real attitude towards
higher education, why does she not introspect and realize this fact about
herself? On the traditional view of self-knowledge, if one does not have a real
attitude towards a particular moral proposition then the fact that one lacks
this attitude will be available to introspective access. There should have been
nothing stopping the participant from realizing that she doesn’t hold any
attitude, positive or negative, towards free higher education and indicating
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this on the survey scale (by giving a score of 5 out of 9, to indicate neutrality).
There is no explanation, on the traditional view of self-knowledge, for why
participants on two occasions sincerely claim to have attitudes that they don’t
possess: at any point, introspection should have revealed to them that they
have no real attitude towards the issue in question. Thus, this interpretation
poses a challenge to the concept of direct introspective access, as well as
entailing the unsettling conclusion that over 50% of the population has no real
attitudes about some of the most salient and pressing moral and political
issues of the day.
Aside from choice blindness itself, the choice blindness experiments
reveal another curious phenomenon: after the manipulation, participants
provide verbal reports in which they ardently provide reasons and
justifications for choices that they didn’t actually make. These verbal reports
are confabulations, and I will argue that the phenomenon of confabulation is
just as big a threat to the traditional theory of self-knowledge as participants
becoming oblivious to choices they made just moments before. Commonsense
dictates that when someone is asked to give reasons for a choice they didn’t
actually make they will be stymied: how is one supposed to respond to such an
odd request? However, in the Nisbett and Wilson and choice blindness
experiments, we see that, far from being tongue-tied, participants provide
cogent, well-reasoned, detailed, and persuasive verbal reports in support of
their initially rejected opinion.
Recall that in Nisbett and Wilson’s stocking experiment the
participants were required to select one out of four pairs of stockings and then
provide reasons for their choice. The catch was that the four stockings were
identical. Nisbett and Wilson had recently discovered a position effect,
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whereby rightmost objects in an array are chosen more often than any other
object if all else is equal. Surely enough, the participants ended up selecting
the rightmost stockings more often. However, when participants reported the
reasons for their choice, not one of them mentioned the position of the
stockings as a relevant factor; and no one noticed that the stockings were all
identical. Nisbett and Wilson report that the participants examined the
stockings thoroughly and attentively, before confidently and freely launching
into an explanation for their choice (only a quarter of the participants
required any prompting by the experimenters.) Participants would report
things like “I chose this pair of stockings because the knit is superior,” “this
pair is best because the workmanship is better, “or “this pair feels the softest
to me.” Not a single participant struggled to provide a reason for her choice or
failed to give a reason at all.
What is noteworthy about the participant’s justifications for their
choice is that these cannot possibly be the real reasons, the actual basis, for
their decision. The stockings were all identical, so the particular pair that they
chose would not have been “the softest,” or “the sheerest,” or whatever. Their
verbal explanations had no connection to the genuine reason why they made
their choice (which probably had something to do with the position of the
stockings in the array). However, from the participant’s perspective absolutely
nothing was amiss: as far as they were concerned, they were reporting the
genuine reasons for their choice and took their verbal report at face value as a
sincere report of their decision-making process. Thus, the participants were
unaware of the factors that led to them choosing the paired that they did, but
this lack of awareness did not stop them from giving some reasons as to why
they made that decision anyway – reasons that could not have possibly been
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the real basis for their decision. Nisbett and Wilson claim that, in this case, the
participants were “telling more than they could know, “and classified their
verbal reports as “confabulations.”
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the choice blindness
experiments. Recall that, in one particular experiment, participants were
presented with a pair of photographs and were required to pick the most
attractive face. They were then prompted to provide reasons for their choice.
In the non-manipulated trials, participants pointed to the face they preferred.
The experimenter then placed the cards face down and passed the chosen
photograph to the participant. The participant upon receiving his choice is
then asked to explain why he preferred this face over the other one. The verbal
reports in the non-manipulated trials are just as one would expect.
Participants reference actual features of the women in the photographs: “I like
her more because she is brunette, and has a nice smile,” “She has big eyes, and
I like her earrings,” and so on. In the non-manipulated trials, then, the
participants refer to actual features of the photograph when justifying their
choice, and they appear to be providing the actual reasons as to why they
prefer one face over another.
However, in the manipulated trials, the experimenter performs a
sleight of hand and actually gives the participant the rejected face instead of
the chosen face. The participants who failed to notice the switch were then
asked to explain why they chose the picture that, in fact, they initially rejected.
Commonsense dictates that when one is asked to provide reasons for a choice
that one did not actually make it is difficult to know how to even begin to
respond to such a request. Intuitively, the participants should be stumped:
after all, they don’t have any reasons for preferring the face in front of them
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because this is the face that they didn’t select. Thus, when participants are
asked to provide reasons for a choice they didn’t’ make we have the strong
intuition that their verbal reports (if they provide any at all) will be quite
different from the verbal reports in the non-manipulated trials. Much to the
experimenter’s surprise, however, the verbal reports in the manipulated trials
are very similar to the verbal reports in the non-manipulated trials.
Participants say things like “I like her dimples,” or, “I like her thick eyebrows,
and her curly hair”, and the features they adduce match the features of the
photograph in front of them (so participants are not simply providing the
reasons why they prefer the originally chosen photograph but are referencing
the photograph they have been given.) Rather than exhibiting hesitation or
confusion, the participants provided confident, plausible reasons for their
choice. The problem is these reasons cannot possibly be a basis for their
decision, because, as we know, this was not a choice that the participants
actually made. Johansson classifies these verbal reports as ‘confabulations’
and contrasts them with the veridical reports in the non-manipulated trials.
As he states:

It is interesting that the participants do talk in the manipulated trials –
that they say anything at all. As they are asked to explain a choice they
did not make, saying “I don’t know” or “I wanted the other one” would
seem the more natural thing to do…Sometimes the features referred to
are unique for the manipulated picture, such as the earrings, the dark
hair, the hint of a smile. In these cases we can be certain that the
reports are constructed after the fact, and thus in some sense are
confabulatory.407
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In this chapter, I will discuss what is meant by the term “confabulation,” and I
will attempt to pin down a working definition. I will then explain how
confabulation challenges the traditional account of self-knowledge. My
conclusion is that confabulation, just like choice blindness, cannot be easily
reconciled with the traditional view of self-knowledge.

The medical origins of confabulation

“Confabulation” was originally a term of art in Victorian-era medicine, and it
is worth briefly discussing confabulation in a medical context. Pathological
confabulation is useful to think about, because the ways in which various
cognitive systems can break down may give us an insight into how cognitive
systems that underwrite the ability to produce verbal reports normally
function. The 19th century neurologist Korsakoff first used the term
“confabulation” to refer to the abnormal verbal reports of his patients, who
suffered from an alcoholism-induced form of dementia.408 Korsakoff observed
that his patients suffered from an unusual form of amnesia. They might, for
example, talk enthusiastically about their long-dead parents, or sincerely
insist that they were heading to a workplace that they had not been to in years.
They told stories from years ago in their pasts, with no awareness that they
were relaying distant memories: from their point of view they were providing
the doctors with truthful information about their current circumstances. The
patients told these fantastical stories with a high degree of confidence and
sincerity, and were not in the least bit perturbed by having the falsity of their
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claims pointed out to them. Initially, the symptom of confabulation was
thought to only occur in patients with amnesia and other memory deficits. The
dominant theory was that confabulations were either reports of actual
memories that were remembered out of time (for example, an event that
happened 20 years ago might be misremembered as happening very recently)
or reports of imagined events that were mistaken for genuine memories.409
Over time, however, the concept of confabulation came to be applied to
patients with no apparent memory deficit; and it is now accepted in the
medical community that memory impairment is not necessary for
confabulation to occur.410 Confabulation was eventually understood to
comprise more than just “false reports about memories,”411 and it was thought
to more generally involve the “production of fictitious stories”412 that may or
may not have some element of truth to them. For example, a stroke victim
who has lost the use of her left arm might sincerely report that she is
completely capable of moving the arm. When asked to demonstrate her arm
movement, she will say things like “I’m too tired right now,” “I don’t feel like
lifting my arm up.” If the doctor challenges her assertion that she can move
her arm, she will vigorously protest that she is entirely able to – while coming
up with an imaginative range of (sincerely believed) reasons as to why she
can’t demonstrate her arm movement at that moment.413 Her verbal report is
Hirstein, William. Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of
Confabulation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.
p.61.
410 Hirstein, William. "Introduction: What Is Confabulation?". Chap. 1 In
Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and
Philosophy, edited by William Hirstein, p.3.
411 Hirstein, William. "Introduction: What Is Confabulation?" p.3.
412 Schnider, Armin. "Spontaneous Confabulation and the Adaptation of
Thought to Ongoing Reality." Nature Reviews 4, no. 8 (2003): 662-71, p.662.
413 Hirstein, William. Brain Fiction, p.1.
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a confabulation even though it does not involve a misremembered memory or
an imagining that has been falsely attributed as a memory.
Since Korsakoff’s time, the symptom of confabulation has been
observed in a diverse range of medical conditions. Patients who have
undergone strokes, aneurysms, brain injuries and lesions, hemispherectomies,
dementia, and schizophrenia have all been known to make confabulatory
utterances.414 The fact that confabulation occurs in such a wide range of
conditions, with hugely diverse sites of brain damage, entails that there is not
one single type of brain injury, or lesion area, that directly causes patients to
produce confabulatory reports. In other words, there is not a single brain
module, or mechanism, that, when damaged, results in confabulation. This
implies that the ability to provide successful, non-confabulated verbal reports
is a complex cognitive achievement that is underwritten by many different
parts of the brain. If the core feature of confabulation is not a memory deficit,
however, and if it can arise out of a multitude of different brain lesions, what
characterizes medical confabulation?
According to Hirstein, pathological confabulation is best characterized
as a symptom of metacognitive failure, and not as a consequence of a memory
deficit. Confabulation occurs in brain-damaged patients due to a failure of
executive processes, which are supposed to monitor and control mental
representations for errors.415 Hirstein postulates that confabulation in braindamaged patients is the result of two simultaneous failures. Firstly, patients
generate a false, or ill-grounded mental representation: there is a failure of
knowledge that leads to them generating a thought that is on shaky ground,
414
415
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epistemically speaking.416 Thus, the first step towards confabulation, in braindamaged patients, is the production of thoughts that are very weakly
epistemically justified. If these patient’s brains weren’t damaged, they would
not countenance claims that are very unlikely to be correct, but because they
are compromised in some way they “are not worried about…the truth of what
they are saying.”417 The mere generation of a faulty mental representation is
not enough for confabulation to occur, however. Confabulation also requires a
second step: namely, that frontal lobe based executive processes fail to notice
and prevent the ill-grounded thought.418 Usually, the executive processes
monitor ongoing mental representations for ill-grounded thoughts. Once an
ill-grounded or otherwise inappropriate thought is detected, the executive
systems then suppress this thought from coming into conscious awareness,
and from being verbally expressed. In confabulatory patients, their executive
systems fail to monitor and correct errors in their thinking. Ill-grounded
representations are not blocked, and as a result these patients go on to
produce confabulatory verbal reports.
An interesting implication of Hirstein’s theory of pathological
confabulation is that the ability to not provide an answer at all or to assert “I
don’t know,” is a more cognitively advanced task than giving an answer in
response to a query. According to Hirstein, the brain, by default, wants to
provide an answer; and complex processes of checking, monitoring, and
inhibition must be in place to prevent us from blurting out just any old
nonsense that first pops into our head. In short, saying something, anything,
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is our default mode of operation; while confessing ignorance, or remaining
silent, requires a greater deal of cognitive control and mental power. Thus, as
Hirstein puts it, “confabulating is a behavior that results from
disinhibition.”419 The surprising upshot, then, is that what we think of as our
normal state – our ability to respond with “I don’t know”, or “let me get back
to you when I think about this some more”– is not due to answers failing to
come into our mind but, rather, due to “forces actively suppressing incorrect
thoughts from becoming conscious.”420 When we are asked a question, the
brain has to actively work to suppress bizarre and irrelevant answers from
popping into our heads. From my perspective, when I am asked a difficult
question, it just feels as if no answer comes to mind. In reality, my brain has
been working hard behind the scenes suppressing responses that are
unsuitable. Clinical confabulation, then, involves a breakdown of this normal
process whereby the brain resorts to its default state of providing answer –
any answer – in response to questions.
It used to be thought that confabulation was something that only
patients with damaged brains were susceptible to, but there is increasing
consensus that confabulation routinely occurs in healthy individuals as well:
as Doris states “it’s become customary to suggest that the unaffected
confabulate as much as the afflicted do.”421 Diverse experimental paradigms in
psychology have demonstrated that normal people are apt to confabulate in a
diverse range of circumstances: as Carruthers states, “immediate, confident
confabulation for past mental events is found in study after study.”422 A rich
Hirstein, William. Brain Fiction, p.102.
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source of confabulation can be found in research on non-conscious influences
on behavior. Studies into priming, cognitive dissonance, self-perception
attribution, implicit bias, decision-making, and choice blindness have all
yielded confabulation data.423 In light of these studies, Hirstein admits that:

Rather than being merely an odd neurological phenomenon, the
existence of confabulation may be telling us something important
about the human mind and about human nature…The creative process
of confabulation, its character and persistence, is emblematic of what it
is to be human.424
In the rest of this chapter, I will focus on non-pathological confabulation:
confabulation that occurs in normal people as seen in the choice blindness
experiments. The core lesson to take away from pathological confabulation,
however, is that the brain may have a default tendency to provide answers in
response to queries and that it requires further cognitive processing to
suppress faulty or irrelevant mental representations from reaching conscious
awareness. That is, non-confabulatory reports may be the result of effortful
inhibitory cognitive mechanisms, whereas confabulation is the result of
disinhibition.

Characteristics of confabulation

It’s easy to provide examples of confabulation, from both the fields of
medicine and psychology, but it is surprisingly difficult to define just what,
precisely, constitutes a confabulatory utterance. It is beneficial to firstly
Scaife, Robin. "A Problem for Self-Knowledge: The Implications of Taking
Confabulation Seriously." Acta Analytica 29, no. 4 (2014): 469-85, p.476.
424 Hirstein, William. Brain Fiction, p.239.
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outline what confabulation is not. Confabulated utterances are not lies, and
confabulators are not liars. Intuitively, lying requires knowledge that one what
is claiming is false, or very unlikely to be true, as well as an intention to
deceive another into believing that the claim is true.425 The participants in the
Nisbett and Wilson stocking experiment were not lying when they claimed
things like “this pair of stockings is the softest.” That is, they were not
deliberately trying to persuade the experimenters that the stockings were the
softest when they knew full well that the stockings were not the softest; nor
did they have any active intention to deceive their interlocutors. Rather, from
their perspective, the participants were simply reporting what seemed to them
to be the truth. Thus, confabulations do not involve any actual intent to
deceive, nor do confabulators knowingly relay information that they are
convinced is false.
There is also empirical evidence that confabulated reports are not lies.
In the analysis of the report corpus, Johansson et al. discovered that the
manipulated reports do not share any similarities with verbal reports that
contain lies.426 Previous linguistic analyses have revealed that lies have
properties which distinguish them from truthful reports. Untruthful verbal
reports contain fewer first-personal pronouns and references to the self, fewer
exclusive words like “except,” and more negative words. Lies are also more
negative in terms of emotionality, and, crucially, exhibit signs of cognitive load
(pauses, more simplistic language) because lies require cognitive effort to
generate and maintain. However, the confabulated reports in the manipulated
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trials do not share any features with untruthful verbal reports. Confabulation
is not a form of lying.
Secondly, confabulators are not suffering from self-deception. A
standard case of self-deception involves “the acquisition and maintenance of a
belief (or…the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the
contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and
retention of that belief.”427 For example, an individual might have persuaded
herself that she hates her father. Whenever she is asked her feelings about her
father, she unhesitatingly states that she despises him. In fact, she really loves
her father but has managed to self-deceive herself into thinking that she does
not. One characteristic of self-deception is that it often results in behavioralbelief mismatches (as seen in cases of implicit bias, or in cases that involve
supposed ‘aliefs.’) The individual who claims that she hates her father may act
in ways that are not consistent with that avowal: she may worry about him
when he is sick or look forward to a greetings card from him on her birthday.
Another key feature of self-deception is that it is thought to be intentional:
self-deception requires an active and ongoing effort on the part of the agent to
suppress reality and uphold the deluded belief. Whenever our self-deceived
individual encounters evidence that she really does love her father (for
example, when she observers herself exhibiting care towards him), she
disregards or outright rejects it so she can continue to maintain her selfdeception.
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Confabulation does not seem to qualify as a form of self-deception.
There is no evidence that confabulators intend to confabulate, or that they
actively maintain their confabulations in light of conflicting evidence. On the
contrary, when the confabulating participants in the choice blindness study
are debriefed by the experimenters and told that they defended their originally
rejected choice without noticing, the participants display shock and disbelief
that they could have done such a thing. When confronted with contrary
evidence, participants immediately repudiate their confabulated utterance,
which is the opposite of what a person in the grip of self-deception would do.
Furthermore, while self-deceptive beliefs have strong motivations behind
them (for example, to avoid trauma, or severe harm to one’s sense of self), it is
far from evidence that confabulatory utterances of the sort in the choice
blindness experiments have a similar motivational core. For example, if a
patient with terminal cancer deceives himself into believing he is not ill, then
the anxiety and fear-reducing benefits of such a self-deception are obvious.
There is a strong emotional motivation to downplay the seriousness of one’s
illness. However, it is difficult to grasp why a study participant would have a
strong motivation to deceive herself into believing that, for example, the pair
of stockings she chose is the softest. There doesn’t seem to be very much at
stake, psychologically speaking, if it turns out that the pair of stockings one
has chosen turns out to not be the softest after all.
It might be argued that study participants are motivated to confabulate
to avoid social awkwardness and embarrassment in the course of the
experiment. The idea is that participants are keen to avoid the socially
awkward interaction of pointing out to the experimenter that they actually
chose the other photograph, and so they have a strong incentive to just go
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along with the experimenters and pretend that the photograph in front of
them was their original choice all along. As I have previously discussed,
however, it has been well established that there is no motivational element to
the choice blindness studies. The participant’s undisguised astonishment and
disbelief at being informed that they did not receive what they originally chose
is evidence against any explanation that relies on participants being motivated
to comply with the experiment out of feelings of embarrassment, or
obligation. Furthermore, the confabulators in the choice blindness
experiments behave in ways that are consistent with their confabulation: there
is no behavioral-belief mismatch. Confabulation, then, is not the same kind of
phenomenon as self-deception.
If confabulation is not a form of lying or self-deception how is it best
characterized? While a concrete definition of confabulation has proved tricky
to pin down, there are at least some features of confabulatory reports are
almost universally agreed upon. One essential characteristic of confabulatory
reports is that they are often said to be delivered with “rock-jawed
certainty.”428 Confabulators are not in any doubt about the integrity of their
verbal reports and are simply “reporting what seems to be true.”429 When
challenged, confabulators staunchly stand by their utterances and strenuously
deny ignorance. In the Nisbett and Wilson stocking experiment, for example,
the participants refused to entertain the possibility that the stated reasons for
their choice were mis-attributed, and that they were ignorant of the real basis
of their decision. Furthermore, in the choice blindness experiments a large
majority of participants are exceptionally confident that they could not
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possibly succumb to the choice blindness effect even after they have already
succumbed to the manipulation.
The manipulated reports from the choice blindness experiments also
reveal confidence and certainty even at a linguistic level of analysis.
Uncertainty in verbal reports has various telling signs. When someone is
uncertain about what they are saying, their verbal report is full of long pauses,
stammers, nervous laughter, and hedging words like ‘um,’ ‘err,’ and ‘I
guess…’430 Surprisingly, however, the manipulated reports exhibit a large
degree of linguistic certainty – the participants in the manipulated condition
deliver their verbal reports with as much confidence as those in the nonmanipulated trials.
Another universally agreed upon characteristic, which is also noted in
cases of pathological confabulation, is that confabulators are highly sincere in
their utterances. According to Eriksson, an utterance is sincere when the
speaker of that utterance is trying to inform others about his state of mind –
when he is “trying to present himself as he takes himself to be” to his
audience.431 An utterance does not have to actually be true to qualify as
sincere. If Tim informs me that he was abducted by aliens last week, his
utterance may be sincere even if it is completely false. What matters for
sincerity is that Tim reports things as he honestly sees them – that “the
speaker believes he has the state of mind he expresses.”432 If Tim does not
genuinely believe that he is in that state of mind then Tim’s utterance that he
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was abducted by aliens is insincere. However, if Tim does believe that he was
abducted by aliens, and if he is attempting to convey his state of mind to me,
then Tim’s report is sincere. Similarly, confabulated utterances may be false,
or ill-grounded, but this does not preclude them from being sincere verbal
reports. Sincerity can also be regarded as a virtuous character trait and not
just a property of a verbal report. Intuitively, the confabulators in the choice
blindness experiments are sincere because they are trying to get something
right with their verbal reports – they want to accurately convey the reasons for
their attitude to the experimenters, and they want to avoid being misleading.
A final feature of confabulation, which is related to both sincerity and
certainty, is that confabulators are entirely unaware that they are
confabulating. Confabulations go undetected (from the first-person
perspective, at least.) Confabulated reports are presented with as little
hesitancy and as much speed as genuine explanations: confabulators “give
every impression of thinking that they are just reporting on events or
processes that are transparently accessible to them in memory. For that is the
way it seems to them.”433 Thus, from the inside, confabulations are
phenomenologically identical to genuine reports – when we confabulate, it
feels like we are directly accessing our reasons via introspection. This entails
that it is not possible for one to work out that one has just confabulated
without external evidence. No amount of reflection and introspection will
reveal that a particular verbal report on a particular occasion was, in fact, a
confabulation.

433

Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind, p.328.
262

A Definition of Confabulation

In the previous section, I provided a few widely agreed upon features of
confabulation. Confabulated utterances are not lies, nor are they selfdeceptions; and they are delivered with a high degree of certainty and
sincerity. Furthermore, it is not possible (from the inside at least) to tell apart
a confabulatory utterance from a non-confabulatory utterance: people are
ignorant of the fact that they are confabulating. If you put all of these widely
agreed upon features together, however, this still does not actually tell us what
confabulation is. Frustratingly, the phenomenon of confabulation is hard to
pin down and precisely define, and it is easier to provide examples of
confabulations than it is to give necessary and sufficient conditions. As
Hirstein states “a definition of the term confabulation is still a difficult and
controversial topic. There is no orthodox, problem free definition of
confabulation.”434 The challenge is formulating a definition of confabulation
that is neither too broad, so as to include standard false belief cases, or too
narrow in such a way that fails to capture the essence of the broader
phenomenon. As Bortolotti points out, early definitions of confabulation were
too narrow in that they applied only to cases of confabulation caused by a
memory deficit, and thus failed to include the many instances of non-amnesic
confabulation.435 In this section, I will discuss a couple of potential definitions
of confabulation, before settling on a working definition.
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The choice blindness experiments result in two separate report
corpuses that we can compare and contrast: the non-manipulated reports and
the manipulated reports. It is tempting for traditional theorists of selfknowledge to claim that the non-manipulated reports are the result of
successful introspection, whereas the manipulated reports are the result of
self-interpretation. That is, introspection leads to veridical verbal reports
which reflect the genuine reasons for the choice; whereas inference leads to
confabulations and reasons which could not possibly be the basis for the
original decision. With this in mind, Fiala and Nichols suggest a definition of
confabulation in which “confabulations…are…first person mental state
attributions that are generated by an interpretative process as opposed to an
introspective process.”436 If a verbal report is generated via introspection, then
it cannot qualify as a confabulation. Only verbal reports that are made on the
basis of a self-interpretive process can possibly be confabulations. Nichols and
Fiala refine their definition further when they state that “confabulations
include all false self-attributions that result from interpretation, and accurate
interpretive self-ascriptions do not count as confabulatory.”437
There are two problems with this definition of confabulation, however.
Firstly, it simply begs the question that we do, in fact, possess privileged
access to some of our mental states and can generate accurate verbal reports
on the basis of this direct access. However, the existence of direct
introspective access to propositional attitudes remains to be demonstrated. It
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is not good enough to just assume, in the absence of evidence and argument,
that we do possess direct introspective access to mental states – this has to be
argued for like any other hypothesis. Thus, a working definition of
confabulation cannot assume at the outset that veridical reports are the result
of introspection, whereas confabulations are caused by self-interpretation. As
Johansson et al. suggest, it could be the case that both the non-manipulated
and manipulated verbal reports are the result of self-interpretation (and,
indeed, there is some evidence for this claim.)438 Secondly, it is not correct to
say that confabulations are necessarily false. It is possible for confabulations
to be truthful - a verbal report does not have to be false to qualify as a
confabulation. As Bortolotti notes, “confabulations do not need to patently
false, self-contradictory, bizarre, or highly improbable.”439 The relevant
distinction between confabulated reports and introspective reports (if these
exist) is that confabulation involves a reconstructive inference whereas
introspection is direct and non-inferential. However, just because
confabulated reports are the product of inference does not mean that they are
false. A reconstructed inference may yield errors, but it could also result in a
truthful utterance. Similarly, direct introspection is not infallible – sometimes
introspection will yield mistaken results as well. Thus, both introspected and
confabulated reports can turn out to be false – falsity is not a necessary
property of confabulations.
An influential definition of non-pathological confabulation comes from
Hirstein. Hirstein argues that the core feature of confabulation, epistemically
speaking, is that confabulations are, in some sense, ill-grounded: “a
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confabulation is a certain type of epistemically ill-grounded claim that the
confabulator does not know is ill-grounded.”440 This definition is too broad,
however, because it encompasses utterances which, intuitively, are not
obviously confabulations. A conspiracy theorist may believe, and sincerely
claim, that a high-profile disaster was entirely faked by the government. This
report is ill-grounded because there is no evidence for it, and the conspiracy
theorist should, in principle, be in a position to recognize the ill-groundedness
of his claims. However, it doesn’t seem right to say that he is confabulating
when he asserts that the government caused the disaster. Something more
than unspecified ‘ill-groundedness’ is required for an utterance to qualify as a
confabulation.
Hirstein elaborates on his definition, however, and he adds more
conditions. According to his extended definition, an individual confabulates if
and only if 1) they claim that p, 2) they believe that p, 3) p is ill-grounded, 4)
they don’t know that p is ill-grounded, 5) they should know that p is illgrounded, and 6) they have confidence that p.441 Hirstein’s extended
definition has some good points. It captures the universal intuition that
confabulators are sincere, confident, and are not intentionally lying; and it
avoids the mistake of assuming that confabulations are necessarily false or
grossly inaccurate. Condition 5, that individuals should know that their
utterance is ill-grounded, is supposed to distinguish confabulations from
merely mistaken beliefs. As Bortolotti points out, the use of “should” here is
normative – confabulators are epistemically blameworthy for making
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utterances that, by all accounts, they should be in a position to realize are illgrounded.442
What does it mean to say that confabulators should be in a position to
notice that their verbal reports are ill-grounded? Suppose that, for example,
the weather channel mistakenly runs an old weather report from last year, and
upon viewing the report I form the mistaken belief that it will rain tomorrow.
In this case, my utterance that “it will rain tomorrow” is just false. Is it fair to
say that, in this case, I should have known that my utterance is mistaken? I
don’t think so. My statement is in error due to plain bad luck, and not due to
any fault of my own. I am not irrational, or epistemically irresponsible, for
trusting the weather report: it is simply a matter of bad luck that the report
happened to be out of date. In this case, then, I am not blameworthy for my
false utterance – it’s not my fault that it turned out to be false. Hirstein argues
that in the case of confabulation, however, the confabulator is epistemically
blameworthy for their utterances. The confabulator should know better than
to make such an utterance given that they are in a position to recognize how
obviously ill-grounded these utterances are. Confabulators are highly
irrational and epistemically irresponsible because they should know that their
utterances are ill-grounded. The confabulator, then, is like the conspiracy
theorist who should be aware of how ill-grounded and implausible his claims
are, and how selective his evidence is.
There is a problem with condition 5, however. Bortolotti points out that
it is simply not true that people who confabulate are always in a position to
recognize the ill-groundedness of their utterances. She provides Nisbett and
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Wilson’s stocking experiment as a case where the participants are, intuitively,
not at any epistemic fault for failing to realize that their utterance about the
stockings is ill-grounded. It is not the case that the Nisbett and Wilson
experiment participants are in a position to realize that their utterance is illgrounded, because “subjects have no access to the way in which they arrive at
their choices, so the grounds for their…beliefs are not available to them.”443 If
it is impossible for participants to become aware that their belief, or utterance,
is ill-grounded due to the grounds of their utterance being inaccessible to
them, then it is not the case that they should be aware that their utterance is
ill-grounded. It is unfair to say that the stocking experiment participants
should have realized something was awry with their verbal report when no
amount of reflection would reveal the actual grounds (the reasons) for their
decision due to the fact that such mental processes are non-conscious. Thus, if
it is impossible for the participants to access the grounds for their decision,
then, intuitively, the participants are not at epistemic fault. And if that’s the
case, then the verbal reports in the stocking experiment fails to qualify as
confabulations as per Hirstein’s definition, because condition 5 has not been
fulfilled. However, commonsensically these verbal reports are paradigm cases
of confabulation, so something must be wrong with Hirstein’s definition.
A further difficulty with Hirstein’s definition is that, if anything,
confabulated verbal reports are not so much “ill-grounded” as they are merely
mistaken. If the core characteristic of confabulatory utterances is that they are
inferential reconstructions, it does not seem to be the case that for that very
reason they must therefore be ill-grounded or unjustified. Hirstein is incorrect
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to assume that confabulatory reports are ill-grounded just because they are
inferential. As I have previously discussed, verbal reports that are constructed
via inference are not necessarily false or unjustified. Thus, it seems that 3) and
5) of Hirstein’s definition are simply not necessary conditions of confabulation
at all. Confabulators are not in any position to be aware that there is something
awry with their verbal reports, and it also doesn’t seem to be the case that
confabulatory utterances are necessarily ill-grounded. Hirstein’s definition
simply fails to capture what confabulation is.
Leaving aside definitions for the moment, I would like to attempt to get
at the core feature of confabulated utterances. It seems that the central feature
of confabulatory utterances is that they are reconstructions – they are verbal
reports constructed after the fact to play some justificatory role.
Confabulations are not verbal reports of reasons that are constructed at the
very moment of the decision making but are verbal reports of inferred reasons
that are reconstructed after the decision-making process is complete. I
confabulate when I make a decision and then come up with reasons to justify
that decision after the fact – reasons that may or may not have anything to do
with why I chose the way I did. As Gertler puts it, confabulation necessarily
involves “inventing reasonable sounding motivations for...attitudes after the
fact.”444 To return to the weather report example, suppose I go ahead and
cancel a camping trip because the out of date weather report forecasts rain. If
I’m asked to explain my reasons for canceling the trip, I state that “I canceled
the trip because the weather report said it would rain tomorrow.” Is my
explanation for the cancelation a confabulation? No. The reason I cite for
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canceling the trip, the promise of rain, is undoubtedly mistaken because the
weather report is out of date. However, my explanation is not confabulatory
because I didn’t reconstruct the reasons for the trip cancelation long after I
actually canceled the trip. Rather, I encountered reasons to cancel the trip and
then, on the basis of those reasons, I canceled the trip. The reason I cite, the
forecast of rain, came first, and the trip cancelation followed shortly after.
Consider a typical choice blindness case, however. Imagine a choice
blindness participant initially picks a photograph that depicts a woman with
long hair, and he rejects a photograph that shows a woman with short hair.
After selecting the long-haired woman, he is actually given the picture of the
short-haired woman. He fails to notice this and succumbs to the choice
blindness effect. When he is asked why he picked the photograph, he replies “I
chose this photograph because I like her short hair.” This is a confabulatory
utterance because it is a reconstruction after the fact. There were, in fact, no
reasons for why he picked that photograph because he didn’t actually pick it.
The participant was forced to work out what his reasons for his ‘choice’ might
be, and so he inferred that he must have picked the photograph because he
admires the woman’s short hair (which is not an implausible reason for
preferring a picture of a short-haired woman). When confronted with his
‘decision’ he thus constructed plausible reasons on the fly and offered these up
as an explanation. This element of reconstruction is the distinctive
characteristic of confabulations: not the fact that they are false, mistaken, illgrounded, or unjustified. Confabulated “reasons” are fabricated long after the
decision has been made – they did not factor into the decision-making process
at the time the choice was made and thus are post-hoc constructions.
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Note that my simple account of confabulation leaves open the
possibility that the verbal reports in the non-manipulated choice blindness
trials could be confabulations, just like the verbal reports in the manipulated
trials. Recall that Johansson et al. hypothesized that the non-manipulated
reports would exhibit very different features from the manipulated reports. In
particular, they hoped to establish that ‘directly introspected’ verbal reports
had distinctive features from ‘confabulated’ verbal reports. However, to their
surprise, the non-manipulated and manipulated verbal reports were
practically identical. This suggests that the non-manipulated reports derive
from the same source as the manipulated reports: that the non-manipulated
verbal reports also are inferred reconstructions after the fact. The nonmanipulated verbal reports might be wholly reconstructed as well, and thus
may involve the very same cognitive processes as the manipulated reports.

How confabulation threatens the traditional view of selfknowledge

A confabulated statement is a confidently stated, sincere utterance that is a
justificatory story, a reconstruction made long after the actual decisionmaking process. The confabulator is ignorant of the fact that she is
constructing a story after the fact, however, and sincerely believes that she is
accurately reporting her inner states: as Scaife puts it, confabulators “are
completely unaware that they are fabricating accounts of their own
motivations and confidently treat their confabulations as if they were genuine
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introspective insights.”445 In this section, I’m going to explain how the
phenomenon of confabulation threatens the traditional view of selfknowledge. I shall argue that, just like choice blindness, confabulation is very
difficult for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate and
explain.
Confabulation poses a significant problem to the traditional view of
self-knowledge because it strongly intimates that we lack direct, privileged
access to our propositional attitudes. On the traditional view of selfknowledge, I have first-person authority over my own mental states because I
can gain access to them using the special method of introspection. Thus, when
I am asked the reasons for why I made a choice just moments ago, or when I
am asked to justify why I hold a particular moral or political opinion, it should
be trivially easy for me to introspect, gain access to my reasons, and then
veridically report them. When there are no reasons to introspect, however, I’m
not supposed to just reconstruct plausible sounding reasons (without even
being aware that I’m doing so.) And yet, this is precisely what seems to occur
in the case of confabulation. As Johansson puts it:
If we are supposed to know our own minds from the inside, we should
know why we do what we do…When asked to describe why we chose a
face we, in reality, did not prefer, we are not supposed to just fabricate
reasons (at least, not without knowing this is what we are doing.)446
On the traditional view of self-knowledge, if the introspective faculty fails to
detect any reasons for my decision (because I never made that decision in the
first place, as in the case of the manipulated choice blindness trials, or because
Scaife, Robin. "A Problem for Self-Knowledge” p.470.
Johansson, Petter. "Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention”,
p.20.
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the real reasons for my choice are inaccessible to conscious awareness, as in
the Nisbett and Wilson experiments) then this fact should be available to me
via the introspective faculty.
At this point, it’s worth considering a criticism from Antony. Antony
objects that Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments take place in “degraded
circumstances,” and thus do not pose any real danger to the traditional
view.447 Her complaint is this: the experiments practically invited participants
to confabulate because they were making a decision in a “degraded condition”:
a condition whereby they had to make a choice in a circumstance where all of
the options were actually identical. Antony maintains that “the degraded
circumstance here is the absence of any reason in the agent’s mind for
introspection to detect.”448 Thus, Antony’s claim is that cases where no
reasons are detected by the introspective faculty are unusual, or ‘degraded’
circumstances, that do not reflect the normal operating conditions of the
introspective faculty. In such instances where no reasons are detected by the
introspective faculty, confabulation is bound to occur: the absence of reasons
is an invitation for participants to confabulate. However, I disagree with
Antony that it is outside of the normal operations of the introspective faculty
to detect and report a lack of reasons, and I also disagree that in the absence
of reasons it is to be expected that participants will just construct an answer.
Rather, I maintain that part of the introspective faculty’s normal function is to
report the absence of reasons, as this is a useful piece of self-knowledge for
one to learn; and that, commonsensically, one should expect participants to
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confess ignorance when their introspective faculty reveals to them that they
have no reasons.
As Carruthers points out, the introspective faculty must be able to
detect, and signal, the absence of mental states as well as their presence,
because this is essential for adequate monitoring and control:

During decision-making, for example, inner sense would surely need to
be capable of detecting that no decision has yet been reached. And in
order to monitor and intervene in reasoning, likewise, the introspective
faculty would need to be able to detect that no premise of some
required sort has yet been introduced.449
If the function of the introspective faculty is to provide us with accurate selfknowledge, there is no reason why it should not be capable of reporting an
absence of mental states. Rather than being a ‘degraded circumstance,’ it
seems entirely plausible that introspection should be able to inform us when
no reasons for a decision have been detected. If one learns that there were no
reasons for one’s decision, this is exceptionally useful information to know
about oneself. When a choice blindness study participant is asked to explain
why she chose a photograph that she never actually wanted, her introspective
faculty should signal to her that no such decision was made and thus there are
no reasons for the decision. In this kind of situation, commonsensically the
introspective faculty “should have been delivering the output NO DECISION
MADE.”450 In such a case, according to Carruthers, “a null output from inner
sense [introspection] would be used to deny that the behavior in question has
a mental cause, or at least to deny knowledge of such a cause.”451
Carruthers, Peter. The Opacity of Mind, p.334.
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If the introspective faculty fails to detect any reasons for one’s action, is this
an invitation to confabulate? I don’t see why it should be. If a participant in a
choice blindness study learns that she had no reason to make her decision, I
don’t see why learning this fact about herself would necessarily spur her to
make something up. Instead, commonsensically, upon gaining this new piece
of self-knowledge, I would expect a participant to report her lack of reasons
and to confess ignorance about why she made that particular decision: as
Carruthers states “there are all sorts of circumstances in which people are
perfectly content to say “I don’t know why I just did it” when asked to explain
why they acted in a particular way.”452
Thus, upon being asked her reasons for why she chose the originally
rejected photograph, the participant’s introspective faculty should, intuitively,
fail to detect the relevant mental states because no decision was actually
made. And if the decision in question was never made, the introspective
faculty should report that there are no reasons for why she made that decision
(precisely because she never actually chose the photograph she was given.)
The participant would thus become aware that she had no reasons to prefer
the photograph, and so, commonsensically, should report this to the
experimenters: we would expect participants to report something like, “I
actually don’t know why I chose this photograph”, “I don’t see any reason why
I chose it…did I even choose this one?”
The problem for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge is that this is
not what happens. If participants really do introspect and come to learn that
they have no reasons for making their “choice,” why do they then provide
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entirely made up reasons by way of an explanation? As Carruthers puts it,
“why, when asked for an explanation by the experimenters, should subjects
choose to ignore this information [that they have no reasons] and interpret for
themselves an alternative explanation instead?”453 If the traditional view of
self-knowledge is correct, the participants, upon realizing that they have no
reasons for the decision in question, ought to have confessed their ignorance
to the experimenters. We certainly would not expect them to become aware
that they lack reasons for their choice, which they never even made, and yet
report some made up reasons anyway which they then take at face value as the
real explanation for their decision. For a traditional theorist of self-knowledge,
such behavior is utterly baffling.
As Carruthers explains, some traditional theorists of self-knowledge
attempt to defuse the threat of confabulation by adopting a dual-systems
theory of self-knowledge. On the dual-systems proposal, it is possible for us to
gain self-knowledge in two different ways: either by introspection or by selfinterpretation.454 Sometimes mental states are not available (for whatever
reason) to the introspective faculty, or the introspective faculty itself is
disabled, and thus on these occasions we switch to a self-interpretive mode to
work out what our mental states are. Note that the dual-systems proposal is
quite a departure from the standard traditional view of self-knowledge. On the
standard traditional view, we enjoy unrestricted access to the mental states
that are accessible by introspection. This means that if a state is introspectable
then nothing should stop me from becoming aware of that mental state via
introspection (unless, of course, I consciously choose to interpret my mental
453
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states.) In short, the hallmark of the traditional view is that it is always
possible for me to arrive at knowledge of my mental states directly, via
introspection. The dual-methods proposal denies that this is the case: on the
dual-methods account it may sometimes not be possible for me to gain
knowledge of my mental states directly.
According to the dual-theorist, during the choice blindness
experiments a participant may attempt to introspect but will find himself
unable to. He will then switch to a self-interpretation mode, and this results in
him misattributing mental states and providing faulty reasons for a choice
that he never actually made. Confabulation, then, doesn’t prove that
introspective access to our mental states doesn’t exist: it merely demonstrates
that on certain occasions (like during the choice blindness experiments)
introspective access is disabled. However, I agree with Carruthers that this is
not a satisfactory response to the phenomenon of confabulation.
Firstly, as Carruthers points out, the traditional theorists of selfknowledge who wish to advocate for a dual-method approach will “need to
add as an auxiliary principle that introspective outputs of the form NO
RELEVANT STATE DETECTED are routinely ignored by the
mindreading…systems”455 and are dealt with by an interpretive/inferential
faculty instead. However, such a principle is unmotivated and implausible. If
introspection reveals that no mental states are detected, that there are no
reasons for any particular decision, then this, surely, is an exceptionally useful
piece of self-knowledge. If I come to learn that there is, in fact, no reason why
I made a particular decision, this is a substantial piece of self-knowledge
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which can then be a launch pad for further reflection: “I didn’t actually have
any reason for my decision…but why could that be? Why did I make that
choice for no reason? I wonder…” If the function and aim of our introspective
faculty is to provide us with accurate self-knowledge, why would the system be
designed such that, when no mental states are detected, it fails to tell us that
no mental states have been detected and defaulting to an interpretive mode
instead? The only reason to propose this auxiliary principle is to save the
concept of introspective access from the threat of confabulation – there is no
independent motivation to postulate such a strange mechanism.
Secondly, the dual-method theory also lacks predictive validity. It is not
enough, to stave off the threat of confabulation, to merely propose that
sometimes the introspective faculty will operate, and sometimes selfinterpretation will take over instead. For this to be a substantial account of the
mechanisms of self-knowledge, we need to know when and why the two
methods operate. In which circumstances can we expect the introspective
faculty to be fully operational, and when will control be handed over to the
interpretive faculty? Without a principled explanation of how the two methods
are supposed to operate in tandem, the dual method theory looks less like a
fully-fledged theory and more like a sticking plaster used only to save the
concept of introspective access. Thus, the dual-method proposal may generate
more problems for the traditional view of self-knowledge than it solves.
Finally, the dual-method proposal has to contend with evidence that we
only ever use one method to work out our mental states – and it’s not
introspection. That is, there is evidence that introspective access to our mental
states simply doesn’t exist and that we only ever self-interpret. This evidence
comes from the linguistic analysis of the verbal report corpuses from the
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choice blindness studies. As I discussed in detail in chapter 2, Johansson et al.
discovered that the manipulated (confabulated) reports had the same
properties as the non-manipulated (non-confabulatory) reports. The fact that
the two report corpuses are practically identical poses a problem for the dualmethod proposal and even casts doubt on the existence of introspective access
itself.
According to the dual-method theorist, in the non-manipulated trials,
the choice blindness participants introspect and produce veridical verbal
reports. That is, during the non-manipulated trials when they are asked to
report their reasons they introspect, detect the reasons for their choice, and
then report these reasons to the experimenter. In the manipulated trials,
however, the dual-method theorist argues that the participants don’t, or
cannot, introspect because if they did they would come to learn that they lack
reasons for their decision (that they never actually made), and so would be in
a position to report their lack of reasons to the experimenters. What we see,
however, is that participants do report reasons, and so the dual-method
theorist will say that, in the manipulated trials, the participants self-interpret
their mental states, and mistakenly report misattributed reasons. If the dualmethod proposal is correct, then, we should expect to see evidence that the
participants introspect and produce a veridical report in the non-manipulated
trial, and evidence that they self-interpret and produce confabulatory reports
in the manipulated trials. The best evidence for this would be a difference in
the reports themselves: intuitively, a report that is based on carefully
considered, introspected reasons should be different from a report that is
constructed on the fly long after the actual decision has been made.
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Indeed, BonJour maintains that genuine attitude reports will differ
from confabulated reports in two ways. Firstly, he claims that “there would be
a temporal gap between arriving at [the judgment] and the inventing of the
supposed reasons.”456 This makes sense. The confabulated reports are
invented on the fly, whereas the genuine attitude reports are based off preexisting reasons that one simply reports from memory. Intuitively, if I have to
quickly construct a reason on the spur of the moment, there should be a brief
temporal gap as I quickly invent and embellish these reasons. Thus, the
confabulated reports can be expected to have gaps in them and will take
longer to relay than the non-confabulated reports. Secondly, BonJour claims
that the invented reasons “cannot have been easy to come up with,” which
again would result in differences between the confabulated and genuine
attitude reports. If I am asked to justify a choice that I never made, and which
I originally rejected, it will be, intuitively, harder for me to come up with
reasons as to why I preferred the object in question. It is not easy to come up
with reasons for why you like something that you didn’t want! Whenever one
engages in a more taxing, difficult task, the increased cognitive load is
reflected in one’s language (stalling, re-starting the sentence, less complex
language, the use of filler words.) Thus, we would expect to see indications of
cognitive load in the confabulated verbal reports as compared to when
participants report genuine reasons. Intuitively, it is more difficult to come up
with reasons on the spot, as opposed to reporting pre-existing reasons.
This, however, is not what is observed. There are no differences
between the manipulated and non-manipulated reports. BonJour’s
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predictions, then, do not bear out – there is no evidence that the confabulated
reports are more difficult for participants to come up with than the nonconfabulated reports, and there are no temporal gaps in the confabulated
reports either. This surprising result leads Johansson et al. to suggest that “if
there are no or few differences between manipulated and non-manipulated
reports, and we know that the manipulated reports at least to some extent are
confabulatory, then this might indicate that the same mechanism is
responsible for both types of reports.”457 In other words, if another method to
gain self-knowledge was in play, if there existed an alternative route to
producing verbal reports, we would expect there to be at least some
differences between the two kinds of report. If there are no differences
between the two kinds of verbal reports, however, this implies that perhaps
there is only one cognitive route involved in the production of verbal reports.
What’s worse, from the traditional theorist’s point of view, is that the report
corpus analysis only has evidence for the existence of the interpretive route:
there is no evidence that introspective access exists. While the verbal report
analysis doesn’t provide any direct evidence against the existence of an
introspective faculty, it doesn’t provide any evidence that the introspective
faculty exists – which is precisely what the dual-method proposal relies upon.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that all verbal reports may be the result of selfinterpretation, and thus are all constructed to some extent (just like what
Nisbett and Wilson proposed).
Confabulation challenges the traditional view of self-knowledge
because it casts doubt on the existence of direct introspective access to mental
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states. Participants in the choice blindness studies opt to make-up reasons to
explain a choice they never made as opposed to simply just introspecting,
learning that they had no reasons, and then reporting this fact to the
experimenters – something which is deeply puzzling for the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge. This is not the only problematic component of
confabulatory reports, however. Another challenging element of confabulation
for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to explain is the fact that
confabulators remain blissfully unaware that they are, in fact, confabulating:
they have no clue that their verbal reports are confabulatory. From the firstperson perspective, there is, apparently, no phenomenological difference
between a confabulated and a non-confabulated explanation. As far as the
confabulator is concerned, she is offering up introspectively accessed reasons
for her decision – she would certainly deny that her verbal report is a
constructed story made up after the fact. The traditional theorist of selfknowledge can accept that, on occasion, we make mistakes and report reasons
for choices that we never actually made. Not even the staunchest traditional
theorist will go so far as to insist that we are 100% correct when we report our
mental states: errors can and do happen. However, the fact that confabulators
are utterly oblivious to the fact that they are confabulating should be worrying
to the traditional theorist of self-knowledge, because it raises the concern that
confabulators are never in a position to correct their error: there is no way for
them to reliably check, from the inside, if they are confabulating or not.
One potential reply to this skeptical worry is to argue that, on the
contrary, it is possible to tell whenever one is confabulating. BonJour, for
example, quite simply denies that “those who invent reasons will be unable to
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tell by reflection that they are doing this.”458 His proposal is that the
experimental participants who unwittingly confabulate only have themselves
to blame: if they engage in some rigorous reflection, they will be able to
uncover the fact that they are constructing a confabulatory utterance. He
further maintains that, with the aid of reflection, they will be able to tell that
their reasons are very poor, and not epistemically justified. Focusing on the
Nisbett and Wilson stocking experiment in particular, he argues that a
participant who says something like “this pair of stockings is the best because
they are the softest” will be able to reflect and come to realize that this reason
for preferring the stockings, that they are “the softest” is a very weak reason
for choosing them. BonJour does not claim that the experimental participant
will, via reflection, be able to uncover the real reason for why she chose the
stockings (the position effect); nor does he claim that she will even be able to
articulate why her reason (“it’s the softest”) for preferring the stockings is
poor. However, this does not matter – all that is required to defeat the
skeptical worry is that the stockings experiment participant can, in principle,
discover that she is confabulating. If reflection can reveal to us that we are
confabulating and that our confabulated reasons are weak, then the threat
confabulation poses to the traditional view of self-knowledge will not be so
great. Confabulation will just be one of many epistemic errors that we
occasionally fall into that can be remedied by engaging in some quality,
careful reflection. If experimental participants can come to learn that they are
confabulating, just by reflecting, this would be a big boon to the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge. So, can they?
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BonJour thinks that there are properties of confabulated verbal reports
that distinguish them from genuine reports of reasons and that participants
who carefully attend to their verbal reports can detect and recognize these
differences and thus pick out which utterances are confabulatory. As
previously mentioned, BonJour thinks that confabulated reports take longer
to come up with, and are more difficult to devise. These differences, moreover,
are obvious enough that “careful reflection would reveal this.”459 As we have
seen from the linguistic analysis of the verbal reports, however, these
differences cannot be revealed by even the most “careful reflection” because
they simply don’t exist: confabulated reports do not take longer to construct,
nor do they require more cognitive resources. In fact, the linguistic analysis
reveals that there aren’t any substantial differences between confabulated
(manipulated) reports and non-confabulated (non-manipulated) reports.
Bonjour has assumed that there are easily detectable differences that mark out
the confabulated reports when, in fact, no such differences exist. And if there
are no detectable differences between confabulated reports and nonconfabulated reports, no amount of careful reflection in the world will reveal
which of my utterances are confabulatory and which are not. Thus, it is false
to say that mere reflection is capable of revealing to participants that they are
engaging in confabulation.
Furthermore, if the reconstruction of reasons occurs at the subpersonal level (that is, it occurs non-consciously) it is not obvious that any
temporal gap would even exist. BonJour appears to fall into the same trap that
many traditional theorists of self-knowledge stumble into when they assume
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that inference must be performed at the personal level, and so will exhibit
some temporal gap. However, inferences at the sub-personal level can be
performed exceptionally swiftly, and outside of conscious awareness. There is
every reason to think, then, that there would be no temporal gap if
confabulations are the result of a sub-conscious inference.
BonJour does not just claim that participants will be able to tell,
through reflection, that they are confabulating, however. He also claims that
they will be able to detect that their reported reasons are poor. Thus, in the
stockings experiment, “the reasons invented would be extremely unlikely to
stand up under careful scrutiny,” because “there were in fact no significant
differences between the items in question.”460 That is, BonJour appears to be
suggesting that the fact that the stockings were identical can be uncovered via
rational reflection: if one pauses and carefully considers their reasons, one will
become aware of the fact that there were no differences between the stockings
and so one’s chosen pair cannot possibly be “the softest”. Given BonJour’s
views on the Nisbett and Wilson experiments, it is likely that his take on the
choice blindness experiments will be similar. In the choice blindness
experiments, the reasons the participants invent to justify a choice that they
never made will also be unlikely to stand up to rational reflection because they
didn’t, in fact, make the relevant decision. It is reasonable to surmise that,
according to BonJour, choice blindness participants could come to learn, via
conscious reflection, that they didn’t make the decision they are being asked
to justify. In other words, the choice blindness effect befalls participants who
are particularly unreflective. BonJour predicts that any participant who
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reflects adequately enough will not succumb to the choice blindness effect:
choice blindness can be remedied by careful reflection. Indeed, in the case of
decision-making experiments in general, BonJour holds that “it is certainly
not that reflection is incapable of revealing a mistake.”461 The most we can say
about the mistakes made in decision-making experiments is that “even careful
introspection or further reflection may fail to uncover [them]”; but, on the
whole, BonJour is quite confident that a dose of careful reflection will reveal
errors very swiftly.
Again, given what we know about these decision-making experiments,
it is highly unlikely that participants are capable of detecting the weakness of
their reasons via reflection. In the choice blindness experiments, for example,
the participants are given plenty of opportunities to reflect on their answers,
and are even asked questions like “did you think there was anything at all odd
or strange about the experiment you just completed?”462 There are numerous
points during and after the experiment where participants are invited to
reflect and ponder whether there was anything strange about their answers, or
the experiment in general: in fact, the very question ought to invite suspicion
that something was up during the experiment. While some participants do
indeed twig that they provided reasons for a choice that they never made, as
we know, over 50% remain completely oblivious to their choice blindness and
the fact they have confabulated. Another piece of evidence against the idea
that participants can discover the weakness of their reported reasons via
reflection comes from the excessive surprise that participants exhibit during
the debriefing. Before debriefing the vast majority of choice blindness
461
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participants confidently state that they would not fall for the choice blindness
manipulation; and they are very shocked when they discover the true nature
of the experiment they have just taken part in.
Similarly, in the Nisbett and Wilson stocking experiments, Nisbett and
Wilson report that participants are highly skeptical of any suggestion that the
position of the stockings influenced their choice – they too are highly
confident in their confabulated answers. In short, it seems unlikely that even
the most careful, extended period of reflection could reveal to these
participants the error they have made – they are ignorant of their own
ignorance. Reflection cannot help in these cases, and so the skeptical
challenge that confabulation poses to the traditional view of self-knowledge
remains.
Given the many challenges that confabulation poses for the traditional
theory of self-knowledge, the choice blindness is even more difficult for a
traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate because, on any
plausible interpretation of the choice blindness experiments, the participant’s
reports in the manipulated trials always turn out to be confabulatory. Take
the first interpretation, on which the participant’s beliefs, but not her actual
attitudes, change. A participant may, for example, have a positive attitude
towards free university education but the experimental manipulation causes
her to falsely come to believe that she has a negative attitude towards free
university educating. When the experimenters ask her to explain why she has
a negative attitude towards free university education, she launches into a
cogent, well-reasoned explanation of why free university education is
immoral. Is her verbal report confabulatory? Yes. Her reasons for thinking
that free university education is immoral are confabulatory because at no
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point during her decision-making process did these reasons come to mind. To
put it simply, when she expressed a strong positive attitude towards free
higher education, was not entertaining reasons for why free higher education
is immoral. She did not think something like “I think free higher education is
morally good because it’s good for people to pay their own way for services
that only benefit them.” The negative thoughts towards free higher education
only arose later on, when she mistakenly came to believe that she held a
negative attitude towards free higher education and felt she had to explain and
justify this attitude to the experimenters.
The confabulation that occurs in this case is straightforwardly quite
difficult for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to explain. If the
participant’s actual attitude towards free higher education did not change
then, at the moment she was asked to explain her reasons, her introspective
faculty should have revealed to her that she actually possesses a positive
attitude towards free higher education. Her introspective faculty would not
detect any pre-existing reasons for why she thinks that free higher education
is wrong because these reasons do not exist – she doesn’t really have a
negative attitude towards free higher education. If anything, her introspective
faculty should have revealed to the participant her positive attitude towards
free higher education as well as her reasons for holding this attitude. In light
of the fact that, at any point, introspection should have revealed her real
attitude, and real reasons, it is very difficult for the traditional theorist of selfknowledge to explain why she then provides entirely fabricated, post-hoc
reasons for an attitude she does not actually hold. The best explanation for her
verbal report is that it is constructed after the fact to justify her false beliefs:
she believes that she has a negative attitude towards free higher education,
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and so produces a verbal report with reasons that are consistent with the
holding of this attitude. This explanation is fully compatible with an
inferentialist view of self-knowledge but is not what one would expect if the
traditional theory of self-knowledge is correct.
The third interpretation of choice blindness, that participants don’t
actually possess any genuine attitudes at all, also results in confabulatory
reports. On this interpretation, the very reason why the participant becomes
choice blind in the first place is because she lacks a real attitude towards free
higher education – she doesn’t really feel strongly about it one way or the
other. Because the participant lacks a real attitude towards free higher
education, she succumbs to the experimental manipulation and is tricked into
believing that she originally reported a negative attitude towards free higher
education. Again, when the experimenters ask her to explain her negative
attitude towards free higher education, she cites perfectly coherent reasons.
This verbal report is also a confabulation – the participant’s explanation is an
after the fact story she has constructed to justify (to herself, as much as to the
experimenters) her apparent negative attitude towards free higher education.
The reasons she cites against free higher education played no role in her
decision to originally report a positive attitude towards free higher education
– again it makes no sense to say that she reported a positive attitude in favor
of higher education because of reasons that are actually against free higher
education.
This confabulatory report is, similar, very difficult for the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge to explain. It is bad enough that, on this
explanation of choice blindness, a large percentage of participants lack set
attitudes about pressing moral and political issues; but the fact that they then
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go on to confabulate entails that they are ignorant about this fact. It would not
be half as bad if they lacked set attitudes towards moral issues and knew this
fact about themselves: “yes, I have no real opinion either way about free
higher education.” What’s disturbing about this interpretation of choice
blindness is that participants lack genuine moral attitudes but are under the
mistaken impression that they do have strong attitudes. Furthermore, this
interpretation also entails that a failure of introspection has occurred, which
needs to be explained. At the moment she is asked why she has a negative
attitude towards free higher education, the participant’s introspective faculty
should have informed her that she doesn’t actually hold any attitude towards
free higher education at all. She has no ‘reasons’ for thinking that free higher
education is immoral because she doesn’t actually hold that attitude. Thus,
she should have been in a position to tell the experimenters that she doesn’t
have any thoughts on the matter, one way or the other, or that she doesn’t
know what her reasons are.
On the second interpretation of choice blindness, the experimental
manipulation actually causes the participant’s attitude to change – she goes
from thinking that free higher education is a good thing to holding that free
higher education is a bad thing. This interpretation raises the specter of
irrational attitude change that goes completely unnoticed by the participant,
but does it result in confabulatory reports? On the face of it, this
interpretation isn’t as worrisome for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge.
If a participant really does now hold a negative attitude towards free higher
education, and then gives reasons in favor of this negative attitude then what’s
the problem? The participant might have introspected, detected her (recently
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changed) negative attitude, and then sincerely and vertically reported reasons
that support her attitude. This, surely, does not qualify as a confabulation.
However, I maintain that this verbal report is also confabulatory. On
this interpretation recall that the attitude change occurs without the
participant even being aware of this fact. Furthermore, the attitude reversal
does not happen for rational reasons: it is not the case that the participant, on
the basis of consciously considered reasons, decides to change her mind about
free higher education. Rather, her attitude reversal is something that happens
to her rather than something that she consciously authors and approves of.
Furthermore, there is every reason to think that this is not a real, long-lasting
attitude change because participants very quickly revert to their original
(presumably genuine) moral attitudes; and they also entirely repudiate and
reject that the reversed attitude is their real opinion in the post-experimental
debriefing. In light of how this attitude change comes about, let’s consider the
participant’s verbal report in this case. Did the reasons she is citing have any
causal role in her attitude reversal? That is, did these reasons against free
higher education form the basis for her changing her attitude? Did she change
her moral opinion because of a consideration of these reasons? No. Her
attitude reversal was something that happened to her, entirely outside of her
awareness, as a result of the experimental manipulation. These reasons played
no role in the switching of her attitude: the only thing that caused her attitude
reversal was the experimental manipulation itself. In light of how her negative
attitude came to be formed, then, it is safe to say that that participant’s verbal
report, in this case, is confabulatory. The real reason she has switched her
attitude is due to the experimental manipulation: careful consideration of
reasons against free higher education played no causal or justificatory role in
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the formation of her negative attitude. The real explanation for the
participant’s negative attitude towards higher education is that she
succumbed to the choice blindness manipulation. The reasons she cites are
not explanations for her holding of the negative attitude, because these
reasons had absolutely nothing to do with the formation of the attitude in the
first place. Rather, what has happened is that the participant in question has
found herself, inexplicably, with a negative attitude towards free higher
education, and thus the reasons she cites are a reconstructive attempt to
justify the attitude she finds herself lumbered with.

More bad news for the traditional view of self-knowledge

In this chapter, I discussed the concept of confabulation, and after considering
some possible definitions, I argued that the core feature of confabulations is
that they are post-hoc stories that are reconstructed to serve a justificatory
purpose. All confabulatory utterances are after-the-fact stories we tell
ourselves and other people, and which we mistake for genuine explanations of
our actions.
Confabulation poses many problems for the traditional view of selfknowledge and is difficult for the traditional theorist to explain away. Firstly, I
argue that confabulation undermines the very concept of direct introspective
access. If we really have direct introspective access to our mental states, then
our introspective faculty should be able to report that no reasons, or mental
states, are detected. Given the fact that confabulators could easily introspect,
it is a mystery why they instead opt to construct reasons which they then take
at face value. If we really had introspective access to our reasons, we would
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expect to see choice blindness study participants, for example, confess their
ignorance or explain that they didn’t have any reasons for why they made that
decision. The traditional theory of self-knowledge needs to explain why study
participants ignore the outputs of their perfectly working introspective faculty
and opt to reconstruct reasons instead.
Secondly, if the traditional theorist of self-knowledge opts to adopt a
dual-method theory to accommodate confabulation, this may cause more
problems than it solves. The dual-method proposal is that we sometimes gain
self-knowledge via introspection, and sometimes via self-interpretation.
During choice blindness, the introspective faculty shuts off or is inaccessible,
and the participants are forced to self-interpret instead. The fact that
participants confabulate does not show that the introspective faculty does not
exist, but it merely demonstrates that self-interpretation leads to errors. The
problem with the dual-method theory is that it is an unmotivated (except for
the purpose of saving the concept of introspective access), bloated, more
complex, implausible theory compared to, say, a purely interpretive theory of
self-knowledge like Carruthers’s ISA account. The dual-method theory lacks
predictive validity because it doesn’t explicitly state when, and why, the two
methods operate; and it is nonsensical because there is just no good reason
why the introspective faculty should fail to work during the choice blindness
experiments.
Thirdly, the linguistic analysis of the manipulated (confabulated) and
non-manipulated (non-confabulated) reports from the choice blindness
experiments should worry the traditional theorist of self-knowledge, because
it heavily implies that participants in both conditions self-interpret: there is
no evidence or sign that an introspective faculty exists. A traditional theorist
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of self-knowledge would predict (just as Johansson et al. did) that the two
report corpuses should exhibit very different properties – the manipulated
reports would be different from the non-manipulated reports. The reason is
because the two kinds of reports are generated in different ways. The nonmanipulated reports come from the introspective faculty, whereas the
manipulated reports are generated via self-interpretation. However,
Johansson et al. actually found no differences between the two kinds of
reports. While this does not rule out the existence of an introspective faculty,
it certainly is not what the traditional theorist of self-knowledge would expect
to see. The results are more consistent with an inferentialist view of selfknowledge, on which participants use just one method to generate their verbal
reports in both conditions: self-interpretation. If anything, these results
strongly suggest that just one mechanism is responsible for generating verbal
reports, and that mechanism is not introspection. The linguistic report
analysis lends credence to the thesis that both the manipulated and the nonmanipulated verbal reports are confabulatory, in that they are reconstructions
that occur by means of the same cognitive process.
The final problematic element of confabulation is that confabulators
are ignorant of their own ignorance – they take their confabulated utterances
entirely at face value and are completely unaware that they are just making up
a story after the fact. This poses a skeptical challenge to the traditional view of
self-knowledge because it could be the case that many of our utterances are
confabulatory without us even knowing.463 Scaife, for instance, worries that
cases of confabulation are indistinguishable from cases where we gain correct
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information about our own decision making. This leaves open the skeptical
possibility that any time we consider our own motivations we might not be
getting accurate information.”464 In other words, it might be the case that we
are confabulating most of the time and thus lack self-knowledge. Scaife argues
that we have extra motivation to take this problem seriously because we know
that confabulation does, in fact, occur – it is not an abstract possibility, like
the ‘brains in vats’ scenario, but a real, possible threat to our self-knowledge.
BonJour claims that this skeptical worry can be overcome because it is
possible to use reflection to tell when we are confabulating. BonJour thinks
that confabulatory utterances have distinct properties from non-confabulatory
verbal reports, and that careful reflection can reveal these properties to us.
BonJour’s solution, however, does not work. Confabulated utterances
do not, in fact, have the properties that BonJour claims they do – they do not
take longer to come up with, nor do they involve a heavier cognitive load.
Furthermore, given that confabulations are constructed at the sub-personal
level, it is not the case that we should expect to observe a temporal delay as
BonJour suggests. As it happens, there are no observable differences between
confabulated reports and non-confabulated reports; and if there are no
differences then no amount of reflection can let one know if one has
confabulated or not. BonJour’s suggestion that choice blindness study
participants can detect that their reasons are epistemically poor is also
implausible. Choice blindness participants are given numerous opportunities
to reflect and consider whether there is anything strange about the reasons
they have provided, and 50% of them still succumb to the choice blindness
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effect. It is highly likely that no amount of careful reflection will reveal to a
choice blindness participant that her reasons are, in fact, for a choice that she
never made – this is only made apparent to the choice blindness study
participant after the debriefing. In short, reflection cannot help the traditional
theorist of self-knowledge escape the skeptical threat that confabulation
poses.
In the next chapter, I’m going to argue that the phenomenon of choice
blindness and confabulation leave the traditional theory of self-knowledge in a
bad state. The traditional view of self-knowledge cannot accommodate or
explain choice blindness or confabulation, and so it ought to be rejected in
favor of an inferentialist account of self-knowledge.
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CHAPTER 6
MOVING ON FROM THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF SELFKNOWLEDGE

In the last two chapters, I discussed how choice blindness and confabulation
cause problems for the traditional view of self-knowledge. To recap, in chapter
four I argued that no matter which interpretation of choice blindness turns
out to be correct, the traditional view of self-knowledge has a difficult time
accommodating the phenomenon. Choice blindness, recall, is where
individuals become oblivious to choices they made just moments before.
There are three competing plausible explanations of choice blindness, and
they pose a trilemma for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge because all
of the explanations have unpalatable consequences for the traditional view.
On the first interpretation of choice blindness, the participant’s actual
attitudes towards the target object remain untouched by the experimental
manipulation, but his beliefs about his attitudes change. The participant
retains his original attitude but falsely comes to believe that he holds the
opposite attitude instead. If the traditional view of self-knowledge is correct,
the participant should not have become oblivious to his genuine attitude
because he ought to have been capable of introspectively accessing it at any
point during the decision-making process. However, during the choice
blindness experiments, participants do appear to become oblivious to their
attitudes. When the experimental manipulation occurs, and when the
participants are asked to justify their attitude to the experimenters, this causes
the participants to form, and attribute, a false belief. If the participants really
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do possess direct introspective access to their mental states, as the traditional
view of self-knowledge claims, then there is no reason why they should fail to
take advantage of this faculty and opt to self-interpret their beliefs instead.
The most the traditional theorist can say in such a case is that in cases of
choice blindness the introspective faculty shuts down, and participants are
forced to self-interpret their mental states which leads to them attributing a
false belief in error. However, there is no good reason why the participant’s
actual attitude should become inaccessible during the choice blindness
experiment: it makes no sense for the introspective faculty to shut down due
to an experimental sleight of hand. Finally, on this interpretation of choice
blindness, the participant’s verbal reports about their reasons are
confabulatory because report their falsely attributed beliefs as opposed to
their actual attitudes.
The second interpretation of choice blindness is equally problematic for
the traditional view of self-knowledge. On this interpretation, the
experimental manipulation actually causes the participant’s attitude about the
target object to reverse. A participant enters the experiment with a positive
attitude towards the target object, but the experimental manipulation causes
her attitude to reverse without her even noticing. She thus may leave the
experiment with a negative attitude towards the object, while being entirely
oblivious that an attitude reversal has taken place. This explanation poses
problems for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge because it entails that
our sincerely held, longstanding attitudes can be reversed by a simple
experimental manipulation without us even noticing. Our attitudes can be
changed by wholly irrational forces, without any conscious consideration of
reasons. The traditional theorist also owes us an explanation as to how this
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attitude change occurs – why and how does the experimental manipulation
cause the participant’s attitude to reverse, outside of her conscious awareness?
As Carruthers notes, there is no obvious or plausible mechanism which could
cause such an effect, and so the traditional theorist has a difficult task
ahead.465 Finally, this explanation also implies that the participant’s verbal
report about her ‘choice’ is confabulatory. The participant may indeed have
direct introspective access to her new attitude, but the reasons she gives for
why she holds this attitude are post-hoc reconstructions. Her attitude did not
change in light of any reasons, and so any reasons she cites will be
epiphenomenal with regard to her attitude change. In short, this explanation
of choice blindness is highly unpalatable to the traditional theorist of selfknowledge.
The third plausible interpretation of choice blindness is just as difficult
for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to accommodate. This
interpretation postulates that participants who succumb to the choice
blindness manipulation do not, in fact, possess any genuine attitudes about
the object they become choice blind to – they just think they do. On this view,
participants who report strong attitudes either way about the target object are
entirely mistaken in doing so: they don’t really have any set attitude, one way
or the other, about the object. The virtue of this explanation is that it renders
the choice blindness effect into a sort of test for ‘attitudinizes,’466 as Johansson
et al. put it. If an individual becomes choice blind and fails to notice the
experimental manipulation this means that their attitude towards the target
object isn’t ‘real.’ If someone resists the choice blindness effect, on the other
465
466
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hand, this is a sign they have a genuine attitude about the object in question.
However, this interpretation still poses problems for the traditional theorist of
self-knowledge, because it disturbingly entails that over 50% of the population
holds no genuine attitudes about pressing moral dilemmas or salient political
issues.
Furthermore, this interpretation also challenges the concept of direct
introspective access to propositional attitudes because if the participants
really do lack a genuine attitude towards the target object, this fact about
themselves should have been available to introspection. Commonsensically,
the participants should be capable of introspecting and coming to learn that
they have no real opinion, either way, which they should then be capable of
reporting to the experimenters. The participant’s actual behavior, then, is
quite puzzling for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to explain. If a
choice blindness participant really does lack a real attitude towards a
particular moral issue why does she remain oblivious to this fact about herself
throughout the experiment and self-attribute an entirely false attitude
instead? Why does the participant insist that she does have a strong attitude
towards the moral issue when, in fact, she does not? At any point, her
introspective faculty should have revealed to her that she lacks a genuine
moral attitude. The fact that she remains ignorant of this fact about herself
implies that she lacks introspective access to her mental states; which is a
troublesome prospect for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge.
In summary, then, choice blindness poses a trilemma for the traditional
view of self-knowledge. The traditional theorist must accept 1) that we lack
access to mental states which should, by all accounts, be available to
introspection; and that we self-attribute entirely false beliefs, or 2) that our
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sincerely held attitudes can irrationally reverse without us even being aware
that this has occurred, or 3) that a large proportion of the population lack any
concrete attitudes at all, even about some of the most salient and pressing
moral issues of the day, while being under the mistaken impression that they
do, in fact, have strong attitudes. No matter which interpretation turns out to
be correct, choice blindness is very difficult for the traditional view of selfknowledge to accommodate. On each interpretation, the traditional theorist
owes us an explanation about how and why the choice blindness experimental
manipulation can bypass our rationality or shut down introspective access.
In chapter five, I also discussed in detail how the phenomenon of
confabulation also threatens the traditional view of self-knowledge.
Confabulated utterances, which can be observed in the choice blindness
experiments and other psychological studies into decision-making, are
products of a post-decision reconstructive inference that individuals
mistakenly take to be the genuine reasons for their decision: they are reasons
that are reconstructed after the fact to play a justificatory role. Confabulation
occurs on all plausible interpretations of choice blindness: in all of the
manipulated trials, participants offer confabulatory explanations for the
choices that they never actually made. Confabulation challenges the
traditional theory that we possess direct introspective access to our
propositional attitudes. Intuitively, if I am asked to provide reasons for a
decision that I didn’t actually make then introspection should reveal to me
that I had no reasons for that decision: no reasons were generated because no
decision was made. It does not make much sense to postulate that the
introspective faculty only reports the presence of mental states and not the
absence of mental states. If the function of the introspective faculty is to
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provide one with accurate self-knowledge, then learning that one lacks
relevant mental states is undoubtedly a useful piece of self-knowledge. If I
have behaved in a certain way for no reason, then it would certainly be useful
and informative for me to learn this fact about myself via the introspective
faculty. Upon being asked to explain their reasons for a choice they never
actually made, the participants in the manipulated trials should have been
capable of introspecting and coming to learn that no reasons had been
detected. This might then prompt further refection which results in the
realization that no decision was actually made (for example, a participant may
be prompted to think something like: “wait, I don’t have reasons for choosing
that item. Why did I choose it for no reason? Did I actually choose it?”) As
Johansson points out, what we don’t expect to happen, on the traditional view
of self-knowledge, is for participants to just construct reasons for why they
made a choice that they never actually made. And yet, this is what actually
occurs: the choice blindness participants confabulate reasons for why they
made their “decision.”
To defuse the threat of confabulation, the traditional theorist may
propose a dual-methods account of self-knowledge. The standard traditional
theory postulates that we can always gain introspective access to our
propositional attitudes – we are never forced to interpret our beliefs or
desires. The dual-method approach abandons the concept that we can always,
in principle, gain direct access to our mental states and claims instead that
sometimes introspective access is unavailable. On the dual-method approach,
we may gain self-knowledge of our mental states in two different ways: by
direct introspective access or by self-interpretation. According to the dualmethod account, during the choice blindness experiments the introspective
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route to self-knowledge is blocked, and so participants are forced to selfinterpret their reasons instead. In this kind of situation, their inference goes
awry, and this explains why participants mistakenly attribute reasons for a
decision they never actually made.
There are numerous problems with the dual-method approach to selfknowledge, however. Firstly, the theory requires an auxiliary principle to be in
place, such as “when no mental states are detected disable introspective access
and switch to self-interpretation mode.” However, such a principle is poorly
motivated and ad-hoc. If the purpose of the introspective faculty is to provide
us with accurate self-knowledge, it makes no sense why it would shut down
when no mental states have been detected. Secondly, the dual-method theory
lacks predictive validity. As Carruthers points out, we are owed an explanation
of when and why the two methods operate. In what contexts does the
introspective faculty shut down, and what is it about these particular
circumstances that causes this to happen?467 If the theory is to be more than a
sticking plaster designed only to save the concept of privileged access, we need
an account that will enable us to predict when introspective access is likely to
be blocked. Finally, the dual-method theory has to contend with the fact that it
is a more complex, bloated theory compared to a single-method, inferentialist
account of self-knowledge (like Carruthers’s ISA theory, for example.) Two
mechanisms, two distinct pathways to self-knowledge, makes for a more
complicated theory than an account which postulates only one method.
Furthermore, the dual-methods theorist has an extra explanatory burden
because we are owed an account as to just why there are two distinct methods
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to gain self-knowledge as opposed to one. What is the benefit of having two
methods of gaining self-knowledge? What is the benefit of having an
introspective faculty as opposed to just one general purpose inferential
mechanism?
The dual-methods account is also challenged by strong empirical
evidence that suggests that both the manipulated and non-manipulated
reports are generated by a single mechanism. Linguistic analysis of the report
corpus reveals there to be no substantial differences between the manipulated
reports and the non-manipulated reports. If the two kinds of reports really
were generated via different mechanisms (the manipulated ones via selfinterpretation, and the non-manipulated ones via introspection), one would
expect them to exhibit different, perhaps even radically different, properties.
For example, BonJour postulates that the manipulated reports take longer to
generate (because they are made up on the fly), and are harder to construct
and thus should exhibit signs of cognitive load.468 These are reasonable
assumptions to make, and even Johansson et al. initially hypothesized that
there would be very large, characteristic differences between the two report
corpuses: “we predicted not just differences between the non-manipulated
and manipulated reports, but huge differences.”469 The fact that no differences
were found very strongly suggests that only one method was used to generate
the reports: and this method wasn’t introspection. If anything, the linguistic
analysis of the report corpus can be taken as evidence that verbal reports are
only ever generated via inference and self-interpretation, and that
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introspective access simply doesn’t exist. In the face of evidence suggesting
that only one method is ever used to gain self-knowledge, the burden of proof
is now on the traditional theorist to establish that direct introspective access
actually exists.
The phenomena of choice blindness and confabulation, then, pose
serious challenges to central tenets of the traditional view of self-knowledge.
In this chapter, I’m going to argue that in light of these challenges, the
traditional view of self-knowledge is very unlikely to be correct and ought to
be abandoned in favor of an inferentialist account. In particular, I shall
maintain that all the evidence suggest that we do not have privileged access to
our propositional attitudes and that there is no evidence that we gain selfknowledge of our beliefs and desires via a unique first personal, introspective
method. I will argue that even if the evidence does not entirely rule out the
existence of privileged access entirely, the choice blindness and confabulation
data is still enough to deal a significant blow to substantial traditional theories
of self-knowledge. I will then address the argument that privileged access to
propositional attitudes is conceptually necessary in order to secure epistemic
goods like human rationality, critical reasoning, and moral responsibility. I
will argue that there is no good reason to think that privileged access is
conceptually necessary, and thus the traditional theory of knowledge will have
to compete on a level footing with the inferentialist approach.
Finally, I will argue that the empirical evidence from psychology can
only be properly accommodated and explained by a theory of self-knowledge
that denies the concept of privileged access and first-personal introspection,
such as Carruthers’s interpretivist ISA theory. In short, while choice blindness
and confabulation are exceptionally difficult for the traditional theorist to
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accommodate and explain, they are precisely the kinds of phenomena that are
predicted to occur on an inferentialist account of self-knowledge. The
inferentialist view of self-knowledge doesn’t just explain the choice blindness
and confabulation data: it anticipates it.
I will close the chapter by addressing concerns that the choice
blindness results threaten our overall rationality. The argument is that
because we frequently succumb to the choice blindness effect, we cannot be as
rational as we commonly take ourselves to be. I deny that the fact we
occasionally become choice blind threatens our rationality. In particular, I will
compare choice blindness to the related phenomenon of change blindness,
and I will argue that we should respond to choice blindness in much the same
way as we respond to change blindness. In just the same way that change
blindness does not, in fact, threaten the overall reliability of our vision I will
argue that choice blindness does not threaten our overall rationality. Finally, I
will argue that given the architecture of human cognition, it may be the case
that ‘rationality’ as conceived of by the traditional theorist of self-knowledge is
not actually achievable by human beings.

The end of the traditional view of self-knowledge?

In chapter one I argued that a central tenet of the traditional view of selfknowledge is that we possess privileged access to at least some of our mental
states. “Privileged access” is access to mental states that proceeds via a first
personal method, introspection, and which yields especially epistemically
secure knowledge. Gertler maintains that “the domain of privileged access is
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very narrow,”470 and restricts the scope of privileged access to just three kinds
of mental states: ongoing sensations (like pain), thoughts (like stream-ofconsciousness musings), and occurrent propositional attitudes. Gertler,
crucially, denies that we have privileged access to dispositional, or standing,
propositional attitudes. This means that we don’t have privileged access to
stored beliefs in memory that are not presently activated or occurrent. So, my
belief that “Paris is the capital of France” is currently the target of my
conscious awareness, then it will be possible for me to gain knowledge of this
belief via privileged access. If my belief that “Paris is the capital of France” is
not occurrent, however, then it is not directly introspectable. However, Gertler
concedes that there is a strong link between occurrent and dispositional
propositional attitudes, such that when I am asked to name the capital of
France this will immediately trigger the occurrent thought of “Paris,” which is
then available for direct introspection. On the basis of my direct access to my
occurrent belief that “Paris is the capital of France” I can easily infer that I
must hold the dispositional belief that “Paris is the capital of France.” It is
thus not very difficult to gain self-knowledge of one’s dispositional beliefs and
other propositional attitudes.
However, not every traditional theorist agrees with Gertler that the
domain of privileged access is so restricted. In fact, many philosophers argue
that we possess privileged access to an enormous range of mental states such
as causal relations, emotions (both basic and complex), justificatory relations
between mental states, the etiology of our propositional attitudes, and
dispositional propositional attitudes.
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The extent of privileged access, then, is not as settled or agreed upon as
Gertler claims. However, for the sake of argument, I will assume that Gertler
is correct and I will accept that privileged access is restricted to just three
kinds of mental states: sensations, thoughts, and occurrent propositional
attitudes. I’m going to argue that the phenomena of choice blindness and
confabulation demonstrate that we do not, in fact, have privileged access to
occurrent propositional attitudes. The domain of privileged access is thus
restricted even further, and can, at most, be said to encompass current
sensations and conscious thoughts. Even though these empirical results do
not demonstrate that we lack privileged access entirely, I’m going to argue,
contra Gertler, that the traditional view of self-knowledge is mortally
wounded even if privileged access to at least some mental states is still
possible. In other words, even if it turns out that we do possess privileged
access to sensations and current thoughts, it is my contention that the
traditional view of self-knowledge is doomed. The traditional view of selfknowledge cannot survive, cannot function as a viable account of selfknowledge, if privileged access is just restricted to sensations and thoughts:
direct access to occurrent propositional attitudes is essential to distinguish the
traditional view of self-knowledge from inferentialist accounts. Or so I shall
argue.
No matter which explanation of choice blindness turns out to be
correct, the choice blindness results strongly imply that we lack privileged
access to occurrent propositional attitudes. In the face choice blindness
experiment, for example, a participant may select photograph number one,
which depicts a long-haired woman, and reject photograph number two,
which depicts a short-haired woman. During the manipulated trial, he
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indicates that he prefers photograph number one by pointing at the picture of
the long-haired woman. The experimenter then puts the photograph face
down on the table and slides the selected photograph to the participant.
Unbeknownst to the participant, however, the experimenter has switched the
photographs, and so the participant actually receives the picture of the
rejected face – the short-haired woman. The participant is said to become
“choice blind” if he fails to notice that he actually received a photograph of the
rejected face. Choice blind participants go on to give reasons why they ‘chose’
the face that they, in fact, rejected without noticing that anything is awry. The
participant may state that he picked picture two (the originally rejected
picture) because he likes short hair, when in fact his actual choice, picture one,
depicted a long-haired woman. At the moment the participant makes his
choice, he will have an occurrent desire with the content “I want photograph
number one,” and he may also have a belief with the content “I believe that I
chose photograph number one.” His desires and beliefs about photograph
number one are occurrent – he will be actively entertaining and consciously
considering his desires and beliefs throughout the decision-making process. It
is not likely that he will only consciously entertain his desire for picture
number one at the very moment he selects the picture and not a second later.
Rather, the participant will actively entertain thoughts about his choice right
up until the moment he receives the picture he ‘selected.’
On the common sense assumption that during decision-making our
executive systems actively monitor our choices to make sure we actually get
what we chose, it makes sense that the participant would occurrently entertain
his beliefs and desires throughout the decision-making process.. As Johansson
notes, it is commonly supposed that there is a tight loop between intentions
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and outcomes such that the outcome of our choices is monitored and
compared with the object that we actually chose.471 This is to ensure that when
we make a decision, we actually end up getting what we intended.
If such monitoring really does occur, we should expect the participant’s
beliefs and desires about the target object to be occurrent throughout the
whole of the decision-making process right up until the participant receives
the ‘chosen’ object. And given that the participant’s desires and beliefs are
occurrent, it should be the case, on the traditional view of self-knowledge, that
he has privileged access to these propositional attitudes. Throughout the
decision-making process and up to the moment he receives his choice, the
participant should be able to introspect and gain access to the fact that he has
an occurrent desire for photograph one, and that he believes that he chose
picture one and not picture two. In other words, if he really does possess
privileged access to his propositional attitudes, choice blindness should
simply not occur. At the moment he receives photograph number two, instead
of photograph number one, he should be capable of directly introspecting and
realizing that he didn’t actually choose photograph two, but, rather, desired
photograph one. The fact that he becomes choice blind to the choice he made
a second previously strongly suggests that he does not, in fact, have privileged
access to his occurrent propositional attitudes – if he did, it is not obvious he
would even succumb to the choice blindness manipulation.
The majority of choice blindness participants are totally oblivious to
their actual choice, and they go on to confabulate reasons for a decision they
never actually made. This indicates that they either lack privileged access to
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their occurrent mental states, or they are opting to ignore the outputs of their
introspective faculty and attribute false beliefs instead. The latter explanation
can be ruled out because the participants exhibit genuine surprise and
bewilderment during the debriefing process: they certainly appear to lack
awareness of the fact that they had become blind to their original choice.
Thus, the most plausible explanation for choice blindness and the subsequent
confabulation, is that the participants just don’t have privileged access to their
occurrent mental states. Thus, the choice blindness experimental results are
strong evidence that we lack privileged access to our occurrent propositional
attitudes.
Even if we assume that the participant changes his mind at the very
moment he makes his decision (which is consistent with the second
interpretation of choice blindness, in which participant’s actual attitudes
towards the target object change), the choice blindness studies still threaten
the concept of privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes. For
example, suppose the choice blindness participant picks face number one,
receives face number two, and subsequently changes his mind (or undergoes
attitude reversal due to the experimental manipulation) and comes to prefer
face number two. He didn’t receive what he originally chose, but he
immediately changes his preferences and is now happy to receive photograph
number two instead of photograph one – he actually got want he wanted, even
if it wasn’t what he initially chose. Even if his attitudes switch, such that he
ended up receiving what he now desires, he should still be capable of
introspectively accessing the fact that he originally chose face number one but
changed his mind and now prefers face number two (which he fortuitously
received instead of the picture he actually chose.)
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Again, given that his beliefs and desires are occurrent and thus directly
introspectable, he should be able to report to the experimenter that he initially
chose photograph one, and that he initially desired photograph one, but that
he changed his mind when he saw that he received photograph two and now
prefers this picture instead. We should not expect him to be completely
oblivious to the fact that he originally desired, and chose, photograph number
one: the participant should not be under the impression that he always
desired the photograph he ended up with. But this is precisely what happens
in the manipulated trials. Even if participants change their minds about their
choice and come to prefer the option which they originally rejected, they
should not become blind to the fact that they originally desired, and chose,
something else entirely. So even if the participant’s actual attitudes toward the
target object change during the experiment, the choice blindness experiments
still strongly suggest that we don’t have privileged access to our occurrent
propositional attitudes.
In the face choice blindness studies, the participants point to an object
and immediately receive what they chose (or what they initially rejected, in
the case of the manipulated trials.) However, there is another breed of choice
blindness experiment in which participants are not immediately questioned
about their choices. These are the questionnaire-style choice blindness
studies, such as the experiments in which participants are quizzed about their
moral and political opinions. In this kind of choice blindness experiment,
there is a short delay between the participants reporting their attitude and
receiving their manipulated survey with the altered answers. In the face choice
blindness studies, the participants point at the chosen photograph and
immediately receive the rejected option (which they subsequently fail to
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notice, if they have become choice blind.) In the survey choice blindness
studies, however, the participants fill out the survey, hand it to the
experimenter, and wait a short while until their survey is given back to them.
There is thus a temporal delay of a few seconds before they see their
manipulated survey answers. It could be argued that this delay, combined
with the fact that participants have to answer multiple questions about their
attitudes all in one go (as opposed to considering each option separately and
one by one, as in the face choice blindness studies), means that, in these kinds
of choice blindness experiments, the participant’s propositional attitudes are
not occurrent. These kinds of choice blindness experiments, then, do not
threaten the traditional view of self-knowledge because traditional theorists
do not maintain that participants have access to non-occurrent propositional
attitudes in the first place.
For example, consider the moral opinions choice blindness study. The
participants in this study are required to fill out a survey indicating the extent
of their agreement with various moral opinions. In the manipulated trials,
some moral statements are altered in such a way so that scores which indicate
approval of a moral issue now signify disapproval. Consider a case where a
participant strongly agrees with the statement “the death penalty is morally
wrong.” She gives this moral viewpoint a score of 9/10 (indicating strong
agreement) and proceeds to fill out the rest of the survey. Just a short while
later, she hands her completed survey to the experimenter who (unbeknownst
to her) alters the death penalty statement, so it now reads “the death penalty
is morally permissible.” Her score of 9/10 now indicates strong agreement
with the opposite moral opinion. Her manipulated survey sheet is handed
back to her, and she is then invited to discuss why she strongly agrees that the
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death penalty is morally permissible. She looks at her survey sheet and sees
that she gave a high score to the moral statement “the death penalty is morally
permissible,” which indicates that she strongly agrees that the death penalty is
permissible. The participant becomes choice blind to the fact that she
originally strongly disagreed with the death penalty and goes on to
confabulate reasons about why she thinks the death penalty is morally
permissible.
Now, Gertler and other traditional theorists of self-knowledge could
very well argue that this kind of choice blindness study does not establish that
we lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes. It could be
argued that the participant only consciously entertains the various moral
issues as they arise in the course of her completing the survey. In the previous
example, the participant only occurrently entertains thoughts about the death
penalty issue as it appears while she is completing the survey. When she
moves on to consider the next topic, whatever that may be, her propositional
attitudes concerning the death penalty are no longer occurrent. At the
moment she hands the survey back to the experimenter she may not be
actively entertaining any thoughts about the death penalty issue – rather, she
may be thinking about the last question she answered, which might have
nothing to do with the death penalty at all. Because there is a delay between
her completion of the survey and the receipt of the manipulated answers, as
well as the fact that she has to entertain thoughts about many different moral
issues, it is likely that the participant’s beliefs about the death penalty are not
occurrent at the moment she receives the manipulated survey back. And if the
participant’s beliefs about the death penalty aren’t occurrent, then she
wouldn’t have privileged access to them anyway, according to Gertler. Thus,
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the survey-style choice blindness experiments don’t actually establish that we
lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes.
I have two replies. Firstly, and most importantly, it does not matter
that the lack of privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes is only
demonstrated in one kind of choice blindness experiment and not in the other.
The fact that participants in the face choice blindness studies apparently lack
introspective access to occurrent mental states which should be available to
them is evidence that we don’t, in fact, possess direct introspective access to
our occurrent propositional attitudes. Secondly, if we adopt an alternative
definition of “occurrent” it may very well be the case that participants in the
survey-style choice blindness experiments do lack privileged access to
occurrent propositional attitudes. Gertler, and other traditional theorists of
self-knowledge assume that occurrent attitudes are synonymous with
conscious attitudes – that what it means for a mental state to be occurrent just
is the fact that it is conscious. However, in a recent paper, Bartlett raises
problems with the practice of identifying occurrent states with conscious
states.472
Bartlett gives an example of a man who speaks in a spiteful way to his
wife out of a non-conscious, implicit desire to hurt her feelings. Bartlett argues
that the non-conscious desire to hurt his wife causes the man to make hurtful
utterances. He further argues that while the desire is not conscious it certainly
is active and playing a role in the man’s current behavior. Bartlett has the
intuition that the man’s unconscious desire to hurt his wife’s feelings is
occurrent, in the sense that it is active (and, at the very least, available to
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systems-level consciousness if not conscious awareness at the personal
level.)473 To put it another way, it certainly doesn’t seem as if the implicit
desire which drives his behavior is a standing or dispositional attitude – if we
must classify the man’s desire one way or the other it seems to be better
categorized as occurrent rather than anything else. And yet, if we are forced to
identify only conscious mental states as occurrent, the man’s desire cannot be
said to be an occurrent state. Indeed, as Bartlett states, “since our behavior
often seems to be driven by attitudes of which we are not aware, the
unconscious occurrent attitude could even be considered the standard
form.”474 Bartlett proposes that we adopt a different conception of ‘occurrent’
which divorces the concept from conscious awareness. Bartlett argues that
occurrent states are better thought of as ‘active’ or ‘activated’ states, whereas
standing mental states are ‘inactive.’ According to him, a mental state is
“active…when it is changing in certain salient properties over time; whereas if
it is unchanging it is inactive.”475
If we divorce occurrent mental states from conscious states, then, it is
conceivable that the participants in the survey-style choice blindness studies
do indeed lack privileged access to occurrent mental states. Even if the
participant in the political choice blindness study is not consciously
considering her attitude towards capital punishment at the moment she
receives her manipulated survey answers, one could argue that her beliefs and
attitudes towards capital punishment are ‘active’ because they have very
recently been activated just moments ago when she was filling out the survey.
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And if her beliefs and attitudes towards capital punishment are ‘active’ then
they may be classified as occurrent mental states according to Bartlett. As
previously mentioned, it does not matter very much whether the participant’s
beliefs and attitudes in the survey-style choice blindness experiment are
occurrent or not, because the lack of privileged access to occurrent
propositional attitudes has already been demonstrated in the other kind of
choice blindness studies in which participants make a choice and receive an
outcome immediately. However, it is just worth keeping in mind that there is
some debate about what is meant by the term ‘occurrent’ state, and so it may
very well turn out that both kinds of choice blindness experiments establish
that we lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes especially if
occurrent states are not necessarily conscious states.
I maintain that the choice blindness experiments indicate that we lack
privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes. This means that the
scope of privileged access must be restricted even further, to encompass just
current sensations and conscious thoughts. However, in response to these
findings, Gertler and other traditional theorists could bite the bullet and deny
that the traditional theory of self-knowledge is threatened in any way by these
experimental results. This is not because Gertler is the kind of philosopher
who simply denies that science is relevant to philosophical theorizing: she
concedes that results from cognitive science and psychology may “sharply
restrict the domain of privileged access.”476 She is thus willing to accept that
results from psychology can, and do, limit the scope of privileged access. What
Gertler contests is that the concept of privileged access itself is threatened by
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such results: these studies “do not show that we lack privileged access
entirely.”477 Gertler argues that empirical results only threaten the traditional
view of self-knowledge if the entire concept of privileged access is threatened
– if it can be established that there is no such thing as privileged access. If the
findings from psychology merely rule out privileged access to one kind of
mental state or another, then this is not a problem, according to Gertler. All
that such results imply is that the domain of privileged access is even more
restricted than we commonly suppose: they do not establish that there is no
such thing as privileged access.
Gertler could concede that the choice blindness experiments show that
we lack privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes while insisting
that we still possess privileged access to ongoing sensations and thoughts. The
choice blindness experiments do not rule out the possibility that we have
privileged access to thoughts and phenomenal states, and so they do not
disprove the concept of privileged access per se.478 Gertler already maintains
that the restriction of privileged access to just three kinds of mental states
“has done little to diminish the importance of introspection in philosophy,”479
so what does it matter that the domain of privileged access has been reduced
even more? For Gertler, the scope of privileged access is not as important as
the mere fact that privileged access itself exists.
The traditional theorist could argue that the mere existence of
privileged access, to even just one type of mental state, guarantees the
metaphysical specialness of self-knowledge. If privileged access exists, even in
Gertler, Brie. Self-Knowledge, p.70.
Johansson, Petter. "Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention”,
p.20.
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a highly restricted format, then the asymmetry between self and other
knowledge obtains. Even in light of the choice blindness findings, the
traditional theorist can still argue that self-knowledge is metaphysically
distinct because I can gain direct knowledge of my sensations and ongoing
thoughts, but I am forced to infer yours. As long as privileged access exists,
even in a highly attenuated form, there is still a fundamental asymmetry
between self and other knowledge: I can gain knowledge about some of my
mental states via a special method that only yields knowledge about myself
and can never be used to gain knowledge about other people’s mental states.
And if there exists a fundamental asymmetry between self and other
knowledge, then self-knowledge is fundamentally different and special from
other kinds of knowledge. The traditional theorist, then, can accept that the
choice blindness experiments show that we lack privileged access to
propositional attitudes, but can deny that this threatens the traditional view of
self-knowledge in any serious way. As long as some form of privileged access
to at least one kind of mental state exists, then the traditional view of selfknowledge remains a viable account of self-knowledge.
It is my contention that such a response from the traditional theorist is
unsatisfactory and fails to stave off the deep threat that choice blindness and
confabulation pose to the traditional view of self-knowledge. If the traditional
theorist accepts the choice blindness results and limits the scope of privileged
access even further to just encompass sensations and thoughts, then she
essentially buys into the inferentialist view of self-knowledge. If we lack
privileged introspective access to our propositional attitudes – to our beliefs
and desires – then we must surely gain knowledge of them via inference,
which is precisely what inferentialist, non-traditional accounts of self319

knowledge maintain. Indeed, as I discussed in chapter one, many
inferentialist theories of self-knowledge like Carruthers’s ISA theory, and
Nisbett and Wilson’s account, readily acknowledge that we do have direct
introspective access to feelings and sensations, such as pain and hunger. Thus,
if the traditional theorist restricts the scope of privileged access even further
to just encompass feelings, sensations, and thoughts, then the traditional
theory of self-knowledge becomes, in essence, indistinguishable from major
inferentialist accounts of self-knowledge. The distinguishing feature of
inferentialist theories of self-knowledge, the core element that makes them
non-traditional, is the fact that we lack direct, privileged access to our
propositional attitudes and must infer what they are instead. The very feature
which differentiates traditional from inferential accounts of self-knowledge is
the method by which we gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes. As
Gertler herself puts it, what distinguishes a traditional view of self-knowledge
from an inferentialist view, like Carruther’s ISA account, is that “our basic
conception of mental states derives not from theory but from our awareness of
such states in ourselves, achieved by use of an exclusively first personal faculty
of introspection.”480
The traditional theorist of self-knowledge, then, simply cannot give up
privileged access to occurrent propositional attitudes, for this is the very
feature which makes a theory of self-knowledge ‘traditional.’ Without
privileged introspective access to propositional attitudes, there is no such
thing as the traditional view of self-knowledge because many inferential
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theories of self-knowledge willingly concede that we may have privileged
access to sensations and other phenomenal mental states. The dividing line
between traditional and inferentialist theories of self-knowledge, then, is not
direct, privileged access per se but privileged access to propositional attitudes.
The traditional view of self-knowledge must then, at all costs, preserve
privileged access to propositional attitudes if it is to remain a distinct
competitor to the inferentialist approach.
Even if we reduce the scope of privileged access even further, to
encompass just current sensations and thoughts, it is not at all evident that
the inferentialist is forced to concede that this kind of privileged access
introduces a metaphysically deep asymmetry between self and other
knowledge. Cassam, for instance, argues that even if we do possess privileged
access to current sensations and thoughts (as many inferentialists accept), this
does not imply the existence of a deep metaphysical asymmetry that cannot be
accommodated by an inferentialist account of self-knowledge. Referring to
Moran’s definition of epistemic asymmetry, Cassam argues that a deep
metaphysical asymmetry between self and other knowledge can only be
established if the way I come to know my own mental states is “categorically
different in kind and manner” from the way I come to know other’s mental
states.481 As Cassam puts it, “the issue isn’t whether there is an asymmetry
between self-knowledge and knowledge of others – even inferentialism can
accept this” but whether there is a deeper kind of asymmetry that is sufficient
to “rule out inferentialism.”482 Cassam distinguishes between a deep
metaphysical kind of asymmetry, “Asymmetry,” and mere “asymmetry.” He
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argues that even if we do have privileged access to our own sensations,
feelings, and thoughts, this is not enough to establish the existence of
Asymmetry, and, at most, just guarantees a benign form of asymmetry
between self and other knowledge. If the access I have to my own mind is not
‘categorically different’ in kind and manner from the access I have to other
people’s minds, then there is no reason to think there is a significant
metaphysical gulf between self-knowledge and my knowledge of other
people’s mental states – or so Cassam argues.
Suppose I wish to know if I desire to eat ice cream. One piece of
evidence I can use to figure out if I want ice cream is my own inner feelings –I
can directly feel my sensation of hunger and can attend to my ongoing
thoughts that are about ice cream. If my friend wants to work out if I want ice
cream, she has less evidence at her disposal. She will have to figure out that I
want ice cream based on what I say and how I behave. She cannot consult my
inner feelings, sensations, and thoughts as I can. Cassam concedes that, in this
case, my friend comes to know that I want ice cream in a different way from
how I come to know that I want ice cream – as he puts it, me and my friend
are not “in the same boat, epistemologically speaking” because we “have
access to different types of evidence.”483 In this case, then, Cassam doesn’t
deny there is a difference between my friend and I, in terms of the kinds of
evidence we have at our disposal. What he does deny is that this difference
amounts to a metaphysically significant Asymmetry between self and other
knowledge. The reason he denies that this difference constitutes an
Asymmetry is because “this…is not a difference in kind and manner.”484
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Cassam maintains that the way I come to know my own mental states,
and the way my friend comes to know my mental states, “are the same”
because we both know what I want “by drawing inferences from the evidence
available.” And this mere difference in the kind of evidence that is at our
disposal “isn’t the kind of difference that justifies talk of an epistemic
Asymmetry.”485 Cassam’s argument is that if privileged access only extends to
current sensations, thoughts, and feelings this is not enough to create a
significant enough difference, in kind and manner, between self and other
knowledge. The only difference between my friend and I, in the ice cream
case, is that I have access to a little bit of extra evidence that isn’t at her
disposal. Once my friend and I have finished gathering evidence, we both
work out that I desire ice cream in the same way – by putting all the evidence
together and inferring that I must want ice cream. This is not enough, Cassam
maintains, to establish that there is a metaphysically significant Asymmetry
between the way I come to know my own mental states and the way I come to
know other’s mental states. It’s not enough to demonstrate that there is a
radical difference between the way I come to know my own mind and the way
I come to know the minds of others.
In summary, then, the mere existence of an ‘asymmetry’ between self
and other knowledge is not enough to sufficiently distinguish the traditional
view of self-knowledge from an inferentialist account: “inferentialism can
accept that there is an asymmetry between knowledge of oneself and
knowledge of others, but not the [major] difference that Moran is talking
about…our access to our own attitudes is peculiar but not as peculiar as is
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commonly supposed.”486 Gertler thus cannot rely on a mere asymmetry to
distinguish the traditional view of self-knowledge from the inferentialist view,
because the inferentialist account can accommodate a benign asymmetry
between self and other knowledge. If we lack privileged access to propositional
attitudes, there is no reason to think that the asymmetry that remains between
self and other knowledge is metaphysically significant – Asymmetry with a
capital A.
Even if the scope of privileged access could be restricted further
without threatening the very concept of the traditional view of self-knowledge
(and I maintain it cannot), it is not obvious that the majority of traditional
theorists would be willing to give up the concept of privileged access to
propositional attitudes. This is because, as I discussed in chapter two,
privileged access to propositional attitudes plays a significant role in many
traditional theories of self-knowledge. Many traditional theories of selfknowledge simply cannot function if we just have privileged access to
sensations and current thoughts. For example, Coliva, and many other
traditional theorists argue that privileged access to propositional attitudes is
necessary to guarantee human rationality. If we are forced to infer what our
beliefs and desires are, and do not have direct access to them, Coliva argues
that gross lapses in rationality will occur: it might be the case that other
people work out what I want before I do, or there may be long gaps in the
conversation while I attempt to figure out what I believe.487
It is not only our rationality and normal cognitive function that is at
stake. Coliva also argues that if we lack privileged access to our propositional
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attitudes, if we are forced to infer them in the same way as we infer the
attitudes of others, then there is no real sense in which our beliefs and desires
can be properly said to be ours. Privileged access is required to secure the
ownership, the ‘mine-ness,’ of one’s propositional attitudes: without it, we will
be alienated from our beliefs and desires. If we are alienated from our beliefs
and desires then we cannot be epistemically or morally responsible for them,
so privileged access to propositional attitudes is also essential to secure the
concept of responsibility. Burge and Shoemaker, similarly, argue that
privileged access to propositional access is essential for us to be able to reason
critically. According to Shoemaker, human beings do not just update their
beliefs and desires automatically, and without conscious awareness, as
animals do. Humans can revise their beliefs and desires on the basis of
consciously considered reasons. And these reasons, which are a kind of
propositional attitude, must be grasped directly via privileged access for our
belief revision to be fully ‘human.’ As Shoemaker states: “creatures without
introspective access to their beliefs and desires would lack this resource for
rational revision of their beliefs and desires and would fall short of normal
human rationality.”488
Thus, as I outline in detail in chapter two, privileged access to
propositional attitudes is not an incidental feature of many traditional
theories of self-knowledge: it is a hugely important core component.
Traditional theorists think that privileged access to propositional attitudes –
beliefs, desires, and reasons – is required to secure all manner of abilities and
traits such as human rationality, critical reasoning, efficient communication,
Shoemaker, Sydney. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays,
p.240.
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personhood, and responsibility. Thus, for most traditional theorists of selfknowledge, the scope of privileged access simply cannot be restricted further
to exclude propositional attitudes. There must at least remain the possibility
that we might be able to gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes via
privileged access.

Is privileged access conceptually necessary?

At this point, the traditional theorist of self-knowledge might argue that, no
matter what the choice blindness experimental results show a theory of selfknowledge which postulates privileged access to propositional attitudes is
superior to a theory which does not. It is not merely the case that privileged
access is important, or central, to theories of self-knowledge: it could be
argued that privileged access to propositional attitudes is conceptually
necessary and is thus an essential component of any good theory of selfknowledge. The argument is that privileged access to propositional attitudes is
required for us to be fully human, and so we cannot dispense of privileged
access without serious epistemic consequences. If privileged access really does
turn out to be conceptually necessary to secure rationality, critical reasoning
and so on, then the traditional view of self-knowledge will have a significant
advantage over the infernetialist view which, ostensibly, cannot secure these
epistemic goods.
In chapter two I discussed arguments from traditional theorists as to
why privileged access to propositional attitudes is essential for human
rationality, belief revision and critical reasoning, responsibility, and seamless
human interaction. They argue that without direct access to propositional
326

attitudes we will be in a bad way, epistemically speaking. Thus, in order to
secure these various epistemic goods, the inferentialist account of selfknowledge must be rejected in favor of a traditional view which postulates
privileged access. In this section, I’m going to argue that there’s no reason to
think that privileged access to propositional attitudes is required in order to
secure things like human rationality, critical reasoning, and so on. I contend
that privileged access is not conceptually necessary, and thus the infernetialist
account of self-knowledge is still preferable to the traditional view.
As I discussed in chapter two, some traditional theorists of selfknowledge argue that privileged access to propositional attitudes is necessary
for human rationality. Coliva, for example, claims that if we lacked direct,
privileged access to our propositional attitudes then we would exhibit “failures
of rationality” in our behavior. She gives the example of a woman pushing a
grocery cart around the store. If the woman lacked privileged access to her
propositional attitudes, when she is asked the question “what are you doing”
she will be forced to infer the reasons for her behavior in order to reply. Coliva
maintains that if the woman has to infer her reasons, she will behave in an
exceptionally irrational way that would be indicative of severe mental
illness.489 The woman may take a long pause while she works out what she is
doing and why, or she may respond with something like “hmmm, I don’t’
actually know what I’m doing” if her inference fails to deliver any answers.
The fact that we can immediately answer such questions without long pauses
and are never stumped as to why we are acting in a certain way is evidence,
according to Coliva, that we must have direct, privileged access to our
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propositional attitudes. She concludes that privileged access is necessary to
secure human rationality: without it our behavior would be abnormal and
highly irrational.
The problem with this argument is that it completely mischaracterizes
the nature of inference and relies on the erroneous assumption that inferring
our mental states leads to robotic-like behavior. On the inferentialist account
of self-knowledge, the inferences that we perform to self-interpret our mental
states occur very swiftly at a non-conscious, sub-personal level. Inference
should not be thought of as a clunky, slow, laborious process that results in
noticeable lags in our behavior. When we infer our mental states, it occurs so
quickly and seamlessly that no awkward pauses or behavioral glitches occur.
As Johansson et al. point out, the linguistic analysis of the manipulated and
non-manipulated trial reports demonstrates that there is no difference
between verbal reports that are generated on the spot (via inference) and
verbal reports that may stem from introspective access.490 Verbal reports
generated on the basis of inference are no different from introspective reports
(if they even exist), and there is certainly no reason to think that verbal
reports based on inference necessarily involve irrational or sub-optimal
behavior like long pauses or confessions of ignorance. Privileged access to
propositional attitudes is thus not necessary to secure our rationality and
inferring our mental states will not result in grossly irrational behavior.
Some traditional theorists of self-knowledge claim that if we lack
privileged access to propositional attitudes, we will be alienated from our own
beliefs and desires. The worry is that if we are at the same metaphysical
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distance from our own attitudes as we are from those of other people, there is
no real sense in which our attitudes can be said to belong to us. Coliva, for
example, claims that if we lack privileged access to our propositional attitudes
we will be “in some sense alienated”491 from our own attitudes, and Moran
argues that if we are forced to infer our own attitudes we will be in a “state of
dissociation”492 in relation to our own mental states. These traditional
theorists further argue that if we are alienated from our own mental states, if
they don’t properly belong to us, then we cannot be responsible for these
mental states. We will inevitably be alienated from our beliefs if we are forced
to infer them. Privileged access is thus necessary to secure epistemic
responsibility.
Moran argues that attributional self-knowledge, knowledge we gain via
introspection, involves us taking a third-personal stance towards oneself.
Cassam, interpreting Moran’s theory, states that “attributional self-knowledge
can concern attitudes you don’t identify with, and whose reasons are opaque
to you.”493 Furthermore, according to Moran, the very reason we may become
alienated from attributional self-knowledge is because it is gained via
inference and self-interpretation. On the other hand, ordinary self-knowledge,
which is knowledge we gain directly via introspection “is knowledge of
attitudes you can identify with and rationally endorse.”494 We don’t become
alienated from ordinary, or introspected, self-knowledge according to Moran
precisely because we gain this kind of self-knowledge directly via privileged
access. For Moran, then, privileged access guarantees the ‘mineness’ of my
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attitudes, whereas inference may result in alienation from my own attitudes.
Taken to its logical conclusion, privileged access is necessary for epistemic
responsibility.
In response to this, Cassam argues that privileged access does not
guard against alienation – one could very well end up alienated from attitudes
that one has directly accessed via introspection. Moran’s distinction between
ordinary and attributional self-knowledge thus does not hold, at least as far as
alienation is concerned, because I can fully identify with self-knowledge that I
gain via inference while feeling alienated from introspected self-knowledge.
According to Cassam:
The mere fact that you self-ascribe an attitude on inferential grounds
doesn’t make the attitude alienated or impervious to reason. You can
infer on behavioral or psychological grounds that you have a belief or
desire, and yet have no difficulty endorsing or identifying with that
belief or desire.495
Cassam is correct. There does not seem to be any obvious reason why I should
necessarily be alienated from any desire or belief that I self-attribute via
inference. For example, imagine a case where I am considering whether to get
another dog. Suppose, on the basis of observing my behavior and
psychological states, I perform an inference and conclude that I don’t really
desire to get another dog. Perhaps I observed my initial feeling of revulsion at
the thought of all the extra work and noted that my attendant thoughts on the
matter are quite negative. I consider all the effort, and money that a second
dog would cost, and I think to myself “I can’t really afford any of that.” Putting
it all together, I infer that I do not desire another dog. Just because I have
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worked out my desire on the basis of inference does not prevent me from
identifying with this desire and endorsing it as my own. So, it seems as if
inference does not necessarily result in alienation.
On the other hand, one can easily imagine a case where I directly
introspect a belief or desire and yet don’t identify with it. Suppose I ask myself
“do I really want another dog?” and I proceed to introspect. Via privileged
access, I come to learn of myself that I do, indeed, desire another dog. Does
the fact that I have gained this knowledge directly guarantee that I won’t be
alienated from this introspected desire? No. I can easily imagine, in this case,
that I come to learn that I desire a dog and yet I still feel uneasy about this
desire and don’t identify with it. I may very well be alienated from my
introspected beliefs and desires. There is thus no reason to think that one can
never be alienated from one’s introspected attitudes. We may be alienated
from any beliefs and desires, no matter the method we use to discover them.
Some philosophers, such as Shoemaker, argue that privileged access to
propositional attitudes is necessary for conscious attitude revision. Shoemaker
argues that we must have knowledge about the relevant attitudes which need
attending to before we can engage in conscious belief revision. As he puts it,
“what rationalizes the investigation are one’s higher-order beliefs about what
one believes and has reason to believe.”496 This makes sense – before I can
revise my beliefs in light of new evidence, I need to know which beliefs I must
target. However, Shoemaker also maintains that direct access to these beliefs
is also necessary in order for belief revision to occur: “creatures without
introspective access to their beliefs and desires would lack this resource for
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rational revision of their beliefs and desires would lack this resource for
rational revision of their beliefs and desires, and would fall short of normal
human rationality.”497 Shoemaker’s claim appears to be that without
privileged access to one’s beliefs, one will lack higher-order beliefs about what
one believes and so will not be able to engage in conscious belief revision. If
we can’t engage in conscious belief revision, we will only be able to
automatically update our beliefs in the same way as animals do. And this,
according to Shoemaker, means we would fall short of normal human
epistemic standards. In other words, without privileged access to our system
of beliefs and desires, we will only be able to revise our beliefs in an
animalistic fashion. Privileged access enables us to revise beliefs in a rational,
truly human manner.
I have a couple of replies to Shoemaker’s argument. First, I don’t see
why Shoemaker thinks that introspective access is required in order to have
higher order beliefs about what one believes or has reason to believe. It is not
apparent, without further argumentation, why one ought to accept such a
claim. It seems there is nothing to preclude me from gaining higher-order
beliefs about what I believe via a process of inference or self-interpretation. If
I have knowledge of these second-order beliefs and am consciously aware of
them, does it really make a difference if I gained this knowledge via direct
introspection or via inference? And second, suppose Shoemaker is correct in
saying that without direct access to our beliefs we cannot engage in conscious
belief revision. He argues that such a handicap would mean we would “fall
short of normal human rationality,” but I don’t see any reason why, in
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practice, our rationality would be affected as much as Shoemaker supposes.
The vast majority of our beliefs, desires, and other attitudes update
automatically outside of conscious awareness, and this is a very reliable
process. Indeed, there is even reason to think that when we reflect too much,
and consciously interfere with the belief revision process, that this leads to
less reliability, not more.498 Thus, even if inference only enables us to update
and revise our beliefs automatically (and there is no reason to think this is the
case), it is not true that our rationality will be severely impinged by this
restriction.
Coliva also argues that privileged access is required for us to be morally
responsible for our actions. According to Coliva, if we must resort to
interpreting or inferring our attitudes we would have to infer what we
intended after the action is completed. Coliva argues that at the moment an
individual acts she cannot be held morally responsible for that action unless
she knows what it is she intended. Prior to interpreting the action, it would be
“just a movement or a piece of overt behavior”499 – the action would not mean
anything. Take, for example, a case where an individual stabs another person
and kills him. This individual is only morally blameworthy for this action if he
intended to kill the other person: if it was an accident, or if he didn’t realize
what he was doing, then he is not morally responsible for the death. Coliva
seems to be arguing that if the individual is forced to interpret his intentions
and motives by observing his own behavior then he will have to work out what
his intention is as he is performing the action itself. But if he doesn’t know
Kornblith, Hilary. On Reflection. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
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what his intentions are until he interprets his actions, the action of stabbing
the other person, then he cannot be responsible for the killing. Thus, only
privileged access can secure the concept of moral responsibility because it
guarantees that individuals have direct access to their intentions.
Again, however, this argument rests on a faulty understanding of
inference. Coliva is under the impression that, on the interpretivist account,
the individual who stabs another person may only rely on observation of his
overt behavior to work out what his intentions are. That is, he must watch
himself stab the other person, and from this information alone work out what
it is he was trying to achieve by performing that action. But the inferentialist
view of self-knowledge denies that the only piece of data available to us, when
inferring our mental states, is observation of overt behavior. The individual
who stabs the other person will also have access to his ongoing thoughts and
stream of consciousness, his memories, the content of his current sensory
experience, his background beliefs and desires, his emotional state, and a
whole host of other mental states. On the infernetialist picture, the stabber
will have a huge wealth of information at his disposal which will enable him to
very rapidly infer what his intention is before he even executes the motor
functions to perform the action of stabbing. It is not the case that he must
blindly act and then, only when the action is completed, work out or construct
his intentions. Thus, the inferentialist view of self-knowledge can
accommodate the concept of moral responsibility – we don’t have to have
direct access to our intentions in order to be responsible for our actions.
Finally, Shoemaker also argues that privileged access to propositional
attitudes is necessary for practical purposes. According to Shoemaker,
communication and cooperative endeavors would be much more laborious if
334

we lacked privileged access to our mental states. Shoemaker states that “if I
had to figure out from my behavior what my beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., are
then in most cases it would be more efficient for others to figure this out for
themselves than to wait for me to figure it out and then tell them about it.”500
Privileged access to propositional attitudes is thus required for normal human
communication.
Once more, the infernetialist view of self-knowledge does not entail
that we are forced to rely on overt behavior alone to infer our beliefs, as
Shoemaker seems to suggest. Furthermore, Shoemaker gives the impression
that inferring our mental states will lead to delays – our interlocutors will
have to “wait for me to figure…out” what I believe. But as I have repeatedly
claimed, the process of inference is exceptionally swift – so swift that no one
will be waiting for any noticeable period of time while I formulate my answer
to their question. Finally, even if it were true that “it would be more efficient
for others to figure out for themselves” what I believe rather than to wait for
me to tell them, I fail to see how this means that “cooperative endeavors
would be considerably more difficult.”501 If my interlocutor is very quick at
inferring what my mental states are, so long as her inference is reliable and
accurate then I fail to see how her correct apprehension of my beliefs or
desires in any way makes our collaboration more difficult. Effective
communication and cooperation, then, is not thwarted or complicated by an
inferentialist view of self-knowledge.
In summary, then, it is not the case that privileged access to
propositional attitudes is somehow conceptually necessary and cannot be
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theoretically dispensed with. Many of the traditional theorist’s concerns about
the infernetialist account of self-knowledge are based on a faulty picture of
what an inferentialist account really entails. The inferentialist view of selfknowledge, then, is not incompatible with human rationality, conscious belief
revision, epistemic and moral responsibility, or efficient cooperation and
communication. There is thus no theoretical necessity that compels us to
retain the concept of privileged access and the traditional view of selfknowledge.

Why the infernetialist account of self-knowledge is stronger than
the traditional view

As I’ve discussed in the last few sections, the traditional theorist of selfknowledge simply cannot concede that we lack privileged access to
propositional attitudes because then the traditional view of self-knowledge
will just collapse into the inferentialist account. Furthermore, the traditional
theorist cannot maintain that privileged access to propositional attitudes is
somehow conceptually necessary to secure various epistemic goods. Thus, the
only option left to the traditional theorist of self-knowledge at this to maintain
that the choice blindness experiments do not succeed in demonstrating
conclusively that privileged access to propositional attitudes does not exist at
all.
The traditional theorist can advocate for a dual-method account,
whereby we sometimes gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes via
privileged access and sometimes via inference. According to the dual method
account, the choice blindness experiments, for some reason or other, cause
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introspective access to our propositional attitudes to be temporarily blocked.
The fact that privileged access is restricted during a particular kind of
experiment does not, however, entail that we entirely lack privileged access to
propositional attitudes. All that is needed to save the traditional view of selfknowledge is the possibility that we at least sometimes gain knowledge of our
propositional attitudes via privileged access: it does not have to be the case
that we always gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes this way. While
it may be the case that our faculty of introspection is disabled in choice
blindness scenarios, this does not at all mean that our faculty of introspection
is always disabled. Thus, the traditional view of self-knowledge can be
salvaged by postulating a dual-method approach, or so the traditional theorist
could argue.
It is my contention, however, that even if the traditional theorist adopts
a dual-method approach to self-knowledge this is not enough to salvage the
traditional view. The move to the dual-method picture greatly weakens the
traditional view of self-knowledge, and, furthermore, appears ad hoc in that
the sole motivation to adopt a dual-method view is to save the concept of
privileged access to propositional attitudes. If one compares the dual-methods
approach to the interpretivist view of self-knowledge, the interpretivist view is
a much stronger theory overall. On balance, then, the interpretivist view of
self-knowledge is preferable to the traditional view.
As I’ve previously discussed, there are numerous issues with the dualmethod approach which render it weaker compared to the interpretivist view.
Firstly, it grants a massive concession to the inferentialist because it forces the
traditional theorist to acknowledge that we only gain introspective access to
our propositional attitudes some of the time. It may even turn out to be the
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case, on the dual-method approach, that the occasions on which we gain direct
introspective access to our propositional attitudes is exceptionally rare: we
may, in fact, infer our propositional attitudes for most of the time. By
adopting the dual method view, the traditional theorist is put under pressure
to not only prove the existence of the additional route to self-knowledge that
they propose (introspection,) but to also justify its worth. The dual-method
theorist must demonstrate that introspection plays a crucial, useful role which
confers a significant benefit such that the traditional view is to be preferred
over the inferentialist view of self-knowledge. If the inferentialist view of selfknowledge can fully explain, and account for, the relevant phenomena with
just one postulated mechanism then it’s not obvious why we should adopt the
theoretically bulkier dual-method picture of self-knowledge.
Another disadvantage to the dual-method approach is it is more
complex than single-method theories, which postulate just one mechanism
that we use to gain self-knowledge. Furthermore, as it stands, the dualmethod approach is on shaky ground because there is no apparent reason why
privileged access would shut off, or be unavailable, during the choice
blindness experiments. As Carruthers points out, the difficulty for the
traditional theorist of self-knowledge is the fact in the choice blindness
experiments “one would think that [mental states] of the appropriate kind
should have been transparently accessible.”502 Even if the traditional theorist
opts for a dual-method theory, she still owes us a plausible explanation of just
why the choice blindness paradigm causes our introspective faculty to become
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temporarily disabled - an explanation that doesn’t boil down to an ad-hoc
motivation to save the concept of privileged access to propositional attitudes.
The dual-method approach is also weaker than an interpretivist
account of self-knowledge because it hypothesizes the existence of privileged
access to propositional attitudes when there is no evidence for the existence of
an introspective faculty: if anything, the evidence suggests that an
introspective faculty does not even exist. The traditional theorist is not safe to
simply assume that we possess privileged access to propositional attitudes
without some empirical evidence that we do, in fact, access our propositional
attitudes via an introspective method. However, this evidence does not seem
to be forthcoming. The linguistic analysis from the verbal report corpus of the
choice blindness experiments shows that, unexpectedly, there is no difference
between the manipulated verbal reports and the non-manipulated verbal
reports. This is prima facie evidence that we only use one method to construct
verbal reports and that that method is interpretation, not introspection.
Furthermore, as Wilson points out, “averaging across several studies there
seems to be no net advantage of having privileged information about
ourselves. The amount of accuracy obtained by people about the causes of
their responses is nearly identical with the amount of accuracy obtained by
strangers.”503 In other words, observers with no inside information are just as
accurate at surmising why actors behaved a certain way as the actors
themselves. The existence of privileged access to propositional attitudes is not
categorically ruled out by such findings, of course, but if we really do possess a
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unique method for gaining self-knowledge one would expect there to be at
least some empirical evidence of such a thing.
In short, there is currently no substantial experimental evidence that
there is a unique, first-personal method used to gain self-knowledge; and the
burden of proof is on the traditional theorist to provide evidence that
privileged access exists rather than simply assuming that it does. As Cassam
points out, for too long traditional theorists of self-knowledge have treated
concepts like asymmetry and privileged access as primitive data “which
doesn’t need to be argued for because it is so obvious.”504 The traditional view
of self-knowledge is not the only viable theory of self-knowledge, and it must
compete with purely interpretivist theories which deny that we have privileged
access to propositional attitudes, and do perfectly well without it. For the
traditional view to be a competitive theory of self-knowledge, the traditional
theorist cannot simply declare by fiat that we sometimes have privileged
access to our propositional attitudes. Instead, the traditional theorist must
actively argue for, and provide evidence of, this cognitive mechanism. If there
is no compelling evidence that privileged access exists, and if there is no
pressing theoretical reason to postulate such access, then the traditional view
of self-knowledge is at a great disadvantage compared to interpretivist
theories.
Furthermore, as Carruthers points out, the dual-method approach also
suffers from a lack of predictive validity and explanatory detail. It is not
enough, according to Carruthers, for traditional theorists to accommodate the
choice blindness findings by declaring that sometimes introspective access is
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disabled and so we are forced to resort to self-interpretation. To be a serious
theory of self-knowledge, any dual-method approach must give specific details
as to when the two methods operate, and why the privileged access route
sometimes shuts down. There should be enough explanatory detail such that it
is possible to predict on which occasions the privileged introspective access
route to self-knowledge will be disabled, and the interpretive route becomes
active. In the absence of such an explanatory framework, the dual-method
theory looks less like a fully-fledged account of self-knowledge and more like
an ad-hoc attempt to preserve privileged access, and thus the metaphysical
specialness of self-knowledge.
On the other hand, while choice blindness and confabulation push the
traditional view of self-knowledge into a defensive position, the inferentialist
approach to self-knowledge positively embraces these experimental findings.
The inferentialist view of self-knowledge is a much stronger theory, on
balance, than the dual-method approach. For one thing, the inferentialist view
is a simpler approach because it only postulates the existence of one
mechanism by which we gain self-knowledge and not two like the dualmethod account. Furthermore, the inferentialist account relies on a cognitive
mechanism which is already acknowledged to exist by the traditional theorist.
There are no doubts that we do use inference to gain self-knowledge on some
occasions, but introspection has not been proven – indeed, there isn’t even
any independent experimental evidence for such a faculty.
The inferentialist is also at an advantage when compared to the dualmethod theorist because inferentialism can apparently do everything the dualmethod approach can do without the burden of proving the existence of a
second cognitive mechanism. The inferentialist approach is preferable, then,
341

because it is not explanatorily otiose. There is no reason to prefer the dualmethod account of self-knowledge when a single, inferentialist account can do
just as good a job of explaining the relevant phenomena. The dual-method
theorist cannot even argue that privileged access to propositional attitudes
guarantees increased reliability, which would be a theoretical advantage,
because the inferentialist can reply that inference to the best explanation is
just as reliable a method of gaining self-knowledge as privileged access. There
is no reason to think that inference is a less reliable method to gain selfknowledge just because it is not a direct route to knowledge. Inference to the
best explanation can be a highly reliable and accurate way of gaining selfknowledge, and no traditional theorist nowadays goes so far as to claim that
privileged access is an infallible, perfectly accurate method by which to gain
knowledge of one’s mental states. Thus, the traditional theorist does not gain
any intrinsic advantage by postulating privileged access, because this privilege
access doesn’t buy us any more accuracy or reliability. There is thus no
advantage to proposing a theory which, in addition to inference, also
postulates an introspective mechanism. If anything, dual-method accounts are
weakened because they postulate an additional mechanism, which has very
little evidence in its favor.
Another factor to consider when weighing up the two accounts of selfknowledge is the fact that the dual-method account struggles to account for
and explain the choice blindness findings whereas the inferentialist has a
much easier time explaining the phenomenon of choice blindness. The dualmethod theorist must argue that, for some mysterious reason, the
introspective faculty of becomes temporarily disabled during the choice
blindness manipulation – a postulate which is both poorly motivated and
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implausible. This claim is further complicated by the fact that not every
participant in the manipulated trials becomes choice blind – around a third of
participants do not succumb to the choice blindness effect. It is apparent that
the introspective faculty shuts down in some choice blindness participants,
but not in others. We are thus owed an explanation as to why some
participants retain introspective access to their propositional attitudes while
others do not.
The interpretivist view does not similarly struggle to accommodate the
choice blindness results. Indeed, as Carruthers points out, his ISA theory
actually anticipates that we will sometimes misattribute mental states to
ourselves by mistake and that we will sometimes confabulate. Choice
blindness and confabulation is not merely explained by the ISA account, but
are actually predicted by it. According to Carruthers, because we come to
know our own propositional attitudes via inference our inference may go awry
if the evidence we rely on to self-interpret our mental states is faulty: on the
ISA account “there should be frequent instances of confabulation resulting
from misleading behavior or other sensorially accessible cues. There will be
cases where people misattribute propositional attitudes to themselves.”505
Carruther’s wholly interpretivist account, then, has no problems
accommodating the choice blindness experimental findings because it actually
predicts that whenever participants in such experiments are confronted with
misleading evidence (such as altered survey scores), they can be expected to
misattribute attitudes to themselves and confabulate. Rather than balking at
these experimental results, Carruthers’s interpretivist theory fully
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accommodates them – choice blindness and confabulation are to be expected
on the interpretivist account of self-knowledge.
Cassam, who is also an interpretivist about self-knowledge, agrees with
Carruthers that the reason participants become choice blind is because the
evidence that participants base their inferences on is faulty. On occasions
where the evidence we rely on is weak, ambiguous, or error-ridden, we may
make mistakes when self-interpreting our own mental states.506 Inference is
not an infallible method by which to gain self-knowledge: even the most
perfect piece of inferential reasoning will go awry if the evidence on which it is
based is false. Participants are particularly prone to make errors during choice
blindness experiments because the evidence that they have at their disposal to
interpret their mental states is particularly misleading and so can send their
inference astray. For example, suppose a participant strongly agrees with the
statement that capital punishment is morally wrong. He observes as (what he
thinks is) the very same survey sheet is inspected by an experimenter then is
handed back to him. The survey sheet now indicates that he strongly agrees
that capital punishment is morally permissible. In such a situation, with the
evidence that he has at his disposal, it is not unreasonable for him to infer that
he supports capital punishment – or, at the very least, it is quite
understandable. He may have a slight inkling that he didn’t originally agree
that capital punishment is permissible, but then again, the survey sheet that
he filled out moments ago is solid evidence that he did agree that capital
punishment is permissible. On the basis of such evidence, he may very well
infer that he must have a pro-capital punishment attitude. His inference has
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gone awry, of course, because the evidence he is relying on is misleading and
faulty – his survey sheet has been tampered with.
The problem with this explanation is that, commonsensically, it seems
astonishing that a few moments after completing the survey a participant
could be oblivious to what his actual attitude towards capital punishment is
(assuming, of course, that he does have genuine attitudes towards the issue).
However, even if this outcome is surprising and counter-intuitive, it can’t
simply be assumed, on this basis, that “it is very rare or unusual for us to selfattribute attitudes on the basis of behavioral evidence.”507 If we do actually
more heavily on external environmental, and behaviorally, cues in order to
work out what our attitudes are, then it isn’t quite as shocking that so many
participants in the choice blindness study become choice blind – the evidence
they are relying on is misleading, and so the inference they make is equally
faulty.
Overall, then, the interpretivist approach to self-knowledge has the
upper hand when compared to dual-method theories. Single-method
interpretivist theories, like Carruther’s ISA theory of self-knowledge, are
simpler than traditional dual-method accounts of self-knowledge because they
only posit one mechanism that we use to gain self-knowledge of propositional
attitudes. What’s more, the interpretivist has the advantage of postulating a
mechanism which is universally acknowledged to exist and is incorporated
into all dual-method theories: inference. The traditional dual-method
approach, on the other hand, is a bulker theory that postulates the existence of
a cognitive mechanism for which there is no empirical evidence: if anything,
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the empirical evidence suggests that this mechanism, privileged access, is
unlikely to exist. Even if the traditional theorist of self-knowledge adopts a
dual-method approach and concedes that sometimes (even most of the time)
we gain knowledge of propositional attitudes via inference, and not via
privileged access, this may not be enough to save traditional theories of selfknowledge; especially when they are compared to inferentialist rivals. On
balance, the interpretivist account of self-knowledge is far more successful at
accommodating and explaining the choice blindness results and does not
suffer from as many problems as the dual-method, traditional account. It is
thus fair to conclude that the interpretivist approach to self-knowledge is
superior to the dual-methods view, and so the traditional account may be
rejected.

Does choice blindness threaten our rationality?

So far, I’ve argued that the traditional view of self-knowledge cannot
accommodate and explain choice blindness and confabulation, and so we
ought to adopt an inferentialist approach to self-knowledge instead. In
particular, choice blindness and confabulation pose a strong challenge to the
theory that we possess privileged access to our propositional attitudes, like
beliefs and desires. In response to this challenge, the traditional theorist
cannot just restrict the scope of privileged access even further to exclude
propositional attitudes because privileged access to propositional attitudes is
an essential feature of any traditional theory of self-knowledge. Without
privileged access to propositional attitudes, there is nothing to distinguish
traditional accounts of self-knowledge from inferentialist theories like
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Carruthers’s ISA theory. What’s more, privileged access is an essential
component of many traditional theories of self-knowledge, and so cannot just
be abandoned.
No matter what, then, the traditional theorist must maintain that
privileged access to propositional attitudes is possible, at least on some
occasions. She must argue that even though some participants in the choice
blindness studies lack privileged access to their propositional attitudes, and
are forced to infer them, this only occurs in the context of the choice blindness
paradigm. The traditional theorist must adopt a dual-methods approach to
self-knowledge and argue that in normal non-experimental circumstances we
can, in principle, gain privileged access to our propositional attitudes. The
traditional theorist’s task is made more difficult by the fact that there is no
empirical evidence for this claim: in fact, the linguistic analysis of the verbal
report corpus from the choice blindness studies is evidence against there
being a distinct, non-interpretive method by which we gain self-knowledge.
Compared to the interpretivist view of self-knowledge, which proposes
that we only ever infer our propositional attitudes, the traditional view of selfknowledge appears to be a far less plausible account of how we come to know
our own beliefs and desires because it postulates an additional cognitive
mechanism for which there is no evidence. In short, as I discussed previously,
the dual-method approach is plagued by problems which make it a much less
attractive theory when compared to the considerably stronger interpretivist
framework to self-knowledge. On balance, then, because the traditional view
of self-knowledge struggles to accommodate the findings from the choice
blindness experiments it is reasonable to conclude that the inferential view is
more likely to be the correct account of how we gain self-knowledge of
347

propositional attitudes. Our best science suggests that we don’t have
privileged access to our propositional attitudes, and so we must infer them
instead. Thus, we ought to embrace interpretivist theories of self-knowledge
instead of the traditional view.
In response to this, the traditional theorist of self-knowledge could
argue that the inferentialists have won a somewhat Pyrrhic victory. Even if the
inferentialist account of self-knowledge is correct, the phenomenon of choice
blindness and confabulation imply that we possess less self-knowledge than
we commonly take ourselves to have. The fact that we can become blind to
choices we made just moments earlier and then confabulate reasons for
decisions we never actually made also has disturbing implications for human
rationality. These psychological results may be consistent with an
inferentialist view of self-knowledge, but they threaten the conception we have
of ourselves as rational, knowledgeable agents. The choice blindness paradigm
suggests that we aren’t as rational as we think and that even everyday
knowledge about our own decisions and intentions is not as we take it to be.
We can be mistaken about our own choices and can even be rendered blind to
our own sincerely held attitudes. The upshot, then, is a rather pessimistic
picture: choice blindness and confabulation demonstrate that we are selfignorant, irrational, and frequently prone to epistemic error. The choice
blindness results threaten far more than just the traditional theory of selfknowledge: they also threaten our very rationality.
Psychologists and cognitive scientists have recognized for a long time
that empirical findings may pose a threat to our conception of ourselves. For
example, Johansson while discussing the choice blindness paradigm states
that there is a worry that the choice blindness results “could do…damage to
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the image we have of ourselves as insightful and rational creatures.”508
Similarly, Cohen comments that “reputable investigators tell us that certain
psychological discoveries have bleak implications for human rationality.”509 In
this section, I intend to defuse the potential threat that choice blindness and
confabulation pose to human rationality and epistemic competence. Choice
blindness and confabulation certainly challenge the traditional view of selfknowledge, but they do not, I maintain, threaten our very rationality. My
argument is that the phenomenon of choice blindness and confabulation are
not aberrations or anomalies but are natural side effects of the way our
cognitive systems are set up. In other words, given the way our cognitive
architecture is structured, it is inevitable that choice blindness and
confabulation will occur. In the same way that visual illusions do not threaten
the overall reliability of visual perception, I will argue that choice blindness
and confabulation do not threaten our overall rationality or capacity to gain
self-knowledge.
Now, it could be counter-argued that to conceive of choice blindness
and confabulation as inevitable side effects of the way our cognitive system is
set up makes the overall picture of human rationality even bleaker than
before. Because, on my view, choice blindness and confabulation are ‘built-in’
features of our cognition it could be argued that humans are naturally and
irrevocably irrational. However, following Cassam, I reject any conception of
‘rationality’ that fails to account for how humans are actually constituted.
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What is most relevant for our purposes is human rationality and human selfknowledge: rationality and self-knowledge that human beings can actually
achieve. It is no good, I maintain, to compare the human standard of reason to
some lofty, unattainable ideal, and to expect humans to be model epistemic
citizens. The fact that choice blindness and confabulation naturally fall out of
the way our cognitive system is constructed does not mean we are
irredeemably irrational: it just means that humans are not members of the
species of “homo philosophicus,” to use Cassam’s term.510 In short, I deny
that choice blindness and confabulation imply that humans are unacceptable
ignorant and irrational. It is my contention that the relevant standard of
rationality for humans must be centered around what we are capable of
achieving given the way our cognitive architecture is set up. The trouble with
declaring that humans are irrational, or ignorant because we succumb to
choice blindness and confabulate is that such a view is not “psychologically
realistic” and assumes an “unrealistic conception of human self-knowledge.”511
In the next section, I will discuss change blindness, which is a similar
phenomenon to choice blindness. I will argue that once one understands the
cognitive origins of change blindness the threat it potentially poses to our
rationality is defused. I will then argue that it is highly probable that choice
blindness has similar cognitive origins and so also does not pose any kind of
serious threat to human rationality and overall epistemic competence.

What change blindness can teach us about choice blindness
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In this section, I’m going to discuss the similarities between choice blindness
and the related phenomenon of change blindness. My aim in making such a
comparison is to show that in just the same way that change blindness does
not threaten the overall reliability of our visual system, choice blindness does
not threaten our rationality. I will argue that there are interesting parallels
between change blindness and choice blindness, such that the former can give
us an insight into the latter. We don’t yet know what is going on, cognitively
speaking, during choice blindness but we have a better idea of the
mechanisms involved in change blindness.
The broad explanation for change blindness is that, contrary to what we
commonly suppose, the brain only forms very sparse, rough representations
of our visual environment and does not carry over representations from one
scene to the next. This representational sparseness leads to change blindness.
I will argue that it is very plausible that choice blindness is also caused by
representational sparseness: the brain does not actively track our intentions
and desires at every moment but uses the world to fill in gaps about what our
intentions and desires might be. That is, our grasp on our own intentions
might be more flexible and tenuous than we suppose. I will further argue that
in the same way that visual illusions do not detract from the overall reliability
of our visual apparatus, cognitive illusions like change and choice blindness
do not detract from the overall reliability of our higher cognitive faculties, and
do not entail that we are systematically irrational. Change blindness and
choice blindness are not aberrations but are natural side effects of the way our
cognitive system is set up. As long as the assumptions our cognitive system
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makes are not violated, we capable of gaining knowledge and behaving in a
rational manner.
Change blindness is a well-studied phenomenon in which experimental
participants fail to notice significant changes to scenes and objects.512 Change
blindness, like choice blindness, is a surprising phenomenon because we have
a strong intuition that normal human beings should be capable of noticing the
large changes that occur right before their eyes. In the famous ‘flicker
paradigm,’ developed by Rensink et al., two photographs are presented in
rapid alteration (240 msec) with a blank screen in-between (80 msec).513 The
first photograph is of some object or scene and the second photograph is the
same object or scene with one major alteration. For example, the first
photograph may depict a scene with soldiers boarding a jet, and the altered
photograph may depict the same scene in which the jet’s engines are clearly
missing. (see figure.4)
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Figure 4: An example of the kind of photographs used in a change
blindness experiment. The two different images are cycled, with a
blank screen in-between, until the observer notices a change.
The two images are rapidly cycled, with the blank screen in-between. The
participant is informed that the two images are different, and her task is to
indicate to the experimenter when she notices the change. Under normal
conditions, where the two pictures are presented sequentially with no
interruption between them, it is trivially easy to quickly spot the difference
between the two scenes. However, when the two images are rapidly cycled
with a blank screen in between them (causing a flickering effect), it becomes
very difficult for participants to notice the change between the two scenes. As
Simons and Levin comment, “observers rarely noticed changes during the first
cycle of alternation, and often required many cycles to detect the change.”514
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Surprisingly, most experimental participants take quite some time before they
notice the change; and some fail to see any difference at all.
Change blindness has not just been demonstrated in the laboratory but
also occurs in real-world interactions. In a famous study conducted by Simons
and Levin, participants walking across a college campus are asked for
directions by an experimenter.515 While the participant and experimenter are
talking, two workers carrying a large door barge in-between them. In the few
seconds while the experimenter is occluded from view, another experimenter
jumps in and continues the conversation. (see figure.5) Even though the
participant and the experimenter have an extended conversation for up to five
minutes, and even though the second experimenter looks and sounds different
from the first experimenter, only 7 of the 15 participants noticed that their
conversation partner had changed.516 Those who remained oblivious to the
switch “continued the conversation as if nothing had happened,” and during
the debriefing were “surprised to learn that the person standing in front of
them was different from the one who had initiated the conversation.”517
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experimenters side by side.
Figure
5: A depiction of real-life change blindness. A) A participant
gives directions to an experimenter holding a map. B) The
is interrupted
by workmen.
During
theto have noticed the
noted by theconversation
experimenter. and if subjects
failed to report the change,
nothing unusual C)
nonetheless
claimed
they were directly asked. "Did you notice that I'm not the same person
change
when
asked
directly.
interruption,
the experimenter is swapped with another person. D)
who approached you to ask for directions?" After answering this quesInterestingly, those who noticed the change were all
tion. all subjects were informed
about the purpose of the
A comparison
ofexperiment.
the twostudents
experimenters.
of roughly the same age as the experimenters

(approximately
years old). Those who failed to
detect the change were slightly older than the experiResults and Discussion
If change
blindness
from the
passive nature of menters (approximately 35-65 years old). One possible
Simon
and
Levin results
conclude
that:
mediated stimuli, then these real-world substitutions explanation for this difference is that younger pedestrishould be detected, When asked if they had noticed any- ans were more likely to expend effort encoding those
thing unusual, most pedestrians reported that the people features that would differentiate the experimenters becarrying the door were rude. Yet,despite clear differences cause the experimenters were roughly of their own genin clothing, appearance, and voice, only 7 ofthe 15 pedes- eration. In contrast, older pedestrians would likely enThis experiment
shows
that people may
not notice changes to the
trians reported
noticing the change
of experimenters.
code the experimenters without focusing on features that
central
object
in
a
scene
even
when
the
change
is almost
instantaneous
Those who did not notice the change continued the con- could differentiate
the two of
them, instead viewing them
versationand
as ifhappens
as
members
nothing had
happened
(in
fact,
some
of
a
social
group
other thanalone
their own. This
in the middle of an ongoing natural event. Attention
pedestrians who did notice the change also continued the hypothesis draws on findings from social psychology
does not suffice for change detection, even in the real world…Our visual
conversation!). Pedestrians who did not notice the change that members of one's own social group ("in-group") are
system
does
notthat
automatically
compare
thedifferently
featuresfrom
of amembers
visualofscene
were quite
surprised
to learn
the person standing
in treated
social groups disfront of them
different
fromtothe
onenext
who in
initiated
apartafrom
one's own ("out-group"). Upon encounfromwas
one
instant
the
order tinctly
to form
continuous
the conversation.
One pedestrian
noticing
of an in-group, people
tering avisual
memberrepresentation
representation;
wewho
doreported
not form
a detailed
of tend
ourto focus at-

world.518

Simons, Daniel J, and Daniel Levin. "Failure to Detect Changes to People”,
p.648
518

355

There are some obvious, and interesting, similarities between the
phenomenon of change blindness and choice blindness. Indeed, Johansson at
times has suggested that choice blindness just is a kind of change blindness:
his claim is that choice blindness is a species of non-visual change blindness, a
change blindness which occurs at a higher level of human cognition.519 The
first similarity is that both choice blindness and change blindness are highly
counter-intuitive phenomena. We expect normal people to be able to spot
drastic changes that go on right in front of their eyes, and we also expect
normal people to notice when they don’t receive what they chose just
moments previously. The fact that participants go on to become choice blind,
or change blind, is highly surprising and in need of an explanation.
Second, participants in change blindness studies exhibit change
blindness blindness – just like choice blindness participants exhibit choice
blindness blindness. Participants in both change blindness and choice
blindness experiments succumb to a metacognitive error where they exhibit
misplaced confidence in their ability to detect the phenomenon in question.
For example, as Johansson reports, 84% of choice blindness participants are
highly confident that they would not succumb to choice blindness. These
participants subsequently went on to become choice blind in the course of the
manipulated trial. Choice blindness participants thus exhibit misplaced
overconfidence in their own ability to detect choice blindness
manipulations.520 Similarly, participants in change blindness studies also
express a huge amount of confidence in their ability to notice change
Johansson, Petter, and Lars Hall. "From Change Blindness to Choice
Blindness." Psychologia 51, no. 2 (2008): 142-55.
519

520

Johansson, Petter. "Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention”, p.1.
356

blindness effects. For example, 98% of participants claimed that they would
be able to notice if a shop clerk ducked beneath a counter and then was
swapped by a different clerk. In practice, just 46% of people noticed this
change. Similarly, 83% of participants thought they would notice an actor
being switched with another actor in a film. In reality, not a single one noticed
the change.521 Finally, Levin et al. surveyed 300 people about whether they
thought they would notice typical change blindness changes. 82% of
participants confidently declared that they would be capable of detecting such
changes, but in practice only 11% noticed them.522 Thus, both change
blindness participants and choice blindness participants exhibit erroneous
confidence in their own abilities to detect the manipulations and changes.
Third, both change blindness and choice blindness are robust effects, in
that they occur in a wide variety of circumstances, under different
experimental contexts. Change blindness, for instance, can occur across a
wide range of conditions: people can become change blind to changes in
photographs, movies, and in real life interactions. Change blindness is not
dependent on the nature of the task, nor on the way in which the change
occurs: whether the change is gradual or instantaneous, participants still
become change blind. Even if participants are told that a change will happen,
and are warned to look out for it, they still succumb to the change blindness
effect. Choice blindness is a similarly robust phenomenon. Choice blindness,
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while not as extensively studied as change blindness, occurs in the context of
face to face interaction and in online studies. Participants can become choice
blind to flavors they have just tasted, photographs they have just picked, and
even to their own moral and political opinions. As Parnamets notes, “choice
blindness is a robust effect and the basic findings have been replicated in a
wide range of domains.”523 Choice blindness and change blindness are not
mere experimental artifacts.
Fourth, another similarity between change blindness and choice
blindness is that fact that the vast majority of experimental participants
succumb to the manipulation on at least one occasion. In the choice blindness
experiments on average around two-thirds of the participants become choice
blind during at least one trial. As Johansson notes, in the face choice
blindness study just 13% of participants noticed that they received the
photograph they had actually rejected.524 Similarly, most participants become
change blind even in experiments that take place in the real world. In Levin
and Simon’s original study, just 7 out of 15 participants noticed that their
conversation partner had been switched in the middle of a conversation. In
the flicker paradigm, it is very unusual for a participant to see the difference
between the two photographs straightaway – most participants take a
significantly long time to detect the change. Thus, even though change and
choice blindness are highly counter-intuitive, in that they postulate that we
may become oblivious to a choice we have just made or that we may be
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incapable of noticing significant changes to a scene right in front of us, the
vast majority of normal human beings do succumb to these experimental
manipulations. In other words, if put in the same situation, most of us will
become choice blind or change blind.
Change blindness has been studied more than choice blindness, and
cognitive scientists now have a reasonably good idea about why change
blindness occurs in certain circumstances. I’m going to argue that there is
reason to think that choice blindness has the same etiology as change
blindness, cognitively speaking. Both choice blindness and change blindness
are natural side effects of the way our cognitive architecture is set up. When
the cognitive system’s assumptions about the world are violated, effects like
change blindness and choice blindness may manifest. However, the mere fact
that choice blindness and change blindness may occur on occasion is not
enough to impugn our overall rationality and reliability. Thus, the fact that we
succumb to change blindness doesn’t threaten the overall reliability of our
visual system – it is still highly accurate, and informative, in normal
circumstances (and when the visual system’s assumptions are not thwarted.)
Similarly, choice blindness does not threaten our overall rationality either –
the rapid inference we make about our propositional attitudes is highly
accurate and reliable in normal conditions. The fact that in certain cases we
may become blind to a choice we just made, or to an attitude we just
expressed, does not entail that we are fundamentally irrational.
Psychologists theorize that change blindness occurs because of the way
our visual system is set up and operates. Change blindness is caused by “a
general failure to retain or compare [visual] information from moment to
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moment.”525 The visual environment is exceptionally complex, and the visual
system cannot possibly track and encode every single detail of every single
scene – we simply don’t possess that kind of processing power. The visual
system is thus forced to take shortcuts, and so it only provides us with the
visual information that is most relevant and important: “instead of creating a
detailed coherent representation of all the objects in the scene [the visual
system] does so only for those few objects needed for the task at hand.”526 As
Rensink puts it, our visual system does not encode the entirety of a scene but
creates a ‘virtual representation.’ This virtual representation consists of the
‘gist’ of the scene, with only the most important objects encoded in any real
detail. Rensink notes that “such a scheme will have almost all the power of a
complete set of object representations while requiring far less in the way of
processing and memory resources.”527 When a more detailed or coherent
representation is required, the visual system deploys more attention to the
area of interest in the visual array, and the representation is further fleshed
out.
When constructing this virtual representation of the current scene, the
human visual system takes advantage of the fact that the world is relatively
stable and predictable in certain respects to lessen the amount of work it has
to do: as Rensink puts it, “physical objects serve as their own short-term
memory.”528 Objects change in predictable ways that adhere to the general
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laws of physics: for example, objects do not just pop in and out of existence,
and inanimate objects do not move on their own without some force being
applied to them. In everyday life, it is highly unlikely that one’s conversation
partner will be replaced by an entirely different person who will carry on the
conversation as if nothing untoward has happened. The visual system, then,
simply assumes that during a conversation one’s conversation partner will be
the same person throughout. Once the visual system assumes that change is
unlikely to occur in a given situation (such as during conversations) it does
not actively track or search for changes – the conversation partner is not
actively encoded at every single moment during our interaction. Thus, the
visual system simply (reasonably) assumes that one’s conversation partner
will not change in the course of the conversation and this is why it fails to
register when one’s conversation partner actually does change during the
change blindness experiment. In other words, “we represent the world in
much less detail than was previously thought…in this process we rely on the
stability of the world, and we implicitly assume it does not change.”529
Change blindness occurs when the visual system’s usually solid
assumptions about the world are violated. In such cases, the unexpected
change (such as the conversation partner being swapped with a new person) is
not detected because our cognitive systems have literally assumed that such a
thing will not happen. Why do some individuals notice the change, then?
Levin and Simons observed that all of the individuals who noticed that their
conversation partner had been swapped were “of roughly the same age as the
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experimenters,” whereas those who failed to notice the change were older.530
Their hypothesis is that we pay more attention to, and encode the features, of
people who are members of our own social group. When people are not
members of our social group, we are less likely to encode them as individuals
and so are less likely to pay attention to details that could help to differentiate
them. Thus, detailed encoding of individuating features seems to be required
in order to detect the change.
Change blindness is evidence that our visual representation of the
world is much less rich and detailed than we commonly suppose. From our
perspective, the visual picture we have of the world around us is detailed, rich,
and large-scale: we seem to see every single thing around us with great clarity.
In reality, however, our visual representation is remarkably sparse with only a
small area of the visual field being represented in detail at any one time. This
representational sparseness explains why change blindness occurs during the
flicker paradigm. In normal circumstances, we don’t have to actively search
the scene in front of us for changes – change is signaled to our visual systems
whenever movement is detected. If the two pictures of the plane as shown in
figure 4. are rapidly switched, the appearance and disappearance of the
engine will be highly salient to the visual system. However, the introduction of
a blank screen between the two images causes a flicker effect, which effectively
blocks the retina from detecting movement. When the retina is unable to
detect movement in the usual way, it becomes significantly more difficult for
one to detect any changes even when one is focusing one’s full attention on the
scene. What this demonstrates is that our visual system uses a quick and easy
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heuristic to detect change: change is assumed to have occurred whenever
movement is detected in the visual array. We don’t actually usually have to
deploy attentional resources to actively search out changes that occur in a
scene – our attention is immediately drawn to changes when movement is
detected. If the ability to detect movement is hampered, however, it becomes
exceptionally difficult to spot differences between scenes even with one’s full
attention dedicated to the task. Change blindness occurs in the flicker
paradigm because “there is no large scale, detailed buffer into which
information is collected” and because our visual system is very poor at
combining details from one image to the next.531
Change blindness thus reveals that we are all subject to a global visual
illusion. We are under the impression that we observe a large number of
objects at the same time, in great detail; and that the visual array in front of us
is exceptionally rich, stable, and detailed: as Scholl puts it, “in everyday life
we…enjoy a phenomenological sense that we are constantly representing the
visible world in all of its detail.”532 In reality, however, our low-level visual
system builds up a very rough, sparse sketch of the ‘gist’ (or central meaning)
of the visual array. Only one object at a time can be the subject of focused
attention (usually at the center of the gaze), and this is the only object in the
visual array which is represented in any great detail.533 The actual visual
representation of a scene is far sparser, and changeable than our subjective
experience of it, so why is it that we don’t notice how sparse our visual
representations really are? Rensink theorizes that because “detailed, coherent
Rensink, Ronald A. "Change Blindness: Implications”, p.174.
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structure” is provided “whenever required” this gives rise to the overall
impression that our visual array is always coherent and detailed.534
Given the similarities between choice blindness and change blindness,
it is not unreasonable to surmise that choice blindness also occurs due to the
fact that the cognitive system is forced to take shortcuts in order to preserve
processing power. The mind’s tendency to make assumptions, and to
generate sparse representations instead of encoding absolutely everything in
front of it, is just a general feature of human cognition: as Todd and Hertwig
state, “much of cognitive psychology rests on the premise that human
information processing capacity is rather severely bounded.”535 Human beings
have cognitive limitations and our mental processes, at all levels of cognition,
are shaped and restricted by these boundaries. According to Todd and
Hertwig, many of our mental processes were shaped by selective pressures in
which the fastest organism is often the most successful: it is thus “possible
that any human decision heuristics were selected to achieve speed by seeking
to use as little information from the environment as they could get away
with.”536 Given that all aspects of human cognition are bound by processing
limits it is very likely that choice blindness, just like change blindness, arises
out of these inbuilt limitations.
As Johansson notes, most decision theorists adhere to a folk model of
decision making in which there is a tight feedback loop between one’s
intentions and goals. Let’s say, for example, that I am in a restaurant and my
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intention is to get a pizza. According to this folk model, I (sub-personally)
form a representation of my intention. In this case, I represent my intention to
select a pizza, and I also form a representation of my goal which is to actually
receive the pizza. I will then form an action plan, which is a list of the actions I
will need to complete in order to achieve my goal. My decision-making
cognitive system has a comparator module which constantly monitors my
various actions and compares them to my ultimate goal to ensure that I am on
track.537 The comparator continually provides feedback, and the output it
issues is used by the decision-making system “to maintain or stop the ongoing
action.”538 For example, suppose the waiter asks me what I would like to order
and I point at the burger instead of the pizza.
If my goal is still to receive a pizza, the comparator will note a
mismatch between my action and the intended goal and will issue an error
signal to the decision-making system. My action may then be corrected – I
will quickly realize my mistake and point to the pizza instead. This
monitoring occurs right up until the moment I fulfill my goal, and the final act
of the comparator is to compare what I actually receive with my initial
intention. If I receive a burger instead of a pizza, again this discrepancy
between my intention and my goal will be signaled.
On the folk theory of decision-making, I should always notice if I don’t
receive what I actually chose. This makes a great deal of sense, from a survival
perspective. Intuitively, a creature’s long-term survival is more assured if it
carefully monitors and tracks its intentions and goals. A creature who
Johansson, Petter. "Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention”,
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routinely intends to eat ripe fruit, say, will not survive for very long if it fails to
notice that it actually picked a poisonous berry. The fact that choice blindness
occurs is evidence that this folk theory of decision-making may not be correct,
however. When a participant in the face choice blindness study points at
photograph A but receives photograph B, she should have noticed she didn’t
get what she wanted. The fact that she doesn’t notice implies that the
comparator does not track and monitor our intentions and outcomes as
closely as we commonly suppose. If choice blindness stems from a general
processing limitation, it may very well be the case that the mind constructs,
and relies on, very sparse representations during decision-making. If the mind
makes assumptions, takes shortcuts, and only represents the bare gist of our
decision-making processes then it is not surprising that choice blindness may
occur in certain circumstances.
On a more realistic picture of decision-making, the mind tracks
intentions, and compares these to the eventual outcomes, but with much less
fidelity as we suppose: “there is no need to posit a complete set of preferences
for the sake of the agent’s decision making capacity – after all, she has the
world to rely on and the world is its own best model.”539Furthermore, the
decision-making systems are more flexible than the folk theory allows for.
Once we form an intention we are not locked into it until the outcome: the
environment and ongoing events can affect our intentions in real time. Rather
than being set in stone, our desires and intentions may be influenced by what
we eventually receive. When the choice blindness participant receives the
picture she initially rejected, it may be the case that she self-interprets and
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concludes that she actually desired this photograph all along. Given the fact
that she pointed to a picture and (as far as she is aware) was handed the very
same photograph, she may very well interpret herself as having intended to
choose what she received all along. As Johansson puts it, “the reasons the
participants give is their own interpretation of why they must have wanted
this picture rather than the other. In a sense, they inform themselves as much
as everybody else about what they wanted when they perform and then
explain their actions.”540
Thus, choice blindness may occur because even during decisionmaking tasks “we represent the world in much less detail than was previously
thought.”541 Our decision-making systems rely on the overall stability and
predictability of the world in order to make assumptions which save
processing power. Once an object is chosen, the decision-making system may
assume that the object we have chosen will not radically change its properties.
If I point to an object and watch as it is handed over to me, it is highly unlikely
that the object will radically change by the time I receive it. Similarly, if I fill
out a survey, hand it to another person, and then receive it back just a few
seconds later, it is not very likely that some of my answers will have altered.
During decision-making tasks, it is not the case that the decision-making
system represents the chosen objects with a high degree of detail, and then
compares this detailed representation to the object we eventually receive.
Rather, the decision-making system uses the actual object in the world as a
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model and assumes that the object will not change significantly in the
moments before one actually receives it. Usually, the decision-making system
is safe to assume that the world is stable and fixed and that objects do not
radically change their properties the moment one selects them. However, in
the choice blindness studies, this assumption is violated.
It is my contention that choice blindness, just like change blindness,
occurs because an assumption that the cognitive system is relying on is
violated. In a typical case of change blindness, participants don’t notice the
shop clerk has been swapped with an entirely different person because the
visual system relies on a built-in assumption that people don’t just seamlessly
swap places. Similarly, in the face choice blindness experiments, participants
assume that the picture they point to will not get switched with the rejected
picture. Participants point to photograph A and observe as it is put face down
on the table and slid over to them. From their perspective, the photograph
that is handed to them is the very same as the one they have just selected –
photograph A. Of course, due to an experimental sleight of hand, photograph
A has in fact between switched with photograph B, so the object the
participants actually receive is the initially rejected choice. Choice blindness
participants simply don’t notice that the photograph they receive is the one
they initially rejected, though, because their decision-making system assumes
that objects don’t just randomly switch places or radically change their
properties the moment we pick them. In normal conditions, it is highly
unlikely that the object we choose will change its properties, or be switched
with another object, at the moment we make the choice. Thus, our decisionmaking system assumes that as long as an object remains in our line of sight
at all times, the object we receive will be the same as what we chose. This is
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why participants fail to notice that they don’t receive what they intended: their
mind has literally not anticipated that the object could change in the short
period between the act of choosing and the receipt. The fact that the chosen
photograph has, indeed, been swapped with the rejected photograph violates a
core assumption of our decision-making system, and because the system has
been relying on this assumption to make shortcuts it has not represented the
overall scene in enough detail to flag the discrepancy between the chosen
object and the eventual outcome.
In summary, then, the choice blindness results imply that the folk
theory of decision-making may not be correct and that, in fact, “the
relationship between intention and outcome may sometimes be far looser
than current theorizing has suggested.”542 To conserve processing power, and
to reach a decision quickly, the decision-making system relies on the stability
and predictability of the world to make assumptions. One such assumption is
that chosen objects that remain in the viewer’s line of sight do not radically
change their properties the moment they are chosen. The decision-making
system, then, uses the actual object in the world as its own model and does not
represent it in any great detail – the system assumes that the object’s
properties will remain relatively stable up until one receives it. In the case of
choice blindness, however, this fundamental assumption is violated. At the
moment the object is chosen, it is surreptitiously swapped with another object
(or altered in some way). Our minds literally assume that such a thing cannot
happen, and this is why we fail to notice that we haven’t received the object we
initially chose. It may be counter-intuitive to think that the decision-making
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system does not track and monitor our choices and the eventual outcomes as
closely as we think but the choice blindness results are seriously at odds with
the folk theory of decision-making. The best explanation for the choice
blindness results is that our decision-making systems represent the overall
decision-making task in much less detail than was previously thought.

Why choice blindness doesn’t impugn our rationality

If choice blindness ultimately stems from the same kinds of cognitive
processing constraints that cause change blindness, and there is reason to
think this is the case, then choice blindness does not threaten our overall
rationality, or so I shall argue. The fact that we occasionally succumb to the
choice blindness effect does not mean that there is something wrong with us,
or that we are fundamentally irrational.
As I discussed in the previous section, change blindness and choice
blindness are caused by the fact that our cognitive systems are forced to make
assumptions in order to conserve processing resources: our cognitive capacity
is necessarily limited, and so shortcuts must be taken. Our brains cannot
represent in detail every element of the environment, and so the mind creates
an abstracted, sparse representation that conveys only the most essential
information. Arguably, a cognitive system that makes omissions is preferable
to a system that represents the entire world with high fidelity: as Doris points
out “a cognitive system less prone to omissions might be, for many problems,
an over engineered system.”543 If the visual system, for example, presented us
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with every little detail in our visual environment, such as every single leaf on a
tree then this sheer oversaturation of information may conceal information
that is more important for us to be aware of – like the predator sneaking up on
us. Change blindness and choice blindness are not random errors, then, but
are side-effects of the way the human cognitive system is set up in order to
enhance our survival. Change blindness occurs whenever the visual system’s
core assumptions are violated, and choice blindness occurs whenever the
decision-making systems assumptions are thwarted in a similar manner. Just
like visual illusions, choice and change blindness are natural side effects of our
cognitive systems. The fact that in certain circumstances we succumb to
change blindness does not entail our visual systems are unreliable per se –
rather, it merely entails that our visual systems are not reliable in
environments where core assumptions about the world are violated. In
normal circumstances, outside of an experimental setting, it is exceptionally
unlikely that one’s conversation partner might be swapped with another
person while the conversation carries on entirely seamlessly. Thus, in most
cases, the visual system’s assumptions are secure and not violated – and this
means that in most cases our visual system is highly reliable. In everyday life,
we are highly reliable at noticing changes. The fact that change blindness
occurs does not impugn the visual system’s overall reliability or our
rationality.
A similar lesson can be applied in the case of choice blindness. In
everyday life, it is highly unlikely that an object I select (that remains in my
line of sight) changes into a different object by the time I receive it. The
decision-making system thus assumes that observed objects, once chosen, do
not radically change their properties. In most circumstances, this is a very safe
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assumption – objects we select do not tend to radically alter their properties at
the moment we make our choice. We only become choice blind when this core
assumption is violated by an experimental sleight of hand. What this means,
however, is that so long as this assumption holds (and it is reasonable to
surmise that it will hold the vast majority of the time in everyday life) our
decision-making processes are highly reliable, and thus we will end up
behaving rationally. The vast majority of the time, we will receive the objects
that we choose. Choice blindness, when it occurs, does not indicate any kind
of gross malfunction, or irrationality, but is merely an error that occurs
because our decision-making system is operating in less than ideal conditions
where the assumptions it makes are routinely violated. In general, so long as
our cognitive systems are operating in normal conditions, and so long as the
reasonable assumptions they make about the stability of the world are not
violated (as they are in the experimental paradigms), then our overall
cognitive systems will be reliable. It is true that in certain contexts, like during
choice blindness experiments, people may surprisingly fail to notice they
didn’t get the object that they just selected moments previously and go on to
confabulate reasons for why they desired this originally rejected object. Such
behavior, however, does not impugn the overall rationality of human beings–
it simply tells us something about the way that the human cognitive system is
set up.
Given the way that the human cognitive system is constituted, it is
actually unfair to expect participants to not succumb to these experimental
manipulations; and it is not fair to call them irrational if they do. Because our
cognitive systems make assumptions and operate most reliably in
circumstances where these assumptions hold, most human beings simply
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cannot be expected to notice change or choice blindness effects in the very
rare and unusual circumstances where our cognitive system’s assumptions are
violated. To epistemically blame someone for becoming change or choice
blind is like epistemically blaming someone for failing to perceive that the two
lines are of equal length in the Muller-Lyer visual illusion. Now, if a normal
individual routinely becomes blind to choices he has just made, and in
standard conditions where the assumptions of his cognitive system are not
violated, then we may say he is epistemically blameworthy for failing to notice
that he has received an object that he didn’t actually choose. This individual
might, for example, constantly order pizza at a restaurant but fail to notice
when he gets s a salad instead or might buy a ticket to see an action movie but
not notice when a romance is screened. Such an individual may fairly be
labeled as ‘irrational, ‘for he routinely makes a gross epistemic error without
noticing, and there is no cognitive explanation for why he makes such an
error. However, the vast majority of human beings are not like this person.
There is nothing in the choice blindness studies to suggest that participants
frequently and routinely become choice blind in everyday life, in the manner
of the individual I just described. Rather, the most that one can infer from the
choice blindness studies is that choice blindness is likely to occur in situations
where the cognitive system’s assumptions about the world are violated. So
long as, in everyday life, objects within our line of sight do not radically
change their properties the moment we select them (and this seems like a safe
assumption to make), we will be highly reliable in selecting and getting what
we actually want, as well as actually noticing when we don’t receive what we
originally wanted. The world is sufficiently stable and predictable such that we
will not frequently encounter a mismatch between our intentions and
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outcomes in simple decision tasks where we pick something that is right in
front of us and receive it moments later. Furthermore, as Johansson admits,
even a drastic experimental result like choice blindness is “bound at the limits
by decisions and practices we know to be of great importance in everyday
life.”544
It might be argued that the fact that choice blindness and change
blindness naturally falls out of our cognitive constitution is no excuse for
irrationality. Quite simply, change and choice blindness participants fail to
notice something that they should notice. Any rational creature should be able
to notice when she has not received what she selected just moments before, or
that her conversational partner has just been switched with a complete
stranger. One could take the pessimistic position that human beings are
fundamentally irrational because choice blindness and change blindness is
unavoidable given the way our cognitive systems are set up. And if change and
choice blindness are unavoidable, then human beings are inevitably irrational
creatures.
This pessimistic picture of human rationality only makes sense,
however, if human rationality is not judged by the standards of what humans
can achieve but by some other standard altogether. Cassam argues that many
philosophers unfairly compare human beings to an idealized model of the
perfect reasoner – ‘homo philosophicus.’ Homo philosophicus is a “model
epistemic citizen,” because his reasoning is always critical and his
propositional attitudes are always as they rationally ought to be.545 If homo
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philosophicus selected a photograph of a long-haired woman for the carefully
considered reason that he prefers long hair, then he would not fail to notice
that he actually receives a picture of a short-haired woman. He certainly
would not go on to confabulate reasons for why he prefers short-haired
women when it was never his intention to pick this picture in the first place.
As Cassam points out, many traditional theorists of self-knowledge assume
that the human mind is similar, in many respects to the mind of homo
philosophicus. Their argument is that homo philosophicus would notice if he
didn’t get the picture he chose, and he would be irrational if he failed to notice
such a thing and went on to confabulate. Human beings are similar enough to
homo philosophicus such that they should notice if they fail to receive what
they just chose. And if human beings should notice if they fail to receive what
they just chose, then one can conclude that humans who succumb to choice
blindness are irrational.
Cassam resists this line of reasoning and argues that “the challenge for
philosophers…is to relate their theories to the way we humans are.”546
According to Cassam, epistemic theories that align the human mind too
closely to that of homo philosophicus are in “urgent need of a reality check.”547
The reality is that given our cognitive makeup, human beings are not similar
to homo philosophicus, and thus our cognitive capabilities should not be
compared to this unattainable ideal. In particular, theories of self-knowledge
should explain how self-knowledge is possible “for creatures with our
distinctively human cognitive limitations and foibles.”548 In other words, the
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375

relevant question that should be asked is given the structure and constitution
of the human cognitive system what kind of self-knowledge can humans
actually achieve? It is no use postulating a theory of rationality that assumes
human beings are model epistemic citizens with unbounded processing power
– because this simply does not apply to human beings who have bounded
cognitive capacities. Any theory of human rationality should at the very least
aim to be “psychologically realistic”: it must take into account the way the
human mind is actually set up, and how humans actually go about reasoning
and forming attitudes about the world. In short, any theory of human
rationality that fails to account for the fact that the human cognitive system
makes many assumptions and takes many shortcuts is not a theory of
rationality that is about human beings, in any interesting sense.
The pessimistic view of human rationality, then, can be rejected. Given
the psychological makeup of human beings, it is highly likely that in certain
circumstances we will succumb to change blindness or choice blindness. An
ideal reasoner – a member of homo philosophicus – will not succumb to these
effects, but there is no reason to think that actual human beings are, or should
be, similar to homo philosophicus. A perfect reasoner unbounded cognitive
capacity may very well notice the choice blindness manipulation, but the
relevant question is whether a human being with a typical flawed and
imperfect cognitive system should be expected to notice such a manipulation.
It is just not as interesting to ponder the extent to which humans measure up
to an idealized model of the perfect epistemic citizen because, due to the
structure of our cognitive architecture, humans are simply not comparable to
homo philosophicus (or at least, not as comparable as the traditional theorist
supposes.) When it comes to human rationality, then, the important question
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we should be asking is how rational humans can potentially be, given our
inbuilt cognitive foibles. At most, the choice blindness experiments imply that
in certain conditions, when the human cognitive system’s assumptions about
the world are violated, most people will succumb to choice blindness. This
does not mean, however, that humans suffer from global irrationality. There is
every reason to think that in normal conditions (when the assumptions that
the cognitive system makes hold) that human beings will not become choice
blind.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I argued that the traditional view of self-knowledge ought to
be rejected in favor of an inferentialist account. In particular, I maintained
that the choice blindness experiments demonstrate that we lack privileged
access to our occurrent propositional attitudes. The traditional theorist cannot
save the traditional view of self-knowledge simply by restricting the scope of
privileged access to encompass just current thoughts and sensations, or so I
argued, because the very property which distinguishes the traditional theory
of self-knowledge from the inferentialist account is privileged access to
propositional attitudes (whether occurrent or dispositional.) The inferentialist
does not necessarily have to deny the existence of privileged access altogether,
and so can readily acknowledge that we possess privileged access to
sensations, feelings and current thoughts. What the inferentialist does deny,
however, is that we have privileged access to propositional attitudes:
according to the inferentialist account of self-knowledge, we only ever come to
know our propositional attitudes via inference and self-interpretation, and
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never via a special, first-personal method of introspection. If the traditional
theorist abandons the concept of privileged access to propositional attitudes,
then, she will have essentially bought into the inferentialist view of selfknowledge.
Furthermore, the traditional theorist cannot argue that what
distinguishes the traditional view from the inferentialist view is the
commitment to a metaphysically significant asymmetry between self and
other knowledge – an Asymmetry with a capital A. As Cassam argues, the
mere fact that we can, in principle, gain knowledge of our sensations,
thoughts, and current feelings via a first-personal method does not entail that
there is a metaphysically significant asymmetry between self and other
knowledge. According to Cassam, a deep metaphysical asymmetry between
self and other knowledge may only be established if the way I come to know
my own mind is categorically different from the way I come to know the
minds of others. The evidence I use to learn about my own mental states may
be different from the evidence that another person uses to learn about my
mental states, but this difference is not significantly different in kind and
manner. At most, there is evidence for an asymmetry between self and other
knowledge but not an Asymmetry.
Finally, I argued that the vast majority of traditional theorists of selfknowledge would not be happy to abandon the concept of privileged access to
propositional attitudes because it plays a prominent role in many of their
theories of self-knowledge. The traditional theorist of self-knowledge is thus
forced to adopt a dual-method approach in which she must maintain that we
sometimes gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes directly via
introspection, and sometimes via inference. The choice blindness experiments
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do not establish that we entirely lack privileged access to propositional
attitudes: the dual-method theorist must maintain that while privileged access
is somehow disabled during the choice blindness experiments, it is a viable
method for gaining self-knowledge in everyday life.
If one compares the dual-method account with the inferentialist
account, however, it is apparent that the inferentialist theory of selfknowledge is a significantly stronger theory. Firstly, the inferentialist view is
less complex than the dual-method account because it only postulates the
existence of one method by which we gain self-knowledge without losing any
explanatory power. Secondly, the method the inferentialist view postulates is
inference, which is universally acknowledged to exist. On the other hand,
there is a surprising lack of evidence for the existence of introspection.
Thirdly, the dual-method approach suffers from a lack of predictive validity
and explanatory detail – when do the two methods operate, and why does the
introspective route shut down on certain occasions? Fourthly, the choice
blindness results are difficult for the dual-method theorist to explain and
accommodate. The inferentialist does not suffer from a similar problem
because the inferentialist framework actually anticipates and predicts that
phenomena like choice blindness and confabulation will occur in certain
circumstances. Choice blindness and confabulation, then, actually support the
inferentialist theory of self-knowledge rather than damaging it. On balance,
then, I argued that the inferentialist account of self-knowledge ought to be
preferred over the traditional view of self-knowledge.
In the final section of this chapter, I addressed a concern that the
vindication of the inferentialist view is something of a Pyrrhic victory. It might
be argued that the mere fact we succumb to choice blindness and confabulate
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demonstrates that human beings are far less rational and knowledgeable than
we commonly take ourselves to be. The argument is that not only does choice
blindness threaten the traditional view of self-knowledge, but it also threatens
our deeply held conception of ourselves as rational agents. I argued that
choice blindness does not threaten our overall rationality because choice
blindness is a natural consequence of the way that the human cognitive
system is set up.
I compared choice blindness to the more extensively studied
phenomenon of change blindness, and I argued that in the same way change
blindness does not threaten the overall reliability of the human visual system
choice blindness does not threaten our rationality. Change blindness occurs
because the human visual system makes assumptions about the stability and
predictability of the world in order to save on processing power. Contrary to
commonsense, the visual system does not, in fact, produce a detailed
representation of the visual array but only creates a very sparse ‘virtual
representation’ which only imparts to us the most important information. In a
typical change blindness experiment, a conversation partner is switched with
a stranger and the conversation seamlessly continues. In such a situation,
most people predict that they would notice the change – but in fact, most
people do not notice the swap. The reason change blindness occurs in this case
is that one of the visual system’s core assumptions has been violated. The
visual system assumes that in everyday life conversation partners do not just
change while the conversation carries on seamlessly. Thus, when the visual
system’s expectation is violated it fails to pick up on the change because it
literally did not anticipate that such a thing could occur. In everyday life,
however, the assumptions the visual system makes are quite reasonable and
380

are likely to not be violated. Consequently, our visual system is very reliable
when it operates in normal conditions.
I argued that given the similarities between change blindness and
choice blindness and given the fact that constraints and processing limitations
are a general feature of our cognition, that it is highly likely that choice
blindness arises from a similar violation of assumptions. Our decision-making
system may not, as it turns out, track our intentions and outcomes in as much
fine-grained detail as we commonly suppose. The decision-making system
may rely on an assumption that objects that remain in our field of vision do
not radically change their properties the moment we select them. It is
apparent that in the face choice blindness experiment this assumption is
belied. In a typical face choice blindness experiment, the participant may
select photograph A instead of photograph B. In full sight of the participant,
the experimenter slides photograph A over to him. However, unbeknownst to
the participant, the experimenter has swapped photograph A with photograph
B, the rejected choice. The decision-making system’s assumption that the
chosen object will not radically change before one receives it (so long as it
remains in one’s sight at all times) has been violated, and this explains why
participants become choice blind. The decision-making system literally
assumes that the chosen object will not change before one receives it, and so
participants fail to notice that it has been swapped with the rejected object.
The fact that choice blindness occurs due to processing constraints
does not, however, mean that we are irredeemably irrational creatures. In
normal conditions, the decision-making system’s assumptions will hold and
thus we will succeed in tracking our intentions and outcomes. In everyday life,
it is highly unlikely that objects we choose will radically change their
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properties just moments later and so there is every reason to think that we
would notice if there was a mismatch between our choice and what we actually
receive.
Finally, if we compare humans to an ideal, model epistemic citizen then
humans may be considered to be irrational, but I argue that there is no reason
to do so. As Cassam argues, it is not informative to compare humans to homo
philosophicus, the perfect reasoner with unbound cognitive capacity. The
ideal theory of self-knowledge will take into account the psychological and
cognitive reality of human beings and judge their rationality by standards that
are actually achievable. Thus, the fact that humans sometimes succumb to
change blindness and choice blindness due to their inbuilt cognitive
limitations does not impugn overall human rationality. We must look to what
humans are capable of, and how reliable they are, in spite of these cognitive
constraints and foibles. We are capable of a high degree of epistemic reliability
and rationality just so long as our cognitive systems are operating in normal,
ideal conditions. While our decision-making system’s assumptions are
violated in the choice blindness experiments, there is no reason to think that
these assumptions are routinely violated in everyday life. Thus, given our
cognitive constraints and the fact of general representational sparseness,
human beings do succeed in achieving a high degree of epistemic reliability
and rationality.
In conclusion, then, the choice blindness experiments demonstrate that
the traditional theory of self-knowledge is unlikely to be correct. The
inferentialist view of self-knowledge is a far stronger theory because it is able
to accommodate the choice blindness effect and confabulation. In light of this
fact, the traditional theory of self-knowledge ought to be rejected in favor of
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the inferentialist account. While the choice blindness results threaten and
ultimately doom the traditional view of self-knowledge, I maintain that they
do not also challenge human rationality and cognitive reliability. Choice
blindness is not an aberration but is a natural side effect of our cognitive
makeup (just like visual illusions). There is thus no reason to think that choice
blindness poses a threat to our overall rationality.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I’ve argued that the most popular epistemic approach to selfknowledge, what I’ve termed the ‘traditional view’, ought to be rejected. The
central tenet of the traditional view of self-knowledge is that we have
privileged access our propositional attitudes (like beliefs, desires, and
intentions.) Privileged access enables one to gain knowledge of a particular
mental state directly via a special, first-personal method called introspection.
This method may only be used to gain knowledge of one’s own mental states:
the mental states of other people must be inferred by observing their behavior.
The traditional view of self-knowledge thus postulates a deep metaphysical
distinction between self and other knowledge. The inferentialist view of selfknowledge, on the other hand, denies that we have privileged access to
propositional attitudes. We don’t gain knowledge of our own beliefs and
desires via an exclusive, special method but must infer them in just the same
way as we infer the mental states of others. The inferentialist denies there is
anything metaphysically distinct about self-knowledge and rejects the idea of
a deep metaphysical asymmetry between self and other knowledge.
Traditional theorists of self-knowledge treat the concept of privileged
access as a primitive datum, and do not find it necessary to provide evidence
that privileged access actually exists. For traditional theorists, it is just
obvious and apparent that we gain knowledge of our mental states
immediately and directly. Furthermore, the infernetialist view of selfknowledge is regarded to be highly counter-intuitive: common-sense dictates
that we don’t have to infer what our own beliefs are. The traditional view of
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self-knowledge has significant intuitive appeal compared to the “implausible”
infernetialist account, and this explains why the traditional view is the most
popular epistemic account of self-knowledge.
In this thesis, I’ve argued that empirical evidence from psychology and
cognitive science may be used to adjudicate between the traditional view of
self-knowledge and the infernetialist account. I deny that the concept of
privileged access is an obvious, primitive datum that requires no argument or
evidence in its favor. Rather, privileged access to propositional attitudes is
something that must be argued for with empirical evidence. I also deny that
the inferentialist account of self-knowledge is highly unintuitive. Once the
inferentialist view is fleshed out in more detail, it becomes apparent that it is a
viable theory of self-knowledge and a serious competitor for the traditional
view.
In particular, I argue that results from a recent experimental paradigm,
the choice blindness paradigm, cast doubt on the existence of privileged
access and thus the viability of the traditional view of self-knowledge. Choice
blindness is a phenomenon whereby experiment participants can be
manipulated into becoming oblivious to choices that they made just moments
previously. A participant may end up receiving the object she initially rejected,
and yet be completely oblivious that she did not get what she actually wanted.
Furthermore, the choice blindness experiments also revealed that
manipulated participants can be induced into providing confabulated reasons
for why they picked an object they did not, in fact, choose. Participants will
construct compelling, cogent, detailed explanations for why they “chose” an
object that they had actually rejected just moments before.
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I maintain that choice blindness and confabulation are both very
difficult for the traditional view of self-knowledge to explain and
accommodate. If we really do possess privileged access to our propositional
attitudes then, intuitively, choice blindness and confabulation simply should
not occur. In chapter four, I argued that there are just three plausible accounts
of what happens to participants’ beliefs and attitudes at the moment they
become choice blind. On the first interpretation of choice blindness, the
participant’s beliefs towards the originally desired object change but her
attitudes towards the object do not. That is, she still has a positive attitude
towards the object she initially chose but she comes to believe that she does
not have a positive attitude towards that object. On this interpretation, it is a
mystery why the experimental manipulation causes the participant to form a
false belief about her attitudes. Furthermore, if the traditional view of selfknowledge is correct, at any point during the experiment the participant
should be able to introspect and gain knowledge of her actual attitude. The
fact that she remains oblivious to her attitude and goes on to confabulate
reasons for her “decision” based on her false beliefs, indicates that the
participant does not have privileged access to her attitudes.
On the second interpretation I considered, the participant’s actual
attitude towards the target object reverses: she goes from having a positive
attitude to having a negative attitude. Again, the mechanism which causes the
participant’s attitudes to entirely reverse, outside of her conscious awareness,
is mysterious. On the traditional view of self-knowledge, attitude reversal is
only rational when it occurs consciously on the basis of considered reasons.
The attitude reversal which happens during choice blindness should worry the
traditional theorist because it is highly irrational, and also occurs without the
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participant even being aware that her attitudes have changed: from her
perspective, it is as if she has always held the resultant attitude. Furthermore,
the participant will go on to state reasons for her attitude that cannot be the
real reasons for her attitude change, because her attitude change did not occur
in light of these consciously considered reasons. The reasons she provides are
post-hoc justifications after the fact, and thus are confabulatory.
The third potential interpretation of choice blindness postulates that
choice blindness participants do not, in fact, hold any real attitudes or beliefs
about the target object – they just think that they do. That is, the very reason a
participant succumbs to choice blindness in the first place is due to her
lacking real attitudes towards the target object. She doesn’t really prefer object
A over B, but just thinks that she has a preference. This interpretation
generates the prediction that participants who possess genuine attitudes
towards the target objects will not succumb to choice blindness, whereas those
who do not have genuine attitudes will become choice blind. Again, this
interpretation poses problems for the traditional view of self-knowledge. If
this interpretation is correct, it implies that over 50% of the population have
no strong attitudes towards topical political or moral issues. It is highly
unintuitive to think that the majority of people are entirely indifferent towards
moral or political issues such as abortion, or climate change. Furthermore, on
this interpretation confabulation also occurs. At any point, participants should
have been able to introspect and learn that they don’t have any strong
attitudes towards the target object. They should then be in a position to report
this indifference to the experimenters. Instead, however, participants opt to
construct reasons based off an attitude that they don’t even possess. This
behavior is very difficult for the traditional theorist to explain.
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In chapter five, I discuss in detail the phenomenon of confabulation,
which also poses a problem for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge. I
define confabulation as reasons that are reconstructed for justificatory
purposes after the actual decision has been made. Confabulation is
problematic for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge because
confabulators are entirely unaware that the reasons they are reporting are
post-hoc reconstructions: from their perspective they feel as if they are
reporting introspected reasons. On the traditional view of self-knowledge, if a
participant lacks a reason for her decision (such as if she never actually made
that decision in the first place), this information should be available to her
introspective faculty. What we don’t expect to happen is for her to construct
reasons for her ‘decision’ when no such decision was actually made. The fact
that choice blindness experiment participants confabulate, while being under
the impression they are reporting introspectively derived reasons, is very
difficult for the traditional theorist of self-knowledge to explain.
Taken together, the phenomena of choice blindness and change
blindness present a challenge to the traditional view of self-knowledge. If we
really do possess privileged access to our propositional attitudes, we would
not expect the majority of choice blindness participants to succumb to choice
blindness, and confabulate reasons for their “decision.” The traditional
theorist has an uphill battle because she must accommodate these results
while, at the same time, maintaining that privileged access to our
propositional attitudes is possible.
As I argued in chapter six, the traditional theorist cannot simply reduce
the scope of privileged access to encompass just feelings, sensations, and
conscious thoughts. Privileged access to propositional attitudes is a necessary
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component of the traditional view of self-knowledge: without it, the
traditional view just collapses into the inferentialist account. The traditional
theorist cannot, furthermore, argue that privileged access to propositional
attitudes is conceptually necessary. As I argue in detail, there are no good
reasons to think that privileged access to propositional attitudes is necessary
in order to secure epistemic goods such as rationality, conscious belief
revision, cooperation, or moral responsibility. Traditional theorists are under
the mistaken impression that if we infer our mental states our behavior will
exhibit signs of irrationality. However, the process of inference is not a clunky,
slow, laborious affair that requires conscious effort – inference occurs at the
sub-personal level and is exceptionally swift and reliable. There is thus no
reason to think that if we must infer our propositional attitudes there will be
massive gaps in the conversation, or individuals will be at a complete loss as to
why they are performing an action. The inferential account is easily able to
secure human rationality, and other epistemic goods. Privileged access to
propositional attitudes is thus not conceptually necessary.
The only option left to the traditional theorist, at this point, is to adopt
a dual-method account of self-knowledge. the dual-method view postulates
that we gain self-knowledge via two distinct mechanism: sometimes we gain
knowledge by introspecting, and sometimes we gain knowledge by inference.
The dual-method view explains the choice blindness results by proposing that,
for some reason, the privileged access route to self-knowledge is blocked
during the choice blindness experiments. Participants are forced to selfinterpret their mental states, and the misleading evidence at their disposal
results in them making an erroneous inference which leads to them
attributing a false mental state.
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The move to the dual-method account weakens the traditional view
quite considerably. The single-method traditional view holds that what is
special about self-knowledge is the fact that we don’t have to self-interpret or
infer our beliefs because we can always introspect and gain knowledge of our
propositional attitudes directly. The dual-method account, however, requires
the traditional theorist to abandon the idea that we may always, in principle,
gain knowledge of our propositional attitudes via introspection. In certain
circumstances we are simply unable to gain knowledge via introspection, and
thus must resort to self-interpretation and inference.
I argue that, on balance, the infernetialist account is a stronger theory
than the dual-method account, and so the inferentialist view of self-knowledge
ought to be preferred to the traditional view. The dual-method account is a
more complicated theory because it postulates two mechanism of selfknowledge instead of just one. Furthermore, the additional method of
introspection does not boost the explanatory power of the dual-method
account. The infernetialist can point to linguistic analysis results from the
choice blindness lab which demonstrate that there is no difference between
confabulated (inferred) verbal reports, and verbal reports that may stem from
introspection. If an introspective mechanism of self-knowledge really existed,
we would expect there to be at least some discernible differences between
inferred verbal reports and reports derived from introspection. The fact that
there is no difference between the two kinds of reports gives credence to the
view that there is, in fact, only one route to self-knowledge – inference.
Another problem with the dual-method account is that it lacks
predictive validity. The dual-method account proposes that sometimes
introspective access is disabled, and so we sometimes are forced to infer our
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mental states. However, in order for the dual-method account to qualify as a
fully-fledged theory of self-knowledge we are owed an explanation as to when
the two methods will operate, and why introspective access is shut off in
certain circumstances. Without this explanation, the dual-method account
does not look so much like an independently motivated theory of selfknowledge but more like a sticking plaster designed to save the concept of
privileged access to propositional attitudes. In light of these numerous
weaknesses, I conclude that the traditional view of self-knowledge ought to be
rejected in favor of the infernetialist account. Surprisingly, our best scientific
evidence suggests that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional
attitudes but must infer or self-interpret them instead.
I conclude by addressing a worry that the vindication of the
infernetialist account of self-knowledge is a Pyrrhic victory. The argument is
that the choice blindness experimental results do not just challenge the
traditional view of self-knowledge, but also challenge our epistemic
competence. If we routinely succumb to choice blindness, and produce
confabulated reasons, this implies we are far less rational than we commonly
suppose. Choice blindness and confabulation thus threaten the very picture of
ourselves as rational beings.
I argue that while choice blindness and confabulation do indeed
challenge the traditional view of self-knowledge, they do not threaten
humanity rationality. Choice blindness and confabulation are natural sideeffects of the way our cognitive systems are set up. In the same way that visual
illusions do not threaten the overall reliability of our visual systems, neither
does choice blindness threaten our overall rationality. I compare choice
blindness to another very similar phenomenon called change blindness.
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During change blindness experiments, participants fail to notice major
changes to a visual array that, in normal conditions, would immediately be
spotted. Change blindness has even been demonstrated in real-life contexts.
The majority of participants fail to notice when a shop clerk who has been
serving them ducks beneath the counter and is replaced by an entirely
different person.
Like choice blindness, change blindness is a counter-intuitive and
puzzling phenomenon. Common-sense dictates that normal people should not
fail to notice massive changes that take place before their eyes; or remain
oblivious to the fact that they didn’t receive an item they selected just
moments ago. I argue that given the similarities between the two phenomenon
it is not unreasonable to surmise that choice blindness just is a form of change
blindness albeit at a higher conceptual level. If this is the case, then lessons
about change blindness can also apply to choice blindness as well.
The causes of change blindness are well known. Change blindness
occurs because the human visual system, in order to preserve processing
power, makes assumptions about the stability of the world. By making these
assumptions (for example, that conversation partners do not get swapped
with total strangers in the middle of a conversation), the visual system is
saved from representing and encoding every single detail in a visual array. The
downside of this power saving strategy, however, is that if the assumptions the
visual system relies upon are violated then errors may occur. Change
blindness, it seems, occurs because a core assumption of the visual system is
violated unexpectedly. The visual system simply takes for granted, and
assumes, that one’s conversation partner will not be swapped with another
person. Thus, when this highly unlikely event actually occurs during the
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experiment the visual system fails to register this change. It has assumed that
this event cannot, and will not happen, and so fails to register when it does.
Only active encoding of the visual scene, and conscious effort, will enable
individuals to notice that the swap has occurred.
I maintain that, cognitively speaking, choice blindness may very well
have a similar cause. Contrary to common-sense, our decision-making
systems do not fully represent and encode every detail of the decision-making
process. Instead, the decision-making system (just like the visual system)
makes assumptions in order to conserve cognitive resources. The decisionmaking system may assume something like “it is safe to assume that a chosen
object, that remain in one’s line of sight, does not radically change its
properties until one has received it.” Thus, when the choice blindness
participant selects an object, and instead receives (via sleight of hand) the
object he actually rejected, it may be the case that he fails to notice this simply
because the decision-making system has assumed that such an unlikely event
does not happen.
Choice blindness and change blindness thus do not threaten human
rationality because in normal conditions the assumptions that our cognitive
systems make are not violated. It is highly unlikely, in everyday life, that these
assumptions will be violated, and so we can safely assume that the human
decision-making system is highly reliable most of the time. Choice blindness
does not therefore pose a global threat to human rationality.
I finally address the argument that humans are irrevocably irrational
precisely because choice blindness is inevitable, given the way our cognitive
systems are set up. Following Cassam, I argue that human rationality ought to
be judged by standards that humans, with their normal cognitive
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constitutions, can actually achieve. For too long, human beings have been
unfairly compared to a model epistemic citizen, homo philosophicus. Given
our inbuilt cognitive constraints, however, it is impossible for humans to ever
match up to this epistemic ideal. The very concept of rationality, then, should
be reconceptualized in light of what human beings are actually like, and what
they are actually capable of achieving. Given that we do have processing
constraints, and given the shortcuts and assumptions our cognitive systems
make, the appropriate question to ask is whether we are rational enough to get
by on most occasions. Even though choice blindness and change blindness can
and do occur, this need not impugn our overall capacity for rationality.
In conclusion, then, the choice blindness experimental results strongly
suggest that the traditional model of self-knowledge is faulty. The
inferentialist approach self-knowledge can accommodate and explain the
phenomenon of choice blindness and confabulation, and so it is a far more
successful theory of self-knowledge than the traditional account. Finally, even
though the traditional view of self-knowledge is challenged by the choice
blindness results, I deny that choice blindness also impugns our overall
capacity for rationality. We are still rational creatures, even if we sometimes
succumb to choice blindness in certain circumstances.
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